De Deo uno

120. In the first section the discussion concerned natural knowledge of God, that is, the knowledge whose principles and sources are natural: natural human reason and God's natural manifestation in creation. This knowledge of God, however, is very imperfect. “Therefore, since, as St. Thomas says, the knowledge of God to which man could attain by the foregoing ways through a certain intellectual, quasi-intuitive insight was weak, in his superabundant goodness, so that man's knowledge of God might be firmer, he revealed to men certain things about himself that exceed the human intellect. In this revelation, moreover, a certain order is observed in keeping with man's condition, so that he may gradually pass from the imperfect to the perfect, as happens in other mutable things. First, then, these things are revealed to man in such a way that they are not understood but are believed merely as if heard; for, in this state, in which the human intellect is joined to sensible things, it cannot at all be raised to behold what exceeds every proportion of sense. But when it has been freed from its connection with sensible things, then it will be raised to behold what is revealed. There is, therefore, a threefold human knowledge of divine things. The first is that by which man ascends to knowledge of God through creatures by the natural light of reason; the second is that by which divine truth, exceeding the human intellect, descends to us by way of revelation, not as something demonstrated for us to see, but as something uttered in speech for us to believe; the third is that by which the human mind is raised to behold perfectly the things that have been revealed” ¹.

Faith and vision are supernatural kinds of knowledge, and in the present order, according to God's will, they are ordinary and common kinds of knowledge, indeed necessary for all human beings: faith in this life, on the way; vision in the other life, at the goal.

Besides these, however, other kinds of knowledge also seem to have been or to be granted by God, namely, the knowledge of the first parents before sin, and that of the prophets, as well as the special knowledge found in “infused contemplation.”

The section on the supernatural knowledge of God could therefore² be divided as follows: 1) on common supernatural knowledge, a) in this life: faith; b) in the other life: vision; 2) on special supernatural knowledge, a) of the first parents and the prophets; b) of mystics. The kinds of knowledge indicated under 2) belong to other treatises³, while faith is discussed at length in the treatise on the virtues, so that in the present treatise only intuitive vision of God need be treated. 121. It nevertheless seems appropriate briefly to indicate here certain things about knowledge of God through faith. God manifested himself to wayfarers not only in the very work of creation, but it pleased “his wisdom and goodness to reveal himself and the decrees of his eternal will to the human race by another, supernatural way, as the Apostle says: ‘In many parts and in many ways of old God spoke to the fathers in the Prophets; in these last days he has spoken to us in the Son’” ⁴ (Conc. Vatic. s. 3 cap. 2; Denz 1785). This is positive revelation, God's attesting word. To embrace it, God infuses faith, a supernatural virtue, into man, so that knowledge through faith is supernatural both as to its principle and as to its source. The object of this knowledge is not only those things “to which natural reason can attain,” but also “the mysteries hidden in God, which cannot be known unless divinely revealed” (ibid. cap. 4; Denz 1795; cf. cap. 2; Denz 1786) ⁵. This knowledge excludes every error, affords greater certainty than natural knowledge of God, and makes knowledge of God much easier for everyone. But the “mode of knowing” in faith does not change: it too is knowledge through an alien form, analogous and imperfect, just as natural knowledge was described above. “For although by revelation we are raised to know something that would otherwise be unknown to us, we are not thereby enabled to know in a different way than through sensible things” (St. Thomas, In Boethium de Trinitate q. 6 a. 3). Even in knowledge through faith, God and divine things are conceived after the manner of a creature. Hence, for all knowledge founded on faith, and for theology as a whole, those things said supra nr. 118, about natural knowledge of God apply and must be given great attention.

On the supernatural knowledge of God through intuitive vision

122. The common supernatural knowledge of God possessed by the blessed in the other life is intuitive vision of God. Insofar as this is man's beatitude and eternal life, it is considered in the treatise On the Last Things; here, however, it is to be treated insofar as it is knowledge of God. We shall establish first the fact, namely, that such knowledge of God is possible for human beings; then we shall treat its supernaturality; third we shall inquire further into the nature of the vision; and fourth, into the object that is seen.

PETRUS LOMBARDUS, 1. 4 d. 49; S. TH., 1 q. 12 a. 1; SUÁREZ, De Deo, tr. 1, 1. 2 c. 7; PETAVIUS, De Deo, 1. 7 c. 5-7; FRANZELIN, thes. 15; KLEUTGEN, nr. 409-417; BILLOT, thes. 13; PESCH, prop. 10; MUNCUNILL, nr. 214 ss.; VAN DER MEERSCH, nr. 292-296; BERAZA, Tractatus de Deo elevante, de peccato originali, de novissimis, Bilbao, 1924, pag. 57 ss.

123. BENEDICT XII, in the Constitution Benedictus Deus (1336), describes the intuitive vision of God as follows. The blessed in heaven “see the divine essence by intuitive and also facial vision, with no creature serving as an object seen, but with the divine essence itself immediately showing itself nakedly, clearly, and openly” (Denz 530). It is therefore knowledge of God that is immediate in the strict sense: every created objective medium is denied, that is, a medium which, once known, would lead to knowledge of God (a medium from which), and a medium in which God would be known through what is known. A medium under which (light) is not excluded; a medium by which, since it does not hinder immediate knowledge, should not for this reason be denied in the vision; it will, however, be shown later that it must be ruled out for another reason. God is known neither from creatures, nor through creatures, nor in creatures; rather, knowledge has divine being itself as its immediate term. Such knowledge is not analogous, but proper per se: a thing is known as it is in itself. Thus God is not known as a creature, a finite being, but in God's own manner, as an infinite being. Since the divine essence shows itself nakedly, clearly, and openly in this vision, that knowledge is clear and distinct, neither obscure nor confused. It is readily understood that such knowledge is most aptly called “intuitive vision”: clear intellectual knowledge is called “vision,” by a transferred use of a word drawn from bodily, sensible sight; this word already indicates to some extent that the knowledge is immediate, and the added word “intuitive” emphasizes this still more, while also indicating that the object is physically present to the intellect. The same is expressed by the term “facial vision” (cf. 1 Cor 13), which expresses both the object's presence and the denial of an objective medium.

We affirm that such knowledge is possible for man. We prove this possibility by proving as a fact that God grants this vision to human beings (the blessed). We do not in any way prove this possibility a priori, nor do we claim that we can grasp this possibility intrinsically; rather, only the fact, known through revelation, that man is raised by God to the vision shows us its possibility. This thesis does not ask whether it is naturally possible.

124. The adversaries of this thesis, then, are those who deny the possibility of an intuitive vision of the divine essence itself. Such was THEODORET, who grants that angels see God's splendor, his glory (δόξα), but not the essence itself, which is distinct from that splendor.

In his work Eranistes, dial. 1: “Orth. We, for our part, using pious thoughts and believing the divine testimonies—which expressly affirm that no one has ever seen God ¹—say that those who saw did not see the divine nature, but certain visions accommodated to their capacity. — Eran. That is what we say. — Orth. So let us understand this also of the angels, when we hear that they always see the face of your Father ². For they do not see the divine substance, which can neither be circumscribed nor comprehended nor grasped by the mind, and which comprehends all things, but a certain splendor accommodated to their nature” (MG 83, 49; R 2150).

Likewise the HESYCHASTS (Palamites), Greek monks devoted to mystical contemplation, distinguish between the divine essence and a certain uncreated light that proceeds from the divine essence and is really distinct from it, yet not separate from it. The divine essence can be seen neither in this life nor in the next; mystics and the blessed, however, see that uncreated light.

JUGIE ³ describes the light as follows: “This divine light is the same as sanctifying grace, the light of glory, and glory itself, or the beatitude of the saints. It is something divine and uncreated, not separate from the divine essence, but really distinct from it. For the divine essence as such is wholly imparticipable, invisible, and incommunicable. Yet by supernatural power this divine light was seen with bodily eyes raised and strengthened: by Stephen, by Saul near Damascus, and by the Apostles on Mount Tabor. For the light in which our Lord appeared transfigured and radiant was the glory, effulgence, and ray of his very divinity; therefore it was something uncreated, although distinct from the divine essence” ⁴.

Church documents

125. BENEDICT XII, the Constitution Benedictus Deus, supra nr. 123; the same author, in the booklet Iam dudum to the Armenians (1341), lists as the eighth error of the Armenians: “The Armenians say that the souls of baptized children and the souls of many perfect men will enter the kingdom of heaven after the general judgment ... Yet they will not see the essence of God, because no creature can see it; instead they will see the brightness of God, which emanates from his essence, just as sunlight emanates from the sun and yet is not the sun ... And they say that in this consists the beatitude of perfect saints and baptized children” (Msi 25, 1196).

COUNCIL OF FLORENCE, Decree for the Greeks (1439): “And their souls ... are at once received into heaven and clearly behold God himself, triune and one, as he is” (Denz 693).

HOLY SCRIPTURE

126. 1 Cor 13, 9 ss. After speaking in cap. 12 about charismatic gifts, the Apostle points out in cap. 13 a more excellent way, namely, charity. From verse 2 he compares it with the gifts of knowledge in this life: prophecy, knowledge, and faith. But all these will one day cease, for they are imperfect kinds of knowledge and will not remain when that which is perfect comes. Charity, however, will remain forever, for it is itself perfect. Hence it is clear that the more excellent way is the way of charity.

The Apostle's thought can be set out in this form: When the perfect comes, the imperfect ceases (v. 10; 11); but our present knowledge is imperfect, whereas future knowledge will be perfect (v. 9; 12); therefore, our present knowledge will one day cease. As to the major premise: v. 10 states a universal principle, which v. 11 illustrates with an example. As to the minor premise: v. 9 had already indicated the imperfection of knowledge as the reason why it will one day cease; v. 12 shows in what the imperfection of present knowledge and the perfection of future knowledge consist, comparing the two kinds of knowledge. This part contains the argument for our thesis. Present knowledge is imperfect, for it is through a mirror: whatever one may think about mirrors in antiquity, St. Paul undoubtedly means knowledge through an instrument, mediated knowledge ⁵; the perfection opposite to it, therefore, is that future knowledge is immediate. Another imperfection of knowledge in the present life consists in its being in a riddle: truth in a riddle does not appear clearly and openly, but is wrapped up in other truths. Knowledge in a riddle is therefore understood as obscure, mediated through other truths, and improper; the opposite perfection will be clear and proper knowledge. The Apostle himself expresses the opposition to “through a mirror, in a riddle” by “face to face,” which means seeing “in such a way that face is turned toward face, immediately, in person” (ZORELL). It is, then, an immediate intuition of a person ⁶. In part: From the described character of present, imperfect knowledge it follows that by this knowledge God is known “partially,” that is, something of God is known: God under this or that aspect, in this or that respect. To this is opposed perfect knowledge, which concerns its object in such a way that the whole object is known and nothing of the object remains unknown. Even as I have been known: just as we have been known immediately by God, so we shall know God immediately. The Apostle always contrasts different modes or kinds of knowing, not different degrees of perfection within the same kind. Therefore, he does not say that our mode of knowing is at the same degree of perfection as God's; he does not affirm that our knowledge of God is comprehensive. The object of the imperfect knowledge of which the Apostle speaks is divine things, above all God himself; hence the object of perfect knowledge is the same. And since it is knowledge “face to face,” “even as I have been known,” it concerns knowledge of a personal being; hence it is knowledge of God himself.

Therefore, the future knowledge of God described by the Apostle in 1 Cor 13 is immediate, facial, clear, and proper knowledge; but this is precisely intuitive vision of God (supra nr. 123); therefore, this vision is possible for man.

127. 1 Io 3, 2: The text seems clear; nevertheless, the force of the argument from this text depends to some extent on how the words “when it appears” are interpreted. If they mean “when what we shall be appears,” then “to him” and “him” are rightly understood of God, and the intended conclusion follows. But if they mean “when Christ appears,” then “to him” and “him” seem to be understood as seeing Christ in glory at the Second Coming. Even so, however, the Apostle hardly seems to be speaking of seeing Christ's bare humanity.

The Roman Catechism understands these words in the former way: “For he (St. JOHN) means that beatitude consists of these two things: that we shall gaze upon God as he is in his nature and substance, and that we shall be made, as it were, gods” (P. 1 c. 13 nr. 7).

