De Deo uno

PETRUS LOMBARDUS, 1. 1 d. 3; S. THOMAS, 1 q. 12 a. 12; c. g. 4, 1; In Boeth. de Trin. q. 1 a. 2; FRANZELIN, De Deo uno, thes. 1; 2; 5; De traditione et Scriptura, appendix on the relation of human reason to faith; KLEUTGEN, De ipso Deo, 1. 1 q. 1 a. 1-3; DE SAN, De Deo uno, nr. 32-35; BILLOT, De Deo uno et trino, thes. 1; PESCH, Praelectiones dogmaticae, tom. 2, prop. 1-3; MUNCUNILL, Tractatus de Deo uno et trino, nr. 18-33; VAN DER MEERSCH, Tractatus de Deo uno et trino, ed. 2, p. 40 ss.

43. The words of the proposition are the very words of the First Vatican Council, and are understood in the same sense in which the Council’s definition is to be understood: “can be known” means that the capacity is present; the exercise or use of the capacity is not at issue, nor in itself and immediately those things required for its development, unless perhaps positive revelation is precisely required for such development so that one can know God. What is meant, however, is an active capacity, not a merely passive capacity to receive this knowledge from another;

“by the natural ... from created things” indicates the means of this knowledge;

“natural” does not mean “in a state of pure nature,” but applies to every state in which true human nature is found.¹ “human” is said, not “by a human being,” “lest we seem to define as a dogma of faith that there can never be adults who are invincibly ignorant of God” (above, nr. 27);

“from created things” (the canon says: “through the things that have been made”) positively establishes mediated knowledge, though not yet exclusively. Therefore Ontologism is not touched, unless it denies mediated knowledge of God; nor is the system of innate ideas, insofar as it deals precisely with the origin of ideas. But if this system is established so as to deny certain mediated knowledge from created things, it is contrary to the thesis;

“with certainty” means true certainty, as opposed to probable opinion (above, nr. 25); this proposition does not yet say “demonstrated” (cf. nr. 25).

“God, the beginning and end of all things” (the canon says: “the one and true God, our creator and lord”); these words set forth the object of knowledge. As shown above (nr. 26), the Council intended to define knowledge of God that includes knowledge of moral principles and the obligation to worship God. What is therefore meant is knowledge of God as the supreme, personal being, distinct from the world, on whom the world, and humanity itself, depends as its author, and toward whom it ought to tend as its end. This does not require a scientific concept of God (which considers God not only in relation to the world but also as he is in himself and absolutely, and in a certain way presents a “definition” of God); a common concept suffices, one that designates God chiefly in his relation to the world, and especially to humanity. An obscure idea does not suffice (that is, one by which the object cannot be distinguished from others); a clear idea is required. It need not, however, be distinct; a confused idea suffices.

44. All those who deny that by natural human reason God, a personal being to be worshipped religiously by humanity, can be known with certainty oppose the doctrine proposed in this thesis—even if they affirm that a personal God can be reached by another, non-rational or non-intellectual way, or even concede that reason can know from created things the existence of some (impersonal) cause of the world. All, then, are opponents of this thesis in whose system agnosticism is contained, at least in religious matters, whether they establish it on theological grounds (human nature corrupted by sin, the insufficiency of natural powers, the necessity of grace) or on philosophical grounds (insofar as they deny either the possibility of certain intellectual knowledge in general or, specifically, of objects beyond the senses or divine objects). The number of those defending such opinions grew considerably after the Reformation, and not independently of it.

LUTHER himself, perhaps partly under the influence of nominalist philosophy, but also because of his false opinion about the condition of human nature after sin, denied natural reason religious knowledge; according to him, religious knowledge is attained by faith, which is properly experiential knowledge, a kind of feeling².

“Philosophers debate and speculate about God and arrive at some sort of knowledge, as Plato contemplates and acknowledges divine governance. But all of this is merely objective; it is not yet the knowledge Joseph (the Egyptian) had, that God cares, hears, and helps the afflicted. Plato cannot establish this. He remains in metaphysical thought, like a cow looking at a new gate.”³

The FORMULA OF CONCORD states as follows.⁴ “On this matter, this is our faith, doctrine, and confession: that the human intellect and reason are wholly blind in spiritual matters and can understand nothing by their own powers.” Likewise, II Pars. Solida declaratio, De libero arbitrio, 7.

