De Deo uno

Heinrich Lennerz

De Deo uno

Heinrich Lennerz (1880–1961)

First published 1955

Lennerz's De Deo uno (Romae, 1955, editio quinta): his Gregorian course on the one God. The rights of the original Latin are held by the Deutsche Region der Jesuiten, K.d.ö.R., München.


Introduction

Pars I: On the knowability of God

Sectio I: On natural knowledge of God

The teaching of the Church on natural knowledge of God

Thesis I: God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known with certainty from created things by the natural light of human reason

Thesis II: The existence of God can be demonstrated

Thesis III: Natural knowledge of God in this life is only mediate

Thesis IV: By this natural knowledge we know God not through his proper form but through the form of creatures, which are his effects; yet we know not merely extrinsic denominations but truly, although imperfectly, the quiddity of God

Sectio II: On supernatural knowledge of God

Thesis I: The intuitive vision of God is possible for human beings

Thesis II: The intuitive vision of God is absolutely supernatural

Sectio III: On the universality of knowledge of God

Thesis I: Knowledge of God is so universal that there are no adult negative atheists

Pars II: On the divine perfections

231. The divine perfections can be known by reason alone from the natural manifestation of God (cf. thes. 4); how and by what path this knowledge proceeds has been set out in natural theology. Here we ask only what God has revealed about his perfections, and we will consider in particular what is contained in sacred Scripture.

232. One principal and fundamental truth, often stated explicitly and contained implicitly in other things said about God, is that there is one true God: monotheism. Gen. 1: God is the creator of heaven and earth, of the whole universe, and he alone is to be worshiped (cf. Deuteron. 4, 19); Gen 2 ss.: God is the author of the first parents, from whom the whole human race descends; Gen. 6: by the flood this one God punishes the whole human race; only Noah and his family are preserved; Gen 11: God disperses the whole human race over all the earth. He is the God who made heaven and earth (Gen 14, 19), who blesses the nations of the earth in Abraham (18, 18); no other gods are admitted (35, 2). After he had delivered his people from Egypt, he gave them his commandments so that they would worship him alone, the creator of heaven and earth (Ex 20, 3. 11).

God is explicitly called one: Deut 3, 24; 4, 35. 39; 6, 4; 32, 39; 2 Reg 7, 22; 3 Reg 18, 37. 39; Tob 8, 19; 13, 1 ss.; Ps 17, 32; 82, 19; 85, 10; 96, 9; 113, 4 ss. Ps 28: God is Lord of the whole world, of all people; 66, 5: he judges and governs the nations. Sap 12, 13; Eccli 36, 2; Is 42, 8; 43, 10 ss.; 44, 6 ss.; 45, 5 ss.; 54, 5; Ierem 10, 10 s.; Baruch 3, 32-36; Ezech 6; Daniel 2, 47; 3, 45; Ioel 2, 27; 2 Machab 1, 24 s.

233. Obj. Although monotheism is found in later times, it is said not to have existed in earlier times. The reasons are:

  1. The universal law of ascending development in religion;

  2. The God spoken of in the Old Testament is, in the earliest times, only the God of the people of Israel, and he alone is to be worshiped by them; other peoples, however, have other gods.

  3. A trace of polytheism is found in the plural form Elohim for one God.

I answer. To 1. No such law exists; rather, the opposite.

To 2. From the earliest times the God of Israel is considered the creator of the whole world and of all people; he has no equal, not even among other nations; he exercises judgment over other peoples and their “gods”: Exod 12, 12; his glory fills the whole earth: Num 14, 21; cf. Gen 39, 5; 4 Reg. 5, 1; 8, 7.

To 3. The plural form is no trace of Jewish polytheism. Rather, according to a common Eastern manner of speaking, a single king or deity was expressed in the plural on account of majesty or dignity.

