De Deo uno

7. In this section we ask what revelation teaches about knowledge of God attained by natural principles alone. We answer by stating first the fact: God’s existence can be known with certainty and demonstrated by natural means, but only mediately; then we must speak of the nature and value of this knowledge: it is true, but imperfect knowledge. As a preliminary, however, we set out what the Church’s Magisterium has taught on this matter in response to various errors.

Ecclesiastical authority treated this question directly, especially from the beginning of the nineteenth century up to our own times¹.

8. L. E. BAUTAIN had sought truth and certainty in vain by reason alone, according to the various philosophical systems of his day; he found uncertainty and disagreement, but not truth. Christian revelation, however, supplied it to him. Thereafter he judged reason incapable of knowing God's existence and attributes, all the more because, as he thought, KANT had proved the impotence of pure reason; divine revelation, to be embraced by faith, is absolutely necessary for knowing God. For human reason has been so weakened by original sin that by itself it can no longer attain such knowledge; it is semi-Pelagian to assert that God can be known by reason alone. Divine faith must necessarily come first: FIDEISM².

He subscribed to contrary theses proposed by his bishop on 18 Nov. 1835 and 8 Sept. 1840, and on 26 April 1844 he was ordered by the S. Congr. Episc. et Reg. to promise by his signature “never to teach that, by the light of right reason alone, setting aside divine revelation, no true demonstration of God's existence can be given” (Denz 1622 ss.).

9. TRADITIONALISM: Rationalism exaggerated the powers and scope of reason, asserting that everything must be known and explained by reason alone and that nothing should be admitted unless it is proved by reason, and to the extent that it is proved by reason; it therefore attacked revelation and faith and denied the mysteries. Some Catholics went to the opposite error, excessively restricting the powers of reason. All certain knowledge of truth ultimately rests on authority; tradition, therefore, or instruction, is necessary, and faith corresponds to it. Thus, for example, DE BONALD³: ideas are in some way innate in us; nevertheless, without voice, speech, or language no knowledge is possible, at least of immaterial things. Ideas must somehow be awakened so that actual knowledge may arise. Neither an individual nor society itself could have invented language; rather, the first man received language, and with it the first knowledge of truth, from the “author” of his reason, and this rests on that author's “authority.” These truths had to be passed on by instruction from the first man to others, and this continues down to our own times. Thus all certain knowledge of such truths ultimately rests on God's authority. F. DE LA MENNAIS held similarly⁴: Individual reason can err; if it is fallible, it can never be certain that it is not mistaken. To seek certainty is to seek an infallible reason, whose infallibility must be believed—that is, admitted without proof; and this reason is not individual, but common reason. By the most universal tradition, and hence the most certain, common reason testifies to God's existence, indeed to the fact that God himself communicated himself to the human race: the principal truth of God's existence rests on the testimony of infinite authority. God manifested this truth to the first man through speech, which man could not have invented by himself (in this respect DE BONALD's view is similar). Through the first man, the truth is preserved in human society by continuous tradition from God to others. Faith in the testimony of the human race is the highest certainty for human beings, just as faith in God's testimony is the certainty of the human race. Outside these, there is universal doubt.

Such doctrines were accepted by many. Hence several provincial councils⁵ (Tours 1849; Avignon 1849; Aix 1850; Toulouse 1850) warned the faithful to avoid both extreme positions, rationalism and traditionalism. AUG. BONNETTY, who defended traditionalism in his writings, subscribed to the following four theses of the S. C. of the Index, approved by Pope Pius IX on 15 June 1855.

“1. Although faith is above reason, there can never be any true disagreement or discord between them, since both arise from one and the same immutable source of truth, God most good and great, and so mutually assist one another. (Encyclical of Pope Pius IX, 9 Nov. 1846).

2. Reasoning can prove God's existence, the spirituality of the soul, and human freedom with certainty. Faith comes after revelation; consequently, it cannot appropriately be invoked to prove God's existence against an atheist, or the spirituality and freedom of the rational soul against an adherent of naturalism or fatalism. (Proposition subscribed to by D. Bautain, 8 Sept. 1840).

3. The use of reason precedes faith and leads a person to it with the help of revelation and grace. (Proposition subscribed to by D. Bautain, 8 Sept. 1840).

4. The method used by St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and the other scholastics after them does not lead to rationalism, nor was it the cause of philosophy's falling into naturalism and pantheism in modern schools. Therefore, these doctors and teachers cannot be charged with having used this method, especially when the Church approved it or at least remained silent. (Propositions opposed to propositions taken here and there from D. Bonnetty).” (Denz. 1649 ss.).

10. ONTOLOGISM, so called by Gioberti in opposition to psychologism, holds that the direct object of knowledge is not some modification of the soul, but reality itself, being. To establish the objective truth and certainty of our knowledge, and to explain truth's universality, necessity, eternity, and immutability, the ontologists affirmed a certain direct and immediate intuition of God himself under the aspect of τοῦ esse simpliciter. This direct knowledge of God becomes reflective on the occasion of knowing sensible things. It was proposed in different forms by different thinkers, for example FABRE, BRANCHEREAU, ROTHENFLUE S. I., and GIOBERTI.

FABRE⁶ explains the matter more or less as follows: Universal ideas are objectively real; they are not forms or modifications of the soul, nor something created, but something necessary, immutable, and absolute. Their center is being simply. This infinite being is the first idea perceived by our mind, the first intelligible, the light in which we see and contemplate all eternal, universal, and absolute truths. These truths can have no reality outside the eternal essence; therefore, they can subsist only in union with the divine substance, and hence we can see them only in the divine substance.

BRANCHERAU extracted fifteen theses from his work “Praelectiones philosophicae”, which contain his doctrine⁷:

“1. Two things must be distinguished as essential to thought: the thinking subject and the object thought.

2. The object thought is itself divided into two kinds: being simply and being in a certain respect.

3. By being simply we mean a real, concrete, and infinitely perfect being, essentially distinct, therefore, from being in general, which is nothing other than an abstraction of the mind. In a word, being simply is God.

4. Being simply necessarily exists, whereas beings in a certain respect can be conceived either in a state of existence or in a state of mere possibility.

5. Considered in the state of possibility, beings in a certain respect are something eternal and necessary; in the state of existence, however, they are something temporal and contingent.

6. Since the eternal and necessary reality of beings insofar as possible beings does not exist in itself, it must be contained in a necessary being, that is, in God. This reality is called the metaphysical essence.

7. Essences, then, can be nothing other than divine ideas, or archetypes, according to whose pattern God produces all things.

8. The metaphysical essences, which can be actualized in an indefinite number, constitute the objective reality of universal ideas.

9. Actualization takes place through creation, by which God causes a being to pass from possibility to existence, not by communicating his own being, but by drawing it out of nothing according to the pattern of the archetype contained in himself.

10. Created things, therefore, can in no sense be called God, nor can they have anything divine in themselves.

11. We call realities ideas insofar as they intelligibly affect the mind. Thus, relative to our intellect, ideas are something objective; the operation by which we apprehend them is ideal perception.

12. From the first instant of existence, the mind enjoys ideal perception, not reflectively but directly.

13. Among the intelligible truths we apprehend ideally, God is foremost; our intellection of him, although essentially distinct from the vision of the blessed, terminates not in a representative image but in God.

14. We apprehend the metaphysical essences of things that we know in the divine intellect; their actualizability, however, becomes known to us through the concept of the creative power belonging to God.

15. We apprehend created things ideally neither in God nor in themselves. Their knowledge is produced as follows: 1) we know our own soul through inner sense, or consciousness; 2) created things distinct from the soul, however, we know through an invincible judgment founded on divine truthfulness, by which we affirm that some essence has been actualized through creation.”

Ontologists said that this immediate perception of God is altogether different from the beatific vision. It is natural knowledge, in some way essential to the soul, which (according to some) is continuously present in the soul as direct knowledge, but becomes reflective on the occasion of objects presented by the senses. It is an intuition of divine being under the aspect in which it is the exemplar of all being; the blessed, by contrast, see God's inner life, especially the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity.

11. By a decree of the Holy Office (18 Sept. 1861), the following propositions were declared unsafe to teach:

“I. Immediate knowledge of God, at least habitual knowledge, is essential to the human intellect, so that without it the intellect can know nothing, since it is the intellectual light itself.

II. That being which we understand to be in all things, and without which we understand nothing, is divine being.

III. Universals considered as things are not really distinct from God.

IV. Innate knowledge of God as being simply eminently involves every other knowledge, so that through it we have implicitly known every being that can be known under any aspect.

V. All other ideas are nothing but modifications of the idea by which God is understood as being simply.

VI. Created things are in God as a part in a whole—not in a formal whole, but in an infinitely simple whole that sets its quasi-parts outside itself without any division or diminution of itself.

VII. Creation can be explained in this way: God produces a creature by the very special act by which he understands and wills himself as distinct from a particular creature, for example a human being.”

12. The doctrine of ROSMINI, which in many respects approaches the doctrine of ontologism, was condemned by a decree of the Holy Office (14 Dec. 1887).

“I. In the order of created things, something divine in itself is manifested immediately to the human intellect, namely, something of such a kind as to belong to the divine nature.

1. In the sphere of created things something divine in itself is manifested immediately to the human intellect, that is, something belonging to the divine nature. (Teosof. Vol. IV, n. 2, p. 6).

II. When we speak of the divine in nature, we do not use the word ‘divine’ to signify a non-divine effect of a divine cause; nor do we intend to speak of something divine that is so by participation.

2. When I speak of the divine in nature, I do not use the word ‘divine’ to signify a non-divine effect of a divine cause. For the same reason, I do not intend to speak of something divine that is so by participation. — (Ivi).

III. In the nature of the universe, then—that is, in the intelligences within it—there is something to which the designation ‘divine’ applies in its proper, not figurative, sense. It is an actuality not distinct from the rest of divine actuality.

3. In the nature of the universe, then—that is, in the intelligences within it—there is something to which the designation ‘divine’ applies, not figuratively but properly. (Teosof. Vol. IV, Del divino nella natura, num. 15, pp. 18-19). And it is an actuality indistinct from the rest of divine actuality, indivisible in itself, divisible by mental abstraction. (Teosof. Vol. III, n. 1423, p. 344).

IV. The indeterminate being, which is doubtless known to all intelligences⁸, is the divine reality manifested to human beings in nature.

4. Indeterminate being (ideal being), which is undoubtedly evident to all intelligences, is the divine reality manifested to human beings in nature. (Teosof. Vol. IV, nn. 5 e 6, p. 8).

V. The being intuited by a human being must necessarily be something of a necessary and eternal being, the creating, determining, and consummating cause of all contingent beings; and this is God.

5. The being intuited by a human being must necessarily be something of a necessary and eternal being, the creating, determining, and consummating cause of all contingent beings⁹; and this is God. (Teosof. Vol. I, n. 289, p. 241).

VI. The indeterminate being that abstracts from creatures and from God, and God as being not indeterminate but absolute, have the same essence.

6. In the one being (which abstracts from creatures and God, and is indeterminate being) and in the other (which is no longer indeterminate but God himself, absolute being), there is the same essence. (Teosof. Vol. II, n. 848, p. 150).”

13. Certain professors at the University of Louvain proposed a doctrine that was a kind of mitigated traditionalism: instruction in society is required for reason to develop to the point where it can know God and moral principles, not as an efficient cause, but as a necessary condition. Ontologism was later joined in part to this doctrine¹⁰. The doctrine is readily recognized from what the S. Ind. Congregation (3 June 1843) deemed worthy of note in the books of Professor UBAGHS:

“The Rev. D. UBAGHS teaches in his Theodicea, and sometimes also in his Logica, the following propositions, which the Sacred Congregation of the Index judges should be corrected.

I. ‘We cannot come to know any external metaphysical truth (that is, one concerning things that do not fall under our senses) without instruction from another, and, in the final analysis, without divine revelation.’

This doctrine cannot be admitted, because just as internal and mathematical truths can be known by reasoning, as the author himself admits, so it is at least possible to attain external truths whenever they are necessarily connected with internal truths, or when the internal truths themselves cannot stand without presupposing some external truth.