The intuitive vision of God possessed by angels is referred to in Mt 18, 10; see also Io 17, 24; Apoc 22, 4; 2 Cor 5, 6 ss.

THE FATHERS

128. ST. IRENAEUS, Adversus haereses, 1. 4 c. 20 nr. 5: “In view of his greatness and wondrous glory, no one will see God and live ⁷; for the Father cannot be grasped. But in view of his love and kindness, and his power over all things, he grants even this to those who love him, namely, to see God, as the prophets also foretold. For what is impossible with men is possible with God ⁸. Man does not see God by himself. But God is seen by men at his will, by whom he wills, when he wills, and as he wills. For God is powerful in all things: he was seen then through the Spirit of prophecy; he was also seen through the Son by adoption; and he will be seen in the kingdom of heaven in the paternal manner, with the Spirit preparing man in the Son of God, the Son bringing him to the Father, and the Father bestowing incorruptibility unto eternal life, which comes to each person from seeing God” (MG 7, 1035; R 236).

ST. CYPRIAN, Epist. 58, 10 (al. 56): “What glory and how great a joy it will be to be admitted to see God ...” (ML 4, 357; R 579).

129. PSEUDO-BASIL (Evagrius Ponticus?), Epist. 8, 7: Neither the Lord considered according to the Incarnation, nor the contemplation that is in angels, is the highest good to be desired. “For even knowledge of these things is crude when compared with that which is face to face. The Father alone, he says, knows, for he himself is both the end and the highest beatitude. For when we no longer know God in mirrors or through things other than himself, but approach him as though alone and one, then we shall also know the ultimate end. For they say that Christ's kingdom is all material knowledge, whereas the Father's is immaterial contemplation of God and, so to speak, of divinity itself. And our Lord himself is also the end and the highest beatitude when considered as the Word” (MG 32, 256; R 913) ⁹.

ST. GREGORY NAZIANZEN, Orat. theol. 2, n. 17, 31 (MG 36, 48. 72; R 988, 989).

130. ST. EPIPHANIUS, Adv. haeres. Panar., haer. 70, c. 7: “For God to be seen, especially by human nature, is impossible, nor is it permitted for the visible to see the invisible. But this invisible God, out of kindness and power, strengthens the weak, enabling them by his power to behold the invisible and infinite God—not insofar as he is infinite, but to the extent that their weak nature can grasp him, once strengthened with such force and power that it can attain knowledge of that mighty one. And there will be no discrepancy in divine Scripture, nor will one statement be found opposed to another” (MG 42, 349; R 1106).

ST. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM, Ad Theodorum lapsum, 1. 1 nr. 11: “Listen to what blessed Peter says: It is good for us to be here ¹⁰. If he, after seeing an obscure image of future things, immediately cast everything else from his mind because of the pleasure infused by such a vision, what will be said when the very truth of things is present, when the royal halls are opened and it will be possible to behold the King himself, no longer in a riddle or through a mirror, but face to face, no longer through faith but through direct sight?” (MG 47, 292; R 1114).

131. ST. AUGUSTINE, De civitate Dei, 1. 22 c. 29 nr. 1: “... Their angels in heaven always see the face of my Father who is in heaven ¹¹. Just as they see, so we too shall see, although we do not yet see in that way. For this reason the Apostle says what I said a little earlier: Now we see through a mirror, in a riddle, but then face to face. This vision is therefore reserved for us as the reward of faith. Speaking of it, the Apostle John also says, when he appears, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is ¹². The face of God is to be understood as his manifestation, not as some bodily member like the one we have and call by that name” (ML 41, 797; R 1786). At least this much is to be understood of spiritual vision, according to St. Augustine; he then discusses whether, and in what sense, God is also seen by the blessed through bodies. Cf. Retractationes, 1. 1.c. 14 nr. 2 (ML 32, 606; R 1971).

132. ST. GREGORY THE GREAT, Moralia, 1. 2 c. 3 nr. 3 (ML 75, 612; R 2303); 1. 18 nr. 90 ss.: “It must be known, however, that there were some who said that God is indeed seen in his splendor in that region of beatitude, but is not seen in his nature. They were misled by a lack of subtlety in their inquiry. For in that simple and immutable essence, splendor is not one thing and nature another; rather, its very nature is splendor, and its splendor is nature. Since this Wisdom of God would one day show himself to those who love him, he himself promises, saying, whoever loves me ... I will manifest myself to him ¹³, as if to say plainly: you who see me in your (human) nature still have to see me in my (divine) nature. Hence he says again, Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God ¹⁴. Hence Paul says, Now we see through a mirror, in a riddle, but then face to face. Now I know in part, but then I shall know even as I have been known” ¹⁵ (ML 76, 93 ss.).

On the opinions of medieval theologians as to whether the beatific vision of God is without a medium, see DONDAINE¹⁶, L'objet et le “medium” de la vision béatifique chez les théologiens du XIII siècle. Rech. de Théol. anc. et méd. 19 (1952) 60-99; text 100-130. The same author, Hugues de S. Cher et la condamnation de 1241. Revue des sc. phil. et théol. 33 (1949) 170-174. In 1241 the University of Paris condemned the proposition: The divine essence in itself will be seen neither by man nor by angel. (Chartul. Univ. Paris. I nr. 128).

Objections

133. 1. From 1 Cor 13 it seems that perfect and imperfect knowledge differ only in degree; but imperfect knowledge of God is mediated; therefore perfect knowledge is mediated too. Hence it is not intuitive vision.

Proof of the major: According to v. 11, future knowledge relates to present knowledge as the knowledge of a man to that of a child, and according to v. 12 as knowledge in part to knowledge in full; but these are differences of degree; therefore.

I answer. I deny the major; I grant the minor. As to the proof of the major: a) regarding v. 11, I distinguish the major: he directly introduces that comparison to show the difference between the two kinds of knowledge, I deny (supra nr. 126: he introduces it directly to illustrate the universal principle stated earlier); perhaps the difference between the kinds of knowledge is also indicated to some extent in this example; I distinguish further: under some universal notion of the perfect and imperfect, I grant or pass over; by indicating precisely what that perfection and imperfection consists in, I deny. I pass over the minor. I distinguish the conclusion according to the distinction made in the major: one could conclude that the difference is a difference of degree if he introduced the example to show the difference between perfect and imperfect knowledge, and what it consists in, I grant; if he introduces it directly for another end, I deny.

b) Regarding v. 12: I grant the major; I distinguish the minor: it can be a difference of degree, I grant; it must be a difference of degree, I deny. I distinguish the parallel conclusion in the same way: if “in part” and “in full” necessarily expressed a difference of degree, I grant; if not, I deny. It is indeed possible that, within the same mode of knowing, the object is known in part by one act of knowledge and in its entirety by another. Nevertheless, it is also possible that the nature of one mode of knowing necessarily entails that such an object is known and can be known only in part (knowledge partial by its nature), whereas another mode of knowing is by its nature knowledge of the whole object. Hence, from the words “in part” one cannot by themselves infer anything about the nature of the knowledge; one must attend to the kind of knowledge to which they are opposed in context (cf. supra nr. 126).

2. If St. Paul's words are understood strictly, they prove comprehensive knowledge (v. 12: “even as I have been known”); but this is impossible even for the blessed; therefore, the Apostle's words must be restricted.

I answer. I distinguish the major: if the Apostle were speaking directly of different degrees of perfection in the same mode of knowing, I grant or pass over; if he is speaking of a different kind of knowing, I deny (cf. the explanation of the text).

134. 3. The same terms occur in Exod 33 and Num 12 as in 1 Cor 13; but Moses did not see God intuitively; therefore, neither do they signify intuitive vision in St. Paul's passage.

I answer. Those who affirm, with St. Thomas (1 q. 12 a. 11; 2, 2 q. 174; q. 175 a. 3) and others, that Moses¹⁷ and Paul saw God himself intuitively, pass over the major and deny the minor, and the difficulty disappears. Many theologians, however, deny that Moses had an intuitive vision of God (because of Io 1, 18; 1 Tim 6, 16); they concede the minor but deny the major. For Ex 33, 11 says that God spoke with Moses face to face, while v. 20 explicitly denies him the vision of God's face; Num 12, 8 says, “openly and not through riddles and figures he sees the Lord” (from which text some conclude that there was a true vision of God), but it does not say “face to face.” According to those who deny that Moses had a vision, those words contain nothing more “than a comparison between the more exalted intellectual manifestation made to Moses and the more symbolic manifestations made to the other prophets” (FRANZELIN, p. 189, nota 3). Moreover, in these texts one must attend to whether the subject is intellectual vision or sensible apparition, for example in Num 14, 14. Further, “it must be noted that the angel of the Lord (Maleach Iahve), who appeared to Moses and others in the Old Testament, was not God, but an angel who appeared in visible form, performing a divine mission and speaking in God's person: ‘I am the God of your fathers.’ The Jews knew this well (Act 7, 30. 34. 53; Gal 3, 19; Hebr 2). Therefore, when Jacob says, ‘I saw God face to face’ (Gen 32, 30), the context shows that he saw the visible form of the angel with whom he wrestled” (PESCH, nr. 66) ¹⁸.

135. 4. According to Holy Scripture, God is invisible: Rom 1, 20; 1 Tim 1, 17; 6, 16.

I answer. He is invisible to bodily eyes and to the created intellect by nature, I concede; that he is not visible even supernaturally, I deny.

5. Comparing 1 Cor 13 with 2 Cor 5, 7, the subject seems to be Christ; therefore, the passage concerns not intuitive vision of the divine essence, but seeing Christ glorified.

I answer. From what was said in the explanation of the text (nr. 126), the subject is knowing God himself. But if the text were applied to Christ, it would have to be understood of his divinity.

136. 6. The holy Fathers deny the vision of God. For example, ST. CYRIL OF JERUSALEM, Catech. 6, c. 6 (MG 33, 545; R 822); ST. CHRYSOSTOM, De incomprehensibili, hom. 1 n. 6: “But, if you will, leaving Paul and the prophets aside, let us ascend to heaven and see whether there may perhaps be anyone there who knows God's substance. Even if there are any there who know it, they have nothing in common with us, for there is a great difference between angels and men. Yet, so that you may learn all the more that no created power there knows it, let us listen to the angels themselves. What, then? Do they discuss that substance there and question one another about it? Not at all” (MG 48, 707; R 1123).

I answer. Attention must be paid to how they understand “vision.” When they argue against the Eunomians, it often means comprehension of God, which is rightly denied even to the blessed without denying intuitive vision; sometimes they deny only intuitive vision in this life, or bodily vision (cf. VÁZQUEZ, in 1 disp. 37 c. 1 ss.; PETAVIUS, De Deo, 1. 7 cap. 5 et 6; DONDAINE, supra nr. 132).

7. The arguments by which it is contended that intuitive vision of God is impossible cannot yet be explained here; see nr. 197 ss. for these arguments.

S. TH., 1 q. 12 a. 4; SUÁREZ, tr. 1, 1. 2, c. 8, 9; FRANZELIN, thes. 14; KLEUTGEN, nr. 398-408; PALMIERI, Tractatus de Deo creante et elevante, Romae 1878, thes. 34-39; 43; BILLOT, thes. 13; PESCH, prop. 8; MUNCUNILL, nr. 199 ss.; VAN DER MEERSCH, nr. 297-302; BERAZA, pag. 65 ss.

137. The supernatural is distinguished from the natural insofar as “natural” signifies what is due to created nature. Things belong to a nature constitutively (essential and integral parts), consecutively (properties, faculties, acts), and exigentially (things external to nature itself, but required by it, whether physically—as necessary for its sustenance, development, or attainment of its natural end—or morally, as a due reward). The supernatural is what does not belong to created nature in any of these ways; it can therefore be described as a gift of God positively undue to created nature and superadded to it.

St. Thomas explains well the reason for this due or undue character, which in our day has not always been correctly understood: “Once it is supposed that God wills to do something, it follows from the supposition of his liberality, by way of a certain debt, that he does those things without which the thing he wills cannot exist—as, if he wills to make a human being, he gives him reason. But wherever there is something without which another thing willed by God could exist, this does not proceed from him by reason of any debt, but from sheer liberality. The perfections of grace and glory, however, are goods of this kind, since nature can exist without them; for they exceed the limits of natural power. Hence, when God wills to give someone grace and glory, this proceeds from sheer liberality.” De veritate q. 6 a. 2 c.