234. This one true God is the omnipotent, free creator and wholly independent Lord of the whole world, heaven and earth. Creator of heaven and earth: Gen. 1; Gen 2; Ex 20, 11; Ps 103; 135; 145, 9; Is 40, 26; 44, 24. Great in power: Gen 18, 14; 17, 1; 28, 3; 35, 11; Ps 20, 14; 58, 12. 17; 61, 12; Baruch 3, 1. 4. Created freely: Ps 113, 3; cfr. 134, 6. Hence he is Lord of the whole world: Ex 19, 5; Deuter 10, 14; Ps 23, 1; 46; he is king: Ps 9, 16; 28, 10; Eccli 1, 8; 18, 1. Lord of hosts: 1 Reg 1, 3. 11; 15, 2; 17, 45; 2 Reg 5, 10; 6, 18; 7, 8. 26. 27; 3 Reg 18, 15; 19, 10. 14; 4 Reg 3, 14; 19, 31; Is 1, 24; 2, 12 etc., very often; similarly in Ierem; Ezech; Osee; Agg. The angels serve him: Gen 3, 24 and frequently in the history of the Patriarchs; Tobias; Ps 96, 7; 102, 20; 90, 11; Daniel 3, 49 sqq.; 6, 22; 7, 10. A wholly independent Lord, who owes no account to anyone: Sap. 12, 12 sqq.; cf. Iob 38 sqq.

235. A great God, in comparison with whom all created things are as nothing: Is 40, 9 sqq.; Sap 11, 23; a God of supreme majesty and glory, which fills the whole earth: Num 14, 21; which all things must praise: Daniel 3, 57 sqq.; very often in the Psalms, for example Ps 148-150. People approach God's majesty with fear: Exod 19, 10; Deuter 5, 25.

God is holy: Lev 11, 44 sq.; 19, 2; 20, 6; Iosue 24, 19; 1 Reg 2, 2; Ps 70, 22; 77, 41; 88, 19; 98, 9; Eccli 46, 6; Is 6, 8; 12, 6 etc.; eternal: Gen 21, 33; Ex 15, 18; Deuter 32, 40; Tobias 13, 1; Ps 89, 2. 4; 101, 27; Is 40, 28; 41, 4; 44, 6; living: “As I live”: Num 14, 21. 28; Is 49, 18; Ierem 22, 14; Ezech 17, 19. “The Lord lives”: Iudic 8, 19; Ruth 3, 13; 1 Reg 14, 39; 26, 10. “The living God”: Ps 41, 3; 83, 3; Ierem 10, 10; 2 Mach 15, 4; but idols are not living: Sap 13, 17. 18; Ps 113, 4 sqq.

Immense: 3 Reg 8, 27; Baruch 3, 24 sq.; present everywhere: Ps 138; Amos 9, 2 sqq.; Ierem 23, 23 sq.; all-knowing: Gen 40, 8; 41, 16. 39; Ps 146, 4-5; 93, 8-11; 138; Is 66, 18; Ierem 23, 24; 32, 19. Searcher of hearts: 1 Paralip 28, 9; Ps 7, 10; 43, 22; Ierem 11, 20; 17, 10; 20, 12; wise: Ps 103, 24; 146, 5; Prov 3, 19; Sap 9, 2; 14, 2. Fountain of wisdom, often in Prov.; Sap; Eccli 1.

236. This great God governs the world and human beings by his providence: as is evident in the history of the first parents, Gen 2, sqq.; in the history of the Patriarchs, Gen 12, 1 sqq.; 13, 14 sqq.; 15, 1; 17, 1 sqq. etc. Eccli 17, 13; 43; Ps 103. He is a just God: Ps 17, 21 sqq.; 35, 7; 47, 11; 95, 10; Is 59, 17; Ierem 7, 8; 11, 20; 17, 10, who gives rewards to the good: the history of the Patriarchs; Ps 5, 13; 25; punishments to the wicked: Gen 6, the flood; Gen 18, Sodom; Gen 19, Lot's wife; Exod 34, 7; Tob 13, 5; Ps 9, 6; 10, 6 sqq.; 51, 74; Is 59, 17. He is good, gracious, merciful: Exod 34, 6 s.; Deuter 7, 9; Tob. 13, 5; Eccli 17, 28; 18, 9. 12; Ps 35, 6 sqq.; 50, 3; 58, 18; 88; 89; 90; 99, 4; 100, 1; 102, 8. 9. 13; 106; 114; 115; 116; Is 40, 11 (shepherd); 45, 11; 49, 14 sqq. (mother); 54, 8; 63; 66; Ierem 31, 3; Osee 3, 1; 11; Ionas 4; Malach 1, 6.