II. ‘External metaphysical truths cannot properly be demonstrated.’ (See Theod. p. 220, n. 413 et seq.).

Yet external truths are sometimes necessarily joined to internal ones as an effect to its cause, and therefore can be demonstrated through this connection by the kind of argument called a posteriori, whose certainty is no less than that obtained by an a priori demonstration.

III. ‘God's existence cannot be demonstrated at all. We deny that it can be demonstrated that God exists.’ (Theod. p. 73).

This untenable doctrine follows of itself from the author's opinions, which have already been judged.

IV. ‘Proofs of God's existence reduce to a kind of faith, or are based on this faith by which we do not so much see as believe—that is, we are naturally persuaded that this idea is trustworthy, something we cannot discern by purely internal evidence.’ (Theod. p. 73).

These words seem to mean that God's existence is believed rather than demonstrated, which is entirely contrary to the truth.

V. ‘The author reduces all proofs of external metaphysical truths to common sense.’

This doctrine cannot be admitted, because some external truths are demonstrated a posteriori through internal truths, without any reference to common sense. Thus, from our consciousness of our own existence, we directly infer the existence of a cause that bestowed existence on us; that is, from one internal truth we deduce another external truth without the intervention of common sense.

‘These are the principal opinions in the aforementioned book that appear to require correction. The Sacred Congregation therefore warns the Rev. Author to have his book corrected in a new edition and, in the meantime, to refrain from teaching these opinions in his scholastic lectures.’”

14. On 1 Feb. 1860, professors BEELEN, LEFEBVRE, UBAGHS, and LAFORET explain the doctrine concerning the necessity of instruction as follows:

“While on the one hand we defend the powers of human reason, on the other we profess, as we have already intimated, that we hold the view that the human mind should not be credited with that complete spontaneity or absolute independence which rationalists attribute to it. Rather, we think of the human mind in this way: the human mind possesses an inner power of its own and is continuously active of itself; nevertheless, for a person endowed with this mind to attain a ready use of reason, some external intellectual assistance is needed. We therefore hold that the principles of rational, metaphysical, and moral truths were implanted in the human mind by God the Creator; but we also judge this to be the natural, or psychological, law of our mind: a person needs some intellectual instruction in order to attain such a ready use of reason as will suffice to acquire distinct knowledge of God and of moral truths. We do not deny that, without such instruction, the human mind has a certain confused sense and vague apprehension of these truths; but here we are speaking of acquiring true knowledge, that is, a clear and certain awareness of them. By instruction we mean any external intellectual assistance, whether deliberately or unintentionally provided, whether by speech, writing, gesture, or any other means supplied by social intercourse. We mean that the need is absolute, not in the sense that we think God could not have created a human being otherwise, but in the sense that we think this need is common to all human beings as they are now born. We affirm that this absolute need for instruction exists if the matter is acquiring a ready use of reason; we do not at all say—and, on the contrary, consider it false—that knowledge of individual truths of the natural order must be acquired through instruction. For once a person actually enjoys the use of reason, he can discover and know very many truths by reason alone. We further note that, in our view, this instruction is not to be regarded as the efficient cause by which a person attains a ready use of reason, but as a mere condition without which he cannot attain that ready use; just as air, heat, and moisture are required as conditions without which the life actually present in a seed, though enclosed and hidden, cannot manifest itself. The principles of natural law are written in the human heart; but no one will ever be able to read them distinctly until, with the aid of that intellectual assistance of which we have spoken, he has attained the ready use of his reason.”

With the approval of Pope Pius IX, the doctrine of the Louvain professors was rejected on 11 October 1864, 2 March 1866, and 30 August 1866.

15. The Vatican Council¹¹, session 3, chapter 2, first part of § 1, says this about the natural knowledge of God: “The same holy mother Church holds and teaches that God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known with certainty from created things by the natural light of human reason; for his invisible attributes, ever since the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood through the things that have been made”¹².

Canon 1: “If anyone says that the one true God, our Creator and Lord, cannot be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason through the things that have been made: let him be anathema.”

16. According to Bishop GASSER's report¹³, three things are affirmed about the natural knowledge of God: “1) We say that a human being has a capacity for knowing God, and not merely a passive but an active one; this is to say that a human being has the powers needed to know God. Hence the words: ‘The same holy mother Church holds and teaches that God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known.’ 2) We then say that means sufficient for this knowledge of God are available to a human being in the natural order, in the words ‘by the natural light of human reason from created things.’ And finally, 3) God can be known with certainty from creatures”¹⁴.

17. The rationale followed by the Fathers appointed to revise the earlier dogmatic schema is explained on this point as follows¹⁵:

“This definition¹⁶—that God can be known with certainty through created things by the light of reason—and the corresponding canon seemed necessary, not only because of traditionalism but also because of the widespread error that God's existence cannot be proved by any firm arguments and therefore cannot be known with certainty.

“As far as traditionalism is concerned, it seemed sufficient to lay down a principle that would effectively exclude it. The principle laid down is this: human rational nature has the power to know God with certainty through created things. Anyone who said that it is altogether impossible for a human being, even one with a developed ability to reason, to attain certain knowledge of God without positive instruction about God handed down would deny that principle. The question whether some instruction is necessary for a human being to attain the use of reason is not addressed.

“Although the word ‘Creator’ appears in the canon, this does not define that creation, properly speaking, can be demonstrated by reason; rather, the word used by Scripture in revealing this truth is retained¹⁷, without any addition specifying its meaning.”

18. Certain proposed amendments—some intended to uphold in some measure the system of mitigated traditionalism, others to condemn it explicitly—gave Bishop GASSER occasion to speak at greater length about traditionalism and the doctrine opposed to it. His exposition greatly helps in rightly understanding the meaning of the definition¹⁸.

“First of all, I will say very little about the system of traditionalism itself. To begin at the beginning, I will cite the well-known words of TERTULLIAN in his book against Marcion: We (that is, against Marcion) define that God is first to be known by nature, then recognized by instruction: by nature from his works, by instruction from preaching. According to Tertullian, then, the matter stands as follows: God can indeed be known from his works under the guidance of nature; but for this knowledge of God to be saving, God must not merely be known naturally—he must also be recognized through instruction and preaching. For Tertullian, the first is natural knowledge, not first in time but in order, and then comes supernatural knowledge. He says, ‘first to be known by nature, and then recognized through instruction and preaching.’ In this matter Tertullian certainly has Sacred Scripture on his side, as is clear to anyone who consults Wisdom chapter 13, Romans chapter 1, and Acts chapters 14 and 17; and, as far as I can see, the Fathers of the Church are also on his side.”

19. “But those generally called TRADITIONALISTS (I would never have used this name, Most Reverend Fathers, had it not already been heard so often in this very hall)—the adherents of this system, I say, reverse Tertullian's position and say: we define that God is first to be known by instruction, and then recognized by nature: by instruction from preaching, by nature from his works. That is, the first idea of God must be communicated to a human being through instruction or preaching, understood in general; and, once this idea has been communicated to and received by a person, God's existence can indeed be proved by arguments drawn from reason. The traditionalists differ greatly among themselves as to how this idea is communicated. Some say that this communication must truly take place through the teaching of the Gospel, or revealed teaching; consequently, a person must receive the idea of God and his existence through divine faith, and there can be no certainty about God's existence unless that divine faith is present first. These traditionalists are properly called fideists, and their system is also called cruder traditionalism.

20. “Others, however, do not derive this communication directly from the teaching of the Gospel or revealed teaching, at least not immediately, but in general from the idea of God already present in human society. They therefore consider it sufficient for a person to receive the idea of God by human faith, and then to formulate arguments from reason for God's existence. Although these mitigated traditionalists, as they are called, derive the idea of God proximately only from its communication through human society, it can scarcely fail to be the case that ultimately they derive it from its first source, God's original instruction communicated to the human race. The mitigated traditionalists again differ greatly among themselves about the reason why a person cannot attain certain knowledge of God, at least without human faith. This is not the place to go into each of these views.”

21. “What, then, should be said about this doctrine? The doctrine of cruder traditionalism must certainly be condemned altogether, as it has already been condemned: for this doctrine uproots the very foundation of our faith, certainty about God's existence. This is of the greatest importance, especially in our own times.

“For you know, Most Reverend Fathers, what opinion has prevailed in the minds of many people since the so-called French Encyclopedists and the beginnings of critical philosophy in Germany: the opinion, namely, that God's existence cannot be proved at all with certainty by certain arguments, and that the arguments held in such high honor at all times are not capable of establishing the point. Consequently, religion itself, as lacking a foundation, has come to be despised. Indeed, in our own times matters have most recently reached the point where people everywhere are trying to sever moral teaching from all religious teaching, saying this is absolutely necessary lest a person, as he grows older, see that nothing certain can be held in religion, not even God's very existence, and so, I say, fall into moral depravity. But you know, Most Reverend Fathers, how effective a moral education of this sort can be when its principle is not that of the Psalmist¹⁹: the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.

22. “But mitigated traditionalism too is certainly beset with dangers. Because it is beset with such dangers, the eighth amendment was proposed²⁰, directly attacking the doctrine in its formal principle. Other Most Reverend Fathers, however, considering the doctrine less unfavorably, proposed the third and fourth amendments, which seem to defend the cause of mitigated traditionalism”²¹.

23. “Having first set out these points about the doctrine itself and its relation to sound doctrine, I must explain the course the Deputation of the Faith thought should be followed in this matter. The Deputation of the Faith judged that none of the amendments coming from one side or the other should be accepted by the general congregation. Rather, traditionalism in general should be opposed by a certain principle that would directly condemn cruder traditionalism, since that doctrine indeed exposes the very foundations of religion to danger. The Holy Synod certainly cannot fail in this duty, even if the proposed principle or doctrine also touches mitigated traditionalism to some extent; all the more because, as I have already said, mitigated traditionalism too is beset by many dangers and, I freely admit, cannot be taught without danger. Since, therefore, traditionalism even in its mitigated form seems to need some remedy, and certain limits must be imposed on this doctrine, the Deputation of the Faith proposes its doctrine as a certain principle that directly attacks cruder traditionalism and that, since it cannot be otherwise, also touches mitigated traditionalism”²².

24. “The question now is whether this approach has in fact set limits to deviations. In the opinion of the Deputation of the Faith, such limits have indeed been set, provided the points we propose in the doctrine, in this very chapter, are taken in their natural force—that is, provided what I said about the means available to a human being, even in the natural order, for knowing God is taken in its natural force. I said: if they are so taken. To exclude every danger, however, the Deputation of the Faith judged that it would fulfill its duty only if the general Council also adopted in due course the admonition found at the end of this dogmatic constitution, where all decrees ever issued by the Apostolic See concerning the subject of this dogmatic constitution are confirmed by the Holy Synod itself.”

25. The definition says “can be known with certainty,” not “can be demonstrated.” The seventh amendment²³ proposed this wording: “The same holy mother Church holds and teaches that God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known and demonstrated with certainty by the natural light of human reason, that is, by metaphysical, cosmological, and moral arguments. — Or simply: can be known and demonstrated with certainty by the natural light of reason.”

“As regards this amendment,” GASSER says in his report²⁴, “it can scarcely be approved, precisely because its presupposition is false. The Most Reverend proposer holds that our doctrine is opposed to the well-known arguments, or at least to the metaphysical argument. But this presupposition is entirely false: our doctrine supports these arguments; it does not oppose them. For if we say that God can be known by the natural light of reason through creatures—that is, through the traces impressed on all creatures—we exclude all the less the image impressed on the immortal soul of the human being. The metaphysical argument, therefore, is certainly not excluded. Which of us, having endorsed this doctrine we propose, thinks that it condemns that celebrated ontological argument of St. Anselm, whatever his view of the argument may be? The other amendment, in its second part, ‘can be known and demonstrated with certainty by the natural light of reason,’ is deficient in one respect and goes too far in another. It is deficient because it does not indicate the natural means by which a human being could know God naturally; it goes too far because it declares not merely that God can be known with certainty by natural light, but also that God's existence can be proved with certainty, or demonstrated. Although ‘to know with certainty and to demonstrate’ are in some measure the same thing, the Deputation of the Faith judged that it should choose the milder phrase, rather than this stronger one.”

