De Deo uno

Ecclesiastical authority treated this question directly, especially from the beginning of the nineteenth century up to our own times¹.

8. L. E. BAUTAIN had sought truth and certainty in vain by reason alone, according to the various philosophical systems of his day; he found uncertainty and disagreement, but not truth. Christian revelation, however, supplied it to him. Thereafter he judged reason incapable of knowing God's existence and attributes, all the more because, as he thought, KANT had proved the impotence of pure reason; divine revelation, to be embraced by faith, is absolutely necessary for knowing God. For human reason has been so weakened by original sin that by itself it can no longer attain such knowledge; it is semi-Pelagian to assert that God can be known by reason alone. Divine faith must necessarily come first: FIDEISM².

He subscribed to contrary theses proposed by his bishop on 18 Nov. 1835 and 8 Sept. 1840, and on 26 April 1844 he was ordered by the S. Congr. Episc. et Reg. to promise by his signature “never to teach that, by the light of right reason alone, setting aside divine revelation, no true demonstration of God's existence can be given” (Denz 1622 ss.).

9. TRADITIONALISM: Rationalism exaggerated the powers and scope of reason, asserting that everything must be known and explained by reason alone and that nothing should be admitted unless it is proved by reason, and to the extent that it is proved by reason; it therefore attacked revelation and faith and denied the mysteries. Some Catholics went to the opposite error, excessively restricting the powers of reason. All certain knowledge of truth ultimately rests on authority; tradition, therefore, or instruction, is necessary, and faith corresponds to it. Thus, for example, DE BONALD³: ideas are in some way innate in us; nevertheless, without voice, speech, or language no knowledge is possible, at least of immaterial things. Ideas must somehow be awakened so that actual knowledge may arise. Neither an individual nor society itself could have invented language; rather, the first man received language, and with it the first knowledge of truth, from the “author” of his reason, and this rests on that author's “authority.” These truths had to be passed on by instruction from the first man to others, and this continues down to our own times. Thus all certain knowledge of such truths ultimately rests on God's authority. F. DE LA MENNAIS held similarly⁴: Individual reason can err; if it is fallible, it can never be certain that it is not mistaken. To seek certainty is to seek an infallible reason, whose infallibility must be believed—that is, admitted without proof; and this reason is not individual, but common reason. By the most universal tradition, and hence the most certain, common reason testifies to God's existence, indeed to the fact that God himself communicated himself to the human race: the principal truth of God's existence rests on the testimony of infinite authority. God manifested this truth to the first man through speech, which man could not have invented by himself (in this respect DE BONALD's view is similar). Through the first man, the truth is preserved in human society by continuous tradition from God to others. Faith in the testimony of the human race is the highest certainty for human beings, just as faith in God's testimony is the certainty of the human race. Outside these, there is universal doubt.

Such doctrines were accepted by many. Hence several provincial councils⁵ (Tours 1849; Avignon 1849; Aix 1850; Toulouse 1850) warned the faithful to avoid both extreme positions, rationalism and traditionalism. AUG. BONNETTY, who defended traditionalism in his writings, subscribed to the following four theses of the S. C. of the Index, approved by Pope Pius IX on 15 June 1855.

“1. Although faith is above reason, there can never be any true disagreement or discord between them, since both arise from one and the same immutable source of truth, God most good and great, and so mutually assist one another. (Encyclical of Pope Pius IX, 9 Nov. 1846).

2. Reasoning can prove God's existence, the spirituality of the soul, and human freedom with certainty. Faith comes after revelation; consequently, it cannot appropriately be invoked to prove God's existence against an atheist, or the spirituality and freedom of the rational soul against an adherent of naturalism or fatalism. (Proposition subscribed to by D. Bautain, 8 Sept. 1840).

3. The use of reason precedes faith and leads a person to it with the help of revelation and grace. (Proposition subscribed to by D. Bautain, 8 Sept. 1840).

4. The method used by St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and the other scholastics after them does not lead to rationalism, nor was it the cause of philosophy's falling into naturalism and pantheism in modern schools. Therefore, these doctors and teachers cannot be charged with having used this method, especially when the Church approved it or at least remained silent. (Propositions opposed to propositions taken here and there from D. Bonnetty).” (Denz. 1649 ss.).

10. ONTOLOGISM, so called by Gioberti in opposition to psychologism, holds that the direct object of knowledge is not some modification of the soul, but reality itself, being. To establish the objective truth and certainty of our knowledge, and to explain truth's universality, necessity, eternity, and immutability, the ontologists affirmed a certain direct and immediate intuition of God himself under the aspect of τοῦ esse simpliciter. This direct knowledge of God becomes reflective on the occasion of knowing sensible things. It was proposed in different forms by different thinkers, for example FABRE, BRANCHEREAU, ROTHENFLUE S. I., and GIOBERTI.

FABRE⁶ explains the matter more or less as follows: Universal ideas are objectively real; they are not forms or modifications of the soul, nor something created, but something necessary, immutable, and absolute. Their center is being simply. This infinite being is the first idea perceived by our mind, the first intelligible, the light in which we see and contemplate all eternal, universal, and absolute truths. These truths can have no reality outside the eternal essence; therefore, they can subsist only in union with the divine substance, and hence we can see them only in the divine substance.

BRANCHERAU extracted fifteen theses from his work “Praelectiones philosophicae”, which contain his doctrine⁷:

“1. Two things must be distinguished as essential to thought: the thinking subject and the object thought.

