De Deo uno

PETER LOMBARD, 1. 1 d. 25; 38; 39. ST. TH., 1 q. 14 a. 2. 3. 5. 9-13; MOLINA, Liberi arbitrii concordia, q. 14 a. 13 disp. 52; BÁÑEZ, on the cited place in the Summa; SUÁREZ, De Deo, 1. 3 c. 1-3; De gratia, prolog. 2; PETAVIUS, De Deo, 1. 4 c. 3. 4. 6-8; RUIZ, De scientia, de ideis, de veritate ac de vita Dei, disp. 5. 9. 61-70; BILLUART, Summa s. Thomae, p. 1 diss. 5 a. 2 § 1; diss. 6 a. 1. 2. 5; FRANZELIN, thes. 37; 41-42; 45; KLEUTGEN, nr. 449-453; 457-486; DE SAN, nr. 145-151; 154-158; 168-190; BILLOT, thes. 21. 22; PESCH, prop. 29-32; MUNCUNILL, nr. 274-292; 340-344; 383-388; VAN DER MEERSCH, nr. 350-373.

The thesis says that God is omniscient, that is, whatever has the character of truth is known to God. This is already contained in the fact that God is infinite in intellect; in this thesis it is shown specifically with respect to each of the objects.

God knows himself

250. This is explicitly taught in sacred SCRIPTURE, Matth 11, 27; 1 Cor 2, 10. 11; implicitly, in that God reveals many things about himself in sacred Scripture.

That the FATHERS explicitly taught the same doctrine is clear from several texts already cited above, for example CYR. HIEROSOL. (nr. 192), BASIL (nr. 83), JOHN CHRYSOSTOM (nr. 83 and 192), GREGORY THE GREAT (nr. 192), MINUCIUS FELIX, Octavius 18: “he is known to himself alone as great as he is” (ML 3, 290; R 270); TERTULLIAN, Apologeticus 17: “What is immeasurable is known to itself alone” (ML 1, 376); CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA, Thesaurus de s. et consubst. Trinitate, ass. 31: “What, then, would prevent God from knowing himself perfectly according to his essence, while we, who are human, understand him in an inferior way?” (MG 75, 452; R 2073). In presenting this doctrine, they often appeal to or allude to Matth 11, 27.

God knows all things that are other than himself

251. The Vatican Council teaches this explicitly (Denz 1784). This is the explicit teaching of sacred SCRIPTURE, both of the Old Testament (above, nr. 235; for example, the whole of Ps 138) and of the New Testament: Hebr. 4, 13, the text cited by the Vatican Council. Indeed, knowledge of the things most hidden is attributed to God: he is the searcher of hearts: Ps 7, 10; Eccli 23, 28; Rom 8, 27; 1 Cor 4, 5; during his public life Christ often manifested this knowledge: Mc 2, 8; 3, 2 ss.; 8, 17; 17; 12, 15; Io 2, 24 s.; 6, 15. 61.

The FATHERS explicitly taught the same (many texts in R, ser. 118); it is implicitly contained in the Fathers’ doctrine of universal divine providence (R, ser. 124).

252. Obj., 1. In sacred Scripture some ignorance seems to be taught of God, for example Matth 7, 23; Luc 13, 27.

I answer. I distinguish: knowledge simply speaking is denied, I deny; knowledge of approval, I grant. By knowledge of approval God knows the things that please him, which he approves. It is the knowledge by which God knows “the way of the just” (Ps 1, 6), by which he “knows by name” (Ex 33, 12. 17), by which the good shepherd knows his sheep (Io 10, 14), by which the Lord knows those who are his (2 Tim 2, 19).

2. ST. JEROME, In Habacuc, 1. 1 c. 1 v. 14: “Just as among human beings God's providence extends to each individual, so among the other animals we can understand a general dispensation, order, and course of things. For example, how a multitude of fish is born and lives in the waters, how reptiles and quadrupeds arise on the earth, and what foods sustain them. But it is absurd to bring God's majesty down to the point that he knows at each moment how many gnats are born or die, what multitude of bugs, fleas, and flies there is on earth, how many fish swim in the water, and which of the smaller must become prey to the larger. Let us not be such foolish flatterers of God that, while we drag his power down even to the lowest things, we insult ourselves by saying that the providence over rational creatures is the same as that over irrational ones” (ML 25, 1286; R 1377).