When some later proposed (amendments 51, 52½, and 53)²⁵ that the word “with certainty” itself be omitted, the Deputation of the Faith judged that it had to be retained²⁶. Bishop GASSER explained this at greater length in the general congregation²⁷.

26. How the Council understood the knowledge of God appears in connection with amendment 11²⁸, which wished to add the following after the words taken from the Apostle's authority: “Hence they are without excuse, for although they knew God, they did not glorify him as God or give thanks.” It added this rationale: “so that it might at least be indicated that human beings can not only know God by the light of reason, but also know their principal duties toward God.”

To this Bishop GASSER replied²⁹: “The reason that moved the Most Reverend proposer is this: he wants natural knowledge, which he thinks is restricted to theoretical knowledge of God, to be extended also to the principal moral duties. But in this respect the amendment seems superfluous, because when we say that a human being can know God as the beginning and end of all things, we also declare that a human being can understand and know the principal moral duties. For no one can tend toward God as his—natural, of course—end and author of nature without also knowing at least the principal duties toward God. Hence the pagan philosophers themselves joined moral knowledge of God to theoretical knowledge of God; Plato, for example, says in his Theaetetus that knowledge of God is true wisdom and true virtue. The Deputation therefore considers these words entirely superfluous.” It is therefore understood that the Council means the knowledge of God required and sufficient for a person to be able and obliged to lead a religious life.

27. The first canon had said: “can be known with certainty by a human being through the natural light of reason.” Amendment 49³⁰ proposed that “the words ‘by a human being’ be deleted, lest we seem to define as a dogma of faith that there can never be adults who are invincibly ignorant of God. The word human could be added to reason ...” The Deputation of the Faith judged that this amendment should be accepted and recommended it to the Fathers³¹; nearly all accepted it³².

28. Amendment 51 wished to give the first canon this form³³: “If anyone says that human reason as it now is cannot know God from created things by its natural light: let him be anathema.” Bishop GASSER replied³⁴: “This amendment cannot be accepted, because it does not fit the aim of the doctrine. For our doctrine does not simply ask whether God can be known with certainty by natural light by a human being as he now is; rather, it concerns the condition of human nature in general.” See also amendment 52 (7, 225) and Bishop Gasser's reply (7, 238).

29. The Council determined the following concerning the necessity of positive revelation:

“To this divine revelation it must indeed be attributed that, even in the present condition of the human race, all people can readily know with firm certainty and without any admixture of error those things in divine matters that are not in themselves inaccessible to human reason. Revelation is not to be called absolutely necessary for this reason, however, but because God, in his infinite goodness, ordained the human person to a supernatural end, namely, to share in divine goods that wholly surpass the understanding of the human mind. For what no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor has entered into the heart of man, what God has prepared for those who love him”³⁵.

30. Bishop GASSER on this passage³⁶: “The question, then, is the necessity of revelation under two aspects: 1) in relation to the natural knowledge of God, and 2) in relation to the supernatural order. As for the necessity of revelation in the natural order, it is taught that revelation is not absolutely necessary, as stated at the beginning of the second paragraph: ‘Revelation is not to be called absolutely necessary for this reason.’ If, then, absolute necessity is not taught, some moral or relative necessity is nevertheless taught. In regard to revelation so-called formal, or the revelation of supersensible things, as we are accustomed to say in our German language, in order to distinguish supersensible things from supernatural things, the moral necessity of divine revelation is taught. That is, this necessity does not arise on the side of the object—for the objects are things in divine matters that are not inaccessible to human reason—but on the side of the subject, that is, the human being, even in the present condition of the human race. Third, the question is not the power of knowing God, though active, but actual knowledge of God: that all may know God readily, without a long delay for study and inquiry, with firm certainty even those scarcely capable of arguments drawn from reason, and, finally, without any admixture of error. If, then, the question is the actual natural knowledge of God in these circumstances, so many and such great difficulties confront a human being as he now is that supernatural revelation can be called morally necessary.

31. “The second part of this paragraph teaches the necessity of revelation so-called materially supernatural, and concerning this the following points are taught. First, in general it is said that this revelation is absolutely necessary, supposing, of course, the plan of divine goodness and wisdom already mentioned above. It is therefore called absolutely necessary, and the proximate cause of this absolute necessity is given first. The proximate cause of this absolute necessity is the ordination of the human person to a supernatural end, namely, to share in divine goods. The more remote cause of this necessity is the set of truths needed to know this supernatural order, which exceed the grasp of reason and must therefore be revealed positively by God. To prove this truth, the authority of Sacred Scripture is then cited from Paul's letter to the Corinthians, where it says: No eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor has entered into the heart of man. Therefore, without revelation these truths are unknown, the truths God has prepared for those who love him. Therefore, the supernatural end to which the human person is ordained is taught.”

32. Two amendments on the necessity of revelation (55½ and 56) were proposed³⁷, and Bishop GASSER addressed them³⁸: “The Most Reverend authors of these objections are displeased that supernatural revelation is said to be absolutely necessary only because it pleased God to raise the human person to the supernatural state. They would like some absolute necessity to be left, at least indirectly, even for the natural order.

“For they object, first: This doctrine of ours condemns the view that some instruction in human society is necessary for the exercise of reason.

“What is the answer? I deny it. I do deny it, provided one distinguishes, as I said just before, between the exercise of reason and the principles of reason³⁹. What, then, do we teach? What is our doctrine? Our doctrine is this: there are two orders of truths concerning God and divine things, namely, the natural and the supernatural. Just as there are two orders of truths concerning God and divine things, so there are also two ways of attaining knowledge of these truths: one through the principles of reason, the other through revelation. Revelation is therefore absolutely necessary for supernatural truths about God and divine things, but it is not absolutely necessary in the same way for knowing natural truths. Thus, we are speaking only of the way by which a human being can attain knowledge of both natural and supernatural truths; we are not speaking of the way in which a human being attains the exercise of reason. When we say that a human being can attain knowledge of natural truths about God and divine things through the principles of reason, we say nothing at all about the way a human being attains the exercise of reason.

“But they object a second time and say: Our best apologists maintain that, even if a human being had been left by God in a state of pure nature, revelation would have been absolutely necessary for the human being to know what worship should be offered to God, or what penance should be offered to God if the human being had sinned. Our doctrine, therefore, is too restrictive.

“What is the answer? I deny it. We merely say that supernatural revelation is not absolutely necessary for knowing things that are not in themselves inaccessible to human reason. We do not say that all natural truths are accessible to human reason. Accordingly, the hypothesis whether there are certain natural truths that are not in themselves accessible to a human being—a hypothesis that is certainly a mere hypothesis—is not touched by our doctrine”⁴⁰.

33. The Council did not deal with ontologism for a purely formal reason; hence no prejudice concerning ontologism follows. The second amendment, in fact, proposed another form for § 1 of chapter 2, whose first part was as follows⁴¹: “The same holy mother Church holds and teaches that, although God, the beginning and end of all things, dwells in inaccessible light, and no human being has ever seen him or can see him, not only face to face, which is granted only to the blessed in heaven, but neither may he be seen and contemplated naturally by a simple intuition of our mind while we sojourn in the body: nevertheless his existence and principal perfections can be known with certainty, as through a mirror and in an enigma, by ascending to him as it were by steps through created things by the natural light of reason ...”

Bishop GASSER said of this part⁴²: “This amendment contains, as we say, a passage against the philosophical system of ontologism, philosophical-theological ontologism. This amendment cannot now be admitted according to the opinion of the Deputation of the Faith, and for this formal reason alone: this very serious system of ontologism cannot be treated in this way, as though incidentally and in passing; given the gravity of the subject, it must be presented to the Council and then treated in a conciliar manner. The Deputation of the Faith therefore desires that this amendment not be approved here; but at the same time it says that no prejudice against the system of ontologism itself should arise from this, that the matter should remain in its former state, and that ontologism is omitted from this discussion here solely for a formal reason.”

For this reason Cardinals RIARIO SFORZA and PECCI (later LEO XIII) submitted a petition against ontologism, proposing for condemnation only that form of ontologism “which is openly opposed to Catholic doctrine and is the foundation of many errors now widely spread, and is contained in the proposition: Direct and immediate knowledge of God is natural to human beings.” See the whole petition in Coll. Lac. 7, 849–853.

34. The admonition mentioned by Gasser (above, n. 24) was added at the end of the Constitution: “Since, however, it is not enough to avoid heretical depravity unless those errors too are carefully shunned that approach it more or less closely, we admonish all of their duty to observe also the Constitutions and Decrees by which this Holy See has proscribed and prohibited such pernicious opinions, even when they are not expressly enumerated here.”

35. Many amendments had been proposed concerning this admonition⁴³, to which Bishop GASSER replied⁴⁴: “The Deputation of the Faith discussed this matter within its own sessions not once but repeatedly, and always judged, with precisely the same resolve, that this conclusion or admonition was absolutely necessary. For it could not fail to foresee how many evils would arise if the opinion prevailed that everything not contained in the chapters or canons of this constitution on the faith could be disputed in the schools freely, indeed with complete freedom. In the judgment of the Deputation of the Faith, the Vatican Council can meet this great evil—which would be all the greater because the Council followed the Council of Trent only after so many centuries—in no other way than by adding to the dogmatic constitution on the faith such a clause or conclusion, which reminds the faithful of their duty to ward off and eliminate errors and reminds teachers that it is not enough for a well-instructed Catholic to avoid only what must be avoided concerning the faith; he must also observe what has been defined by decrees of the Apostolic See ... Moreover, it is self-evident that, as regards dogmatic force—that is, the censure attached—nothing is changed in the decrees of the Apostolic See, even if this conclusion is approved and published by the Vatican Council. Their dogmatic force, or attached censure, remains exactly the same and unchanged as it was before the publication and decree of the Vatican Council.”

36. LEO XIII, in the encyclical Aeterni Patris (4 Aug. 1879): “And indeed, the most gracious God, in matters pertaining to divine things, disclosed by the light of faith not only those truths that the human intellect is unequal to attaining, but also revealed some that are not wholly inaccessible to reason, so that with God's authority added they might immediately become known to all, without any admixture of error. It followed that certain truths, whether proposed by God for belief or closely bound to the doctrine of faith, were known, demonstrated, and defended by sound arguments even by the wise men among the pagans, with only natural reason as their guide. For his invisible attributes are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood through the things that have been made, as is also his everlasting power and divinity⁴⁵; and the Gentiles who do not have the law ... nevertheless show the work of the law written in their hearts⁴⁶ ... Yet the usefulness that flows from this philosophical method is not confined within these bounds. And indeed, the words of divine wisdom sharply rebuke the folly of those who from the good things that are seen were unable to understand him who is, nor by attending to his works recognized who their craftsman was⁴⁷. Thus, in the first place, this great and excellent benefit is derived from human reason: it demonstrates that God exists. For from the greatness of the beauty of created things their Creator can be seen by analogy⁴⁸. — Next, reason shows God to excel uniquely in the abundance of all perfections, above all in infinite wisdom, from which nothing anywhere can be hidden, and in supreme justice, which no perverse desire can overcome; consequently, God is not only truthful but truth itself, incapable of being deceived or deceiving. It clearly follows that human reason wins for the word of God the fullest faith and authority.”

In the encyclical Humanum genus (20 April 1884), he censures the Naturalists because they do not allow even those truths perceived by the natural light of reason to remain certain and fixed, such as God's existence and the fact that human souls are separate from every material composite and are immortal.

37. PIUS X had already counted among modern errors in the encyclical Iucunda sane (12 March 1904): “The very arguments by which God's existence is demonstrated are attacked, and with incredible audacity, contrary to the first judgments of reason, that invincible force of argument is rejected by which a cause—that is, God and his attributes, bounded by no limits—is inferred from effects. For his invisible attributes are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood through the things that have been made; likewise his everlasting power and divinity”⁴⁹.