The BAIANIANS and JANSENISTS proceeded in a similar way (cf. Denz 1391), unduly diminishing the value of natural reason in religious knowledge.

KANT restricts knowledge to phenomena; he denies metaphysics that transcends consciousness, especially knowledge of spiritual and divine things. On the other hand, however, the categorical imperative, the moral law that binds every rational being absolutely, truly exists. The will ought to follow the moral law absolutely and therefore ought to will everything that must be admitted for this end. Hence the will ought to will God’s existence; this belongs to the postulates of practical reason. Kant says of these postulates: “These postulates are not theoretical dogmas, but only presuppositions from a necessary practical point of view; thus they do not enlarge speculative knowledge, but they do give objective reality to the ideas of speculative reason.” Thus God’s existence is held as true by faith. He describes such faith as follows: “Faith (so called without qualification) is confidence that an intention will be attained, the furtherance of which is a duty, although we cannot discern the possibility of carrying it out.… It is a free holding-to-be-true, not of something for which dogmatic proofs can be found for the theoretically determining power of judgment … but of what we assume in order to pursue an intention according to the laws of freedom.”⁵.

Many, especially among Protestant theologians, followed Kant in holding that science and religion must be entirely separated from one another: religion lies outside rational knowledge and does not admit of rational explanation. While they agree with Kant in the negative element (agnosticism), they present the positive element in various ways. SCHLEIERMACHER replaced it with a certain sense of absolute dependence on something infinite. RITSCHL distinguishes theoretical and religious knowledge: the judgments of the former are judgments of being (Seinsurteile), while those of the latter are judgments of value (Werturteile). These judgments are so called because they are knowledge of an object that has value in relation to the knower himself, and because such knowledge is possible only to one who appreciates that value. Disinterested knowledge of God is excluded.

FIDEISM (in its cruder form, Traditionalism): God’s existence must first be believed by divine faith. Milder TRADITIONALISM: God’s existence must first be believed immediately by each individual by human faith; the persuasion about God’s existence that prevails in humankind, however, is to be traced back to God’s first positive revelation (above, nr. 8, 9, 19, 20).

Depending both on Kantian philosophy and on Protestant theologians, the MODERNISTS formed their system, which has already been discussed above (nr. 38).

In the most recent non-Catholic philosophy of religion, it is almost a common position that an irrational element enters into all religious knowledge, including knowledge of the existence of a personal God. If this is admitted, one can no longer say that the existence of a personal God can be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason. As an example, let OTTO be named. According to him, the primary religious element is not some knowledge but a certain irrational, sui generis feeling, which is something primary and therefore cannot be derived.⁶.

HOLY SCRIPTURE

45. Rom 1, 18 ss.⁷ After introductory words, the Apostle indicates the subject of the epistle (1, 16): the Gospel is the power of God for salvation to everyone who believes; in it the justice of God is revealed (17). Apart from the Gospel and outside the Gospel, the wrath of God is revealed against people who deserve God’s wrath because they are sinners (18). He then describes all people as sinners and guilty, both Gentiles and Jews (cap. 2; cf. 3, 9). The argument for our proposition is contained in this first part, where he shows that the Gentiles fell into vices and sins because they did not acknowledge or worship the God whom they had known; therefore God’s wrath is upon them: they are without excuse.