It is therefore not true that in the Old Testament God is presented only as a severe Lord, a judge threatening punishments, nor is there an opposition here between the “God of the Old Testament” and the “God of the New Testament.”

What is already clear from the texts cited will appear much more clearly to anyone who considers the whole history of the human race and of the chosen people, guided and governed by God, protected and defended, punished and delivered by him, from the happy state of paradise and the promise of the Redeemer after sin, right up to the Redeemer's own coming and the completion of redemption.

237. In the New Testament, if we abstract from the explicit revelation of the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity, the same things are revealed about God's nature and perfections: there is one God, the eternal creator and Lord, holy, alone good, all-knowing, who governs all things by wise providence, a just judge, full of goodness and mercy toward human beings: God is love (Io 4, 8).

That the holy Fathers teach the same doctrine is evident and need not be shown with many texts: cfr. Rouët, ser. 94 ss.

238. As was said above (nr. 121), revelation also teaches us those notions about divine things that we have drawn from creatures; through revelation we know and think about God and his perfections in the manner of a creature, not in the manner in which God is in himself. The many different divine perfections about which revelation instructs us are the one, supremely simple, infinite divine perfection. Hence, when we think of a merciful God and a just God, we are thinking of the same supremely simple divine being, but representing him under one aspect and another; hence the expressions “God's justice” and “God's mercy” are not synonymous (cfr. nr. 117); therefore they cannot be used at will, but propositions about God must be formed according to what we think about God through the different notions.

Here too lies the foundation, and at the same time the necessity, of arranging and dividing the various divine perfections, whether known by reason or by faith. The principle of this arrangement and division must not be sought in the manner in which God is in himself, but in the way in which God is conceived by us. Thus God's nature is conceived as prior to his faculties; intellect and understanding as prior to will and willing; the will presupposes intellect, existence, and so on.

239. In particular, divine attributes are divided:

  1. into affirmative and negative, according as a simple perfection is affirmed (good, wise, living, etc.) or an imperfection and limitation is denied (infinite, immutable, immense, eternal); 2) into communicable and incommunicable, according as a corresponding created perfection is possible (wisdom, will) or is not possible (infinity, immensity);

  2. into quiescent and operative, according as the perfection concerns being (simplicity, eternity) or acting (intellection, freedom). With respect to this, ST. THOMAS treats in 1 q. 3 ss. of what pertains to the divine substance, and from q. 14 onward of what pertains to operation;

  3. into absolute and relative, according as they signify no external term (immutable) or signify such a term as well (creator, Lord).

240. In creatures we distinguish nature, substance, and its properties, attributes, and qualities; something similar is usually done with respect to God. Thus those perfections that say what God is are said to “constitute” the divine substance, while those that say what sort he is are called qualities. On this point theologians do not give a single answer, since some count as substance what others conceive as qualities.

241. The VATICAN Council gave a certain kind of answer to the question of what God is, session 3, c. 1 § 1: “The holy Romanᵃ) Catholic Apostolic Church believes and confesses that there is one true and living God, creator and Lordᵇ) of heaven and earth, almighty, eternalᶜ), immense, incomprehensibleᵈ), infinite in intellect, will, and every perfection; and since he is one, singular, altogether simple and immutable spiritualᵉ) substance, he must be declared to be distinct in reality and essenceᶠ) from the worldᵍ), supremely blessed in and of himself, and ineffably exalted above all things that exist or can be conceived apart from him” (Denz 1782).