38. On 8 September 1907, the encyclical Pascendi dominici gregis condemned MODERNISM⁵⁰, which on the one hand denies that God can be known through the intellect, since it restricts the power of reason to phenomena alone (agnosticism); on the other hand, it claims that through religious feeling (experience) a human being immediately reaches divine reality and draws from it the highest conviction of God's existence (vital immanentism).

The best exposition of the whole doctrine is found in the encyclical Pascendi. The principal points relevant to our subject are these: “To begin with the philosopher, modernists make the foundation of religious philosophy that doctrine commonly called agnosticism. By its force, human reason is wholly confined to phenomena, that is, to things that appear and the manner in which they appear; it has neither the right nor the power to go beyond their limits. Hence it cannot raise itself to God, nor recognize his existence, even through visible things. From this it follows that God can in no way be directly the object of science; as for history, God is not to be considered a historical subject. — Given these premises, everyone can readily see what becomes of natural theology, the motives of credibility, and external revelation. The modernists remove them entirely and consign them to intellectualism, a ridiculous system, they say, long since dead. Nor are they restrained by the fact that the Church has most clearly condemned such monstrous errors. For the Vatican Council decreed: If anyone says that the one true God, our Creator and Lord, cannot be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason through the things that have been made: let him be anathema⁵¹; likewise: If anyone says that it is impossible, or inexpedient, for a human being to be instructed by divine revelation about God and the worship due to him: let him be anathema⁵²; and finally: If anyone says that divine revelation cannot be made credible by external signs, and that therefore people ought to be moved to faith solely by each person's internal experience or private inspiration: let him be anathema⁵³. By what reasoning modernists pass from agnosticism, which is merely ignorance, to scientific and historical atheism, which by contrast is wholly based on denial; and by what right of reasoning they proceed from not knowing whether God intervened in the history of the human race to explaining that same history while entirely neglecting God, as though he had in fact not intervened—anyone who can may understand. This much, however, is settled and fixed for them: science and history must be atheistic, allowing room within their limits for phenomena alone, with God and everything divine completely expelled. — From this most absurd doctrine, what must be held about the most holy person of Christ, the mysteries of his life and death, and likewise his resurrection and ascension into heaven, we shall soon see clearly.

“In the teaching of the modernists, however, agnosticism is to be regarded only as the negative part; the positive part, as they say, consists in vital immanence. Their progression from one to the other is as follows. — Religion, whether natural or supernatural, like any other fact, must admit of some explanation. But once natural theology has been abolished, access to revelation barred by rejecting the arguments for credibility, and every external revelation wholly set aside, it is useless to seek that explanation outside the human person. It must therefore be sought in the human person himself; and since religion is a certain form of life, it must be found wholly in human life. Hence the principle of religious immanence is asserted. The first impulse of every vital phenomenon, and religion has already been said to be such a phenomenon, must be traced to some need or impulse. More precisely, the beginnings of life must be located in a movement of the heart called feeling. Since God is the object of religion, it must therefore be concluded that faith, the beginning and foundation of every religion, must be located in an inner feeling arising from a need for the divine. Since this need for the divine is felt only under certain appropriate conditions, it cannot itself belong to the sphere of consciousness; it lies first beneath consciousness, or, to borrow a term from modern philosophy, in the subconscious, where its root also remains hidden and undetected. — Someone may ask how this need for the divine, which a human being perceives within himself, finally becomes religion. The modernists reply: Science and history, they say, are enclosed within two boundaries: one external, namely the visible world, and the other internal, namely consciousness. Once they have reached either boundary, they have nowhere further to go; beyond these limits lies the unknowable. In the presence of this unknowable, whether it lies outside the human person and beyond the visible order of things or is hidden within in the subconscious, the need for the divine, in a mind disposed toward religion and without any prior judgment of the intellect (as the tenets of fideism require), stirs a certain distinctive feeling. This feeling contains within itself the divine reality itself, both as its object and as its intimate cause, and in some way unites the human person with God. This feeling is what the modernists call faith, and for them it is the beginning of religion.”

“Now, if someone wishes to know how the believer differs from the philosopher among the modernists, it must be observed that, although the philosopher admits divine reality as the object of faith, he finds this reality nowhere but in the believer's mind, as the object of feeling and affirmation, and therefore does not go beyond the sphere of phenomena; whether this reality exists in itself outside such feeling and affirmation, the philosopher passes over and ignores. The modernist believer, by contrast, holds it as settled and certain that divine reality truly exists in itself and does not depend wholly on the believer. If you ask on what this believer's assertion rests, they reply: on each person's private experience. — In this assertion, while they indeed differ from the rationalists, they depart into the opinions of Protestants and pseudomystics. They explain it thus: religious feeling must be recognized as a certain intuition of the heart by which a human being reaches God's reality itself without mediation, and draws such conviction of God's existence and action both within and outside the human person that it far surpasses any conviction obtainable from science. They therefore posit a true experience, superior to any rational experience; if someone denies it, as rationalists do, they claim this is because that person does not wish to place himself in the moral conditions required to produce the experience. Once attained, this experience properly and truly makes a person a believer. — How far this is from Catholic principles! We have already seen that such notions were rejected by the Vatican Council.”

39. In the motu proprio Sacrorum antistitum (1 Sept. 1910), the profession of faith is prescribed: “God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known with certainty, and therefore also demonstrated, by the natural light of reason through the things that have been made—that is, through the visible works of creation—as a cause through its effects.”

40. Pius XI, in the encyclical Studiorum ducem (29 June 1923): “The arguments by which Thomas teaches that God exists and that he is the one who is subsistent Being itself are still today, as in the Middle Ages, the strongest of all for proving this. They also clearly confirm the Church's dogma solemnly proclaimed at the Vatican Council, which Pius X aptly interprets as follows: ‘God ... can’” (as above in the motu proprio of Pius X).

Among the twelve propositions submitted to the Holy Office⁵⁴, which it judged “as they stand, to have already been proscribed and condemned as a group by the Vatican Council and the Holy See, or to pave the way for the same already proscribed and condemned propositions” (1 Dec. 1924), are the following:

“VI. Logical arguments, both for God's existence and for the credibility of the Christian religion, have no objective value in themselves, as they say; that is, of themselves they prove nothing about the real order.

VII. We cannot attain any truth in the proper sense without admitting God's existence, indeed even Revelation.

VIII. Whatever value such arguments may have does not come from their evidence or dialectical force, but from the ‘subjective’ demands of life or action, which need these truths in order to develop rightly and cohere with themselves.”

41. Pius XII, in the encyclical Humani generis (12 Aug. 1950): “It is called into question whether human reason, without the help of divine revelation and divine grace, can demonstrate from arguments drawn from created things that a personal God exists ... It is well known how highly the Church values human reason as regards the certain demonstration of the existence of the one personal God” (AAS 42, 1950, 570 s.).

42. Therefore, the doctrine contained in the Church's documents is this: God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known with certainty by the light of human reason from created things, in such a way that the obligation to worship God arises from this knowledge; this knowledge is possible without any positive revelation about God (Conc. Vatic.). God's existence can be demonstrated (Bautain, nr. 8; Bonnetty, nr. 9; damn. doctr. Lovaniensium, nr. 13 s.; Leo XIII, nr. 36; Pius X, nr. 37 ss.; Pius XI, nr. 40; Pius XII, nr. 41). The object of this knowledge is the existence of a personal God, his nature, attributes, and infinite perfections (Bautain, Pius IX, Leo XIII, Pius XII). Immediate natural knowledge of God, however, cannot safely be taught (Ontologismus, nr. 10 ss.).

PETRUS LOMBARDUS, 1. 1 d. 3; S. THOMAS, 1 q. 12 a. 12; c. g. 4, 1; In Boeth. de Trin. q. 1 a. 2; FRANZELIN, De Deo uno, thes. 1; 2; 5; De traditione et Scriptura, appendix on the relation of human reason to faith; KLEUTGEN, De ipso Deo, 1. 1 q. 1 a. 1-3; DE SAN, De Deo uno, nr. 32-35; BILLOT, De Deo uno et trino, thes. 1; PESCH, Praelectiones dogmaticae, tom. 2, prop. 1-3; MUNCUNILL, Tractatus de Deo uno et trino, nr. 18-33; VAN DER MEERSCH, Tractatus de Deo uno et trino, ed. 2, p. 40 ss.

43. The words of the proposition are the very words of the First Vatican Council, and are understood in the same sense in which the Council’s definition is to be understood: “can be known” means that the capacity is present; the exercise or use of the capacity is not at issue, nor in itself and immediately those things required for its development, unless perhaps positive revelation is precisely required for such development so that one can know God. What is meant, however, is an active capacity, not a merely passive capacity to receive this knowledge from another;

“by the natural ... from created things” indicates the means of this knowledge;

“natural” does not mean “in a state of pure nature,” but applies to every state in which true human nature is found.¹ “human” is said, not “by a human being,” “lest we seem to define as a dogma of faith that there can never be adults who are invincibly ignorant of God” (above, nr. 27);

“from created things” (the canon says: “through the things that have been made”) positively establishes mediated knowledge, though not yet exclusively. Therefore Ontologism is not touched, unless it denies mediated knowledge of God; nor is the system of innate ideas, insofar as it deals precisely with the origin of ideas. But if this system is established so as to deny certain mediated knowledge from created things, it is contrary to the thesis;

“with certainty” means true certainty, as opposed to probable opinion (above, nr. 25); this proposition does not yet say “demonstrated” (cf. nr. 25).

“God, the beginning and end of all things” (the canon says: “the one and true God, our creator and lord”); these words set forth the object of knowledge. As shown above (nr. 26), the Council intended to define knowledge of God that includes knowledge of moral principles and the obligation to worship God. What is therefore meant is knowledge of God as the supreme, personal being, distinct from the world, on whom the world, and humanity itself, depends as its author, and toward whom it ought to tend as its end. This does not require a scientific concept of God (which considers God not only in relation to the world but also as he is in himself and absolutely, and in a certain way presents a “definition” of God); a common concept suffices, one that designates God chiefly in his relation to the world, and especially to humanity. An obscure idea does not suffice (that is, one by which the object cannot be distinguished from others); a clear idea is required. It need not, however, be distinct; a confused idea suffices.

44. All those who deny that by natural human reason God, a personal being to be worshipped religiously by humanity, can be known with certainty oppose the doctrine proposed in this thesis—even if they affirm that a personal God can be reached by another, non-rational or non-intellectual way, or even concede that reason can know from created things the existence of some (impersonal) cause of the world. All, then, are opponents of this thesis in whose system agnosticism is contained, at least in religious matters, whether they establish it on theological grounds (human nature corrupted by sin, the insufficiency of natural powers, the necessity of grace) or on philosophical grounds (insofar as they deny either the possibility of certain intellectual knowledge in general or, specifically, of objects beyond the senses or divine objects). The number of those defending such opinions grew considerably after the Reformation, and not independently of it.

LUTHER himself, perhaps partly under the influence of nominalist philosophy, but also because of his false opinion about the condition of human nature after sin, denied natural reason religious knowledge; according to him, religious knowledge is attained by faith, which is properly experiential knowledge, a kind of feeling².

“Philosophers debate and speculate about God and arrive at some sort of knowledge, as Plato contemplates and acknowledges divine governance. But all of this is merely objective; it is not yet the knowledge Joseph (the Egyptian) had, that God cares, hears, and helps the afflicted. Plato cannot establish this. He remains in metaphysical thought, like a cow looking at a new gate.”³

The FORMULA OF CONCORD states as follows.⁴ “On this matter, this is our faith, doctrine, and confession: that the human intellect and reason are wholly blind in spiritual matters and can understand nothing by their own powers.” Likewise, II Pars. Solida declaratio, De libero arbitrio, 7.

The BAIANIANS and JANSENISTS proceeded in a similar way (cf. Denz 1391), unduly diminishing the value of natural reason in religious knowledge.