46. Verse 18: detinent (“suppress”): not merely to have or possess, but to hold back, restrain, suppress; in iniustitia (“in injustice”): deviation from the right norm. Verse 19: quia (“because”): gives the reason why there is injustice, or the reason for the revelation of God’s wrath; notum (“known”): in the New Testament, τὸ γνωστόν usually means what is known; in profane usage, what can be known. Either is possible here, though perhaps the latter is preferable. How God himself manifested it is stated in verse 20. Invisibilia (“invisible things”): Scripture often says that God is invisible; cf. 1 Tim 6, 16. A creatura mundi (“from the creation of the world”): κτίσις can mean active creation or the created order; if active, it is to be understood temporally; if passive, it indicates the source of knowledge: from created things. Intellecta (“understood”): νοεῖν in itself indicates the knowledge of νοῦς, in which spiritual knowledge, rather than sensory perception, is considered. Conspiciuntur (“are seen”): καθοράται, “I grasp with the mind’s eye; I know, perceive, understand something by reasoning, etc.” (ZORELL, s.v.). The invisible things of God, those known precisely from creation, are then specified more precisely: his eternal power and divinity. Ita ut sint (“so that they are”): εἰς τὸ εἶναι can be understood either consequentially—“and therefore they are without excuse”—or in a final sense: God manifested himself so clearly in creation precisely so that people could have no excuse if they did not thereby know and acknowledge God. And so it happened: cum cognovissent (“although they knew”): they not only could know, but actually did know. Non glorificaverunt … (“they did not glorify …”): the Apostle is therefore speaking of knowledge of God that entails an obligation of worship, and thus of a personal God distinct from the world. God had manifested himself to people in creation as creator, author of the world, to whom glory and thanksgiving are due. The Gentiles did not give these to God; indeed, they offered to false gods the worship due to the one true God. Evanuerunt (“they became futile”): they became vain, that is, lacking truth and right judgment (ZORELL; cf. the gods of the Gentiles are called τὰ μάταια). Stulti facti sunt (“they became fools”): what this foolishness consists in is stated in the following verse (23): idolatry; cf. Ps 105, 20. In verse 24, and again in verses 26 and 28, the Apostle emphasizes that those sins and vices are the punishment for sin, turning away from God, and idolatry. He does not, however, suppose that people lost right judgment about what is permitted and forbidden (v. 32). They are therefore truly without excuse (v. 20; 2, 1) and justly subject to God’s wrath.

47. It is readily apparent that the text, as explained, contains what our proposition affirms: 1) an active capacity to know God is present; indeed, the Apostle also affirms its exercise (21); 2) by the natural light of reason: understood, they are seen (20); from created things: through the things that have been made (20). Nothing is said about revelation; the Apostle would have had to indicate it if knowledge of God from created things were impossible without revelation. Moreover, he is speaking of the Gentiles, distinguishing them precisely from the Jews, who are the people of revelation. 3) Knowledge is certain: there is an obligation to worship God; people are culpable. 4) The object: God is the beginning, as shown by creation and his eternal power; God is the end, toward whom they ought to tend as their author by rendering him worship; God is personal, for only a personal being can be the object of worship.

48. Sap. 13. In the first part (c. 1–9), “the author exhorts the reader to pursue wisdom and teaches how it is attained.” “Wisdom is the right knowledge of God and divine things, which considers God in all things, so that one follows God’s will and fear throughout life. This wisdom, both speculative and practical, is a gift of God, which comes down from God himself, and a certain participation in uncreated Wisdom, by which God created and governs all things.” “In the second, historical part, he shows from the history of the people of Israel the blessings and effects of wisdom (10, 1–19, 20).”⁸ In this part, after recounting how wisdom saved the Israelites in their exodus from Egypt but punished the Egyptians in all those things in which they had been idolaters (12, 3 ss.), he treats idolatry itself (13, 1–15, 19), distinguishing a kind of more elevated idolatry, the worship of nature and its powers, the elements and the stars (13, 1–9), from crude, vulgar idolatry, the worship of human handiwork (13, 10–14, 7).