The supernatural is not distinguished from the natural insofar as “natural” means what was present from birth, from the first origin, or from the beginning; its opposite in this sense is what was added or acquired later. In this sense, therefore, supernatural gifts can be natural.

Nor is it distinguished from the natural insofar as “natural” means what is fitting to nature, whose opposite is what is violent; in this sense too the supernatural can be natural.

Finally, it is not distinguished from the natural insofar as “natural” means what proceeds necessarily from nature—for example, from a faculty—and is necessarily posited, whose opposite is what is free.

138. The supernatural is divided into the supernatural in mode, when the gift itself that is conferred is natural to the subject, but the mode in which it is conferred is undue (the miraculous restoration of sight); and the supernatural in substance, when what is conferred belongs to nature neither constitutively, consecutively, nor exigentially, but is positively undue to nature. The supernatural in substance is relative supernatural if it is undue in the stated way to the particular creature to whom it is conferred, though it need not be undue to every created being (freedom from the necessity of dying in a human being); it is supernatural simply, or better, absolutely supernatural, if it is undue to every created and creatable being: it exceeds the order of creatures and hence belongs to the divine order.

Attention should be paid to the terminology of different authors. Sometimes what was called above “supernatural in mode” is called “supernatural in a qualified sense”; accordingly, “supernatural in substance” can be called “supernatural simply.” The risk of such confusion seems reduced if the terms “supernatural in a qualified sense” and “supernatural simply” are avoided.

139. In the thesis we affirm that the intuitive vision of God is absolutely supernatural. On this point there are various opinions.

1. The BEGUARDS AND BEGUINES denied that the vision which is final beatitude is supernatural. Their opinion was condemned at the Council of Vienne (1311–1312). According to them, vision belongs consecutively to nature. “That every intellectual nature is naturally blessed in itself, and that the soul does not need the light of glory to raise it up to see God and enjoy him in beatitude” (Denz 475; cf. 474) ¹.

140. 2. The denial that vision is supernatural is contained in the teaching of BAIUS, whose fundamental error seems to have been that he falsely conceived the relation of human nature to the supernatural end actually given by God, insofar as he held this to be the only possible end and the gifts corresponding to this end to be due to integral nature. Cf. prop. 21, 23, 24 (Denz 1021 etc.) ². Vision therefore belongs exigentially to nature. Similarly, JANSENIUS, who says in De statu purae naturae, bk. 2, c. 3: “Here we shall prove that the beatitude of the clear vision itself cannot be denied even to an innocent creature in the kingdom of God” ³.

141. 3. RIPALDA did not extend the concept of nature (the natural order) to all creatable substances, but restricted it to existing substances and possible substances akin to those that exist (De ente supernaturali, disp. 3, sect. 2). There may therefore be possible substances superior to them, for which the vision of God would be connatural; he calls such a creature a supernatural substance. According to him, if one follows the authorities, one might say that such a substance is impossible; but if one follows natural reason, he says he finds no repugnance, while the contrary authority does not seem such as to make it rash to depart from it (Disp. 23; 132, sect. 4). On this opinion, vision would no longer be supernatural for every possible creature; it would therefore have to be called supernatural only relatively.

“Nature, then, is better explained in theological usage if it is said to be the collection of substances that now exist and of the possible substances attached and akin to those that exist. Those possible substances are akin and attached to existing ones whose impossibility would necessarily entail the impossibility of some existing substances, because of the transcendental order by which they are related to them. These, in turn, are the substances contained essentially within the natural physical or intentional powers of existing substances. I mean that those substances are contained essentially within the physical powers of existing things which, as to their essence, can be made adequately or inadequately by the natural power of existing things. Those, meanwhile, are contained essentially within the natural intentional powers which can be attained essentially by some cognition natural to existing things. For this reason possible angels, though superior to existing things, are not beyond nature … But a substance able to produce by its own powers the vision of God, an act of faith, or another salutary act would be beyond nature and supernatural, because such a substance is contained essentially neither within the natural physical powers nor within the natural intentional powers of existing things. For just as justifying grace, the habits of the light of glory, charity, and faith are not now known essentially, so neither could that substance, equivalent in power and perfection to these supernatural gifts, if it were possible, be made or known essentially by the natural power of existing things” (Disp. 3, sect. 2). “If we follow authority, the opinion that denies a possible supernatural substance must be defended absolutely, and consequently affirms that supernatural things are beyond every creatable substance … The authority for this opinion that denies it is not so great that an opinion freely affirming it cannot be defended without a mark of rashness … (For) the only authority that openly opposes the opinion affirming a supernatural substance is that of recent authors. But the authority of recent authors alone does not suffice to brand an opinion with any rashness” (Disp. 23, s. 2). “Following reason, I do not find a supernatural substance repugnant … Moreover, if we are guided only by the light of reason, it would not be improbable that such a substance is possible … For if a limited and finite accidental perfection can contain something supernatural, limited and finite, by some kind of connection, why, by the same reasoning, could not a substantial perfection, however finite and limited, contain the same?” (sect. 3). Cf. disp. 132, sect. 40. On this question, see also Molina, In 1 q. 12 a. 5 disp. 2.

142. 4. Vision is absolutely supernatural. This is by far the most common opinion among theologians.

Teaching of the Church

143. THE COUNCIL OF VIENNE, condemnation of the errors of the BEGUARDS AND BEGUINES (above, nr. 139); PIUS V in the condemnation of the errors of BAIUS (above, nr. 140); cf. CLEMENT XI, Constitution “Unigenitus” (1713), nr. 35, 37 (Denz 1385; 1387); PIUS VI, Constitution “Auctorem fidei” (1794), nr. 16 (Denz 1516); THE VATICAN COUNCIL, s. 3 cap. 2: “By his infinite goodness God ordained man to a supernatural end, namely, to share in divine goods that utterly surpass the understanding of the human mind” (Denz 1786). Here “the supernatural end to which man is ordained” is taught (above, nr. 31). From the Council of Vienne, our thesis is de fide at least with regard to existing intellectual creatures. PIUS XII, Encyclical “Humani generis,” 12 August 1950: “Others corrupt the true ‘gratuitousness’ of the supernatural order when they claim that God cannot create beings endowed with intellect without ordaining and calling them to the beatific vision” (AAS 42, 1950, 570).

PRELIMINARY NOTE ON THE ARGUMENT FROM SACRED SCRIPTURE AND THE FATHERS. The thesis can be proved from Sacred Scripture and the Fathers in two wholly independent ways: one, by showing that in the present order absolutely supernatural gifts are conferred on man, and therefore the vision which is the end of this order must have the same supernatural character; the other, by showing directly that vision itself is supernatural.

Sacred Scripture

144. First way: Since this matter is usually explained in other treatises as well, it is enough here to give a brief account of the principal idea.

In the present order, the just person is a child of God, regenerated and born of God: Rom 8, 15-17; Gal 4, 5-7; Tit 3, 5 ss.; Io 1, 12; 1 Io 2, 29; 3, 1. 2. 8. 9; 4, 7; 5, 12. Although the mere name “child” could be understood metaphorically, this is ruled out by the fact that this sonship is adoptive, which is not usually understood in an improper sense, especially when said of individuals (theocratic adoptive sonship is said of the people, Rom 9, 4). Indeed, it is clear that in the present case adoptive sonship must be taken in the proper sense from the fact that, according to St. Paul, the right of inheritance follows from this adoption (Rom 8; Gal 4; Tit 3). Adoption, however, is the taking of an outsider into the rights of a natural child; by its very concept, then, it is undue to those who are not natural children. In human adoption it is only morally undue, insofar as the adopted person is not a natural child; but the nature of the rights and the goods to which the right is granted remain within the human order. The goods proper to the natural Son of God, however, belong to the divine order and exceed the whole natural order. Hence adoption as a child of God, by which the just person becomes an heir of God and a co-heir with Christ (Rom 8), and by which the goods of the natural Son of God are or will be shared (cf. Io 14, 2; 15, 1 ss.; Apoc 3, 21), exceeds the order of creatures and is absolutely supernatural (cf. 2 Pet 1, 4, partakers of the divine nature). The intuitive vision of God is, in concrete terms, that inheritance, that beatitude (cf. Denz 530, 693); it is the end of this supernatural order, its perfection and summit, and must have the same supernatural character. Therefore the vision of God is absolutely supernatural.

145. Objection. According to the explanation given above, adoptive sonship seems opposed to the servitude proper to a creature as creature. But 1) this opposition does not seem to accord with St. Paul’s intention, since he opposes sonship either to slavery to sin or to slavery under the old law (Gal 4), which nevertheless presupposes slavery to sin; therefore sonship is in itself due to man before sin, and thus is not absolutely supernatural; 2) if, however, one admitted that this sonship is opposed to the servitude of a creature, one would establish that by this adoption the creature ceases to be a servant, which seems impossible in itself.

I answer. To 1: In either case, it is supposed that sonship is natural to man; but if that were so, its conferral after sin and slavery under the law could not be called adoption, but only restoration, namely, of the rights of a natural child. Now in fact it is called adoption; in the present order this also has the character of restoration, because before Adam’s sin man had already been established as an adoptive child of God. It is therefore a restoration of adoption.

To 2: “Servant” is said a) in opposition to “free,” and signifies one who is subject to a master and must “serve”; b) in opposition to “child,” and signifies one who does not belong to the “family” and has no family rights. In both senses a creature is naturally God’s servant: adoption removes the latter servitude, while the former remains. An adoptive child of God too must “serve” God.

146. Second way: 1) The vision of God belongs exclusively to the divine persons; therefore it is natural to no creature, that is, it is absolutely supernatural.

Proof of the antecedent. In Matth 11, 27 (Luc 10, 22), Christ attributes to the divine persons a certain knowledge that belongs exclusively to them; but this is the intuitive vision of God; therefore. Proof of the minor. That knowledge cannot be understood as mediated knowledge of God, for a) this belongs to creatures, and b) it does not lead to knowledge of divine paternity and filiation, as does the knowledge of which Christ speaks. Still less can it be understood as knowledge through faith, since this too is mediated and can in no way have a place in the divine persons. Therefore it must be understood as immediate knowledge by which the divine persons themselves are known, that is, intuitive vision. This is in fact comprehensive, but Christ does not consider it here under this aspect; he considers it precisely insofar as it is knowledge of divine paternity and filiation. For the object of this knowledge can be made known to human beings through revelation and believed by them through faith, which is not true of this knowledge insofar as it is comprehensive. Therefore the knowledge which Christ here presents as belonging exclusively to the divine persons is precisely the intuitive vision of God itself.

From the fact that vision belongs exclusively to God, it does indeed follow that it cannot be proper and natural to any creature; it does not follow, however, that it cannot be communicated to a creature supernaturally. We have positively proved in the preceding thesis that this can happen.

2. God is invisible to the human intellect: Rom 1, 20; 1 Tim 6, 16. Neither passage concerns bodily invisibility: the things invisible in Rom 1, 20—the eternal power and divinity—are perceived intellectually through creatures; and in 1 Tim 6, 16, dwelling in inaccessible light is listed among the perfections proper to God alone, which cannot be said of bodily invisibility. Cf. Io 1, 18; 6, 46; 1 Io 4, 12.

3. 1 Cor 2, 7 ss. is now commonly understood by exegetes of the plan of redemption; in tradition, v. 9 is often applied to the beatific vision (as at the Vatican Council concerning the supernatural end).

The Fathers

147. First way: The argument can be framed in the same way as above (nr. 144), from Sacred Scripture. SCHEEBEN explains this matter well, Handbuch der Dogmatik, II, § 163; for patristic texts, see also R: in justification, man becomes a partaker of the divine nature (ser. 358), an adoptive child of God (ser. 359), an heir of the heavenly kingdom (ser. 360); supernatural gifts (ser. 353); the vision of God is beatitude (ser. 607).