242. On the structure of this paragraph, Bishop GASSER said: “The first paragraph begins with a solemn confession of faith in God, to which are added at the same time those names of God that sacred Scripture uses very often when it designates the true God, in contrast with the false gods of the nations. Hence this solemn confession: the holy Roman Catholic Church believes and confesses that there is one true and living God, creator of heaven and earth, almighty, most provident: a comma or semicolon was omitted here. After this solemn profession of faith, the reworked schema goes on to say what God is. As you know, every thing is defined in two ways, by saying what it is in itself and how it is distinguished from others. The reworked schema followed this same method; and therefore what God is in himself is treated first in what follows, and all those divine attributes that theologians call constitutive of the divine essence are set out. But only these, and no others, are set out; hence it says eternal, immense, infinite in intellect, will, and every perfection. For these are the divine attributes by which the divine essence is constituted according to our way of conceiving.”

243. “In the second part of this paragraph, God's distinction from the universe of things is described in two ways: first, by saying that this distinction is essential, and second, that it is infinite. To make clear that the difference between God and the world is essential, it is said that God's essence is one, singular, altogether simple and immutable substance; for in this way the divine essence is essentially distinguished from the universe of things. The reworked schema then proceeds to say that the difference between God and the world is not only essential but infinite, both because God is supremely perfect and blessed in and through himself, and needs no creature in any way, and then because in reality he is ineffably exalted above everything that exists or can be conceived apart from him.”

244. Amendment 4: “It is thought that the words infinite in every perfection are not placed in the proper order, but should instead be placed in the preceding lines to give a fuller account of the more general notion of God; therefore it is thought one should say: ‘That there is one true and living God, most perfect and infinite by his nature,’ not ‘infinite in every perfection,’ to avoid the quibbles of pantheists, as if God were or became infinite by accumulating every perfection. When God's perfections are enumerated, an order should be observed. Accordingly, before ‘Creator’ one should place: ‘eternal, immense, infinite in intellect and will, with freedom without a shadow of change, always his own master, most upright and most holy, most wise, good, and omnipotent, Creator of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible, cause of all the perfections of creatures, and unfailing exemplar; who, since he is ...’ as in the schema.”

On this amendment Bishop GASSER said: “The Deputation of the Faith believed that this amendment could not be accepted: for it contains an enumeration of most of the divine attributes, both absolute and relative, or both immanent and transitive. But it was not the Deputation's intention to enumerate the divine attributes, but to define the divine essence; therefore it included in the text only those attributes that constitute the divine essence.”

Similarly, concerning amendment 5, which among other things contained an enumeration of divine attributes, GASSER said: “But I have already said that according to the Deputation's intention this part does not deal with an enumeration of all the divine attributes, but only with those attributes that constitute the divine essence according to our way of conceiving.”

Amendment 6, besides proposing another order for enumerating the divine attributes, thought that “the words Creator, etc., could be omitted from the first paragraph, since creation is necessarily spoken of already in the second paragraph.” GASSER replied that he could not, even on behalf of the Deputation, agree with the opinion that the words Creator, etc., were superfluous: “For the name Creator belongs, according to the manner in which sacred Scripture speaks of God, among God's most frequently used names; and therefore, since the beginning of this paragraph contains a solemn profession of faith in God, with the divine names that sacred Scripture uses very often, the name Creator could not be deleted. There is also another reason: by this name Creator, God is distinguished especially from created things.”

Amendment 7 (adding “and Lord” after “Creator”) was accepted; likewise amendment eight (omitting “most provident” and adding a new paragraph on divine providence and omniscience).

Amendment 9 (deleting the words eternal, immense) was proposed for rejection “because they pertain to the attributes constitutive of the divine essence.”