49. 13, 1. Autem (“but”): μέν, to which δέ corresponds (v. 10); there are two classes of idolatry. In the Greek text γάρ follows, indicating the reason and confirming what had been said at 12, 27 about the just punishment of the Egyptians. Vani (“futile”), as in the Epistle to the Romans above; in the Greek text φύσει (“by nature”) is added: as human beings are now, in fallen nature, they incline toward this futility, although (v. 3) that knowledge, as knowledge, is not so difficult. The sense cannot be that human nature is such as to include or entail this futility and foolishness in itself, because such an explanation would contradict what follows. Et de his … (“And concerning these …”): it indicates in what respect they are futile and foolish. Non potuerunt (“they were unable”): physical capacity is not denied (for he later explains that they ought to have known), but for the other reasons indicated there is a lack of moral capacity (vv. 6, 7). Bona quae videntur (“the good things that are seen”): in contrast with him who is, that is, God. Attendentes (“paying attention”): some take it concessively, so that the sense is “although they paid attention”; others take it causally, “because they paid too much attention.” The former is preferable. Therefore they are blamed because, from visible things, they did not see him who is, nor recognize the maker from his works. Verse 2 describes which creatures and powers of nature they took for gods of the world. From the beauty (v. 3) and power (v. 4) of creatures they ought to have known the greater beauty and power of their author. Cognoscibiliter (“in a way that can be known”), ἀναλόγως (v. 5): by comparison according to a proportion; videri poterit (“can be seen”), θεωρεῖται: is contemplated by the mind. Verse 6: minor querela (“less blame”), namely, in comparison with those of whom he will speak in v. 10 ss.; fortasse (“perhaps”): the sense is not “perhaps they are in error,” for there is no doubt about their error, but it indicates what may have been the reason or occasion for their error (vv. 6, 7). Thus, although they deserve less blame (v. 8), they are nevertheless not excused, for verse 9 says: it was easier to find the Lord than to estimate the world.

At verse 10 the description of the other class of idolatry begins. That they are much less excusable follows a fortiori from what has been said up to this point; 14, 23 describes the sins and vices into which they fell.

50. Verses 1–9 clearly contain the following: there is a capacity to know God by the natural light of reason, namely, the same light by which people know the greatness and beauty of the world (vv. 3, 4, 5, 9); from created things (vv. 1, 3, 4, 5, 9); with certainty (they are without excuse, v. 8). The knowledge concerns a personal God whom they ought to have worshipped: they are blamed for idolatry.

51. Act Ap 14, 14 ss. Paul had healed a lame man at Lystra; therefore the people of Lystra regarded Paul and Barnabas as gods, and priests came to sacrifice to them. Then Paul and Barnabas spoke to the people, v. 14 ss. He wished to turn them from vain gods to him who made heaven and earth, who, although he had allowed the nations to walk in their own ways, had nevertheless not left himself without witness. God’s witness is the benefits he bestowed on them. “He tells them gently, but clearly, that their ignorance of God is to be charged as their fault and that idolatry admits of no excuse, for in that very providence by which all things are governed toward necessary and useful ends, God’s witness to himself was always available to them” (KNABENBAUER in h. l.).

52. Act Ap 17, 22 ss. St. Paul’s speech on the Areopagus: God, who made the world and everything in it, needs nothing, but himself provides everything to everyone; he made the human race, and the whole history of the human race is directed by God. God wished people to seek him who made and governs all things (v. 27), if perhaps they might find him by groping—as someone in the dark reaches out a hand to find and touch something. Quamvis (“although”), καί γε, that is, “since in fact” (ZORELL, s.v. καί II 3 e): he is not far from each one of us. This indicates that it is not so difficult to find God. The Gentiles themselves recognized that God is near to us (v. 28). If, then, we are God’s offspring (v. 29), we ought not to estimate God as so degraded and base as to suppose him like inanimate things, human inventions; rather, it seems to be implicit in this thought that, by considering human nature, they ought to have arrived at a more perfect idea of God, of the living God, endowed with intellect and will.

THE FATHERS

The same doctrine is found among the Fathers, who distinguish this knowledge of God from the knowledge that comes through positive revelation.