2. The object thought is itself divided into two kinds: being simply and being in a certain respect.

3. By being simply we mean a real, concrete, and infinitely perfect being, essentially distinct, therefore, from being in general, which is nothing other than an abstraction of the mind. In a word, being simply is God.

4. Being simply necessarily exists, whereas beings in a certain respect can be conceived either in a state of existence or in a state of mere possibility.

5. Considered in the state of possibility, beings in a certain respect are something eternal and necessary; in the state of existence, however, they are something temporal and contingent.

6. Since the eternal and necessary reality of beings insofar as possible beings does not exist in itself, it must be contained in a necessary being, that is, in God. This reality is called the metaphysical essence.

7. Essences, then, can be nothing other than divine ideas, or archetypes, according to whose pattern God produces all things.

8. The metaphysical essences, which can be actualized in an indefinite number, constitute the objective reality of universal ideas.

9. Actualization takes place through creation, by which God causes a being to pass from possibility to existence, not by communicating his own being, but by drawing it out of nothing according to the pattern of the archetype contained in himself.

10. Created things, therefore, can in no sense be called God, nor can they have anything divine in themselves.

11. We call realities ideas insofar as they intelligibly affect the mind. Thus, relative to our intellect, ideas are something objective; the operation by which we apprehend them is ideal perception.

12. From the first instant of existence, the mind enjoys ideal perception, not reflectively but directly.

13. Among the intelligible truths we apprehend ideally, God is foremost; our intellection of him, although essentially distinct from the vision of the blessed, terminates not in a representative image but in God.

14. We apprehend the metaphysical essences of things that we know in the divine intellect; their actualizability, however, becomes known to us through the concept of the creative power belonging to God.

15. We apprehend created things ideally neither in God nor in themselves. Their knowledge is produced as follows: 1) we know our own soul through inner sense, or consciousness; 2) created things distinct from the soul, however, we know through an invincible judgment founded on divine truthfulness, by which we affirm that some essence has been actualized through creation.”

Ontologists said that this immediate perception of God is altogether different from the beatific vision. It is natural knowledge, in some way essential to the soul, which (according to some) is continuously present in the soul as direct knowledge, but becomes reflective on the occasion of objects presented by the senses. It is an intuition of divine being under the aspect in which it is the exemplar of all being; the blessed, by contrast, see God's inner life, especially the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity.

11. By a decree of the Holy Office (18 Sept. 1861), the following propositions were declared unsafe to teach:

“I. Immediate knowledge of God, at least habitual knowledge, is essential to the human intellect, so that without it the intellect can know nothing, since it is the intellectual light itself.

II. That being which we understand to be in all things, and without which we understand nothing, is divine being.

III. Universals considered as things are not really distinct from God.

IV. Innate knowledge of God as being simply eminently involves every other knowledge, so that through it we have implicitly known every being that can be known under any aspect.

V. All other ideas are nothing but modifications of the idea by which God is understood as being simply.

VI. Created things are in God as a part in a whole—not in a formal whole, but in an infinitely simple whole that sets its quasi-parts outside itself without any division or diminution of itself.

VII. Creation can be explained in this way: God produces a creature by the very special act by which he understands and wills himself as distinct from a particular creature, for example a human being.”

12. The doctrine of ROSMINI, which in many respects approaches the doctrine of ontologism, was condemned by a decree of the Holy Office (14 Dec. 1887).

“I. In the order of created things, something divine in itself is manifested immediately to the human intellect, namely, something of such a kind as to belong to the divine nature.

1. In the sphere of created things something divine in itself is manifested immediately to the human intellect, that is, something belonging to the divine nature. (Teosof. Vol. IV, n. 2, p. 6).

II. When we speak of the divine in nature, we do not use the word ‘divine’ to signify a non-divine effect of a divine cause; nor do we intend to speak of something divine that is so by participation.

2. When I speak of the divine in nature, I do not use the word ‘divine’ to signify a non-divine effect of a divine cause. For the same reason, I do not intend to speak of something divine that is so by participation. — (Ivi).

III. In the nature of the universe, then—that is, in the intelligences within it—there is something to which the designation ‘divine’ applies in its proper, not figurative, sense. It is an actuality not distinct from the rest of divine actuality.

3. In the nature of the universe, then—that is, in the intelligences within it—there is something to which the designation ‘divine’ applies, not figuratively but properly. (Teosof. Vol. IV, Del divino nella natura, num. 15, pp. 18-19). And it is an actuality indistinct from the rest of divine actuality, indivisible in itself, divisible by mental abstraction. (Teosof. Vol. III, n. 1423, p. 344).

IV. The indeterminate being, which is doubtless known to all intelligences⁸, is the divine reality manifested to human beings in nature.

4. Indeterminate being (ideal being), which is undoubtedly evident to all intelligences, is the divine reality manifested to human beings in nature. (Teosof. Vol. IV, nn. 5 e 6, p. 8).

V. The being intuited by a human being must necessarily be something of a necessary and eternal being, the creating, determining, and consummating cause of all contingent beings; and this is God.

5. The being intuited by a human being must necessarily be something of a necessary and eternal being, the creating, determining, and consummating cause of all contingent beings⁹; and this is God. (Teosof. Vol. I, n. 289, p. 241).

VI. The indeterminate being that abstracts from creatures and from God, and God as being not indeterminate but absolute, have the same essence.

6. In the one being (which abstracts from creatures and God, and is indeterminate being) and in the other (which is no longer indeterminate but God himself, absolute being), there is the same essence. (Teosof. Vol. II, n. 848, p. 150).”