Amendment 11: add incomprehensible after immense. GASSER: “The Deputation of the Faith judged that this amendment should be accepted, although it is not absolutely necessary. For God's incomprehensibility is also contained at the end of this paragraph, where it says that God is ineffably exalted above everything that exists or can be conceived apart from him”.

245. Two amendments (13 a and b) proposed omitting the word singular. GASSER: “On behalf of the Deputation I must tell you, Most Reverend Fathers, that this amendment must in no way be accepted. For God, or the divine substance, can and must be called singular. It is indeed true that God is not included under a species or any genus, but is above every species and every genus; indeed, as the Fathers used to say, God is above every number. Nevertheless, he is singular, and what can and must be predicated of the divine essence is that it is singular; indeed, as the theologians say, by way or mode of eminence it is eminently singular. Venerable Peter, abbot of Cluny, defines this matter very well, saying: The divine essence is singular because it does not admit a participant in itself; and because the divine essence is so singular that it admits no participant, the divine essence cannot be multiplied and is therefore singular.”

Amendment 14 proposed adding spiritual after substance. GASSER: “If it pleases you, this amendment can be accepted, although it is not absolutely necessary, since God is said to be a substance infinite in intellect and will, and thus it is also stated that he is a spiritual substance.”

Amendment 15: “The word must be declared should be changed to another, more authoritative and conciliar expression, namely, must be believed with true and firm faith, absolutely and without qualification, as necessary for eternal salvation for all people.” GASSER: “On behalf of the Deputation I can scarcely agree with this amendment, although I am not entirely opposed to it, for this reason: all the articles of faith are implicitly necessary for salvation, and the articles that are at least of the necessity of means are explicitly necessary; and among these articles necessary by the necessity of means is not only faith in one and living God, but also faith in other articles of religion.”

Amendment 16, that it should say not from this world but from the world, “must be accepted, because it makes the matter much clearer.”

Amendment 17: “Although the words in reality and essence may perhaps have a more polished Latin sound, for greater clarity it would be desirable to replace them with the words distinct from this world, which was made by him.” GASSER: “But, Most Reverend Fathers, as far as I understand and comprehend, this can in no way be done (that is, in reality and essence cannot be deleted): because, as I already said when I spoke of the sequence of statements, in the first part of this last, second portion of the paragraph the essential difference between God and the world is described; therefore, if the subject is the essential difference between God and the world, one must at least say ‘essence’; I will speak of ‘reality’ in the next amendment.”

Amendment 18 asks that reality be omitted, “for in God essence and reality are one and the same.” GASSER: “I find no sufficient reason why this little word should be deleted. For first we say that God is really distinct from the world, and hence we say in reality; but we proceed further and say that he is distinct not only in reality but also in essence, and I do not know why that climax should not be set forth.”

Amendment 19, that instead of in reality and essence one should say infinitely distinct by nature. GASSER: “This opinion is opposed by the fact that this part of the paragraph speaks of the essential distinction between God and the world. For in God nature, essence, and substance certainly coincide; but it is much clearer that God is essentially distinguished from the world if one says that he is distinct from it in reality and essence than if one says that he is distinct by nature.”

246. Among the amendments to the “Dogmatic Constitution,” one (45) proposed: “Instead of infinite in every perfection, it seems better to say infinite and in every perfection, lest some be able to say that God is infinite only because of the accumulation of perfections.” GASSER replies: “According to the opinion of the Deputation of the Faith, this objection is not such that the text should be weakened on its account. For all theologians agree that the perfections of all things can and must be attributed to God, since they are in him as in their efficient cause, and therefore in an eminent manner; accordingly, it can certainly be said of God that he is infinite in every perfection. This phrase would be blameworthy only if the perfections in question were taken in a finite sense; for finite perfections, however greatly they are accumulated, will never produce infinity. But not a single word in the text of our constitution suggests this.”

247. It is often asked whether, among the various divine perfections that we distinguish in God according to our way of thinking, there is one that, by analogy with creatures, should be called the metaphysical essence of God.