FRANZELIN responds to this¹: “The holy Doctor is speaking principally not of speculative knowledge of vision, but of the practical knowledge of providence. Further, he is not speaking of providence simply, but of the special providence pertaining only to rational creatures, which alone can be the object of paternal care and love, whereas the other, irrational creatures are administered by providence, just as they are created, for the rational creatures as their proximate end. St. Jerome therefore said more than he wished to be understood, as St. Bonaventure says of a certain other statement of St. Augustine (Breviloq. P. 3 c. 5). Besides, one must be convinced in itself, and it is shown from other passages of his, that the holy Doctor does not call into question, much less reject as ‘absurd,’ the doctrine taught in the Gospel, throughout Scripture, and in the Christian profession of faith—if I may put it so, an elementary doctrine. Compare, for example, Jerome’s clear and polemical discussion on Ier 32, 26²: ‘God,’ the prophet said, ‘of all flesh,’ so that he may be believed to have made both rational and irrational animals. For there are some who profess the Creator’s providence as far as rational creatures, but claim that irrational creatures live or die by chance. The prophetic word declares that nothing escapes God's providence and knowledge, because some things were created for themselves, others for human use.’” He says similar things in In Matth 10, 29 (ML 26, 27).

God knows all things that can exist

253. Sacred SCRIPTURE attributes to God knowledge of things that precedes their creation or the decree to create them. For God created in supreme wisdom (above 235); but creating in wisdom presupposes that things are known before their creation or the decree to create them; the same is contained in the doctrine of the freedom of creation (above 234) and of providence (above 236). Cf. Eccli 23, 29; Eph 1, 11. The same is likewise contained in the FATHERS’ doctrine of the wisdom and freedom of creation (R, ser. 191) and of divine providence (R, ser. 124).

God knows the things that are to come about through the free action of creatures

254. The Vatican Council: “God, indeed, protects and governs by his providence all things that he has created, reaching mightily from end to end and ordering all things gently. For all things are naked and open to his eyes, even those that are to come about through the free action of creatures” (Denz 1784).

In the reworked schema proposed to the Fathers, the first paragraph of chapter 1 read: “God ... almighty, most provident, eternal” (see above, nr. 241). An amendment (8) was proposed: “In the first paragraph let the word most provident be deleted, and let the following be added after the second: Indeed, God protects and governs by his providence all things that he has created, reaching mightily from end to end and ordering all things gently (Sap. 8, 1). For all things are naked and open to his eyes, not only things that have been made, but also those that are to be made, whether by the necessary or free efficacy of created things” (Col. Lac. 7, 98 s.). This amendment asserts not only divine providence but also divine knowledge.

In his report on this amendment, Bishop GASSER said on behalf of the Deputation of the Faith: “The author of this amendment not only explains the attribute most provident more fully, but also wishes and desires that a third paragraph be added to the first chapter, which should deal with the providence and foreknowledge of God; and the Deputation judged that this amendment should be accepted, for two reasons. First, for a formal reason: namely, the word most provident, as it appears in the reworked schema, was introduced only later; and, to speak frankly, it somewhat disrupts the sequence of statements. It would therefore be much better to omit the word or expression most provident here, and then to add this amendment on the providence and foreknowledge of God as a third part or third paragraph. The Deputation also judged this amendment should be accepted because, in fact, theologians seem to doubt in many places whether God really foreknows contingent futures, that is, free futures. It will therefore certainly not be beside the point to set forth the most certain doctrine, indeed a doctrine that is certainly of faith, that God is most provident and foreknows even contingent and free futures. The Deputation of the Faith was troubled only by the final words of this amendment, which were somewhat harsh; accordingly, having reached an agreement with the author of this amendment, this amendment is proposed to you, Most Reverend Fathers, for your votes in the following form: Indeed, God, all things that he has created, protects and governs by his providence, reaching mightily from end to end and ordering all things gently; for all things are naked and open to his eyes, even those that are to come about through the free action of creatures. All the other points in this newly amended proposal have been left as they were, since they raise no doubt, namely, that God foresees past and future things, both necessary and contingent. All these matters are at least indirectly and implicitly contained in the words ‘even those that are to come about freely, etc.’” (Col. Lac. 7, 105). Almost all the Fathers approved this amendment (Col. Lac. 7, 109). In the form of the Constitution on which votes were cast on April 12, instead of “for all things are naked and open to his eyes” it says “For all things are naked and open to his eyes”; this is the definitive text.

From these facts it is clear that the Council intended to teach not only divine providence, but also God's knowledge, specifically his knowledge of the free actions of creatures. Therefore the interpretation of this text which says that only divine providence is properly defined here, and that what is said about divine knowledge is introduced merely as an argument to prove divine providence, is false. Such an interpretation not only runs contrary to the Council’s intention, but also attributes to the Council a considerable error, namely, that its providence could be proved from God's omniscience. One can indeed infer his knowledge from divine providence in the reverse order, but not providence from knowledge.