KANT restricts knowledge to phenomena; he denies metaphysics that transcends consciousness, especially knowledge of spiritual and divine things. On the other hand, however, the categorical imperative, the moral law that binds every rational being absolutely, truly exists. The will ought to follow the moral law absolutely and therefore ought to will everything that must be admitted for this end. Hence the will ought to will God’s existence; this belongs to the postulates of practical reason. Kant says of these postulates: “These postulates are not theoretical dogmas, but only presuppositions from a necessary practical point of view; thus they do not enlarge speculative knowledge, but they do give objective reality to the ideas of speculative reason.” Thus God’s existence is held as true by faith. He describes such faith as follows: “Faith (so called without qualification) is confidence that an intention will be attained, the furtherance of which is a duty, although we cannot discern the possibility of carrying it out.… It is a free holding-to-be-true, not of something for which dogmatic proofs can be found for the theoretically determining power of judgment … but of what we assume in order to pursue an intention according to the laws of freedom.”⁵.

Many, especially among Protestant theologians, followed Kant in holding that science and religion must be entirely separated from one another: religion lies outside rational knowledge and does not admit of rational explanation. While they agree with Kant in the negative element (agnosticism), they present the positive element in various ways. SCHLEIERMACHER replaced it with a certain sense of absolute dependence on something infinite. RITSCHL distinguishes theoretical and religious knowledge: the judgments of the former are judgments of being (Seinsurteile), while those of the latter are judgments of value (Werturteile). These judgments are so called because they are knowledge of an object that has value in relation to the knower himself, and because such knowledge is possible only to one who appreciates that value. Disinterested knowledge of God is excluded.

FIDEISM (in its cruder form, Traditionalism): God’s existence must first be believed by divine faith. Milder TRADITIONALISM: God’s existence must first be believed immediately by each individual by human faith; the persuasion about God’s existence that prevails in humankind, however, is to be traced back to God’s first positive revelation (above, nr. 8, 9, 19, 20).

Depending both on Kantian philosophy and on Protestant theologians, the MODERNISTS formed their system, which has already been discussed above (nr. 38).

In the most recent non-Catholic philosophy of religion, it is almost a common position that an irrational element enters into all religious knowledge, including knowledge of the existence of a personal God. If this is admitted, one can no longer say that the existence of a personal God can be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason. As an example, let OTTO be named. According to him, the primary religious element is not some knowledge but a certain irrational, sui generis feeling, which is something primary and therefore cannot be derived.⁶.

HOLY SCRIPTURE

45. Rom 1, 18 ss.⁷ After introductory words, the Apostle indicates the subject of the epistle (1, 16): the Gospel is the power of God for salvation to everyone who believes; in it the justice of God is revealed (17). Apart from the Gospel and outside the Gospel, the wrath of God is revealed against people who deserve God’s wrath because they are sinners (18). He then describes all people as sinners and guilty, both Gentiles and Jews (cap. 2; cf. 3, 9). The argument for our proposition is contained in this first part, where he shows that the Gentiles fell into vices and sins because they did not acknowledge or worship the God whom they had known; therefore God’s wrath is upon them: they are without excuse.

46. Verse 18: detinent (“suppress”): not merely to have or possess, but to hold back, restrain, suppress; in iniustitia (“in injustice”): deviation from the right norm. Verse 19: quia (“because”): gives the reason why there is injustice, or the reason for the revelation of God’s wrath; notum (“known”): in the New Testament, τὸ γνωστόν usually means what is known; in profane usage, what can be known. Either is possible here, though perhaps the latter is preferable. How God himself manifested it is stated in verse 20. Invisibilia (“invisible things”): Scripture often says that God is invisible; cf. 1 Tim 6, 16. A creatura mundi (“from the creation of the world”): κτίσις can mean active creation or the created order; if active, it is to be understood temporally; if passive, it indicates the source of knowledge: from created things. Intellecta (“understood”): νοεῖν in itself indicates the knowledge of νοῦς, in which spiritual knowledge, rather than sensory perception, is considered. Conspiciuntur (“are seen”): καθοράται, “I grasp with the mind’s eye; I know, perceive, understand something by reasoning, etc.” (ZORELL, s.v.). The invisible things of God, those known precisely from creation, are then specified more precisely: his eternal power and divinity. Ita ut sint (“so that they are”): εἰς τὸ εἶναι can be understood either consequentially—“and therefore they are without excuse”—or in a final sense: God manifested himself so clearly in creation precisely so that people could have no excuse if they did not thereby know and acknowledge God. And so it happened: cum cognovissent (“although they knew”): they not only could know, but actually did know. Non glorificaverunt … (“they did not glorify …”): the Apostle is therefore speaking of knowledge of God that entails an obligation of worship, and thus of a personal God distinct from the world. God had manifested himself to people in creation as creator, author of the world, to whom glory and thanksgiving are due. The Gentiles did not give these to God; indeed, they offered to false gods the worship due to the one true God. Evanuerunt (“they became futile”): they became vain, that is, lacking truth and right judgment (ZORELL; cf. the gods of the Gentiles are called τὰ μάταια). Stulti facti sunt (“they became fools”): what this foolishness consists in is stated in the following verse (23): idolatry; cf. Ps 105, 20. In verse 24, and again in verses 26 and 28, the Apostle emphasizes that those sins and vices are the punishment for sin, turning away from God, and idolatry. He does not, however, suppose that people lost right judgment about what is permitted and forbidden (v. 32). They are therefore truly without excuse (v. 20; 2, 1) and justly subject to God’s wrath.

47. It is readily apparent that the text, as explained, contains what our proposition affirms: 1) an active capacity to know God is present; indeed, the Apostle also affirms its exercise (21); 2) by the natural light of reason: understood, they are seen (20); from created things: through the things that have been made (20). Nothing is said about revelation; the Apostle would have had to indicate it if knowledge of God from created things were impossible without revelation. Moreover, he is speaking of the Gentiles, distinguishing them precisely from the Jews, who are the people of revelation. 3) Knowledge is certain: there is an obligation to worship God; people are culpable. 4) The object: God is the beginning, as shown by creation and his eternal power; God is the end, toward whom they ought to tend as their author by rendering him worship; God is personal, for only a personal being can be the object of worship.

48. Sap. 13. In the first part (c. 1–9), “the author exhorts the reader to pursue wisdom and teaches how it is attained.” “Wisdom is the right knowledge of God and divine things, which considers God in all things, so that one follows God’s will and fear throughout life. This wisdom, both speculative and practical, is a gift of God, which comes down from God himself, and a certain participation in uncreated Wisdom, by which God created and governs all things.” “In the second, historical part, he shows from the history of the people of Israel the blessings and effects of wisdom (10, 1–19, 20).”⁸ In this part, after recounting how wisdom saved the Israelites in their exodus from Egypt but punished the Egyptians in all those things in which they had been idolaters (12, 3 ss.), he treats idolatry itself (13, 1–15, 19), distinguishing a kind of more elevated idolatry, the worship of nature and its powers, the elements and the stars (13, 1–9), from crude, vulgar idolatry, the worship of human handiwork (13, 10–14, 7).

49. 13, 1. Autem (“but”): μέν, to which δέ corresponds (v. 10); there are two classes of idolatry. In the Greek text γάρ follows, indicating the reason and confirming what had been said at 12, 27 about the just punishment of the Egyptians. Vani (“futile”), as in the Epistle to the Romans above; in the Greek text φύσει (“by nature”) is added: as human beings are now, in fallen nature, they incline toward this futility, although (v. 3) that knowledge, as knowledge, is not so difficult. The sense cannot be that human nature is such as to include or entail this futility and foolishness in itself, because such an explanation would contradict what follows. Et de his … (“And concerning these …”): it indicates in what respect they are futile and foolish. Non potuerunt (“they were unable”): physical capacity is not denied (for he later explains that they ought to have known), but for the other reasons indicated there is a lack of moral capacity (vv. 6, 7). Bona quae videntur (“the good things that are seen”): in contrast with him who is, that is, God. Attendentes (“paying attention”): some take it concessively, so that the sense is “although they paid attention”; others take it causally, “because they paid too much attention.” The former is preferable. Therefore they are blamed because, from visible things, they did not see him who is, nor recognize the maker from his works. Verse 2 describes which creatures and powers of nature they took for gods of the world. From the beauty (v. 3) and power (v. 4) of creatures they ought to have known the greater beauty and power of their author. Cognoscibiliter (“in a way that can be known”), ἀναλόγως (v. 5): by comparison according to a proportion; videri poterit (“can be seen”), θεωρεῖται: is contemplated by the mind. Verse 6: minor querela (“less blame”), namely, in comparison with those of whom he will speak in v. 10 ss.; fortasse (“perhaps”): the sense is not “perhaps they are in error,” for there is no doubt about their error, but it indicates what may have been the reason or occasion for their error (vv. 6, 7). Thus, although they deserve less blame (v. 8), they are nevertheless not excused, for verse 9 says: it was easier to find the Lord than to estimate the world.

At verse 10 the description of the other class of idolatry begins. That they are much less excusable follows a fortiori from what has been said up to this point; 14, 23 describes the sins and vices into which they fell.

50. Verses 1–9 clearly contain the following: there is a capacity to know God by the natural light of reason, namely, the same light by which people know the greatness and beauty of the world (vv. 3, 4, 5, 9); from created things (vv. 1, 3, 4, 5, 9); with certainty (they are without excuse, v. 8). The knowledge concerns a personal God whom they ought to have worshipped: they are blamed for idolatry.

51. Act Ap 14, 14 ss. Paul had healed a lame man at Lystra; therefore the people of Lystra regarded Paul and Barnabas as gods, and priests came to sacrifice to them. Then Paul and Barnabas spoke to the people, v. 14 ss. He wished to turn them from vain gods to him who made heaven and earth, who, although he had allowed the nations to walk in their own ways, had nevertheless not left himself without witness. God’s witness is the benefits he bestowed on them. “He tells them gently, but clearly, that their ignorance of God is to be charged as their fault and that idolatry admits of no excuse, for in that very providence by which all things are governed toward necessary and useful ends, God’s witness to himself was always available to them” (KNABENBAUER in h. l.).

52. Act Ap 17, 22 ss. St. Paul’s speech on the Areopagus: God, who made the world and everything in it, needs nothing, but himself provides everything to everyone; he made the human race, and the whole history of the human race is directed by God. God wished people to seek him who made and governs all things (v. 27), if perhaps they might find him by groping—as someone in the dark reaches out a hand to find and touch something. Quamvis (“although”), καί γε, that is, “since in fact” (ZORELL, s.v. καί II 3 e): he is not far from each one of us. This indicates that it is not so difficult to find God. The Gentiles themselves recognized that God is near to us (v. 28). If, then, we are God’s offspring (v. 29), we ought not to estimate God as so degraded and base as to suppose him like inanimate things, human inventions; rather, it seems to be implicit in this thought that, by considering human nature, they ought to have arrived at a more perfect idea of God, of the living God, endowed with intellect and will.

THE FATHERS

The same doctrine is found among the Fathers, who distinguish this knowledge of God from the knowledge that comes through positive revelation.

53. ST. IRENAEUS⁹, Adv. haeres. 1. 2, c. 6 n. 1: “How, then, could either the angels or the maker of the world have been ignorant of the first God, when they were in his own domain, were his creatures, and were held together by him? He could indeed be invisible to them because of his transcendence, but not unknown because of his providence. For although, they say, they were very far removed from him by their descent, yet, since his dominion extends over all, they ought to know their ruler and to know this very thing: that he who created them is Lord of all. For although he is invisible, his power bestows on all a great intuition and perception of mind concerning his most powerful and almighty transcendence. Hence, even though no one knows the Father except the Son, nor the Son except the Father and those to whom the Son has revealed him, nevertheless all know this very thing, when the reason implanted in the mind moves them and reveals to them that there is one God, Lord of all” (MG 7, 124; R 197). Ibid. c. 9 n. 1: “Now it is enough to have the testimony of those who say the opposite of what we do, since all people ultimately agree on this: the ancients, who first guarded this persuasion from the tradition of the first-formed man and sang of one God, maker of heaven and earth; those who came after them, receiving this recollection of the matter from God’s prophets; and the Gentiles, learning it from creation itself. For creation itself shows him who created it, the work itself suggests him who made it, and the world manifests him who arranged it. The whole Church throughout the world received this tradition from the apostles” (MG 7, 733 s.; R 198). Cf. l. 2 c. 30 n. 3; l. 3 c. 25 n. 1.