Essence is that by which a being is what it is. Physical essence is the physical reality, or those physical realities, that constitute a thing primarily and formally: in a human being, soul and body. Metaphysical essence is the note or notes by which a thing is constituted intrinsically in its order; in a human being, animality and rationality; in creatures it contains genus and specific difference. Consequently, the metaphysical essence of God must be said to be the note by which God is conceived as primarily constituted in divine being and distinguished from everything non-divine, and by which all the other divine perfections are conceived as founded.

248. On this question, which is entirely open to theological opinion, there are various views among theologians and philosophers, of which a few should be mentioned.

  1. Formal infinity, or the complex of all perfections. So the NOMINALISTS. But in this way physical essence is established.

  2. Radical infinity, which is the root and foundation of all perfections; formal infinity is a mode of the divine essence. So some SCOTISTS (FRASSEN, Scotus academicus, De Deo uno, tract. 1 disp. 1 a. 3 q. 2). But that perfection which is the root and foundation of infinity must be determined further, and in fact that determination leads to being itself.

  3. Intellectuality, conceived either as radical understanding, or as an intellectual faculty, or—and so several authors (IOANNES A S. THOMA; BILLUART, Curs. theol., t. 1 diss. 2 a. 1)—as actual intellection, not under the aspect of operation but under the aspect of ultimate actuality subsisting in itself. For we define the metaphysical essence of a creature by its supreme genus and specific difference; for example, a human being is not defined as a rational being, but as a rational animal. Since God is a being, living, and intelligent, his metaphysical essence might seem to be exhibited by subsistent intellection or understanding itself, rather than by subsistent being or being itself. This consideration, however, does not seem effective; for the difference between God and creatures must be considered. In a creature (a human being), being does not include animal, whereas animal includes being; nor is “animal” deduced from “being,” whereas “being” is included in “animal.” But in God subsistent being, or being itself, already includes subsistent understanding, and divine understanding adds no perfection to divine being. The metaphysical essence of a creature is defined by its highest genus, so as to include whatever perfection is in that creature; but in God being itself already contains every perfection, which is also derived from it. Hence the analogy from creatures does not seem rightly applied in this opinion.

  4. Being itself, or subsistent being, being from oneself. This seems to be the more common opinion today. The reason for this opinion: being itself is that by which God is conceived by us as primarily and perfectly constituted in divine being; no perfection must be added to this, nor can any “prior” note or perfection be conceived. As being itself, he is conceived as primarily distinct from everything non-divine, which is participated being; because he is being itself, he is living, intelligent, infinite, etc. Therefore divine being itself is the metaphysical essence of God.

Pars III: On the knowledge of God

Thesis I: God knows himself and all things that exist and can exist besides himself, including those that will occur through the free action of creatures and those that would occur if certain conditions were fulfilled

On the division of divine knowledge

On the knowledge of God which is the cause of things

Further explanations concerning the knowledge of God

From the history of theologians' opinions on divine knowledge of future contingents

Thesis II: God does not know absolutely future free acts in a cause proximately ready to act, nor in a decree of physical predetermination, but, given his knowledge of conditionally future free acts, in a decree to bring about the conditions

Thesis III: God does not know conditionally future free acts in a moment prior to their futurition

Pars IV: On providence and predestination

Sectio I: On divine providence

Thesis I: God governs by his providence all things that he has created

Sectio II: On predestination and reprobation

Historical survey

Thesis I: In the present order of salvation restored by Christ, God sincerely wills the salvation of all adults by an antecedent will: there is therefore no positive antecedent reprobation

On the term of the antecedent will

Thesis II: The doctrine that maintains negative antecedent reprobation must not be admitted

Thesis III: Predestination taken as a whole is gratuitous; but the predestination of adults to glory taken precisely as such is after foreseen merits

On the effects of predestination and reprobation

On the certainty of predestination and reprobation

On the number of the predestined

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