13. Certain professors at the University of Louvain proposed a doctrine that was a kind of mitigated traditionalism: instruction in society is required for reason to develop to the point where it can know God and moral principles, not as an efficient cause, but as a necessary condition. Ontologism was later joined in part to this doctrine¹⁰. The doctrine is readily recognized from what the S. Ind. Congregation (3 June 1843) deemed worthy of note in the books of Professor UBAGHS:

“The Rev. D. UBAGHS teaches in his Theodicea, and sometimes also in his Logica, the following propositions, which the Sacred Congregation of the Index judges should be corrected.

I. ‘We cannot come to know any external metaphysical truth (that is, one concerning things that do not fall under our senses) without instruction from another, and, in the final analysis, without divine revelation.’

This doctrine cannot be admitted, because just as internal and mathematical truths can be known by reasoning, as the author himself admits, so it is at least possible to attain external truths whenever they are necessarily connected with internal truths, or when the internal truths themselves cannot stand without presupposing some external truth.

II. ‘External metaphysical truths cannot properly be demonstrated.’ (See Theod. p. 220, n. 413 et seq.).

Yet external truths are sometimes necessarily joined to internal ones as an effect to its cause, and therefore can be demonstrated through this connection by the kind of argument called a posteriori, whose certainty is no less than that obtained by an a priori demonstration.

III. ‘God's existence cannot be demonstrated at all. We deny that it can be demonstrated that God exists.’ (Theod. p. 73).

This untenable doctrine follows of itself from the author's opinions, which have already been judged.

IV. ‘Proofs of God's existence reduce to a kind of faith, or are based on this faith by which we do not so much see as believe—that is, we are naturally persuaded that this idea is trustworthy, something we cannot discern by purely internal evidence.’ (Theod. p. 73).

These words seem to mean that God's existence is believed rather than demonstrated, which is entirely contrary to the truth.

V. ‘The author reduces all proofs of external metaphysical truths to common sense.’

This doctrine cannot be admitted, because some external truths are demonstrated a posteriori through internal truths, without any reference to common sense. Thus, from our consciousness of our own existence, we directly infer the existence of a cause that bestowed existence on us; that is, from one internal truth we deduce another external truth without the intervention of common sense.

‘These are the principal opinions in the aforementioned book that appear to require correction. The Sacred Congregation therefore warns the Rev. Author to have his book corrected in a new edition and, in the meantime, to refrain from teaching these opinions in his scholastic lectures.’”

14. On 1 Feb. 1860, professors BEELEN, LEFEBVRE, UBAGHS, and LAFORET explain the doctrine concerning the necessity of instruction as follows:

“While on the one hand we defend the powers of human reason, on the other we profess, as we have already intimated, that we hold the view that the human mind should not be credited with that complete spontaneity or absolute independence which rationalists attribute to it. Rather, we think of the human mind in this way: the human mind possesses an inner power of its own and is continuously active of itself; nevertheless, for a person endowed with this mind to attain a ready use of reason, some external intellectual assistance is needed. We therefore hold that the principles of rational, metaphysical, and moral truths were implanted in the human mind by God the Creator; but we also judge this to be the natural, or psychological, law of our mind: a person needs some intellectual instruction in order to attain such a ready use of reason as will suffice to acquire distinct knowledge of God and of moral truths. We do not deny that, without such instruction, the human mind has a certain confused sense and vague apprehension of these truths; but here we are speaking of acquiring true knowledge, that is, a clear and certain awareness of them. By instruction we mean any external intellectual assistance, whether deliberately or unintentionally provided, whether by speech, writing, gesture, or any other means supplied by social intercourse. We mean that the need is absolute, not in the sense that we think God could not have created a human being otherwise, but in the sense that we think this need is common to all human beings as they are now born. We affirm that this absolute need for instruction exists if the matter is acquiring a ready use of reason; we do not at all say—and, on the contrary, consider it false—that knowledge of individual truths of the natural order must be acquired through instruction. For once a person actually enjoys the use of reason, he can discover and know very many truths by reason alone. We further note that, in our view, this instruction is not to be regarded as the efficient cause by which a person attains a ready use of reason, but as a mere condition without which he cannot attain that ready use; just as air, heat, and moisture are required as conditions without which the life actually present in a seed, though enclosed and hidden, cannot manifest itself. The principles of natural law are written in the human heart; but no one will ever be able to read them distinctly until, with the aid of that intellectual assistance of which we have spoken, he has attained the ready use of his reason.”

With the approval of Pope Pius IX, the doctrine of the Louvain professors was rejected on 11 October 1864, 2 March 1866, and 30 August 1866.

15. The Vatican Council¹¹, session 3, chapter 2, first part of § 1, says this about the natural knowledge of God: “The same holy mother Church holds and teaches that God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known with certainty from created things by the natural light of human reason; for his invisible attributes, ever since the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood through the things that have been made”¹².

Canon 1: “If anyone says that the one true God, our Creator and Lord, cannot be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason through the things that have been made: let him be anathema.”

16. According to Bishop GASSER's report¹³, three things are affirmed about the natural knowledge of God: “1) We say that a human being has a capacity for knowing God, and not merely a passive but an active one; this is to say that a human being has the powers needed to know God. Hence the words: ‘The same holy mother Church holds and teaches that God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known.’ 2) We then say that means sufficient for this knowledge of God are available to a human being in the natural order, in the words ‘by the natural light of human reason from created things.’ And finally, 3) God can be known with certainty from creatures”¹⁴.