148. Second way: According to the teaching of the Fathers, no creature can see God naturally.

ST. IRENAEUS (above, nr. 128); ORIGEN, De principiis, 1. 1 c. 1 nr. 6: “Since our mind cannot by itself contemplate God as he is, it understands the Father of the universe from the beauty of his works and the splendor of creatures” (MG 11, 124; R 451). ST. ATHANASIUS (above, nr. 82); ST. GREGORY NAZIANZEN (above, nr. 83); DIDYMUS OF ALEXANDRIA, De Trinitate, 1. 3 c. 16: “Since God exists above the invisible, above what is most hidden, and above every mind, he cannot fall under vision or any sense at all, nor even be seen by the minds of the angels themselves, because he is incomprehensible and inaccessible” (MG 39, 873; R 1075). ST. CHRYSOSTOM, De incomprehensibili, hom. 3 nr. 1: “Let us therefore call him the ineffable, unintelligible God, invisible, incomprehensible, surpassing the power of human speech, exceeding the grasp of mortal thought, untraceable by angels, invisible to seraphim, unintelligible to cherubim, unseeable by principalities, powers, and virtues, and simply by every creature, but known by the Son alone and the Holy Spirit” (MG 48, 720; R 1125).

Reason

149. Vision is not natural to man during the state of union: The intuitive vision of God is immediate cognition, proper per se, through its proper form, by which God is known as he is in himself. The proper and proportionate object of the human intellect in the state of union, however, is the intelligible as found in sensible things. Hence the intuitive vision of God is not natural to the human intellect during the state of union.

150. Vision is absolutely supernatural: Natural cognition is according to the mode of being of the knower; but the mode of being of every creature is potential; therefore the natural cognition of every creature is according to the mode of a potential being. But the mode of being proper to God is not potential; rather, it excludes all potentiality. Therefore no creature naturally knows God according to the mode of being proper to God. But the intuitive vision of God is precisely the cognition by which God is known according to the mode of being proper to God, as he is in himself. Therefore the intuitive vision of God is natural to no creature: vision is absolutely supernatural.

151. The principle from which the argument proceeds is sometimes stated as follows: “The mode of knowing does not exceed the perfection of being.” This can readily be understood as an application of the principle “the mode of operation does not exceed the mode of being.” The principle, so stated, can also be understood in the same sense as the form given above. More immediately, however, it seems to say something about the entitative perfection of the cognitive act, not immediately and directly about the perfection of the mode by which it reaches its object; yet the entitative perfection of an act can be essentially different without an essential difference in the mode by which it is directed to its object (the act of bodily vision in a brute animal and in an infant who has no use of reason at all). The principle “natural cognition is according to the mode of the knower,” however, says something directly about the mode in which the cognitive act is directed to its object. It considers the act precisely as cognition, that is, as the “living representation” of an object, and asserts that this living representation of the object follows not the being of the object but the being of the subject. In other words, different perfections of being correspond to different proper and proportionate objects; here “different perfections of being” does not mean every different physical perfection, but perfection in the very character of being, a different simplicity of being itself.

152. God is his own being; angels are beings that exist not in matter; human souls in the state of the present life are beings that exist in individual matter. The cognitive power of the human soul which is the act of a bodily organ, namely, sense, knows things insofar as they are in matter, as singulars. The cognitive power of the human soul which is not the act of a bodily organ, namely, intellect, knows natures that do indeed exist in individual matter, but not insofar as they are in individual matter; it knows them insofar as they are abstracted from matter. It is connatural to angelic intellect to know what exists not in matter; it is proper and connatural to God to know subsistent being itself (S. TH. 1 q. 12 a. 4; cf. 1, 2 q. 5 art. 5).

153. St. THOMAS gives the reason (ibid.): “Cognition takes place insofar as the thing known is in the knower (not insofar as the thing known is in itself). The thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower (for whatever is received is received according to the mode of the recipient). Hence the cognition of every knower is according to the mode of its nature.”

The reason for the assertion still needs to be supplied: cognition takes place insofar as the thing known is in the knower. This reason seems to be a principle of sufficient reason. In natural cognition, the first act must contain a sufficient reason for this determinate second act; therefore the object too must in some way be contained in the first act (whether in itself, by its likeness, or in some other way). For if it were in no way present in the first act, the first act would no longer be the sufficient reason why this object was known. Hence the object is also known in the mode in which it is in the first act (that is, not in another mode, and at least not in a more perfect mode). In other words, cognition is not according to the thing known as it is in itself, but according to the thing known as it is in the knower.

154. It must be noted that the argument holds for natural cognition, in which natural principles are applied in a natural mode. It cannot be applied in itself to cognition in which principles of a higher order intervene. Therefore one cannot conclude that the vision of God is absolutely impossible for a creature, but only that it is impossible for a creature naturally, with only natural principles applied in a natural mode. A priori, we do not know whether God can supply by some special influx what is not yet contained in the creature’s first act, so that cognition according to the mode proper to God follows, although God according to his proper mode is not contained in the creature’s first act. If the fact of such cognition is established, its possibility is established as well; and by that very fact it is established that God can supply what is lacking, while the argument just given does not contradict this.

Objections

155. 1. The supernatural character of vision is not proved from Matth 11, 27; for the text can be understood of the comprehensive knowledge of God, which belongs exclusively to the divine persons. Therefore it does not prove that intuitive, non-comprehensive vision is natural to no creature.

I answer. I deny the antecedent, according to what was said at nr. 146.

156. 2. If the argument from reason proves anything, it proves metaphysical impossibility; therefore it proves too much. The answer is given at nr. 154.

Yet according to the explanation given for the argument from reason, vision seems to be impossible. Proof. No faculty can go beyond its object; but God according to his proper being is beyond the object of every created intellect; therefore vision is impossible for every creature.

I answer. I distinguish the major: beyond its adequate object, I grant; beyond its proper and proportionate object, I distinguish: naturally, I grant; supernaturally, I ask for proof. I contradict the minor: beyond its adequate object, I deny; beyond its proper and proportionate object, I grant.

157. 3. Vision does not seem supernatural to every creatable substance (RIPALDA); therefore it is not absolutely supernatural in the sense intended by the thesis.

The antecedent is proved from the fact that man, endowed with an accidental perfection, can see God: if a created accidental perfection can contain such an ordering to the vision of God that an intellect endowed with this perfection can see God, there is no reason to deny the same ordering to a created substance of the same order of perfection as that accidental perfection. But a vision of God is possible to such a substance from its natural principles; that is, vision is not supernatural for it. Therefore vision is not absolutely supernatural for every creatable substance.

I answer. I deny the antecedent. To its proof, I deny the major. For even if we set aside the question whether a created substance in the same order of perfection as the accidental perfection of the human intellect seeing God is possible at all (which many deny), the vision of God would not be natural to such a created substance (assuming, not conceding, that it is possible). For the mode of being of a created substance that sees God through its own principles applied naturally would have to equal God’s mode of being; that is, such a created substance would have to be God. Thus it seems possible to show a contradiction in the claim that a created substance sees God by acting naturally; but no contradiction can be shown in the claim that a created substance, while remaining a creature, sees God through accidental supernatural elevation, not by acting through natural principles alone applied naturally (cf. the argument from reason).

158. 4. In man there is a natural appetite for the vision of God; but the object of a natural appetite is natural and proportionate to nature; therefore the vision of God is natural to man ⁴.

I answer. I distinguish the major: an innate appetite, I deny; an elicited appetite can be present in a merely natural way, I distinguish: if man certainly knows by reason alone that this vision is possible for him, I grant; if he cannot know this in that way, I deny. I contradict the minor: the object of an innate appetite, I grant; of an elicited appetite, I distinguish: it can be natural, I grant; it must be natural, I deny.

An innate appetite is the ordering of a nature toward some good prior to the subject’s cognition of that good. It is often divided into an appetite of exigence and an appetite of aptitude or capacity. The former requires the good, and if the good is denied, something is lacking to the nature; the latter says only that the nature is capable of receiving such a good (that such a good is not repugnant to this nature). The latter is called an appetite in a very improper sense; of itself it abstracts from whether the object is proportionate and due, and it can concern a good that is not proportionate and is undue. An innate appetite of exigence, however, expresses a positive inclination toward an object (the weight of nature); it is necessarily directed toward a good proportionate and due to nature. From such an appetite, then, one rightly infers that the object is natural.

An elicited appetite is a second, vital act, following cognition and tending toward a known good. From an elicited appetite one cannot in itself conclude that its object is proportionate and due to the nature, because any good, provided it is known, can be desired. But if man could certainly and positively know the possibility of the vision of God by a purely natural way and by purely natural principles (hence without any positive revelation and without any communication based on revelation), it seems that one would have to conclude that this vision is at least exigentially natural. For on that supposition it seems that man could no longer attain final beatitude without the vision of God; if he knows in the stated way that intuitive vision of God is possible for him, he seems necessarily to have to say that it is destined for him as his ultimate end ⁵.

If, however, man has learned from revelation that the vision is possible supernaturally, an elicited appetite for so great a good can indeed arise; but one can no longer infer from such an appetite that this good is natural or due to man.

159. According to the teaching of the Baianists, one must undoubtedly admit in man a natural appetite for the beatific vision, and indeed a natural appetite in the strict sense, so that this vision is due to integral nature and is man’s natural end. Whoever posits such an appetite in fact denies the supernatural character of vision. BERTI explains the opinion of the Augustinians as follows: “What, I ask, do the Augustinian theologians teach when they say that the state of pure nature is impossible, unless that the ultimate end of a rational creature is God and the intuitive vision of him; that this end is natural as regards the inclination and appetite of the rational creature, but supernatural as regards its attainment and the means by which it is acquired; that without such attainment rational creatures would be most miserable and worse off than the other things created by God that attain their natural end; and that in this, therefore, the nature of angels and human beings surpasses irrational and corporeal substances, namely, that the most excellent end has been established for them, which they cannot attain by the powers of nature alone. Hence supernatural helps of grace had to be conferred on integral nature, uncorrupted by any sin, so that it might attain its end—not because such helps are natural or belong to the constitution of nature, but rather because rational creatures need aids exceeding the order of nature in order to attain their end, and these are in some way due to them: either by title of Providence, which denies no one the means necessary to attain the end, as Fulgentius Bellelli argues, or by the fittingness of the Creator, as Noris taught” ⁶.

To support the doctrine of a natural appetite for the vision of God, BERTI appeals to the opinion of several scholastics. Thus SCOTUS seems to have taught some natural (innate) appetite for vision (Prol. q. 1; in 4 d. 49 q. 10); hence the vision of God can be called man’s natural end as regards appetite, but supernatural as regards attainment; his disciples taught similarly. Moreover: DURANDUS (in 4 d. 39 q. 2), PETRUS DE PALUDE (in 4 d. 49 q. 7 a. 1), DOMINICUS SOTO (in 4 d. 49 q. 2 a. 1); De natura et gratia, 1. 1 c. 4 nr. 8: “It must not be denied that that end is natural to us with respect to appetite, but it is nevertheless above the powers of our nature if you consider its attainment”; TOLETUS (in 1 q. 1 a. 1; tom. 1 pag. 17 ss.); GREGORY OF VALENTIA (De beatitudine, q. 5, punctum 1). ST. BELLARMINE (De gratia primi hominis, 1. 1 c. 7 obi. 13): “I answer that beatitude is man’s natural end as regards appetite, but not as regards attainment. Nor is it new or unworthy of human nature that one naturally desires what one can attain only with supernatural help.” To the objection, “Let it be so: man needs supernatural means; yet it would follow that he could not have been created without those means, and hence could not have been created as he is now born; for he could not have been made for a lower end unless his nature were changed, nor could the means for attaining a natural end have been denied,” he replies: “It was wholly fitting that God should not deny necessary means to man, ordained to so lofty an end; yet nothing absurd would have followed if he had denied them. For although that supreme beatitude is man’s natural end, it is nevertheless a disproportionate end, and besides it man has another natural end wholly proportionate to him, which is to seek truth by reasoning. Therefore God could have led man by natural means to an end proportionate to his nature, without raising him higher.”