Irenaeus’s words in l. 4 c. 6 n. 4: “The Lord taught that no one can know God unless God teaches him—that is, that God cannot be known without God; knowing him is the Father’s will. For those to whom the Son reveals him know him” (MG 7, 988 s.; R 227). The Traditionalists understood this exclusively of revelation in the strict, positive sense. But according to St. Irenaeus’s teaching the Word also “reveals” God through creation itself: “For through creation itself the Word reveals God the creator, and through the world the Lord, maker of the world; through the formed thing, the craftsman who formed it; and through the Son, the Father who begot the Son” (MG 7, 989; R 228).

TERTULLIAN¹⁰, Adv. Marcionem l. 1 n. 10: “From the beginning of things, their creator was known together with the things themselves, which were brought forth so that God might be known … For from the beginning the knowledge of God is an endowment of the soul; this is the same among Egyptians, Syrians, and people of Pontus” (ML 2, 257; R 332); ibid. n. 18: “We define that God is to be known first by nature and then acknowledged through teaching: by nature from his works, through teaching from preaching” (ML 2, 266; R 334); cf. Apologeticus, n. 17 (ML 1, 375; R 275).

54. ST. BASIL, Epistula 235 (ad Amphilochium) 1: “Which comes first, knowledge or faith? We say, generally, that in the sciences faith precedes knowledge. But if anyone were to say, in our teaching, that knowledge precedes faith, we would not contend with him, provided it is knowledge accommodated to human capacity. For in the sciences one must first believe that this letter is alpha; after you have learned its shape and pronunciation, only then can you grasp precisely the letter’s power. But in the faith that concerns God, the thought that God exists comes first; we infer this from created things. For, understanding his wisdom, power, goodness, and all his invisible attributes from the creation of the world, we thus know him. In this way we accept him as our own Lord. Since God is the creator of the whole world, and we are a part of the world, God is therefore our creator too. Faith follows this knowledge, and worship follows such faith” (MG 29, 871; R. 924).

55. ST. GREGORY NAZIANZEN¹¹, Orat. theol. 2 n. 16: “We, however, aflame with desire for God, and so disposed in mind that we cannot in any way admit that this universe lacks a leader and governor, are met by reason; then, looking upon things subject to the eyes and considering those created from the beginning, reason did not stop there either. For it was not reasonable to assign primacy to things that are on the same level as we are in respect of sense. Rather, by their help and support it leads us to what is above them, by whose favor they exist. What, then, arranged the heavenly and earthly things, and those borne through air or water—or rather, the elements prior to these, heaven, earth, air, and water—in an orderly arrangement? Who blended and separated them? What mutual association, kinship of nature, and harmony do they have? I greatly approve this saying, even though it was spoken by a man foreign to our religion: What brought motion to these things and directs them in a perpetual, unhindered course? Is it not their maker, who implanted in all things the reason by which the universe moves and is governed? And who, then, is their maker? Is it not the one who brought them forth and produced them into the order of nature? Surely this power and capacity cannot be ascribed to chance and fortune. Even if we grant that all things came to be by chance, to what, finally, must their arrangement and ordering be ascribed? And even if we also grant this, if one wishes, to chance, whose work, I ask, was it to preserve and maintain them according to the principles by which they were first created? That of someone else, or of chance? Surely that of someone else, not chance. And what else could this be but God? Thus reason, which is from God and implanted in all, the first law established in our hearts and joined to all mortals, has raised us from the things seen by the eyes to God” (MG 36, 46 s.; R 897).

56. ST. CHRYSOSTOM, In epist. ad Rom. hom. 3 n. 2: “Just as someone entrusted with the king’s money, ordered to spend it for the king’s glory, would be punished as one who had gravely offended the king if he spent it on thieves, prostitutes, and magicians, making them splendid at the king’s expense; so too these people, after receiving knowledge of God and his glory, then ascribed it to idols, suppressed the truth in injustice and, so far as they could, dishonored knowledge by failing to use it as they ought. Is what was said clear to you, or must it be explained again more clearly? Perhaps it is necessary to go further. What, then, is meant? From the beginning God implanted knowledge of himself in people. But when the Gentiles ascribed that knowledge to wood and stone, they dishonored the truth, insofar as they could; for it remains unchanged, with its glory unmoved. And how do you know, Paul, that God implanted knowledge of himself in them? ‘Because,’ he says, ‘what is known of him is manifest in them.’ But this is an assertion, not a demonstration. You must prove and show me that knowledge of God was manifest to them and that they deliberately neglected it. How, then, was it manifest? Did he send them a voice? No; but he did what could attract them more than any voice: he placed the created world before them, so that the wise person, the unlearned person, the Scythian, or the barbarian could, from the mere sight of visible things, learn their beauty and ascend to God. Therefore he says (v. 20): For his invisible things, understood through the things that have been made, are seen from the creation of the world; the prophet also says: The heavens declare the glory of God¹². What, then, will the Gentiles say on that day? ‘We did not know you’? Did you not hear the heavens uttering a voice by their mere appearance—the harmony and concord of all things, crying more clearly than a trumpet? The laws of night and day, remaining forever unchanged? The firm and unchanging order of winter, spring, and the other seasons? The sea, useful amid so many storms and waves? All things remaining in order and proclaiming the Creator through their beauty and greatness? Paul summed up all these things, and more, in a few words: For his invisible things, from the creation of the world, are seen, understood through the things that have been made; his everlasting power and divinity also, so that they are without excuse. Even if God did not make them for that end, that is what happened. For God did not bring such a teaching forward to deprive them of an excuse, but so that they might know him; and since they were ungrateful, they deprived themselves of a defense” (MG 60, 412 s.; R 1182). Cf. Ad populum Antiochenum hom. 9 n. 2 (MG 49, 104 s.).

57. ST. AUGUSTINE, Sermo 141, c. 1 et 2: “Among other things, when the holy Gospel was being read, you heard what the Lord Jesus said: I am the way and the truth and the life. Everyone desires truth and life, but not everyone finds the way. Some philosophers of this age, too, saw that God is a certain eternal, immutable, intelligible, intelligent, wise life, making others wise. They did see the fixed, stable, unchanging truth in which are all the principles of all created things, but from afar; they saw it, but were in error. And therefore they did not find the way by which one might reach so great and ineffable and beatifying a possession. That even they saw the Creator through creation (insofar as a human being can see him), the maker through his work, the maker of the world through the world, is witnessed by the Apostle Paul, whom Christians must surely believe. For, speaking of such people, he says: ‘The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all impiety.’ As you recognize, these are the Apostle Paul’s words: The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all impiety and the injustice of people who suppress the truth in iniquity. Did he say that they do not possess the truth? No: they suppress the truth in iniquity. What they possess is good, but the place in which they possess it is bad: they suppress the truth in iniquity.

“It might be objected to him: ‘How do those impious people possess the truth? Did God speak to any of them? Did they receive the law, as the people of Israel did through Moses? How, then, do they possess the truth, even in their very iniquity?’ Listen to what follows and shows it. Because what is known of God, he says, is manifest in them; for God has manifested it to them. Did he manifest it to those to whom he gave no law? Hear how he manifested it: For his invisible things, understood through the things that have been made, are seen. Question the world, the adornment of heaven, the brightness and arrangement of the stars, the sun sufficient for the day, the moon a comfort in the night; question the earth, fruitful with herbs and trees, full of animals and adorned with human beings in every way; question the sea, how full it is of creatures of every kind and nature; question the air, how it teems with so many birds. Question everything, and see whether, in their own way, they do not answer you as though they said: ‘God made us.’ Distinguished philosophers also sought these things and partly came to know the maker. What, then? Why is God’s wrath revealed against impiety itself? Because they suppress the truth in iniquity? Let him come and show how. For he has already said how they knew. His invisible things, that is, God’s, are seen, understood through the things that have been made; his everlasting power and divinity also, so that they are without excuse. Because, although they knew God, they did not honor or thank him as God, but became futile in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened. These are the Apostle’s words, not mine: And their foolish heart was darkened; for, claiming to be wise, they became fools. What they found by curiosity, they lost through pride. ‘Claiming to be wise’ means attributing God’s gift to themselves; thus they became fools” (ML 38, 776; R 1508). Cf. De spiritu et littera, c. 12 (ML 44, 211 ss.); De Civitate Dei, l. 8 c. 6 (ML 41, 231).

58. THEODORET, in Rom. c. 1 v. 20: “Creation, he says, and the things that come to be in creation—the changes of the hours, the succession of seasons, the sequence of night and day, the birth of clouds, the breezes of the winds, the production of fruits and seeds, and whatever else is of this kind—clearly teach us both that God is the maker of all things and that he wisely holds the key¹³ of creation. For he who made all things, moved by his own goodness alone, would never cast away all care for what he made. And therefore the divine Apostle did not say his invisible thing but his invisible things, that is, his creation and providence, his just judgment in each case, and the many and varied principles by which things are governed. For this reason those who, despite having had so many teachers, have received no benefit from so many lessons do not deserve pardon” (MG 82, 62).

OBJECTIONS

59. 1. The First Vatican Council itself teaches that revelation is necessary.

I answer: I distinguish the assertion. It is absolutely necessary, given the elevation of humanity, for knowing supernatural things: granted; for knowing God: I subdistinguish. It is absolutely necessary: I deny; it is morally necessary: I subdistinguish again. So that all may actually know those things about God that can be known by natural reason (not merely God’s existence), readily, with firm certainty, and without any admixture of error: granted; so that there be an active capacity to know God’s existence: I deny. Cf. above, nr. 29 ss.

2. The argument from the Epistle to the Romans is invalid, for: a) St. Paul presupposes revelation; b) at least, he presupposes instruction, and therefore some tradition; c) he speaks only of the wise, not of all people.

I answer a): the answer is given above, nr. 47;

to b) I distinguish: he presupposes instruction whose precise object is to communicate knowledge of God itself: I deny; instruction required for the suitable development of reason itself: I leave undecided. “It should be noted that we are not debating whether a human being brought up from infancy in the woods could of his own accord come to know God, nor whether instruction in general is necessary for an innate capacity to be exercised. Rather, we assert and defend that, according to Scripture and the tradition of the Fathers, a person who—whether in society or outside human company—has attained the use of reason, so as to know not only by sense but also by intellect, can acquire certain knowledge of divine things, even if he has received no tradition” (KLEUTGEN, De ipso Deo, pag. 71);

to c) Even if St. Paul were speaking only of the wise, he would already be teaching that God can be known by the natural light of human reason. It will be shown later, however (nr. 206), that he is speaking not only of the wise.

3. The objections commonly raised against the argument from the Book of Wisdom have already been resolved in the explanation of the text itself. They are: a) they are futile by nature; b) they were unable to know God; c) they are excused (v. 6); d) perhaps they are in error.

4. The theological arguments by which the possibility of natural knowledge of God is opposed—that nature has been corrupted by sin and that grace is necessary for knowing God—rest both on a false concept of the original state and its consequences, and on a confusion of the physical possibility of knowing with the capacity for salutary knowledge. As for the rational arguments commonly brought against our proposition (that God does not fall under the formal object of the human intellect, that God is too far removed from humanity, that there is no proportion between God and humanity, and the like), or those by which the necessity of tradition for attaining certain knowledge is defended, consult what has been said in philosophy.