17. The rationale followed by the Fathers appointed to revise the earlier dogmatic schema is explained on this point as follows¹⁵:

“This definition¹⁶—that God can be known with certainty through created things by the light of reason—and the corresponding canon seemed necessary, not only because of traditionalism but also because of the widespread error that God's existence cannot be proved by any firm arguments and therefore cannot be known with certainty.

“As far as traditionalism is concerned, it seemed sufficient to lay down a principle that would effectively exclude it. The principle laid down is this: human rational nature has the power to know God with certainty through created things. Anyone who said that it is altogether impossible for a human being, even one with a developed ability to reason, to attain certain knowledge of God without positive instruction about God handed down would deny that principle. The question whether some instruction is necessary for a human being to attain the use of reason is not addressed.

“Although the word ‘Creator’ appears in the canon, this does not define that creation, properly speaking, can be demonstrated by reason; rather, the word used by Scripture in revealing this truth is retained¹⁷, without any addition specifying its meaning.”

18. Certain proposed amendments—some intended to uphold in some measure the system of mitigated traditionalism, others to condemn it explicitly—gave Bishop GASSER occasion to speak at greater length about traditionalism and the doctrine opposed to it. His exposition greatly helps in rightly understanding the meaning of the definition¹⁸.

“First of all, I will say very little about the system of traditionalism itself. To begin at the beginning, I will cite the well-known words of TERTULLIAN in his book against Marcion: We (that is, against Marcion) define that God is first to be known by nature, then recognized by instruction: by nature from his works, by instruction from preaching. According to Tertullian, then, the matter stands as follows: God can indeed be known from his works under the guidance of nature; but for this knowledge of God to be saving, God must not merely be known naturally—he must also be recognized through instruction and preaching. For Tertullian, the first is natural knowledge, not first in time but in order, and then comes supernatural knowledge. He says, ‘first to be known by nature, and then recognized through instruction and preaching.’ In this matter Tertullian certainly has Sacred Scripture on his side, as is clear to anyone who consults Wisdom chapter 13, Romans chapter 1, and Acts chapters 14 and 17; and, as far as I can see, the Fathers of the Church are also on his side.”

19. “But those generally called TRADITIONALISTS (I would never have used this name, Most Reverend Fathers, had it not already been heard so often in this very hall)—the adherents of this system, I say, reverse Tertullian's position and say: we define that God is first to be known by instruction, and then recognized by nature: by instruction from preaching, by nature from his works. That is, the first idea of God must be communicated to a human being through instruction or preaching, understood in general; and, once this idea has been communicated to and received by a person, God's existence can indeed be proved by arguments drawn from reason. The traditionalists differ greatly among themselves as to how this idea is communicated. Some say that this communication must truly take place through the teaching of the Gospel, or revealed teaching; consequently, a person must receive the idea of God and his existence through divine faith, and there can be no certainty about God's existence unless that divine faith is present first. These traditionalists are properly called fideists, and their system is also called cruder traditionalism.

20. “Others, however, do not derive this communication directly from the teaching of the Gospel or revealed teaching, at least not immediately, but in general from the idea of God already present in human society. They therefore consider it sufficient for a person to receive the idea of God by human faith, and then to formulate arguments from reason for God's existence. Although these mitigated traditionalists, as they are called, derive the idea of God proximately only from its communication through human society, it can scarcely fail to be the case that ultimately they derive it from its first source, God's original instruction communicated to the human race. The mitigated traditionalists again differ greatly among themselves about the reason why a person cannot attain certain knowledge of God, at least without human faith. This is not the place to go into each of these views.”

21. “What, then, should be said about this doctrine? The doctrine of cruder traditionalism must certainly be condemned altogether, as it has already been condemned: for this doctrine uproots the very foundation of our faith, certainty about God's existence. This is of the greatest importance, especially in our own times.

“For you know, Most Reverend Fathers, what opinion has prevailed in the minds of many people since the so-called French Encyclopedists and the beginnings of critical philosophy in Germany: the opinion, namely, that God's existence cannot be proved at all with certainty by certain arguments, and that the arguments held in such high honor at all times are not capable of establishing the point. Consequently, religion itself, as lacking a foundation, has come to be despised. Indeed, in our own times matters have most recently reached the point where people everywhere are trying to sever moral teaching from all religious teaching, saying this is absolutely necessary lest a person, as he grows older, see that nothing certain can be held in religion, not even God's very existence, and so, I say, fall into moral depravity. But you know, Most Reverend Fathers, how effective a moral education of this sort can be when its principle is not that of the Psalmist¹⁹: the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.

22. “But mitigated traditionalism too is certainly beset with dangers. Because it is beset with such dangers, the eighth amendment was proposed²⁰, directly attacking the doctrine in its formal principle. Other Most Reverend Fathers, however, considering the doctrine less unfavorably, proposed the third and fourth amendments, which seem to defend the cause of mitigated traditionalism”²¹.

23. “Having first set out these points about the doctrine itself and its relation to sound doctrine, I must explain the course the Deputation of the Faith thought should be followed in this matter. The Deputation of the Faith judged that none of the amendments coming from one side or the other should be accepted by the general congregation. Rather, traditionalism in general should be opposed by a certain principle that would directly condemn cruder traditionalism, since that doctrine indeed exposes the very foundations of religion to danger. The Holy Synod certainly cannot fail in this duty, even if the proposed principle or doctrine also touches mitigated traditionalism to some extent; all the more because, as I have already said, mitigated traditionalism too is beset by many dangers and, I freely admit, cannot be taught without danger. Since, therefore, traditionalism even in its mitigated form seems to need some remedy, and certain limits must be imposed on this doctrine, the Deputation of the Faith proposes its doctrine as a certain principle that directly attacks cruder traditionalism and that, since it cannot be otherwise, also touches mitigated traditionalism”²².