160. These words show that this opinion posits no exigence for the vision of God. Hence the natural appetite affirmed by these authors cannot be understood as a natural appetite in the strict sense. Perhaps, at least for some of them, the natural appetite they affirm can be understood as the capacity of intellectual nature for the vision of God (cf. what was said above concerning the appetite of exigence and of capacity, nr. 158). In this sense RIPALDA (De ente supernaturali, disp. 9 sect. 4) considers the scholastic controversy over a natural appetite for the vision of God to be largely about words rather than the matter. If, however, an innate appetite were understood in the strict and proper sense, one would have to conclude that there is a true exigence for vision, and it could no longer be called supernatural in the strict sense.

The same seems to have to be said if the vision is posited as man’s natural end. If this is understood to mean that vision is man’s sole end, to which he is destined as his natural end in every order, so that another natural end for man is impossible, the strict supernatural character of vision does not seem to be preserved. Therefore the doctrine of the Augustinians, as set out above by BERTI, is not to be accepted ⁷. If, however, “natural end” is understood in a certain broader sense, as an end of nature that is not proportionate to it, while some other natural end is admitted as possible, one proportionate to nature, the supernatural character of vision is not necessarily denied. Yet this way of speaking no longer seems suitable today; rather, the vision of God should be called man’s supernatural end.

161. Support for affirming a natural appetite for the vision of God is also drawn from the teaching of ST. THOMAS, who teaches in 1 q. 12 a. 1: To say “that no created intellect can see the essence of God” is foreign to faith and contrary to reason. It is foreign to faith because “if a created intellect can never see the essence of God, then it will either never attain beatitude or its beatitude will consist in something other than God, which is foreign to faith.” He proves that it is contrary to reason in this way: from the natural desire to know the cause when one sees an effect, one would conclude that this desire remains empty if the intellect cannot reach the first cause; from the context it is understood that this means seeing the first cause. Similar statements occur in 1, 2 q. 3 a. 8. Contra Gentiles, bk. 3, c. 50 shows that the desire of separate substances does not rest in the natural cognition they have of God, and hence c. 51 says: “Since it is impossible for a natural desire to be empty—which it would be if it were not possible to attain understanding of the divine substance, which all minds naturally desire—it must be said that it is possible for the substance of God to be seen by the intellect and by separate intellectual substances.” Cf. Comp. Theol. cap. 104 and his manner of speaking about the resurrection of bodies, cap. 151; 152. In 1 Cor c. 13 lect. 4.

162. In these texts, however, the subject does not seem to be an innate appetite in the proper sense; for the appetite or desire under discussion follows cognition, and is therefore an elicited appetite. Moreover, he explicitly denies a natural appetite (the one we called innate above) for the vision of God. De Verit. q. 22 a. 7: “Other things have an implanted natural appetite for some determinate thing, as the heavy for what is below, so that each animal naturally desires what suits it according to its nature. But in man there is implanted an appetite for the ultimate end in general, namely, that he naturally desires to be perfected in goodness. What this perfection consists in—whether in virtues, knowledge, pleasure, or other such things—is not determined for him by nature. When, therefore, by his own reason, aided by divine grace, he apprehends some particular good as his beatitude, in which his beatitude truly consists, he then merits—not because he desires beatitude, which he naturally desires, but because he desires this particular thing, which he does not naturally desire, such as the vision of God, in which his beatitude in fact consists.”

Earlier he had written: “Charity … includes friendship, love, and desire. Natural desire, however, can be only for something that can be had naturally; hence a natural desire for the highest good is in us by nature, insofar as the highest good can be shared by us through natural effects” (In 3 d. 27 q. 2 a. 2 ad 4). “Virtues … are necessary for us so that our natural powers may be directed to the good; therefore no other virtues are needed where natural powers are by their nature already directed to the good. The will has the good, which is the end, as its object; hence, as far as it is concerned, it is naturally directed to the good that is the end proportionate to human nature. For this reason the philosophers posited no virtue in the will with respect to the ultimate end … According to the teaching of faith, an ultimate end that exceeds natural inclination is posited; and so according to theologians one must posit a virtue in the will to raise it to the end in question, and this we call charity” (In 3 d. 27 q. 2 a. 3 ad 5; cf. In 4 d. 49 q. 1 a. 3 qc. 3 in c.).

163. From the natural elicited desire discussed in the passages cited above (nr. 161), one cannot conclude, according to St. Thomas’s meaning, that its object, namely the vision of God, is natural and due. For such an interpretation would contradict what St. Thomas clearly teaches: that seeing the divine essence is proper to God alone and natural to no intellect: 1 q. 12 a. 4; Contra Gent. 1. 3 c. 52; De Veritate q. 8 a. 3. De Malo q. 4 a. 1 ad 14 explains in what sense the absence of vision is a punishment, and in what sense it is not: “The absence of the divine vision pertains to someone in two ways. In one way, he has nothing in himself by which he could attain the divine vision; in that way the absence of the divine vision would pertain even to one who existed with only natural gifts and without sin. For in this way the absence of the divine vision is not a punishment, but a defect consequent upon every created nature, since no creature can attain the divine vision by its natural powers. In another way, the absence of the divine vision can pertain to someone because he has in himself something on account of which he is due to be deprived of the divine vision; in this way the absence of the divine vision is the punishment of both original and actual sin.” Similarly q. 5 a. 1 ad 15; cf. ibid. in corp. and ad 1; art. 2 in corp.: “grace and the divine vision are above human nature.” In art. 3 he explains that those who die with original sin alone suffer no grief or distress from the absence of vision: “The souls of children are not deprived of the natural cognition due to a separated soul according to its nature, but they are deprived of supernatural cognition, which is planted in us here through faith, because they neither had faith in act here nor received the sacrament of faith. It belongs to natural cognition that the soul knows it was created for beatitude and that beatitude consists in the attainment of the perfect good; but that the perfect good for which man was made is the glory possessed by the saints is above natural cognition. Hence the Apostle says, 1 ad Cor 2, 9, that neither eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor has it entered the human heart what God has prepared for those who love him; and he adds: But God has revealed these things to us through his Spirit; this revelation belongs to faith. Therefore the souls of children do not know that they are deprived of such a good, and so they do not grieve; rather, without pain they possess what they have by nature”; ad 4: “Children who die in original sin are separated from God forever as regards the loss of glory, of which they are ignorant, but not as regards their participation in natural goods, which they know.”

Contra Gent. 1. 1 c. 5: “No one tends toward anything by desire and effort unless it is known to him beforehand. Since, therefore, by divine providence human beings are ordained to a good higher than fragile human nature can experience in the present life … the mind had to be called forth to something higher than our reason can attain in the present, so that it might learn to desire and strive for something that exceeds the whole state of the present life.” “Eternal life, however, is a good exceeding the proportion of created nature, since it also exceeds its cognition and desire, according to 1 ad Cor 2, 9” (1, 2 q. 114 a. 2). Therefore the “natural” desire of which St. Thomas speaks has a supernatural object, whose existence can be known only by faith; for a man established in pure nature who dies without sin, its absence would be neither a punishment nor a cause of sadness.

164. Moreover, just as St. Thomas distinguishes two ultimate ends, namely, the natural and the supernatural (1 q. 23 a. 1), so too he distinguishes two kinds of beatitude, 1 q. 62 a. 1: “By the name ‘beatitude’ is understood the ultimate perfection of a rational or intellectual nature; hence it is naturally desired, because each thing naturally desires its ultimate perfection. The ultimate perfection of a rational or intellectual nature, however, is twofold. One it can attain by the power of its nature, and this is called beatitude or happiness in a certain sense. Thus Aristotle (lib. 10 Eth. cap. 8) says that the most perfect contemplation available to man, by which he can contemplate the best intelligible object, which is God, in this life, is man’s ultimate happiness. But above this happiness is another, which we await in the future, when we shall see God as he is; this is above the nature of every created intellect.” And art. 2: “The natural movement of the will is the principle of all the things we will; the natural inclination of the will is toward what is fitting according to nature. Therefore, if something is above nature, the will cannot be borne toward it unless helped by some other supernatural principle … To see God through his essence, in which the ultimate beatitude of a rational creature consists, is above the nature of every created intellect. Hence no rational creature can have a movement of the will ordered to that beatitude unless moved by a supernatural agent; this we call the help of grace.”

Similarly, De Veritate q. 14 a. 2 distinguishes, as it were, two ultimate ends: “There is a twofold ultimate human good that first moves the will as an ultimate end. One is proportionate to human nature, since natural powers suffice to attain it; this is the happiness of which the philosophers spoke … The other is a human good exceeding the proportion of human nature, since natural powers neither suffice to attain it nor to conceive or desire it; it is promised to man by divine liberality alone.” Similarly, q. 14 a. 10, in reply to the objection “man by the nature of his condition was made to be a partaker of eternal beatitude; for God established a rational creature capable of himself, as is stated in 2 Sent. dist. 1; therefore the principles by which he could attain that end had to be implanted in his nature,” he replies: “From its very first establishment, human nature was ordained to the end of beatitude—not as an end due to man according to his nature, but by divine liberality alone; hence the principles of nature need not suffice to attain that end unless aided by gifts superadded through divine liberality.” De Verit. q. 27 a. 2: “Since different natures have different ends, three things are presupposed in natural things for attaining an end: a nature proportionate to that end, an inclination to that end, which is the natural appetite for the end, and movement toward the end. Thus the earth has a nature by which it belongs in the middle, and this nature is followed by an inclination toward the middle place, according to which it naturally desires such a place when it is held outside it by force; hence, if nothing prevents it, it always moves downward. By his nature, man is proportionate to an end for which he has a natural appetite and toward whose attainment he can act by his natural powers: this end is a certain contemplation of divine things, such as is possible for man according to the capacity of his nature, and in which the philosophers placed man’s ultimate happiness. But there is an end for which man is prepared by God that exceeds the proportion of human nature, namely, eternal life, which consists in the vision of God through his essence and exceeds the proportion of every created nature, being connatural to God alone. Hence something must be given to man not only by which he can act toward that end or by which his appetite may be inclined toward it, but by which man’s very nature is raised to a dignity according to which such an end is fitting for him.” Cf. In 3 d. 23 q. 1 a. 4. Nor can one infer from the fact that the vision of God is the end of a rational creature that the creature can reach this end through pure natural powers (De Verit. q. 8 a. 3 ad 12).

“Vision, or beatific knowledge, is in one respect above the nature of the rational soul, insofar as the soul cannot attain it by its own power; in another respect it is according to the soul’s nature, insofar as by its nature it is capable of it, since it was made in the image of God” (3 q. 9 a. 2 ad 3).

165. From what has been said, it is clear that St. Thomas’s doctrine of the natural desire to see God cannot be explained as making the vision of God in some way due to man or naturally exigential. Such an explanation would contradict his clear teaching about its absolute supernatural character: it is an end not proportionate to human nature, to which man is destined by divine liberality alone. The theologians do not agree on how his doctrine of natural desire should be positively explained; the authors cited above may be consulted on this question.

Whether the intuitive vision of God can be proved possible

to the human intellect by reason alone

166. In the fifth thesis the possibility of vision was proved only from the fact that God destined man for this beatitude, a fact proved from revelation itself. In the sixth thesis the strictly supernatural character of this vision was proved: nr. 158 ss. showed that there is no natural appetite, in the strict sense, for the vision.

Whoever denies the supernatural character of vision is readily led to attribute to human reason the ability to know the possibility of vision independently of revelation; the same seems true of those who affirm a natural appetite for the vision. Although the questions are related, however, it is not the same thing to affirm that the possibility of vision can be known by reason alone and to affirm a natural appetite for the vision; one may affirm the former and deny the latter.

The question whether the possibility of vision can be known by reason alone has again been much debated in recent years ⁸; and is in a certain sense the same as the question whether and in what sense the vision of God is a mystery. If reason alone proves that the vision of God is possible to the human intellect, though not by its natural powers alone but through a special divine intervention, it also proves that there are no mysteries in God whose internal possibility is absolutely inaccessible to the human intellect; in other words, it proves that the human intellect can be raised in such a way that no mysteries remain in God for it.

Since the vision of God is cognition according to the mode proper to God, the question whether its possibility can be proved by reason alone can also be stated as follows: Whether it can be proved by reason alone that cognition is possible to the human intellect according to the mode of knowing proper to God as God.

Stated in this way, it also becomes clearer what the question properly means than when one merely says “to see God or God’s essence.”