PETRUS LOMBARDUS, l. 1 d. 3; S. TH., 1 q. 2 a. 1-3; FRANZELIN, thes. 2 et 6; KLEUTGEN, nr. 139-179; DE SAN, nr. 30 s.; BILLOT, thes. 3 et 4; PESCH, prop. 5 et 6; MUNCUNILL, nr. 34-57; VAN DER MEERSCH, nr. 53-97; CHOSSAT, Dict. de Théol. 4, 923-948; I. DE VRIES, Vom Sinn und logischen Aufbau der Gottesbeweise. Scholastik 15 (1941) 481-507.

60. The preceding thesis stated that God's existence can be known with certainty; the present thesis further affirms that it can be proved or demonstrated. The proposition does not hold universally: whatever can be known with certainty cannot for that reason always be demonstrated or proved. For example, what is immediately evident, and what must be used as principles of argument in the very act of arguing, can indeed be known with certainty, but cannot properly be proved. When, however, the question concerns existential, mediate, certain knowledge—that is, when, from an existing object that is known, the existence of another thing is known with certainty, or when the existence of an object is known with certainty from its relation to another known thing—what can be known with certainty in this way also seems capable of demonstration. For knowledge of this kind necessarily involves an inference¹, and if it is true and certain knowledge, the inference itself must be knowable as legitimate: this is what constitutes a demonstration or proof². The present thesis, then, follows from the preceding thesis and affirms that it can be shown that the inference is legitimate by which, according to the preceding thesis, God's existence can be known with certainty from created things.

61. The opponents of this thesis are

1. the same people who deny the preceding proposition;

2. the Ontologists, insofar as in their doctrine an immediate perception of God—as the light of the intellect and the foundation of all certain and universal knowledge—is presupposed by every argument (God is the first thing known);

3. among those who follow the system of innate ideas³, some denied that God can be demonstrated; for example, according to KUHN⁴, philosophical argument alone can lead to knowledge of some pantheistic absolute being, but not to knowledge of an absolute being who is the personal God, toward whom human beings can fulfill religious duties. For this, the idea of God is required, in which God is reflected as in a mirror.

62. 4) The same idea—that philosophical demonstration alone does not lead to a personal God—appears among several recent thinkers who recoil from “intellectualism” and say that affective factors should be given greater weight in the knowledge of God. For a person does not become religious through arguments; the person does not consist of the intellect alone, but the reasons of the “heart” deserve greater attention; it is not the intellect alone but the whole person who knows. Just as religion must be distinguished from metaphysics, so religious knowledge must be distinguished from rational knowledge. The personal God is the object of religious knowledge⁵. It is readily apparent that such views also oppose the thesis insofar as and to the extent that this irrational element is introduced into the knowledge of God.

CHURCH DOCUMENTS

63. In ecclesiastical documents, both before (BAUTAIN, Denz 1622; 1627; above, nr. 8; GREGORY XVI, Denz 1620; PIUS IX, Denz 1670; BONNETTY, Denz 1650; above, nr. 9; condemnation of the Louvain propositions, above, nos. 13 s.) and after the Vatican Council (LEO XIII, above, nr. 36; PIUS X, nr. 37 ss.; PIUS XI, nr. 40; PIUS XII, nr. 41), the demonstrability of God's existence is explicitly taught. In particular, arguments used by the Scholastics are defended, among them especially the argument from causality: PIUS X in the Oath against Modernism, and PIUS XI in the encyclical “Studiorum ducem.”

64. The VATICAN Council, as was already stated in nr. 25, refrained from an explicit definition of the demonstrability of God's existence. An amendment proposed in this sense was rejected. The reason why the Council acted in this way is not given. Some suspect that the Council did not wish directly to condemn the view of those who said that, without the “idea of God,” reason alone cannot know the personal God with certainty, and who denied that there are arguments possessing the full force needed to demonstrate God's existence⁶. Yet it seems simpler to explain this from the Council's intention to define a fundamental principle directly excluding crude Traditionalism; and that principle states precisely that God can be known with certainty by the light of reason.

Nothing, however, can be inferred in favor of the contrary view from the fact that the Council did not wish to define the demonstrability of God's existence. For the Council's proposed teaching also addressed “the widely spreading error that God's existence cannot be proved by any firm arguments and therefore cannot be known with certainty by reason” (above, nr. 17). Establishing a foundation for faith—the certainty of God's existence—seemed of the highest importance for our times, since the opinion had gained ground “that God's existence cannot be proved with complete certainty by certain arguments, and that the arguments which have always been held in such high esteem are not of a kind that can establish the matter” (above, nr. 22). The Council's definition is for the arguments (above, nr. 25); knowing with certainty and demonstrating are, in a certain respect, one and the same (above, nr. 25). From this it is clear that “know with certainty,” as the Council Fathers understand it in the definition, does not abstract from “demonstrability” in the sense that the question of demonstrability is untouched by the definition. Rather, the Fathers understand by it a certain knowledge with which demonstrability is intimately connected. Accordingly, Pope PIUS XI rightly said in the encyclical “Studiorum ducem” that PIUS X had admirably interpreted the dogma solemnly proclaimed at the Vatican Council with the words of the Oath against Modernism (“can also be known with certainty and therefore demonstrated”; above, nr. 40).

65. A PRELIMINARY NOTE on the argument from Sacred Scripture and the Fathers:

It is right to invoke as a supporter of the view affirming the demonstrability of God's existence 1) anyone who intends explicitly to show that the inference from created things to God's existence is truly legitimate; this is self-evident;

2. anyone who directly and in fact proposes the arguments themselves. For although he may not intend explicitly to vindicate the legitimacy of the inference, by proposing his arguments he nevertheless affirms it;

3. anyone who does not explicitly propose the arguments themselves as such, but only indicates the reasoning by which God's existence is known with certainty from created things. For in this way he seems at least implicitly to affirm that the inference from the reasoning he has indicated is legitimate and can be known as such.

SACRED SCRIPTURE

66. We should not expect Sacred Scripture first to propose the demonstrability itself; whether it proposes the arguments themselves—the second point—is perhaps open to dispute, since St. Paul (Acts 14; 17) seems to propose an argument, although not everyone admits this⁷. But the third point is certainly found in Sacred Scripture: Wisdom 13:1, the maker from the works, that is, cause from effect; vv. 3–5, from the world's beauty and power, its author, more beautiful and powerful, that is, cause from effect (perhaps v. 1 also indicates the argument from contingency). Similarly, Rom 1, 20: through the things that have been made, the eternal power and divinity, that is, cause from effect. Acts 14 and 17: providence.

Therefore, the teaching on the demonstrability of God's existence is found at least implicitly in Sacred Scripture.

THE FATHERS

The Fathers propose not only the reasoning by which certain knowledge is attained, but the arguments themselves as well; indeed, they may even be discussing demonstrability itself⁸

67. The principal arguments by which the APOLOGISTS already show that God exists are causality and finality.

ARISTIDES, Apology 1: “Observing that the world and all that is in it are necessarily in motion, I understood that the one by whom it is moved and preserved is God. For whatever moves is stronger than that which is moved; and whatever preserves is stronger than that which is preserved. Therefore I say that he is God, who created all things and preserves them” (MG 96, 1108; R 110).

THEOPHILUS, To Autolycus, bk. 1, nr. 4 ss.: “God made all things, when previously they did not exist, so that his majesty might be known and understood from his works. For just as the soul in a human being is not seen, but, though it escapes human sight, is understood from the body's motion, so God cannot be seen by human eyes, but is seen and understood from his providence and works. For example, when someone sees a ship fitted out at sea, under way, and making for the shore, he will no doubt judge that there is a helmsman on board by whom it is steered. So God must be understood as the governor of all things, though he is not seen with the eyes of the flesh, since he cannot be grasped.… Moreover, an earthly king is believed to exist, although he is not seen by everyone; he is known through his laws, decrees, powers, resources, and images. Will you not understand God from his works and powers?” (MG 6, 1030 s.).

68. MINUCIUS FELIX, Octavius 18: “If, on entering some house, you had seen everything cultivated, arranged, and adorned, you would surely believe that a master presided over it, and that he was far better than those good things. So, in this house of the world, when you perceive heaven and earth, providence, order, and law, believe that there is a lord and parent of the universe more beautiful than the stars themselves and all the parts of the world” (ML 3, 288; R 269).

LACTANTIUS, Divine Institutes, bk. 1, ch. 2, nr. 5: “No one is so uncultivated or so savage in character that, raising his eyes to heaven, even if he does not know whose providence governs all that he sees, he fails to understand from the very greatness, motion, arrangement, stability, usefulness, beauty, and balance of things that some providence exists, and that what stands together by a marvelous ordering could not have been brought about without some greater design” (ML 6, 121; R 624).

69. ST. GREGORY NAZIANZEN, see above, nr. 55.

ST. GREGORY OF NYSSA, On the Soul and the Resurrection: “Someone sees a garment and is led by reasoning to recognize the weaver; from a ship he understands its builder; likewise, as soon as a building has been seen, the hand of its maker comes before the mind of those who look at it. But these people, while looking at the world, are blind and deluded about the one who is disclosed through it.” When Gregory asked, “About this very point, indeed… how can our adversaries avoid doubt and uncertainty that all things are from God and that all things are held together and preserved by him, or whether there is any divine power at all presiding over the nature of things above?” Macrina replied:⁹ “It would be more fitting and proper, she said, to keep silent about such matters and not deign to answer foolish and impious propositions alike. For even a certain divine saying (Prov 26, 4: ‘Do not answer a fool according to his folly, lest you become like him’) forbids answering a madman according to his madness. But, as the Prophet says (Sap 13, 1), the one who denies that God exists is altogether foolish and senseless. Since, however, we must speak about these things too, I shall tell you the reasoning—not mine, nor that of any other human being, since it is too small, whatever it may be—but the reasoning that the creation of things unfolds and recounts through the wonders within it. The eye is the hearer of this creation, and what appears resounds in the heart through a discourse at once intelligent and artful. For creation openly proclaims its maker with a loud voice, while the heavens, as the Prophet says, declare the glory of God in ineffable voices. For who, seeing and considering the harmony of the whole universe and the wonders of heaven and earth… (she lists many), if he looks upon these things with the eyes of understanding and the keenness of the mind, is not plainly taught by what appears that a divine, artful, and skillful power is manifest in all things and extends and spreads through them all; that, while fitting and adapting the parts to the whole, it also fills the whole through its parts; and that the whole universe is held in check and sustained by a single power, while it remains in itself, moves around itself, and never ceases to move, nor passes to any other place than the one in which it is?” (MG 46, 23 ss.).

70. ST. AUGUSTINE¹⁰, Confessions, bk. 11, ch. 4: “Behold heaven and earth: they cry out that they were made, for they change and vary. Whatever has been made, and yet exists, has nothing in it that was not there before; this is what it means to change and vary. They also cry out that they did not make themselves: ‘We are because we were made; therefore we did not exist before we existed, so that we could make ourselves.’ And the very evidence is their voice. You, then, O Lord, made them…” (ML 32, 811; R 1596); cf. bk. 10, ch. 6; ML 32, 782 s.; City of God, bk. 8, ch. 6: “They [the Platonists] saw that whatever is changeable is not the supreme God.… Then they saw that every form in any changeable thing, by which that thing is whatever it is, in whatever way and of whatever nature, can exist only from him who truly is, because he exists unchangeably” (ML 41, 231). In On the Psalms 73, nr. 25, he says to an unbeliever who wishes to admit only what he sees: “Your soul is visible, I suppose! Fool! Your body is visible; who sees your soul¹¹? Since only your body is visible, why are you not buried? And he answers—for he understands this much—‘Because I am alive.’ How do I know that you are alive, when I do not see your soul? How do I know? You will answer, ‘Because I speak, walk, and work.’ Fool! From the body's works I recognize that it is alive; from the works of creation you cannot recognize the Creator!” (ML 36, 944). Sermon 197: “Just as, then, from the movements and governance of the body you understand the soul, which you do not see, so from the governance of the whole world and the rule over the souls themselves understand the Creator” (ML 38, 1022). Cf. above, nr. 57.