24. “The question now is whether this approach has in fact set limits to deviations. In the opinion of the Deputation of the Faith, such limits have indeed been set, provided the points we propose in the doctrine, in this very chapter, are taken in their natural force—that is, provided what I said about the means available to a human being, even in the natural order, for knowing God is taken in its natural force. I said: if they are so taken. To exclude every danger, however, the Deputation of the Faith judged that it would fulfill its duty only if the general Council also adopted in due course the admonition found at the end of this dogmatic constitution, where all decrees ever issued by the Apostolic See concerning the subject of this dogmatic constitution are confirmed by the Holy Synod itself.”

25. The definition says “can be known with certainty,” not “can be demonstrated.” The seventh amendment²³ proposed this wording: “The same holy mother Church holds and teaches that God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known and demonstrated with certainty by the natural light of human reason, that is, by metaphysical, cosmological, and moral arguments. — Or simply: can be known and demonstrated with certainty by the natural light of reason.”

“As regards this amendment,” GASSER says in his report²⁴, “it can scarcely be approved, precisely because its presupposition is false. The Most Reverend proposer holds that our doctrine is opposed to the well-known arguments, or at least to the metaphysical argument. But this presupposition is entirely false: our doctrine supports these arguments; it does not oppose them. For if we say that God can be known by the natural light of reason through creatures—that is, through the traces impressed on all creatures—we exclude all the less the image impressed on the immortal soul of the human being. The metaphysical argument, therefore, is certainly not excluded. Which of us, having endorsed this doctrine we propose, thinks that it condemns that celebrated ontological argument of St. Anselm, whatever his view of the argument may be? The other amendment, in its second part, ‘can be known and demonstrated with certainty by the natural light of reason,’ is deficient in one respect and goes too far in another. It is deficient because it does not indicate the natural means by which a human being could know God naturally; it goes too far because it declares not merely that God can be known with certainty by natural light, but also that God's existence can be proved with certainty, or demonstrated. Although ‘to know with certainty and to demonstrate’ are in some measure the same thing, the Deputation of the Faith judged that it should choose the milder phrase, rather than this stronger one.”

When some later proposed (amendments 51, 52½, and 53)²⁵ that the word “with certainty” itself be omitted, the Deputation of the Faith judged that it had to be retained²⁶. Bishop GASSER explained this at greater length in the general congregation²⁷.

26. How the Council understood the knowledge of God appears in connection with amendment 11²⁸, which wished to add the following after the words taken from the Apostle's authority: “Hence they are without excuse, for although they knew God, they did not glorify him as God or give thanks.” It added this rationale: “so that it might at least be indicated that human beings can not only know God by the light of reason, but also know their principal duties toward God.”

To this Bishop GASSER replied²⁹: “The reason that moved the Most Reverend proposer is this: he wants natural knowledge, which he thinks is restricted to theoretical knowledge of God, to be extended also to the principal moral duties. But in this respect the amendment seems superfluous, because when we say that a human being can know God as the beginning and end of all things, we also declare that a human being can understand and know the principal moral duties. For no one can tend toward God as his—natural, of course—end and author of nature without also knowing at least the principal duties toward God. Hence the pagan philosophers themselves joined moral knowledge of God to theoretical knowledge of God; Plato, for example, says in his Theaetetus that knowledge of God is true wisdom and true virtue. The Deputation therefore considers these words entirely superfluous.” It is therefore understood that the Council means the knowledge of God required and sufficient for a person to be able and obliged to lead a religious life.

27. The first canon had said: “can be known with certainty by a human being through the natural light of reason.” Amendment 49³⁰ proposed that “the words ‘by a human being’ be deleted, lest we seem to define as a dogma of faith that there can never be adults who are invincibly ignorant of God. The word human could be added to reason ...” The Deputation of the Faith judged that this amendment should be accepted and recommended it to the Fathers³¹; nearly all accepted it³².

28. Amendment 51 wished to give the first canon this form³³: “If anyone says that human reason as it now is cannot know God from created things by its natural light: let him be anathema.” Bishop GASSER replied³⁴: “This amendment cannot be accepted, because it does not fit the aim of the doctrine. For our doctrine does not simply ask whether God can be known with certainty by natural light by a human being as he now is; rather, it concerns the condition of human nature in general.” See also amendment 52 (7, 225) and Bishop Gasser's reply (7, 238).

29. The Council determined the following concerning the necessity of positive revelation:

“To this divine revelation it must indeed be attributed that, even in the present condition of the human race, all people can readily know with firm certainty and without any admixture of error those things in divine matters that are not in themselves inaccessible to human reason. Revelation is not to be called absolutely necessary for this reason, however, but because God, in his infinite goodness, ordained the human person to a supernatural end, namely, to share in divine goods that wholly surpass the understanding of the human mind. For what no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor has entered into the heart of man, what God has prepared for those who love him”³⁵.