The opinion that contingent futures have no determinate truth was condemned by Sixtus IV, 8 Jan. 1474 (Denz. 719-723).³

In sacred SCRIPTURE God announced through prophecies many future things whose fulfillment depended on a created free will; hence TERTULLIAN rightly says, Adv. Marcionem, l. 2 nr. 5: God's foreknowledge “has as many witnesses as he made prophets” (ML 2, 290); Christ foretold the betrayal of Judas (Io 6, 64; 13, 11, 21 sqq. Matth 26, 21 sqq.) and Peter’s denial (Matth 26, 34).

The holy FATHERS explicitly teach the same. ST. AMBROSE, De fide, l. 5 c. 6 nr. 83: “Those whose merits he foreknew, he predestined to their rewards” (ML 16, 665; R 1272). ST. JEROME, Dial. adv. Pelagianos, l. 3 nr. 6: “Adam did not sin because God knew that this would happen; rather, God, as God, foreknew what Adam was going to do by his own will” (ML 23, 575). ST. AUGUSTINE, De genesi ad litteram, l. 11 c. 9 nr. 12: “God foreknew that their [that is, the first parents’] will would be evil” (ML 34, 434; R 1707); De civitate Dei, l. 5 c. 9 nr. 4 (ML 41, 152; R 1740); c. 10 nr. 2 (ML 41, 153; R 1742); Enchiridion 104 (ML 40, 281; R 1928). ST. JOHN DAMASCENE, De fide orthodoxa l. 2 c. 30 (MG 94, 969; R 2359).

Obj. Whatever God foreknows must be; but what must be is not free; therefore either God does not know free future things, or there are no free future things.

I answer. I distinguish the major: by antecedent necessity, I deny; by consequent necessity, I grant; or by necessity of the consequent, I deny; by necessity of the consequence, I grant; the minor is contradicted.

God knows the things that would come about through the free action of creatures, given certain conditions.

255. Conditionally future free things are understood to be free (and so the faculty, in the antecedent sign before the second act, is not determined to one outcome but is indifferent) things that would come about if a certain condition were fulfilled, but which, by hypothesis, is either not fulfilled or is at least conceived as unfulfilled. There must be a real connection between the condition and what is conditioned by it, but it is not necessitating or necessary; from the condition, what is conditioned cannot be known with absolute certainty. If the condition is verified (or conceived as verified), what was conditionally future and free becomes absolutely future; every absolutely future free thing, in the antecedent sign before the condition’s futurity, is conditionally future. Hence a distinction is usually made between pure conditionally future free things, whose condition is not verified, and non-pure conditionally future free things, whose condition is verified at some time. An example of such a conditionally future free thing is: If Peter saw this inn in these or those circumstances, he would enter it. Note well: this is not a matter of conditional truth—this or that would be true—but of the absolute truth of a conditional: it is absolutely true that the conditional would be fulfilled if the condition were verified.

256. No theologian seems explicitly and simply to have denied that God in fact has knowledge of conditionally future free things⁴. Some, however, are said to have attributed to God only conjectural or probable knowledge of them⁵, such as PETER DE LEDESMA, Tractatus de divinae gratiae auxiliis, art. 18, diff. ult.; CURIEL and others. JOHN OF ST. THOMAS (disp. 20 a. 1) tries to show that this claim is mistaken. In our own time L. JANSSENS, De Deo uno II, 51 s., says: “God knows with certainty those futuribles that truly are futuribles, that is, those that are either contained in their causes with moral certainty or about which he has made some provision in his decrees: the former, therefore, in two middle terms, the latter in one. The remaining things, although we can imagine them as genuine futuribles, are not truly futuribles, but pertain to mere possibilities, which God contemplates through speculative knowledge.” The knowledge by which God knows futuribles that are contained in their causes, insofar as they are so contained, is morally certain. Nevertheless, theologians commonly teach that God knows futuribles with absolute certainty: ALVAREZ O. P., XANTES MARIALES O. P., GONET O. P., GOTTI O. P., BILLUART O. P., MOLINA, VÁZQUEZ, SUÁREZ, GREGORY OF VALENCIA⁶; in general, Molinists and Bañezians, between whom there is indeed controversy about the explanation of this knowledge and perhaps also its scope, but not about the fact itself: that God knows futuribles certainly and distinctly.