To prove this possibility by reason’s principles alone, it is not enough to show that such cognition seems fitting to reason; from the fact that something seems fitting to us, it does not yet follow with certainty that it is possible. Nor is it enough to prove that impossibility cannot be proved or that no intrinsic repugnance appears in the intuitive vision of God; from the fact that impossibility is not proved and no intrinsic repugnance appears to us, positive possibility does not follow. Thus reason alone cannot prove that a unipersonal being from itself is intrinsically repugnant; nevertheless, it does not follow in any way that a unipersonal being from itself is possible. Indeed, from what revelation teaches, it is clear that the notion of a unipersonal being from itself contains an intrinsic repugnance. Finally, showing that the incapacity for the vision of God found in non-intelligent beings is not found in an intelligent creature does not yet prove that there is no incapacity in it at all.

167. The possibility of vision would be proved by reason alone if it could be proved independently of revelation that man is in fact destined for the intuitive vision of God. From what is, one may infer what can be. If possibility is proved in this way, it does not in itself follow that reason also understands the internal possibility of vision.

But it is impossible to prove by reason alone that man is in fact destined for the vision of God. For according to the teaching of the Vatican Council, revelation is absolutely necessary to know the supernatural end to which God freely destined man in the present order (Conc. Vat. s. 3 c. 2; Denz 1786). Moreover, for such a proof to be possible, a necessary connection would have to be supposed between the existence or creation of intellectual beings and the fact of their being destined for the vision, so that, on the supposition that God freely created intellectual beings, God would no longer be free to destine them to vision but would have to destine them to see him as a consequence of their free creation. But there is no such connection: an order in which man is not destined for the vision of God is possible.

168. Another way of proving the possibility of vision by reason alone would be to show its internal possibility directly. In itself, this might say nothing, at least immediately, about whether man is in fact ordered to that end. But this way too is impossible.

In the letter “Gravissimas inter” (1862), PIUS IX censures the doctrine of Frohschammer: that “philosophy, if it is rightly understood, can not only perceive and understand those Christian dogmas which natural reason has in common with faith (as a common object of perception), but also those which most especially and properly constitute the Christian religion and faith—namely, man’s supernatural end itself and all that pertains to it, as well as the most sacred mystery of the Lord’s Incarnation—as belonging to the province of human reason and philosophy, and that reason, once this object (namely, through revelation) has been given, can by its own principles scientifically reach it” (Denz 1669). He judges such a doctrine as follows: “In this most serious matter we can never tolerate that everything be rashly confused, or that reason seize and disturb even those things which pertain to faith, since the limits beyond which reason has never advanced by its own right and cannot advance are most certain and well known to all. Among these dogmas, everything that concerns man’s supernatural elevation and his supernatural commerce with God, revealed as pertaining to this end, belongs especially and most clearly. Since these dogmas are above nature, they cannot be reached by natural reason and natural principles. Reason can never be made competent by its natural principles ⁹ to treat such dogmas scientifically” (Denz 1671). After citing texts of Sacred Scripture, he continues: “Adhering to these and almost countless other divine utterances, the holy Fathers, in handing on the Church’s teaching, continually took care to distinguish the knowledge of divine things common to all by the power of natural understanding from knowledge of those things received by faith through the Holy Spirit. They consistently taught that through this faith the mysteries are revealed to us in Christ which transcend not only human philosophy but also the natural understanding of angels, and which, even when made known by divine revelation and received by faith itself, nevertheless remain covered by the sacred veil of faith and wrapped in a dark obscurity as long as we are pilgrims in this mortal life, away from the Lord” (Denz 1673; cf. Conc. Vat. s. 3 c. 4 Denz 1796). But a truth whose internal possibility we positively understand can no longer be said to be wrapped in dark obscurity. Moreover, such truths belong to the province of human reason and philosophy, which PIUS IX expressly denies of man’s supernatural end. What is said in this letter against Frohschammer’s doctrine—that such an object must first be given through revelation—applies all the more if someone wishes to affirm that, independently of revelation, man can demonstrate the internal possibility of the vision of God.

In fact, no argument has so far been adduced that proves the possibility of vision. In the arguments commonly put forward (especially from the intellectual nature, as capable of all truth), the things noted above at nr. 166 are usually confused. One can indeed prove that intellectual nature does not have the incapacity found in non-intellectual natures precisely because they are not intellectual; but this still does not prove the capacity for vision. Perhaps an incapacity is already present in the fact that a being is a creature and not a being from itself; the vision of God is cognition according to the mode of an infinite being.

The object of an intellectual cognitive faculty is indeed truth; hence an intellectual creature is capable of knowing every truth. But this in itself says only that it is capable of knowing every truth according to the mode of knowing proper to this creature. It does not follow that a human being is capable of knowing truth according to the mode of cognition proper, for example, to pure spirits; still less that he is capable of knowing every truth according to the mode of knowing proper to God as an uncreated and infinite being.

Therefore the possibility of vision cannot be proved by reason, either by inferring its possibility from the fact of vision proved by reason, or by showing its internal possibility directly.

169. A third way still seems possible, by which neither the fact of vision itself nor its internal possibility is demonstrated directly: reason alone knows that the intuitive vision of God is the most perfect beatitude of an intellectual creature; but God must be able to confer the most perfect beatitude on a creature; therefore God can confer intuitive vision on an intellectual creature. Therefore it must be possible. Since this argument neither proves that God has in fact ordained human beings to the vision of God nor shows its internal possibility, it can be reconciled with the teaching of the Vatican Council and with the condemnation of Frohschammer’s doctrine.

But the major premise of the argument—namely, that the vision of God is the most perfect beatitude of an intellectual creature—is not proved by reason alone; indeed, it can be proved only on the supposition that the vision of God is possible to an intellectual creature, or rather, this possibility is already implicitly asserted in the major proposition itself. For no one says that the most perfect beatitude consists in something intrinsically impossible. The argument in its formal structure must therefore be answered as follows: I distinguish the major: reason alone knows that the vision of God is the most perfect beatitude of an intellectual creature if this vision of God is possible and its possibility is certainly known by reason alone, independently of revelation—I grant; otherwise, I deny. I grant the minor; I distinguish the conclusion: if vision is possible, I grant; if it is not possible, I deny ¹⁰.

How great a mystery the vision of God was for St. THOMAS appears from the words he wrote while enumerating the causes of the Incarnation of the Son of God (Comp. Theol., cap. 201): “Through this (that is, the Incarnation) a certain example is given to man of that blessed union by which a created intellect will be united to an uncreated spirit in understanding. For it is not incredible that a creature’s intellect can be united to God by seeing his essence, since God was united to man by assuming his nature.” It is not very probable that one who taught this also taught that the possibility of this vision can be known by reason alone (cf. above, nr. 163 s.).

On the act of vision itself

S. TH., 1 q. 12 a. 2; SUÁREZ, De Deo, l. 2 c. 10-16; FRANZELIN, thes. 16; PESCH, prop. 12; BERAZA, Tractatus de Deo elevante etc., nr. 163-186; 187-202; BAUTZ, Der Himmel. Mainz 1881; pag. 31-51; 57-58; E. SCHNÜTGEN, Die visio beatifica, ihr Wesen und ihre theologisch-philosophische Berechtigung. Würzburg 1867; COMMER, Zur Theologie der visio beatifica. Divus Thomas (Freiburg) 1918, 288 ss.; ZYCHLINSKI, Die species impressa und expressa beim beseligenden Schauakt nach dem hl. Thomas. Breslau 1918.

170. Once the possibility and supernatural character of vision have been proved, we must inquire as far as possible into the act of vision itself. First, as the foundation of every explanation, we must observe that the act of vision is a vital act of the creature itself that sees God. This seems evident, since it is a cognitive act (1 Cor. 13). It is therefore an immanent act, proceeding from an internal vital principle of the subject and received in that subject.

This act is impossible for a creature by its natural way and principles. Since this impossibility is not based on a lack of knowability in the object, but on the insufficiency of the subject’s cognitive faculty, the created faculty itself needs some help. This help is called the light of glory; the need for some help is proved precisely by the fact that vision is supernatural (S. TH., 1 q. 12 a. 5).

171. ON THE LIGHT OF GLORY. Just as the word “vision” has been transferred from sensible things to signify intellectual cognition, so the word “light” is used for what is in some way the cause of vision. It is called the “light of glory” because it helps in the cognition proper to those who are in the state of glory (theologians usually distinguish three intellectual lights: of nature, of grace, and of glory). The name “light of glory” can in itself refer to 1) God himself, insofar as he illuminates the mind and offers himself to be seen; 2) the help by which vision is made possible to creatures; 3) the very act of vision, since clear cognition is often called “light.” In what follows, we understand the light of glory to mean the help by which the vision of God is made possible to a creature.

172. The opinions of theologians about the nature and function of this light of glory are closely bound up with their opinions about the act of vision itself.

Some have taught that the beatific vision is not created but uncreated. GREGORY OF RIMINI (1358) reports of them: “a rather recent opinion which held that the beatific vision by which a creature sees God is not a created but an uncreated vision, namely, God himself, who is seen. This is proved first as follows: According to the law ordained by God, any creature can be known distinctly in the Word by any blessed person through his beatific cognition, and not through a created beatific cognition; for otherwise that cognition would either be corruptible by the common law, in which case it would not be beatitude, since beatitude is beatitude only if it is to endure forever without end, or it would be a cognition of infinite perfection, because it is cognition of infinitely many things and of each thing distinctly” ¹¹. In favor of a similar opinion, CAJETAN ¹² names JOHN OF RIPA and others ¹³.

This opinion might be supported by the following argument: “If the blessed saw God by a created vision, that vision would be of finite perfection and therefore could not represent God, who is infinite. Hence it must be infinite, in order to be proportionate to its object. If infinite, then uncreated, because nothing created can be infinite” (LESSIUS, loc. cit.). Against this is the fact that the act of vision would then no longer be a vital immanent act of the creature; it seems contradictory that someone should see by a vision communicated to him by another. What should be said in reply to the argument given will become clear later.

173. The opinion of THOMASSIN (De Deo, l. 6 c. 16), if its words are understood as they sound, also seems to consist in the blessed seeing by the uncreated divine act of vision. For according to him, the blessed see God “by no intelligible species other than the Word himself informing the mind.” In explaining the words of Gregory of Nyssa, he says that the light of glory, “by which the mind of any creature, of itself powerless and weak for seeing God, is strengthened and made strong,” is “the Holy Spirit, since no created powers are equal to this, and this is the sense of David’s mind when he invokes the Father: In your light—that is, in the Spirit who proceeds from you, Father—we shall see light. This light is not so much a gift or some created light infused by the Holy Spirit into the mind as the Holy Spirit himself entering the mind. For light is seen in your light, that is, in the Spirit who proceeds from the Father; God is seen in a light equal and akin to God, whereas every created thing is far unequal to him. God is seen in such a way that the evangelical and apostolic axiom remains true: no creature can see God. For the mind, informed by and attuned to the Holy Spirit himself, has already been raised above creatures and carried up into God. Thus it is clear how the blessed see God, and yet God can be seen only by himself; these statements otherwise at odds are reconciled in this way: God is seen only by God because the power and capacity by which he is seen is the Holy Spirit; the species in which he is seen is the Son himself; and yet the created mind, hidden beneath this species in this light, sees God.”

174. Another opinion says that the act of vision is indeed created, but the intellect does not produce it; God himself produces it immediately and infuses it into the intellect. The intellect can be said to see because it receives the vision and is informed by it. This opinion is usually attributed to WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, DURANDUS, and others ¹⁴. “The principal basis of these authors,” says SUÁREZ, “seems to be that the vision is so supernatural in its whole substance that it seems impossible in any way for a natural power to produce it. Paludanus confirms this reason: that vision is made by creation, and no created power can be a principle of creating, either as principal or as instrumental.”

But this opinion too contradicts the vitality of the act of vision: an act produced and infused by another is not an immanent act of the subject.

175. According to SUÁREZ (l. 2 c. 10 nr. 9), some have said that the light of glory “is not only a habit, but a power in the order of understanding, and thus a kind of supernatural intellect infused into the soul, by which it can immediately elicit a supernatural act of understanding in a vital way, just as it produces natural acts through its natural intellect. For what is repugnant to the infusion of a supernatural power into the soul, just as supernatural habits are said to be infused into the powers?”