53. ST. IRENAEUS⁹, Adv. haeres. 1. 2, c. 6 n. 1: “How, then, could either the angels or the maker of the world have been ignorant of the first God, when they were in his own domain, were his creatures, and were held together by him? He could indeed be invisible to them because of his transcendence, but not unknown because of his providence. For although, they say, they were very far removed from him by their descent, yet, since his dominion extends over all, they ought to know their ruler and to know this very thing: that he who created them is Lord of all. For although he is invisible, his power bestows on all a great intuition and perception of mind concerning his most powerful and almighty transcendence. Hence, even though no one knows the Father except the Son, nor the Son except the Father and those to whom the Son has revealed him, nevertheless all know this very thing, when the reason implanted in the mind moves them and reveals to them that there is one God, Lord of all” (MG 7, 124; R 197). Ibid. c. 9 n. 1: “Now it is enough to have the testimony of those who say the opposite of what we do, since all people ultimately agree on this: the ancients, who first guarded this persuasion from the tradition of the first-formed man and sang of one God, maker of heaven and earth; those who came after them, receiving this recollection of the matter from God’s prophets; and the Gentiles, learning it from creation itself. For creation itself shows him who created it, the work itself suggests him who made it, and the world manifests him who arranged it. The whole Church throughout the world received this tradition from the apostles” (MG 7, 733 s.; R 198). Cf. l. 2 c. 30 n. 3; l. 3 c. 25 n. 1.

Irenaeus’s words in l. 4 c. 6 n. 4: “The Lord taught that no one can know God unless God teaches him—that is, that God cannot be known without God; knowing him is the Father’s will. For those to whom the Son reveals him know him” (MG 7, 988 s.; R 227). The Traditionalists understood this exclusively of revelation in the strict, positive sense. But according to St. Irenaeus’s teaching the Word also “reveals” God through creation itself: “For through creation itself the Word reveals God the creator, and through the world the Lord, maker of the world; through the formed thing, the craftsman who formed it; and through the Son, the Father who begot the Son” (MG 7, 989; R 228).

TERTULLIAN¹⁰, Adv. Marcionem l. 1 n. 10: “From the beginning of things, their creator was known together with the things themselves, which were brought forth so that God might be known … For from the beginning the knowledge of God is an endowment of the soul; this is the same among Egyptians, Syrians, and people of Pontus” (ML 2, 257; R 332); ibid. n. 18: “We define that God is to be known first by nature and then acknowledged through teaching: by nature from his works, through teaching from preaching” (ML 2, 266; R 334); cf. Apologeticus, n. 17 (ML 1, 375; R 275).

54. ST. BASIL, Epistula 235 (ad Amphilochium) 1: “Which comes first, knowledge or faith? We say, generally, that in the sciences faith precedes knowledge. But if anyone were to say, in our teaching, that knowledge precedes faith, we would not contend with him, provided it is knowledge accommodated to human capacity. For in the sciences one must first believe that this letter is alpha; after you have learned its shape and pronunciation, only then can you grasp precisely the letter’s power. But in the faith that concerns God, the thought that God exists comes first; we infer this from created things. For, understanding his wisdom, power, goodness, and all his invisible attributes from the creation of the world, we thus know him. In this way we accept him as our own Lord. Since God is the creator of the whole world, and we are a part of the world, God is therefore our creator too. Faith follows this knowledge, and worship follows such faith” (MG 29, 871; R. 924).

55. ST. GREGORY NAZIANZEN¹¹, Orat. theol. 2 n. 16: “We, however, aflame with desire for God, and so disposed in mind that we cannot in any way admit that this universe lacks a leader and governor, are met by reason; then, looking upon things subject to the eyes and considering those created from the beginning, reason did not stop there either. For it was not reasonable to assign primacy to things that are on the same level as we are in respect of sense. Rather, by their help and support it leads us to what is above them, by whose favor they exist. What, then, arranged the heavenly and earthly things, and those borne through air or water—or rather, the elements prior to these, heaven, earth, air, and water—in an orderly arrangement? Who blended and separated them? What mutual association, kinship of nature, and harmony do they have? I greatly approve this saying, even though it was spoken by a man foreign to our religion: What brought motion to these things and directs them in a perpetual, unhindered course? Is it not their maker, who implanted in all things the reason by which the universe moves and is governed? And who, then, is their maker? Is it not the one who brought them forth and produced them into the order of nature? Surely this power and capacity cannot be ascribed to chance and fortune. Even if we grant that all things came to be by chance, to what, finally, must their arrangement and ordering be ascribed? And even if we also grant this, if one wishes, to chance, whose work, I ask, was it to preserve and maintain them according to the principles by which they were first created? That of someone else, or of chance? Surely that of someone else, not chance. And what else could this be but God? Thus reason, which is from God and implanted in all, the first law established in our hearts and joined to all mortals, has raised us from the things seen by the eyes to God” (MG 36, 46 s.; R 897).