30. Bishop GASSER on this passage³⁶: “The question, then, is the necessity of revelation under two aspects: 1) in relation to the natural knowledge of God, and 2) in relation to the supernatural order. As for the necessity of revelation in the natural order, it is taught that revelation is not absolutely necessary, as stated at the beginning of the second paragraph: ‘Revelation is not to be called absolutely necessary for this reason.’ If, then, absolute necessity is not taught, some moral or relative necessity is nevertheless taught. In regard to revelation so-called formal, or the revelation of supersensible things, as we are accustomed to say in our German language, in order to distinguish supersensible things from supernatural things, the moral necessity of divine revelation is taught. That is, this necessity does not arise on the side of the object—for the objects are things in divine matters that are not inaccessible to human reason—but on the side of the subject, that is, the human being, even in the present condition of the human race. Third, the question is not the power of knowing God, though active, but actual knowledge of God: that all may know God readily, without a long delay for study and inquiry, with firm certainty even those scarcely capable of arguments drawn from reason, and, finally, without any admixture of error. If, then, the question is the actual natural knowledge of God in these circumstances, so many and such great difficulties confront a human being as he now is that supernatural revelation can be called morally necessary.

31. “The second part of this paragraph teaches the necessity of revelation so-called materially supernatural, and concerning this the following points are taught. First, in general it is said that this revelation is absolutely necessary, supposing, of course, the plan of divine goodness and wisdom already mentioned above. It is therefore called absolutely necessary, and the proximate cause of this absolute necessity is given first. The proximate cause of this absolute necessity is the ordination of the human person to a supernatural end, namely, to share in divine goods. The more remote cause of this necessity is the set of truths needed to know this supernatural order, which exceed the grasp of reason and must therefore be revealed positively by God. To prove this truth, the authority of Sacred Scripture is then cited from Paul's letter to the Corinthians, where it says: No eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor has entered into the heart of man. Therefore, without revelation these truths are unknown, the truths God has prepared for those who love him. Therefore, the supernatural end to which the human person is ordained is taught.”

32. Two amendments on the necessity of revelation (55½ and 56) were proposed³⁷, and Bishop GASSER addressed them³⁸: “The Most Reverend authors of these objections are displeased that supernatural revelation is said to be absolutely necessary only because it pleased God to raise the human person to the supernatural state. They would like some absolute necessity to be left, at least indirectly, even for the natural order.

“For they object, first: This doctrine of ours condemns the view that some instruction in human society is necessary for the exercise of reason.

“What is the answer? I deny it. I do deny it, provided one distinguishes, as I said just before, between the exercise of reason and the principles of reason³⁹. What, then, do we teach? What is our doctrine? Our doctrine is this: there are two orders of truths concerning God and divine things, namely, the natural and the supernatural. Just as there are two orders of truths concerning God and divine things, so there are also two ways of attaining knowledge of these truths: one through the principles of reason, the other through revelation. Revelation is therefore absolutely necessary for supernatural truths about God and divine things, but it is not absolutely necessary in the same way for knowing natural truths. Thus, we are speaking only of the way by which a human being can attain knowledge of both natural and supernatural truths; we are not speaking of the way in which a human being attains the exercise of reason. When we say that a human being can attain knowledge of natural truths about God and divine things through the principles of reason, we say nothing at all about the way a human being attains the exercise of reason.

“But they object a second time and say: Our best apologists maintain that, even if a human being had been left by God in a state of pure nature, revelation would have been absolutely necessary for the human being to know what worship should be offered to God, or what penance should be offered to God if the human being had sinned. Our doctrine, therefore, is too restrictive.

“What is the answer? I deny it. We merely say that supernatural revelation is not absolutely necessary for knowing things that are not in themselves inaccessible to human reason. We do not say that all natural truths are accessible to human reason. Accordingly, the hypothesis whether there are certain natural truths that are not in themselves accessible to a human being—a hypothesis that is certainly a mere hypothesis—is not touched by our doctrine”⁴⁰.

33. The Council did not deal with ontologism for a purely formal reason; hence no prejudice concerning ontologism follows. The second amendment, in fact, proposed another form for § 1 of chapter 2, whose first part was as follows⁴¹: “The same holy mother Church holds and teaches that, although God, the beginning and end of all things, dwells in inaccessible light, and no human being has ever seen him or can see him, not only face to face, which is granted only to the blessed in heaven, but neither may he be seen and contemplated naturally by a simple intuition of our mind while we sojourn in the body: nevertheless his existence and principal perfections can be known with certainty, as through a mirror and in an enigma, by ascending to him as it were by steps through created things by the natural light of reason ...”

Bishop GASSER said of this part⁴²: “This amendment contains, as we say, a passage against the philosophical system of ontologism, philosophical-theological ontologism. This amendment cannot now be admitted according to the opinion of the Deputation of the Faith, and for this formal reason alone: this very serious system of ontologism cannot be treated in this way, as though incidentally and in passing; given the gravity of the subject, it must be presented to the Council and then treated in a conciliar manner. The Deputation of the Faith therefore desires that this amendment not be approved here; but at the same time it says that no prejudice against the system of ontologism itself should arise from this, that the matter should remain in its former state, and that ontologism is omitted from this discussion here solely for a formal reason.”

For this reason Cardinals RIARIO SFORZA and PECCI (later LEO XIII) submitted a petition against ontologism, proposing for condemnation only that form of ontologism “which is openly opposed to Catholic doctrine and is the foundation of many errors now widely spread, and is contained in the proposition: Direct and immediate knowledge of God is natural to human beings.” See the whole petition in Coll. Lac. 7, 849–853.

34. The admonition mentioned by Gasser (above, n. 24) was added at the end of the Constitution: “Since, however, it is not enough to avoid heretical depravity unless those errors too are carefully shunned that approach it more or less closely, we admonish all of their duty to observe also the Constitutions and Decrees by which this Holy See has proscribed and prohibited such pernicious opinions, even when they are not expressly enumerated here.”