SACRED SCRIPTURE

257. 1 Reg 23, 1 ss. After David in the city of Ceila heard that Saul was planning to come against him at Ceila, he asked God, “Will the men of Ceila hand me over into his hands? And will Saul come down, as your servant has heard?” The Lord answers both questions in the affirmative: He will come down; they will hand him over.

Saul’s descent and the Ceilites’ surrender of David are conditionally future free things; that they are free is clear; each depends on a condition (if David remains in the city, Saul will come down; if Saul comes down, the Ceilites will hand David over); there is a real connection between the condition and the free act, but it is neither necessitating nor infallible (David’s presence in the city is a motive for Saul to come down freely; Saul’s descent is a motive for the Ceilites to hand David over); the conditions are not verified (David does not remain; Saul does not come down).

God knows these conditionally future free things with certainty. For God’s certain and determinate answer presupposes certain and determinate knowledge, since God does not affirm anything beyond his knowledge. David himself already had conjectural knowledge and moral certainty about Saul’s descent, but, not content with such knowledge, he asks God, who knows all things, precisely in order to have perfect certainty.

Obj. Perhaps the words “he will come down,” “they will hand him over” are not to be understood as they sound, but as “he intends to come down,” “they intend to hand him over,” as the Chaldean paraphrase of this text explains; if the text is understood in this way, it proves only moral certainty, or conjectural knowledge based on the disposition of minds⁷.

I answer. 1) The text states definitely, “he will come down, they will hand him over”; 2) David himself had heard of Saul’s intention, and he does not ask God about the intention, but whether Saul will in fact come down in accordance with this intention; 3) God would have affirmed more in words than he knew; 4) it is unlikely that the Ceilites at that time already intended to hand David over (cf. Ruiz, disp. 63 sect. 2).

258. Luc 10, 13 (Matth 11, 21 ss.): The people of Tyre and Sidon would have repented if the works of power that were done in Capharnaum had been done in Tyre and Sidon. Here again the matter concerns free acts (they would have repented), connected by a real but not necessitating relation with some condition (the miracles), which nevertheless is not fulfilled. The same must be said of the people of Sodom (Matth 11, 23 s.). Christ knows both truths. In the text of 1 Reg the condition at issue would not be fulfilled; here the discussion concerns a condition that was not fulfilled. Nevertheless, the nature of the object known is not thereby changed.

But perhaps Christ uses a rhetorical figure, hyperbole (as, for example, Luc 19, 40: “If these should be silent, the stones will cry out”), to indicate the ill will of the people of Capharnaum; perhaps he does not intend to affirm anything with certainty about what the people of Tyre and Sidon would have done. Indeed, if this were not admitted, one would have to say that the people of Tyre and Sidon are judged at the last judgment for what they would have done under other conditions.

I answer. Some say it is difficult to exclude hyperbolic speech from the text alone, but they concede that the text itself contains no positive reason requiring it. Nevertheless, because the Fathers explain the text as concerning true knowledge⁸, it cannot be understood as a mere hyperbolic expression. Nor does the text itself seem well suited to a hyperbolic interpretation: one should not admit hyperbolic speech without reason, and the text provides none, unlike Luc 19, 40, where the figurative sense is apparent from the nature of the matter. The proposed reason—that the people of Tyre would then be judged according to what they would have done in other conditions—is invalid; nothing is affirmed except that they will be punished less because in fact they were less obstinate. Indeed, this appeal to the future judgment would make no sense if Christ had used a hyperbolic figure.

One can argue similarly from Ierem 38, 14-20; Act 22, 17-21.

Some thought that Scripture attributed conjectural knowledge to God, or that he was uncertain about the future, because it sometimes adds “perhaps”; for example, Mt 11, 23: If the works of power that were done in you had been done in Sodom, perhaps it would have remained to this day. Gen. 3, 3: But concerning the fruit of the tree that is in the middle of paradise, God commanded us not to eat of it and not to touch it, lest perhaps we die. Ez 2, 4 s.: They are children with hard faces and stubborn hearts, to whom I am sending you; and you shall say to them: Thus says the Lord God: Perhaps they themselves will hear, and perhaps they will be quiet, for they are a rebellious house. Ierem 26, 2 s.: Thus says the Lord: Stand in the court of the house of the Lord and speak to all the cities of Judah ... all the words ... do not omit a word, perhaps they will hear and each turn from his evil way.