Even in this way, the vital act of the subject itself does not seem to be present. For it is not enough for this that the soul sustain some externally added faculty which produces an act; the soul itself must influence the production of the act through its own faculties.

176. If there are theologians (SOTO?) who have said that the light of glory is the total proximate principle of vision and understood this to exclude the intellect’s immediate influx into the act of vision, the vital act is no longer preserved. For a vital act must proceed immediately from a vital faculty. The same judgment would apply to the opinion (CAPREOLUS?) which distinguishes the act of the blessed as cognition from the act as the vision of God: under the former aspect it proceeds from the created intellect, but under the latter from God alone. For vision is cognition, and if vision does not proceed from the created intellect, it is not a vital act of the creature.

177. Hence the light of glory is to be conceived as supernatural help by which the natural cognitive faculty, the intellect, is elevated and made fit for the act of seeing God, so that the intellect and the light of glory—or better, the intellect elevated by the light of glory—is the elicitive principle of the act of vision. For the act of vision cannot be produced partly by the intellect and partly by the light of glory, since it is a simple, not a composite, act.

178. This supernatural help, however, can be conceived in various ways ¹⁵.

First, as actual supernatural help that does not elevate or intrinsically change the faculty. This opinion seems in fact to be rejected by all theologians. For the supernatural acts of the just on earth already proceed from an intrinsically elevated faculty; all the more, then, must the same be said of the supreme supernatural act. Moreover, the Council of Vienne, when speaking of the light of glory that elevates the soul, does not seem to mean such concurrence or external elevation. But if the question is about possibility, theologians hold different opinions.

Second, the light of glory could be conceived as actual supernatural help that intrinsically elevates the faculty, as actual grace elevates it. Theologians generally say that this opinion would satisfy the definition of the Council of Vienne, but it is generally not accepted. For vision is not an act that ceases after a short time; it continues in the blessed for all eternity.

Hence, third, the light of glory is usually conceived as a permanent operative quality, an operative habit. This is the common explanation among theologians. The reasons for this opinion are: 1) in the present order of grace, God confers a permanent internal supernatural principle for continuous supernatural operation, intrinsically elevating the faculties (the virtues); the same should therefore be said of the next life; 2) just as the act of vision succeeds the act of faith, so the supernatural habit of the light of glory succeeds the habit of faith.

179. The light of glory is therefore “a certain supernatural power of understanding, superior to every natural power, superadded to the intellect of the blessed, informing the mind as a habit and raising it to the intuitive vision of God as he is in himself. For since the rational mind, as the image of God, also has by its nature an imperfect and incipient power to know God, this power of knowing can be raised, completed, and perfected by a superadded supernatural power, so that it can now contemplate God himself clearly and perfectly. Hence this power superadded to the intellect is a certain supernatural assimilation of the created mind to the divine intellect in the very mode of knowing the divine essence, and thus a supreme participation in that infinite light by which God sees himself; and so we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is” (Franzelin, p. 211 s.).

180. ON THE IMPRESSED SPECIES. The cognitive faculty alone does not yet suffice for an act of cognition; the object to be known must in some way also concur, determining the faculty to know it. In human intellectual cognition, this influx is exercised through an impressed species, whose function is to unite the faculty with the object in the proper way and determine it to the cognition of this object. It is related to the faculty as a form, “assimilating” the faculty to the object, so that the power informed by the species is the adequate principle of such cognition of this determinate object. A species of this kind is necessary when the object cannot in itself immediately concur in the act, either because it is material and therefore not immediately intelligible, or because it is not present to the faculty. It is therefore rightly said to take the place of the object.

181. In the intuitive vision of God, there is no created intelligible species; so theologians almost universally teach ¹⁶. A species is plainly superfluous, since God himself is intimately present to the intellect that sees him and is supremely intelligible.

If one asks whether an impressed species is possible in vision, some (S. TH., l. c.) deny it, while others (TOLETUS, in 1 q. 12 a. 2; SUÁREZ, l. c., cap. 13) affirm it, or at least say that its impossibility cannot be strictly proved.

The answer is in some way connected with the doctrine about the nature of the impressed species. For if it is conceived strictly as a likeness representing the object, it seems impossible in vision, since no created likeness can represent God as he is in himself. But if it is conceived only as a determination of the faculty to know precisely this object, without being formally like it, it will be more difficult to prove absolute impossibility (but note that its possibility has not yet thereby been proved). Nevertheless, it would still remain to explain why such a species is necessary or useful.

182. The intelligible species in the vision of God is therefore the very essence of God, so that it is both what is seen and that by which it is seen. The essence of God does not inform the created intellect, but a certain special union or relation between God’s essence and the intellect seems necessary in order for the intellect to be determined to see this object. This union does not arise through a change on the part of the divine essence, but on the part of the intellect. “If two things were previously not united and later become united, this must happen through a change in both or in one alone. But if it is supposed that some created intellect begins anew to see God’s substance, the divine essence must, according to what was set out above, be newly joined to it as an intelligible species. But it is impossible for the divine essence to be moved, as was shown above (bk. 1 c. 13). Therefore such a union must begin to exist through a change in the created intellect. This change can happen only by the created intellect’s newly acquiring some disposition” (Contra Gentiles, bk. 3 c. 53). He then says that this disposition is the light of glory; thus here he seems to locate that change in the intellect’s receiving the light of glory. (Cf. chap. 54; Comp. theol., chap. 105; De Verit., q. 10 a. 11.)

183. ON THE EXPRESSED SPECIES. What has been said so far concerns the prerequisites of vision itself, the first act; in producing the second act, the created intellect, the light of glory, and the divine essence concur ¹⁷. The actual vision itself follows. The first question disputed about it is whether an expressed species should be admitted in it. This question is not so much theological as an application of a philosophical opinion to the act of vision; nor does this discussion provide any further explanation or understanding of vision. Those who, like SUÁREZ, identify the expressed species with the vital act of understanding must affirm such a species in vision insofar as it is identical with actual understanding. On this supposition, however, the expressed species cannot seem to be understood as a formal likeness of the divine essence, because, as was said of the impressed species, a created likeness representing God as he is in himself seems impossible. Those, however, who, like ST. THOMAS, say that the expressed species is a distinct term of the intellective operation, the term in which the object is known, must deny an expressed species in the vision of God, since God is intimately present to the blessed and cannot be known in any created being as he is in himself. There remains some difficulty because this gives us a vital action without a created immanent term; this is usually resolved to some extent by saying that understanding, as such, is not an action that produces a term, but a quality. An expressed species must therefore be denied as that in which God is seen and as a likeness representing God as he is in himself.

184. But then vision would be an act of understanding without intentional assimilation to its object, which seems to contradict the definition of cognition. PALMIERI replies ¹⁸, with an argument from ST. THOMAS’s opinion that can also be applied in some way to SUÁREZ’s opinion: “Is it certain that an act of cognition, insofar as it is abstracted from the word proceeding from it, is a likeness of the object known? I do not see how this can be proved. For that we bear a likeness of what is known in the mind must refer to the word of the mind which the mind forms for itself when the object is not present or recalls it. And in fact, in simple cognition, once the word is set aside, nothing appears but a certain vital apprehension of the thing; it is not apparent why this apprehension should be a likeness. Otherwise, what purpose would the word serve when it supervenes? Hence those theologians who deny that simple cognition is a likeness do not grant that the blessed produce a word, because no likeness can represent God as he is in himself; such are the Thomists, who do not deny that the blessed have an act of understanding.” For in the vision of God we have that marvelous thing, unintelligible to a created intellect, that by some finite act the infinite is seen according to the mode of the infinite, in a finite mode.

The object of vision

185. The object of vision is God as he is in himself, God one and three, and therefore both the divine essence and the divine persons. The Council of Florence says that souls without stain are “immediately received into heaven and clearly behold God himself, three and one, as he is” (Decr. pro Graecis; Denz 693). This, then, is a matter of faith. Theologians dispute, however, whether it is possible, at least by a special miracle, to see the divine essence intuitively without seeing the persons: SCOTUS (in 1 d. 1 q. 2) affirms it; ST. THOMAS, 2, 2 q. 2 a. 8 ad 3, denies it (cf. 3 q. 3 a. 3; 1 q. 12 a. 7 ad 2 and 3 speaks only of the fact), and this is by far the more common opinion ¹⁹. For whoever sees the utterly simple God immediately as he is in himself sees the divine being itself, which by its very concept is absolute and relational (a being from itself that is non-personal or unipersonal is repugnant, like a square circle). Just as it is impossible for someone who sees a circle immediately as it is in itself not to see it as round, so it is impossible for someone who sees God immediately as he is in himself not to see the three persons (cf. above, nr. 80). The arguments usually raised to the contrary seem to consider vision as cognition according to the mode of a creature, as cognition through reason and faith is in this life, whereas it is cognition according to the mode of God.

The vision of God admits degrees

186. The Council of Florence defines that souls behold the triune and one God “with one more perfectly than another, according to the diversity of merits” (Decree for the Greeks; Denz 693). The EUNOMIANS must deny this inequality insofar as they teach a perfect comprehension of God. JOVINIAN, who said that merits and rewards, sins and punishments, are equal, must also have denied inequality in the vision of the blessed; but it does not yet seem that he would have had to deny that possible degrees exist in the vision of God considered in itself and not under the aspect of reward.

187. That the vision of God admits degrees is contained in the doctrine of merit for heavenly glory: Conc. Trid. s. 6 can. 32 (Denz 842); S. Scriptura: Matth 16, 27; 1 Cor 3, 8; 2 Cor 9, 6. The Fathers explicitly teach inequality of beatitude, and hence of the vision of God; in support of this teaching they appeal to Io 14, 2, “many mansions,” and 1 Cor 15, 41, “star differs from star in brightness” (cf. Rouet, ser. 612).

188. APHRAATES, Demonstratio evang., dem. 22 n. 19: “Now hear the Apostle say: Each will receive his reward according to his labor ²⁰. Whoever has labored little will receive according to how much he has been wearied. Whoever has run much will take a reward according to the measure of his course … And again the Apostle says: Star surpasses star in brightness; so too is the resurrection of the dead ²¹. Know, then, that when people enter into life too, reward will be greater than reward, glory more distinguished than glory, and one prize greater than another” (R 696).

ST. EPHRAEM, Sermo de magis etc. 11: “Some will sit in the second rank, others in the third; others will be raised up to the fifth rank, others to the tenth, others to the thirtieth; others will sit in the heights … For each will obtain from justice itself a reward according to his labor” (R 710).

189. ST. JEROME, Adversus Iovinianum, bk. 2 nr. 32 ss.: “It is now the work of our labor to prepare different rewards for ourselves according to the diversity of our virtues … If we are all to be equal in heaven, we humble ourselves here in vain in order to be greater there … Why do virgins persevere? Why do widows labor? Why do married women practice continence? Let us all sin, and after repentance we shall be the same as the Apostles” (ML 23, 329; R 1383).

ST. AUGUSTINE, In Ioann., tract. 67 nr. 2: “That denarius is indeed equal for all: the master of the house commands it to be given to all who worked in the vineyard, not distinguishing between those who labored less and those who labored more ²². By that denarius, eternal life is signified, where no one lives longer, since the measure of living is not different in eternity. But the many mansions ²³ signify differences in the ranks of merits within one eternal life” (ML 35, 1812; R 1831); Sermo 87, 4, 6 (ML 38, 533; R 1502); Enchiridion 111 (ML 40, 284; R 1931).

ST. GREGORY THE GREAT, Moralia, bk. 4 c. 36 nr. 70: “Since in this life there is a distinction among our works, in that life there will undoubtedly be a distinction among our ranks, so that just as one surpasses another here in merit, so there one will surpass another in reward. Hence in the Gospel Truth says: In my Father’s house are many mansions ²⁴. But among those many mansions the very diversity of rewards will somehow be harmonious, because such power unites us in that peace that each rejoices in another having received what he himself has not received. Hence those who do not labor equally in the vineyard ²⁵ all receive the same denarius. There are indeed many mansions with the Father, and yet workers who have labored unequally receive the same denarius, because the happiness of joy will be one for all, though the sublimity of life will not be the same for all” (ML 75, 677; R 2308).