35. Many amendments had been proposed concerning this admonition⁴³, to which Bishop GASSER replied⁴⁴: “The Deputation of the Faith discussed this matter within its own sessions not once but repeatedly, and always judged, with precisely the same resolve, that this conclusion or admonition was absolutely necessary. For it could not fail to foresee how many evils would arise if the opinion prevailed that everything not contained in the chapters or canons of this constitution on the faith could be disputed in the schools freely, indeed with complete freedom. In the judgment of the Deputation of the Faith, the Vatican Council can meet this great evil—which would be all the greater because the Council followed the Council of Trent only after so many centuries—in no other way than by adding to the dogmatic constitution on the faith such a clause or conclusion, which reminds the faithful of their duty to ward off and eliminate errors and reminds teachers that it is not enough for a well-instructed Catholic to avoid only what must be avoided concerning the faith; he must also observe what has been defined by decrees of the Apostolic See ... Moreover, it is self-evident that, as regards dogmatic force—that is, the censure attached—nothing is changed in the decrees of the Apostolic See, even if this conclusion is approved and published by the Vatican Council. Their dogmatic force, or attached censure, remains exactly the same and unchanged as it was before the publication and decree of the Vatican Council.”

36. LEO XIII, in the encyclical Aeterni Patris (4 Aug. 1879): “And indeed, the most gracious God, in matters pertaining to divine things, disclosed by the light of faith not only those truths that the human intellect is unequal to attaining, but also revealed some that are not wholly inaccessible to reason, so that with God's authority added they might immediately become known to all, without any admixture of error. It followed that certain truths, whether proposed by God for belief or closely bound to the doctrine of faith, were known, demonstrated, and defended by sound arguments even by the wise men among the pagans, with only natural reason as their guide. For his invisible attributes are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood through the things that have been made, as is also his everlasting power and divinity⁴⁵; and the Gentiles who do not have the law ... nevertheless show the work of the law written in their hearts⁴⁶ ... Yet the usefulness that flows from this philosophical method is not confined within these bounds. And indeed, the words of divine wisdom sharply rebuke the folly of those who from the good things that are seen were unable to understand him who is, nor by attending to his works recognized who their craftsman was⁴⁷. Thus, in the first place, this great and excellent benefit is derived from human reason: it demonstrates that God exists. For from the greatness of the beauty of created things their Creator can be seen by analogy⁴⁸. — Next, reason shows God to excel uniquely in the abundance of all perfections, above all in infinite wisdom, from which nothing anywhere can be hidden, and in supreme justice, which no perverse desire can overcome; consequently, God is not only truthful but truth itself, incapable of being deceived or deceiving. It clearly follows that human reason wins for the word of God the fullest faith and authority.”

In the encyclical Humanum genus (20 April 1884), he censures the Naturalists because they do not allow even those truths perceived by the natural light of reason to remain certain and fixed, such as God's existence and the fact that human souls are separate from every material composite and are immortal.

37. PIUS X had already counted among modern errors in the encyclical Iucunda sane (12 March 1904): “The very arguments by which God's existence is demonstrated are attacked, and with incredible audacity, contrary to the first judgments of reason, that invincible force of argument is rejected by which a cause—that is, God and his attributes, bounded by no limits—is inferred from effects. For his invisible attributes are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood through the things that have been made; likewise his everlasting power and divinity”⁴⁹.

38. On 8 September 1907, the encyclical Pascendi dominici gregis condemned MODERNISM⁵⁰, which on the one hand denies that God can be known through the intellect, since it restricts the power of reason to phenomena alone (agnosticism); on the other hand, it claims that through religious feeling (experience) a human being immediately reaches divine reality and draws from it the highest conviction of God's existence (vital immanentism).

The best exposition of the whole doctrine is found in the encyclical Pascendi. The principal points relevant to our subject are these: “To begin with the philosopher, modernists make the foundation of religious philosophy that doctrine commonly called agnosticism. By its force, human reason is wholly confined to phenomena, that is, to things that appear and the manner in which they appear; it has neither the right nor the power to go beyond their limits. Hence it cannot raise itself to God, nor recognize his existence, even through visible things. From this it follows that God can in no way be directly the object of science; as for history, God is not to be considered a historical subject. — Given these premises, everyone can readily see what becomes of natural theology, the motives of credibility, and external revelation. The modernists remove them entirely and consign them to intellectualism, a ridiculous system, they say, long since dead. Nor are they restrained by the fact that the Church has most clearly condemned such monstrous errors. For the Vatican Council decreed: If anyone says that the one true God, our Creator and Lord, cannot be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason through the things that have been made: let him be anathema⁵¹; likewise: If anyone says that it is impossible, or inexpedient, for a human being to be instructed by divine revelation about God and the worship due to him: let him be anathema⁵²; and finally: If anyone says that divine revelation cannot be made credible by external signs, and that therefore people ought to be moved to faith solely by each person's internal experience or private inspiration: let him be anathema⁵³. By what reasoning modernists pass from agnosticism, which is merely ignorance, to scientific and historical atheism, which by contrast is wholly based on denial; and by what right of reasoning they proceed from not knowing whether God intervened in the history of the human race to explaining that same history while entirely neglecting God, as though he had in fact not intervened—anyone who can may understand. This much, however, is settled and fixed for them: science and history must be atheistic, allowing room within their limits for phenomena alone, with God and everything divine completely expelled. — From this most absurd doctrine, what must be held about the most holy person of Christ, the mysteries of his life and death, and likewise his resurrection and ascension into heaven, we shall soon see clearly.