56. ST. CHRYSOSTOM, In epist. ad Rom. hom. 3 n. 2: “Just as someone entrusted with the king’s money, ordered to spend it for the king’s glory, would be punished as one who had gravely offended the king if he spent it on thieves, prostitutes, and magicians, making them splendid at the king’s expense; so too these people, after receiving knowledge of God and his glory, then ascribed it to idols, suppressed the truth in injustice and, so far as they could, dishonored knowledge by failing to use it as they ought. Is what was said clear to you, or must it be explained again more clearly? Perhaps it is necessary to go further. What, then, is meant? From the beginning God implanted knowledge of himself in people. But when the Gentiles ascribed that knowledge to wood and stone, they dishonored the truth, insofar as they could; for it remains unchanged, with its glory unmoved. And how do you know, Paul, that God implanted knowledge of himself in them? ‘Because,’ he says, ‘what is known of him is manifest in them.’ But this is an assertion, not a demonstration. You must prove and show me that knowledge of God was manifest to them and that they deliberately neglected it. How, then, was it manifest? Did he send them a voice? No; but he did what could attract them more than any voice: he placed the created world before them, so that the wise person, the unlearned person, the Scythian, or the barbarian could, from the mere sight of visible things, learn their beauty and ascend to God. Therefore he says (v. 20): For his invisible things, understood through the things that have been made, are seen from the creation of the world; the prophet also says: The heavens declare the glory of God¹². What, then, will the Gentiles say on that day? ‘We did not know you’? Did you not hear the heavens uttering a voice by their mere appearance—the harmony and concord of all things, crying more clearly than a trumpet? The laws of night and day, remaining forever unchanged? The firm and unchanging order of winter, spring, and the other seasons? The sea, useful amid so many storms and waves? All things remaining in order and proclaiming the Creator through their beauty and greatness? Paul summed up all these things, and more, in a few words: For his invisible things, from the creation of the world, are seen, understood through the things that have been made; his everlasting power and divinity also, so that they are without excuse. Even if God did not make them for that end, that is what happened. For God did not bring such a teaching forward to deprive them of an excuse, but so that they might know him; and since they were ungrateful, they deprived themselves of a defense” (MG 60, 412 s.; R 1182). Cf. Ad populum Antiochenum hom. 9 n. 2 (MG 49, 104 s.).

57. ST. AUGUSTINE, Sermo 141, c. 1 et 2: “Among other things, when the holy Gospel was being read, you heard what the Lord Jesus said: I am the way and the truth and the life. Everyone desires truth and life, but not everyone finds the way. Some philosophers of this age, too, saw that God is a certain eternal, immutable, intelligible, intelligent, wise life, making others wise. They did see the fixed, stable, unchanging truth in which are all the principles of all created things, but from afar; they saw it, but were in error. And therefore they did not find the way by which one might reach so great and ineffable and beatifying a possession. That even they saw the Creator through creation (insofar as a human being can see him), the maker through his work, the maker of the world through the world, is witnessed by the Apostle Paul, whom Christians must surely believe. For, speaking of such people, he says: ‘The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all impiety.’ As you recognize, these are the Apostle Paul’s words: The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all impiety and the injustice of people who suppress the truth in iniquity. Did he say that they do not possess the truth? No: they suppress the truth in iniquity. What they possess is good, but the place in which they possess it is bad: they suppress the truth in iniquity.