190. Objection. In Matth 20, 1 ss., the workers in the vineyard receive the same reward, although some labored longer than others.

I answer. There are various explanations of the parable ²⁶: some explain it not as referring to beatitude but to the call to faith; others say the denarius means objective beatitude, which is the same for all, namely God himself (cf. 1, 2 q. 5 a. 2 ad 1); others take the denarius to mean subjective beatitude. Knabenbauer, on this passage: “… it must necessarily be held that the same reward is given to all, that is, the same subjective beatitude, that the same reward in every respect is declared by the parable, and consequently that it is supposed that those who labored for one hour acquired the same merit as those who applied themselves to their work in the proper manner throughout the whole day. I say ‘in the proper manner,’ for one cannot suppose that the former were very idle or that the last workers performed as much work in one hour as the others did, as I have already said above. It must then likewise be assumed, from truths known elsewhere, that God gives a reward according to the merits acquired by each person. From this it necessarily follows that each person’s merit is reckoned and assessed not by the length of time, but from another source, whereby it can happen that someone who has labored for a short time has the same degree of rank and the same measure of merit as another who has worked for a long time. We are therefore taught by this parable that such a source and standard underlies actions. What this source is, from which actions receive a certain excellent dignity, cannot be doubted: it is the supernatural principle by which supernatural excellence is communicated to works, namely, the grace of God. The greater and more abundant it is, by God’s liberality and will, in each person, the more worthy become the works that proceed from or are informed by that grace. God bestows this interior grace, according to the hidden counsels of providence, in greater or lesser abundance; hence there are also various degrees of glory in the heavenly homeland … Christ shows, therefore, by that equality of reward, that through the grace of God, which God by his liberality and goodness grants in greater and fuller measure to whomever he wills, it comes about that someone perfected in a short time completes many years; hence in the kingdom of God it is not external labor and a long duration of time that confer dignity on works, but the interior fervor that proceeds from grace.”

191. Inequality in the vision of God arises proximately from the inequality of the light of glory alone, not also from the natural perfection of the intellect, as CAJETAN (in 3 q. 10 a. 4) and others held. For “This (namely, that one sees God more perfectly through his essence than another) will occur because the intellect of one person has greater power or capacity for seeing God than another’s. But the capacity to see God belongs to a created intellect not according to its nature, but through the light of glory” (1 q. 12 a. 6). A more perfect created intellect is no more apt for seeing God or receiving the light of glory than an intellect naturally less perfect; and this holds not only for the varying degrees of perfection among intellects of the same species, but also for intellective faculties differing in species ²⁷.

Creatures neither comprehend nor can comprehend God through intuitive vision

PETRUS LOMBARDUS, 1. 4 d. 49; S. TH., 1 q. 12 a. 7; SUÁREZ, De Deo, 1. 2 c. 5; 29; PETAVIUS, De Deo, 1. 7 c. 3 et 4; FRANZELIN, thes. 18; KLEUTGEN, nr. 390-397; BILLOT, thes. 14; PESCH, prop. 14; VAN DER MEERSCH, nr. 309-315.

192. That God is incomprehensible was defined at the Fourth Lateran Council (Denz 428) and at the Vatican Council, sess. 3 c. 1: “The holy Catholic Apostolic Roman Church believes and confesses that there is one God … eternal, immense, incomprehensible, infinite in intellect, will, and every perfection” (Denz 1782). From what has already been said, it is clear that there are various degrees in the vision of God. The scholastics explicitly raise the question whether those who see God comprehend him. The angels who see God do not know all the wisdom of God (Eph. 3, 10); although the holy Fathers grant that creatures see God in the life to come, they deny them perfect knowledge of God and attribute it to God alone.

193. ST. CYRIL OF JERUSALEM, Catech. 6, c. 6: “What then?” someone may say. “Is it not written that the angels of the little ones always see the face of my Father who is in heaven? ²⁸ But the angels see not as God is, but insofar as they can grasp him. For Jesus himself says: No one has seen the Father except the one who is from God; he has seen the Father ²⁹. The angels see as much as they grasp, and the archangels as much as they can; the thrones and dominations see more than the first, but less than is fitting. Only the Holy Spirit, together with the Son, can see as is fitting” (MG 33, 545; R 822). ST. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM attributes to no creature, not even to the angels in heaven, the knowledge that the Father has of the Son and the Son of the Father: In Ioannem, hom. 15 nr. 1 s. (MG 59, 98; R 1161); cf. De Incomprehensibili, hom. 1 nr. 6 (MG 48, 707; R 1123); hom. 3 nr. 1 (MG 48, 720; R 1125).

ST. GREGORY THE GREAT, Moralia, bk. 18 c. 54 nr. 92: “We shall therefore see God if by a heavenly manner of life we are found worthy to be above human beings. Yet we shall not see him as he sees himself. The Creator sees himself in a far different way from the way in which a creature sees the Creator. For a certain limit of contemplation is set for us by the immensity of God, since we are circumscribed by that very weight by which we are creatures” (ML 76, 95).

194. There is, therefore, a certain knowledge of God that is not communicated even to those who see God supernaturally, and is so proper to God that it cannot in any way be communicated to a created being: no creature knows God as perfectly as God knows himself. This knowledge, from which every creature is excluded, is comprehensive knowledge of God.

Comprehensive knowledge is knowledge that matches the object’s internal ³⁰ knowability: that is, “the object is known according to its whole perfection, intensively and extensively, to the extent that it demands to be known in itself, that is, to the extent of the cognition it can elicit from itself” (FRANZELIN, p. 234 s.). This internal knowability is commensurate with the perfection of the object. God is infinitely perfect; therefore his internal knowability is infinite. Hence comprehensive knowledge of God is infinite knowledge of God.

195. Thus ST. THOMAS: “That is comprehended which is known perfectly; and that is known perfectly which is known as much as it is knowable. Hence, if what can be known by demonstrative science is held as an opinion on the basis of some probable reason, it is not comprehended. For example, if someone knows by demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, he comprehends this; but if someone accepts the opinion that this is so on the probable authority of the wise or of the many, he does not comprehend it, because he does not reach that perfect mode of cognition in which it is knowable. No created intellect, however, can reach that perfect mode in which the divine essence is knowable, as is clear in this way. Each thing is knowable insofar as it is a being in act. God, then, whose being is infinite … is infinitely knowable. But no created intellect can know God infinitely. For a created intellect knows the divine essence more or less perfectly insofar as it is suffused with a greater or lesser light of glory. Since the created light of glory received in any created intellect cannot be infinite, it is impossible for any created intellect to know God infinitely; hence it is impossible for it to comprehend God” (1 q. 12 a. 7 c.).

196. “God is not called incomprehensible because there is something of him that is not seen, but because he is not seen as perfectly as he is visible; just as when a demonstrable proposition is known through some probable reason, there is nothing of it that is not known—neither subject, predicate, nor composition—but the whole is not known as perfectly as it is knowable” (ibid. ad 2). Whoever sees God sees him wholly, but not totally; here “‘totally’ refers to the mode of the object—not indeed in the sense that the whole mode of the object does not fall under cognition, but because the mode of the object is not the mode of the knower. Therefore, whoever sees God through his essence sees that he exists infinitely and is infinitely knowable. But this infinite mode does not belong to the knower, namely, that he should know infinitely. Just as someone can know probably that a proposition is demonstrable, even though he does not know it demonstratively” (ad 3).

197. The various degrees of created vision (nr. 186 ss.) do not therefore concern the extensive scope of the primary object of cognition; that is perfectly the same at every degree, namely, God wholly. Rather, various degrees of intensity and clarity are possible in the finite vision of this object, according to the perfection of the light of glory. Whoever knows God infinitely (comprehensively) also knows all truths founded in the divine essence, so that comprehensive knowledge of God is more perfect than non-comprehensive knowledge, even extensively, with respect to the secondary object. Hence it seems that a finite vision of God that is more perfect intensively is also more perfect extensively with respect to the secondary object (truths knowable in God). The formal reason for God’s incomprehensibility (and the same should be said of the inequality of vision) is therefore not that not all the things knowable in God are known extensively, but that God as a whole is not known intensively as he is knowable in himself.

Everyone seems to agree that God is absolutely incomprehensible in this sense. There is dispute, however, over whether this is the sense in which the Lateran and Vatican Councils are to be understood when they define God to be incomprehensible. The opinion explained above nevertheless seems to be by far the most common among theologians.

The whole doctrine of the intuitive vision of God can be summarized briefly in this way: The blessed see the whole infinite divine perfection, infinitely knowable in itself, according to the mode of the infinite, but in a finite mode.

Objections

198. 1. The vision of God is absolutely impossible for a creature, because the vision of God must be an infinite act.

a) The intellect that sees God necessarily sees all possibles, for they are nothing other than the essence of God, infinitely participable or imitable; but seeing God and infinitely many possibles seems to be infinite cognition; therefore.

I answer. I distinguish the major: it sees that the divine essence is infinitely participable and is the foundation of all possibles, I grant; it sees each participating term individually, I deny; and the reason added must be denied. The divine essence is indeed the foundation of possibles, but is not itself a possible thing: the divine essence is not a possible stone. I grant or pass over the minor; I distinguish the conclusion: if the one seeing God sees the foundation of all possibles, the act must be infinite, I deny; if that person necessarily saw infinitely many individual terms, I grant or pass over.

b) An act is specified by its object; but the object is infinite; therefore the act is infinite too.

I answer. I distinguish the major: immediately and directly according to its whole entitative perfection, I deny; according to the mode of acting or tending toward the object, I subdistinguish: the formal object confers that mode of tending, I deny; different formal objects correspond to different modes of tending or acting, I grant ³¹. I grant the minor; I distinguish the conclusion: if the object specified the act according to its whole entitative perfection, I grant; if not, I deny.

But at least entitative perfection cannot be below the order to which the formal object corresponds, or to which such a mode of tending toward the object corresponds. For if not even such a perfection were present, the faculty would not be capable of tending in that mode. Therefore the faculty that has infinite being itself as the formal object of cognition must be of infinite perfection.

I answer. I distinguish the subsequent minor: if the first act of the knower contains a sufficient reason for such a determinate act, that is, for such a mode of tending toward the object, I grant or pass over; if this is not so, as is in fact the case in the act by which a creature sees God, I deny or ask for proof (cf. nr. 153, 154).

c) The act of vision would have to represent God as he is in himself; but the representation of an infinite object according to the mode of this object must be infinite; therefore the act of vision must necessarily be an infinite act.

I answer. I distinguish the major: it must intellectually apprehend God as he is in himself, I grant; it must formally represent him, I deny. I contradict the minor: the intellectual apprehension of God as he is in himself must be infinite, I deny; formal representation, I grant. And I deny the conclusion and the consequent.

But it must formally represent him. For the act of vision is an act of cognition; cognition is essentially assimilation; therefore.

I answer. I deny the subsequent minor; as to the proof, I grant the major and deny the minor, according to what was said at nr. 184.

199. 2. Whoever sees God intuitively does not fail to see anything of God; but whoever fails to see nothing of the object comprehends the object; therefore the vision of God is necessarily comprehension; but comprehension of God by a creature is impossible; therefore vision itself is impossible too.

I answer. I grant the major; I deny the minor; cf. nr. 194 ss.

3. “The efficacy of an action is measured according to the form that is the principle of acting on the agent’s part, as is clear in the case of heat and heating. But the form by which the intellect understands is the principle of intellectual vision. Therefore the efficacy of the intellect that sees God will be as great as the perfection of the divine essence; therefore it will comprehend the essence itself.”

I answer. “That argument applies when the form which is the principle of an agent’s action is joined according to its whole mode. This must happen in all non-subsistent forms, whose being is to be in something. But although the divine essence is in a certain way a form of the intellect, it is not grasped by the intellect except according to the mode of the intellect that grasps it; and since the action belongs not only to the form but also to the agent, the action cannot be as perfect as the form that is the principle of the action, because there is a deficiency on the agent’s part” (De Veritate, q. 8 a. 2, 3 et ad 3).