The answer is found by considering what corresponds to this “perhaps” in the original text. Mt 11, 23 has a counterfactual proposition; there is no uncertainty. Gen 3, 3 has simply ne (pen), with no uncertainty. In Ezech 2, 5, whether they hear or whether they desist—that is, they will not hear: the outcome of the prophet’s preaching is indicated as uncertain, but despite that the prophet must carry out God’s command. Likewise, in Ierem 26, 3 (forte = ulai), the outcome of the preaching is uncertain, though there is hope and a desire that they be converted (PESCH, nr. 214. See below, nr. 284 and 285, the words of St. John Chrysostom and St. Jerome).

THE FATHERS

259. ST. GREGORY OF NYSSA, De infantibus qui praemature abripiuntur: “It is fitting that he who knows the future as well as the past should prevent a child from reaching adulthood, lest the evil be brought to completion which, through foreknowledge, he knew would be in the child if he were to live in that way, and lest life become an occasion of wickedness for one who would have lived with such a free will ... We hold this opinion about the death of infants: he who does all things rationally, in his goodness removes the occasion of wrongdoing, not granting time for the free choice, known by foreknowledge, to manifest itself through deeds at the height of wickedness, since it has an impulse toward evil” (MG 46, 184; R 1059).

ST. AUGUSTINE, De genesi ad litteram, l. 11 c. 9 n. 12: “God foreknew that their (that is, the first parents’) will would be evil. He certainly foreknew it, and because his foreknowledge cannot be deceived, the evil will is therefore not his but theirs. Why, then, did he create those whom he foreknew would be such? Because, just as he foresaw what evil they would do, so he also foresaw what good he himself would bring about from their evil deeds” (ML 34, 434; R 1707). Therefore God has knowledge of the sin of the first parents in a sign antecedent to the absolute decree of creation; in this sign those acts were conditionally future free acts. De dono perseverantiae, c. 9 n. 22: “Certainly God could have taken them from this life before it happened, foreknowing that they would fall” (ML 45, 1005; R 1996), which can no longer be said of things that are absolutely future; cf. also the texts cited at nr. 258, where St. Augustine understands Christ’s words in Matth 11, 21 s. as referring to true knowledge.

260. The Fathers set forth this doctrine when speaking of divine providence, especially when the question is how God, who is so good, could have permitted evil (many texts of the Fathers in Ruiz, disp. 65; on good works, disp. 66). They do not answer by saying that God was ignorant of future evil, but that although God knew the evil was to come, he nevertheless willed to permit it, since he is so good and powerful that he can himself bring good even out of evils.

But St. AUGUSTINE seems to have denied this knowledge to God in opposition to the Semipelagians.

I answer. I deny that he denied this knowledge; I grant that he denied the use of this knowledge to confer reward or punishment, as the Semipelagians claimed. Thus De dono persev., c. 9 nr. 23: “It is therefore false that the dead are judged according to what they would have done if the Gospel had reached them while they were alive. If this is false, there is no reason to say of infants who perish dying without baptism that this happens to them on account of the merit that God foreknew they would hear the Gospel preached unbelievingly if they lived. It remains, therefore, that they are held bound by original sin alone, and for this alone they go to damnation” (ML 45, 1006; R 1997). Moreover, he is entirely right to affirm that foreknowledge, strictly speaking, does not concern what will never be: “What of the fact that foreknowledge itself is emptied out if what is foreknown will not be? For how can one rightly say that what will not be is foreknown as future?” (De anima et eius origine, l. 1 c. 12 nr. 15; ML 44, 483)⁹.

THEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

261. By a supremely free counsel and with the highest wisdom, God chose the present order from among various possible orders, including the free acts of creatures, and willed it to be absolutely future (cf. the doctrine of creation and providence). But a free and wise choice of a determinate order is excluded if, in the sign antecedent to the absolute choice, God did not know certainly and distinctly what would happen in the different orders. For if he knew what would happen in this order only through his absolute will of this order, it would be more fitting to say that he willed this order blindly. In the sign antecedent to the absolute choice, however, the objects are conditionally future. Cf. Molina, Concordia q. 14 a. 13 disp. 49 (ed. Parisiis 1876 pag. 191 s.).

This knowledge of God is presupposed in every good prayer by which temporal things are asked of God. “It is also permitted to ask for gifts and adornments of the mind, such as the arts and learning, but only on the condition that they will benefit us for the glory of God and our salvation” (Catechismus Romanus p. 4 c. 2 nr. 4). Therefore, one who prays well presupposes that God knows what is better: to have those goods or not to have them; that is, that God knows what would happen if he granted those goods and what would happen if he denied them. Thus the Christian people are taught to pray, and thus they pray in practice, firmly persuaded that God knows what is better.