“In the teaching of the modernists, however, agnosticism is to be regarded only as the negative part; the positive part, as they say, consists in vital immanence. Their progression from one to the other is as follows. — Religion, whether natural or supernatural, like any other fact, must admit of some explanation. But once natural theology has been abolished, access to revelation barred by rejecting the arguments for credibility, and every external revelation wholly set aside, it is useless to seek that explanation outside the human person. It must therefore be sought in the human person himself; and since religion is a certain form of life, it must be found wholly in human life. Hence the principle of religious immanence is asserted. The first impulse of every vital phenomenon, and religion has already been said to be such a phenomenon, must be traced to some need or impulse. More precisely, the beginnings of life must be located in a movement of the heart called feeling. Since God is the object of religion, it must therefore be concluded that faith, the beginning and foundation of every religion, must be located in an inner feeling arising from a need for the divine. Since this need for the divine is felt only under certain appropriate conditions, it cannot itself belong to the sphere of consciousness; it lies first beneath consciousness, or, to borrow a term from modern philosophy, in the subconscious, where its root also remains hidden and undetected. — Someone may ask how this need for the divine, which a human being perceives within himself, finally becomes religion. The modernists reply: Science and history, they say, are enclosed within two boundaries: one external, namely the visible world, and the other internal, namely consciousness. Once they have reached either boundary, they have nowhere further to go; beyond these limits lies the unknowable. In the presence of this unknowable, whether it lies outside the human person and beyond the visible order of things or is hidden within in the subconscious, the need for the divine, in a mind disposed toward religion and without any prior judgment of the intellect (as the tenets of fideism require), stirs a certain distinctive feeling. This feeling contains within itself the divine reality itself, both as its object and as its intimate cause, and in some way unites the human person with God. This feeling is what the modernists call faith, and for them it is the beginning of religion.”

“Now, if someone wishes to know how the believer differs from the philosopher among the modernists, it must be observed that, although the philosopher admits divine reality as the object of faith, he finds this reality nowhere but in the believer's mind, as the object of feeling and affirmation, and therefore does not go beyond the sphere of phenomena; whether this reality exists in itself outside such feeling and affirmation, the philosopher passes over and ignores. The modernist believer, by contrast, holds it as settled and certain that divine reality truly exists in itself and does not depend wholly on the believer. If you ask on what this believer's assertion rests, they reply: on each person's private experience. — In this assertion, while they indeed differ from the rationalists, they depart into the opinions of Protestants and pseudomystics. They explain it thus: religious feeling must be recognized as a certain intuition of the heart by which a human being reaches God's reality itself without mediation, and draws such conviction of God's existence and action both within and outside the human person that it far surpasses any conviction obtainable from science. They therefore posit a true experience, superior to any rational experience; if someone denies it, as rationalists do, they claim this is because that person does not wish to place himself in the moral conditions required to produce the experience. Once attained, this experience properly and truly makes a person a believer. — How far this is from Catholic principles! We have already seen that such notions were rejected by the Vatican Council.”

39. In the motu proprio Sacrorum antistitum (1 Sept. 1910), the profession of faith is prescribed: “God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known with certainty, and therefore also demonstrated, by the natural light of reason through the things that have been made—that is, through the visible works of creation—as a cause through its effects.”

40. Pius XI, in the encyclical Studiorum ducem (29 June 1923): “The arguments by which Thomas teaches that God exists and that he is the one who is subsistent Being itself are still today, as in the Middle Ages, the strongest of all for proving this. They also clearly confirm the Church's dogma solemnly proclaimed at the Vatican Council, which Pius X aptly interprets as follows: ‘God ... can’” (as above in the motu proprio of Pius X).

Among the twelve propositions submitted to the Holy Office⁵⁴, which it judged “as they stand, to have already been proscribed and condemned as a group by the Vatican Council and the Holy See, or to pave the way for the same already proscribed and condemned propositions” (1 Dec. 1924), are the following:

“VI. Logical arguments, both for God's existence and for the credibility of the Christian religion, have no objective value in themselves, as they say; that is, of themselves they prove nothing about the real order.

VII. We cannot attain any truth in the proper sense without admitting God's existence, indeed even Revelation.

VIII. Whatever value such arguments may have does not come from their evidence or dialectical force, but from the ‘subjective’ demands of life or action, which need these truths in order to develop rightly and cohere with themselves.”

41. Pius XII, in the encyclical Humani generis (12 Aug. 1950): “It is called into question whether human reason, without the help of divine revelation and divine grace, can demonstrate from arguments drawn from created things that a personal God exists ... It is well known how highly the Church values human reason as regards the certain demonstration of the existence of the one personal God” (AAS 42, 1950, 570 s.).

42. Therefore, the doctrine contained in the Church's documents is this: God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known with certainty by the light of human reason from created things, in such a way that the obligation to worship God arises from this knowledge; this knowledge is possible without any positive revelation about God (Conc. Vatic.). God's existence can be demonstrated (Bautain, nr. 8; Bonnetty, nr. 9; damn. doctr. Lovaniensium, nr. 13 s.; Leo XIII, nr. 36; Pius X, nr. 37 ss.; Pius XI, nr. 40; Pius XII, nr. 41). The object of this knowledge is the existence of a personal God, his nature, attributes, and infinite perfections (Bautain, Pius IX, Leo XIII, Pius XII). Immediate natural knowledge of God, however, cannot safely be taught (Ontologismus, nr. 10 ss.).