“It might be objected to him: ‘How do those impious people possess the truth? Did God speak to any of them? Did they receive the law, as the people of Israel did through Moses? How, then, do they possess the truth, even in their very iniquity?’ Listen to what follows and shows it. Because what is known of God, he says, is manifest in them; for God has manifested it to them. Did he manifest it to those to whom he gave no law? Hear how he manifested it: For his invisible things, understood through the things that have been made, are seen. Question the world, the adornment of heaven, the brightness and arrangement of the stars, the sun sufficient for the day, the moon a comfort in the night; question the earth, fruitful with herbs and trees, full of animals and adorned with human beings in every way; question the sea, how full it is of creatures of every kind and nature; question the air, how it teems with so many birds. Question everything, and see whether, in their own way, they do not answer you as though they said: ‘God made us.’ Distinguished philosophers also sought these things and partly came to know the maker. What, then? Why is God’s wrath revealed against impiety itself? Because they suppress the truth in iniquity? Let him come and show how. For he has already said how they knew. His invisible things, that is, God’s, are seen, understood through the things that have been made; his everlasting power and divinity also, so that they are without excuse. Because, although they knew God, they did not honor or thank him as God, but became futile in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened. These are the Apostle’s words, not mine: And their foolish heart was darkened; for, claiming to be wise, they became fools. What they found by curiosity, they lost through pride. ‘Claiming to be wise’ means attributing God’s gift to themselves; thus they became fools” (ML 38, 776; R 1508). Cf. De spiritu et littera, c. 12 (ML 44, 211 ss.); De Civitate Dei, l. 8 c. 6 (ML 41, 231).

58. THEODORET, in Rom. c. 1 v. 20: “Creation, he says, and the things that come to be in creation—the changes of the hours, the succession of seasons, the sequence of night and day, the birth of clouds, the breezes of the winds, the production of fruits and seeds, and whatever else is of this kind—clearly teach us both that God is the maker of all things and that he wisely holds the key¹³ of creation. For he who made all things, moved by his own goodness alone, would never cast away all care for what he made. And therefore the divine Apostle did not say his invisible thing but his invisible things, that is, his creation and providence, his just judgment in each case, and the many and varied principles by which things are governed. For this reason those who, despite having had so many teachers, have received no benefit from so many lessons do not deserve pardon” (MG 82, 62).

OBJECTIONS

59. 1. The First Vatican Council itself teaches that revelation is necessary.

I answer: I distinguish the assertion. It is absolutely necessary, given the elevation of humanity, for knowing supernatural things: granted; for knowing God: I subdistinguish. It is absolutely necessary: I deny; it is morally necessary: I subdistinguish again. So that all may actually know those things about God that can be known by natural reason (not merely God’s existence), readily, with firm certainty, and without any admixture of error: granted; so that there be an active capacity to know God’s existence: I deny. Cf. above, nr. 29 ss.

2. The argument from the Epistle to the Romans is invalid, for: a) St. Paul presupposes revelation; b) at least, he presupposes instruction, and therefore some tradition; c) he speaks only of the wise, not of all people.

I answer a): the answer is given above, nr. 47;

to b) I distinguish: he presupposes instruction whose precise object is to communicate knowledge of God itself: I deny; instruction required for the suitable development of reason itself: I leave undecided. “It should be noted that we are not debating whether a human being brought up from infancy in the woods could of his own accord come to know God, nor whether instruction in general is necessary for an innate capacity to be exercised. Rather, we assert and defend that, according to Scripture and the tradition of the Fathers, a person who—whether in society or outside human company—has attained the use of reason, so as to know not only by sense but also by intellect, can acquire certain knowledge of divine things, even if he has received no tradition” (KLEUTGEN, De ipso Deo, pag. 71);

to c) Even if St. Paul were speaking only of the wise, he would already be teaching that God can be known by the natural light of human reason. It will be shown later, however (nr. 206), that he is speaking not only of the wise.

3. The objections commonly raised against the argument from the Book of Wisdom have already been resolved in the explanation of the text itself. They are: a) they are futile by nature; b) they were unable to know God; c) they are excused (v. 6); d) perhaps they are in error.

4. The theological arguments by which the possibility of natural knowledge of God is opposed—that nature has been corrupted by sin and that grace is necessary for knowing God—rest both on a false concept of the original state and its consequences, and on a confusion of the physical possibility of knowing with the capacity for salutary knowledge. As for the rational arguments commonly brought against our proposition (that God does not fall under the formal object of the human intellect, that God is too far removed from humanity, that there is no proportion between God and humanity, and the like), or those by which the necessity of tradition for attaining certain knowledge is defended, consult what has been said in philosophy.