71. St. AUGUSTINE develops the argument of his own, commonly named after him, in On Free Choice of the Will, bk. 2 (ML 32, 1243 ss.). In chapter 3 he sets out the first question to be solved: “How is it evident that God exists?” He shows that nothing in the human being is higher and more excellent than reason (ch. 3–6); in this exposition, what judges another is considered superior. Augustine then asks: “What if we are able to find something that you not only do not doubt exists, but that is also superior to our very reason? Will you doubt calling it God, whatever it is?” Evodius: “I would not immediately call God whatever I might find better than the best thing in my nature. For I do not like to call God that than which my reason is inferior, but that than which nothing is superior.” Augustine: “Quite so.… But, I ask you, if you find that nothing is above our reason except what is eternal and unchangeable, will you doubt calling this God?… ” Evodius: “I shall certainly confess that to be God than which nothing has been shown to be higher.” Augustine: “Good; for it will be enough for me to show that something of this kind exists, which you will either confess to be God or, if something is above it, will agree is God himself. Thus, whether something is above it or not, it will be evident that God exists, when, with his own help, I have shown what I promised: that something is above reason.” In chapter 7 ss. he shows that there is one unchangeable truth. He asks (ch. 12, nr. 34): “Do you think that this truth of which we have been speaking for a long time, and in which one truth we behold so many things, is superior to our mind, equal to our minds, or even inferior? But if it were inferior, we would judge not according to it, but about it, as we judge about bodies because they are below us. We often say of them not only that they are or are not thus, but that they ought or ought not to be thus; and similarly, about our minds, we know not only that the mind is thus, but often that it ought to be thus. We judge about bodies in this way when we say: ‘It is less white than it ought to be,’ or ‘less square,’ and similarly in many cases; and about minds: ‘It is less capable than it ought to be,’ or less gentle or less forceful, as the standard of our conduct requires. We judge these things according to those inner rules of truth that we see in common; but no one judges those rules themselves. When someone says that eternal things are better than temporal things, or that seven and three make ten, no one says that they ought to be so, but simply recognizes that they are so. The examiner does not correct them; the discoverer merely rejoices. If this truth were equal to our minds, it too would be changeable. For our minds sometimes see it more and sometimes less, and thereby acknowledge that they are changeable; but truth remains in itself, neither growing when we see more of it nor diminishing when we see less. Rather, whole and incorrupt, it gladdens those who turn toward it with its light and punishes those who turn away with blindness. Further, we judge even our own minds according to it, although we cannot in any way judge it. For we say: ‘He understands less than he ought,’ or ‘He understands just as much as he ought.’ But the mind ought to understand as much as it is able to draw near to and cleave to unchangeable truth. Therefore, if it is neither inferior nor equal, it remains that it is superior and more excellent.” In chapter 15, nr. 39: “You had agreed that if I showed something above our minds, you would confess it to be God, if nothing were still higher. Accepting your agreement, I had said it would be enough for me to show this. For if something is more excellent, that is God rather; but if there is not, then truth itself is God. Therefore, whether that higher thing exists or not, you cannot deny that God exists; and this was the question we had set ourselves to discuss and investigate.” Cf. On True Religion, ch. 30 s. (ML 34, 145 ss.); Eighty-Three Different Questions 83, q. 54 (ML 40, 38).

72. ST. JOHN DAMASCENE, The Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 3: “All things that exist are either created or uncreated. If created, they are certainly also changeable. For whatever began to exist through change must also be subject to change, whether it perishes or becomes one thing after another through acts of will. But if uncreated, it necessarily follows that they cannot change at all. For things whose being is opposite have opposite modes of being and properties.” He then shows that everything both perceptible to the senses and among souls, angels, and demons is changeable, and continues: “Since, then, they are changeable, they must also be created. If created, there is no doubt that they were fashioned by some maker. But the creator must be uncreated. For if he too was created, he must have been created by someone, and so on, until we reach something uncreated. Since that maker is uncreated, then, he is also altogether unchangeable. And what could this be other than God?

“Moreover, the very structure, preservation, and governance of created things teach us that God exists: he it is who has joined this whole universe together, sustains and preserves it, and provides for it. For how could it have happened that natures at strife with one another—fire and water, air and earth, I mean—came together to constitute a single world and were bound together by such a firm bond that they could not be dissolved in any way, unless some almighty power had joined them and kept them forever from dissolution?

“What is it that assigned definite places to the things that exist in heaven and on earth, that range through the air and dwell in the waters, and even to what is prior to these—to heaven, earth, and air, and also the natures of fire and water? By whom were these things mixed and distributed? What is it that impressed motion upon them and sets them turning in a perpetual course, restrained by nothing? Is it not their maker, who gave all things the order and measure by which this universe is conducted and governed? But who is their maker? Is it not he who created them and brought them into being? For we cannot attribute such power and ability to τῷ αὐτομάτῳ, that is, to chance. Let us indeed grant that it was chance that they came into being; but whose work would it then be to have arranged them? And, if you wish, let us grant that too: whose work would it be to preserve and guard them according to those laws by which they were first created? It must certainly¹² belong to something other than chance; and what could that be but God?” (MG 94, 795 s.).

THEOLOGIANS

73. The Scholastics explicitly raised the question of the demonstrability of God's existence and developed the arguments themselves in various forms¹³.

ST. ANSELM († 1109) proposes in the Monologion an argument similar to St. Augustine's argument in On Free Choice of the Will (above, nr. 71). He sought, however, an argument wholly independent (especially of the existence of things), which he then sets out in the Proslogion: the argument Kant called “ontological.” This designation must therefore be understood in the sense Kant gave it. For Kant, “ontological” is a demonstration that intends to determine a real, actual object a priori, not from experience but from a concept of the intellect or reason, independently of experience¹⁴

RICHARD OF ST. VICTOR († 1173), in his work On the Trinity (ML 196), argues from being that had a beginning—which therefore is neither eternal nor from itself—to being eternal and from itself; from degrees of being to the highest being, since the highest being cannot have what it is from an inferior being, and so must have it from itself; for if nothing were from itself, nothing would be from eternity, and then there would be no origin or succession of things, which contradicts experience; finally, from the fact that whatever exists has the possibility of being either from itself or from another¹⁵.

PETER LOMBARD († 1160), bk. 1, dist. 3, proposes four arguments: first, following Ambrosiaster, the invisible maker is known from the visible work; the second, third, and fourth are from St. Augustine, City of God, bk. 8, ch. 6; cf. his Commentary on Romans (ML 191, 1327 s.)¹⁶.

WILLIAM OF AUXERRE, († between 1231 and 1237), Summa, bk. 1, proves first from the relation of cause to effect; second, from the flow of things (one thing flows from another); third, from the fact that being is included in the highest good, or in what is best; fourth, by Anselm's argument¹⁷.

ALEXANDER OF HALES († 1245) reports several arguments: with Richard, from being that had a beginning; with Damascene, from the mutability of things; with the Auxerre master, from the fact that nothing can be its own cause; with Anselm, by the ontological argument¹⁸.

74. ST. BONAVENTURE¹⁹, in 1 d. 3 p. 1 a. unic. q. 2, shows that God can be known through creatures “because the cause shines forth in its effect, and the wisdom of the craftsman is made manifest in his work; therefore God, who is the craftsman and cause of creation, is known through creation itself.” The foundations are Sap 13, 5 and the authority of Isidore, together with arguments, the first of which is that the cause is known from its effect. He raises certain doubts about the Master's arguments and shows what they presuppose (Dubia circa lit. mag. dub. 1). He admits Anselm's argument (in 1 d. 8 p. 1 q. 2, and elsewhere). In On the Mystery of the Trinity, q. 1, art. 1, second way: “Every truth proclaimed by every creature is an indubitable truth; but every creature proclaims that God exists; therefore. That every creature proclaims that God exists is shown by ten conditions and self-evident suppositions.” These are: if there is a later being, there is also an earlier being; if there is a being from another, there is a being not from another; if there is a possible being, there is a necessary being; if there is a relative being, there is an absolute being; if there is a being in a certain respect, there is a being simply; if there is a being for the sake of another, there is a being for its own sake; if there is a being by participation, there is a being by essence; if there is a being in potency, there is a being in act; if there is a composite being, there is a simple being; if there is a mutable being, there is an immutable being. Likewise, On the Hexaemeron, coll. 10, nos. 12–18.

75. ST. THOMAS 1 q. 2 a. 3 shows by five ways that God exists: from motion, from the notion of an efficient cause, from the possible and the necessary, from the degrees found in things, and from the governance of things. These arguments have been explained in philosophy. He does not admit the ontological argument²⁰

76. In works certainly authentic, SCOTUS clearly teaches that God's existence can be proved, not indeed a priori (by a demonstration propter quid), but a posteriori (by a demonstration quia) (Oxon. in 1 d. 2 q. 2; De primo principio, ch. 3)²¹, saying: “As far as we are concerned, the existence of an infinite being cannot be demonstrated propter quid, although, from the nature of the terms, the proposition could be demonstrated propter quid. But as far as we are concerned, the proposition can be demonstrated by a quia demonstration from creatures” (Oxon. in 1 d. 2 q. 2 nr. 10). He then shows that there is something “simply first in efficiency, and something simply first in the order of finality, and something simply first in eminence” (ibid. nr. 11). He admits Anselm's “colored” argument (it can be conceived without contradiction) in some way (l. c. nr. 32).

77. The Scholastics are thus truly in agreement²² that God's existence can be proved; this agreement persisted among later theologians of various schools. Perhaps very few are to be excepted, such as WILLIAM OF OCKHAM²³ and PETER OF AILLY, who follows Ockham: for him, the proposition “God exists” is not evident to us or demonstrable with evidence, but is naturally probable (in I, q. 3, art. 2). Yet these thinkers cannot undermine that consensus²⁴. The theologians treated this question as not merely philosophical but theological, and ground it in positive sources. There is no consensus, however, about the theological qualification of this teaching. BÁÑEZ (in I, q. 2, art. 2) holds it to be most certain and says the opposite is rash; MOLINA (in I, q. 2, art. 2) says it is “not only rash, but also quite unsafe in faith, to say no more”; VÁZQUEZ (in I, dist. 20, ch. 3, nr. 8) reports that theologians generally call the opposite view rash, which seems excessive to him; SUÁREZ (De Deo, bk. 1, ch. 1, nr. 13) judges the opposite rash and close to error; in nr. 15 ss. he refutes what Vázquez said; VALENTIA (in I, disp. 1, q. 2, part 2, assertion 3): “that it can also be proved by an evident demonstration from God's effects that God exists… is so certain that to deny it is plainly erroneous in faith, if not even manifest heresy.” Among theologians of our time, KLEUTGEN (De ipso Deo, nr. 156) says “although not heretical, it is nonetheless scarcely safe in faith”; PESCH (proposition 5) calls it theologically certain; MUNCUNILL (p. 19), “theologically certain”; VAN DER MEERSCH (p. 47 s.), proximate to faith and formally, implicitly contained in revelation.

Our thesis today seems to be established at least as theologically certain, on account of the consensus of theologians, grounded in Sacred Scripture and the teaching of the Fathers; because it is a conclusion from the definition of the Vatican Council; and because the Church explicitly upholds it²⁵.

The consensus concerns not merely some demonstrability of God in the abstract, but in concrete terms includes at least that way of argument by which God's existence is proved from the visible world, as cause from effect. A Catholic is in no way free to accept or reject this argument (cf. Oath against Modernism, Denz 2145). There was never, however, a consensus about St. Anselm's (ontological) argument; theologically, this is a completely open question²⁶.

S. TH. 1 q. 88 a. 3; FRANZELIN, thes. 7; 10; 11; KLEUTGEN, nr. 125-138; DE SAN, n. 23-26; BILLOT, thes. 2; PESCH, prop. 9; MUNCUNILL, nr. 9-11.

78. The knowledge of God's existence of which we have spoken thus far is such that something else (not God) is first known directly and immediately, and from it one arrives at knowledge of God's existence; God himself as he is in himself, the divine being itself, is not the immediate object of this knowledge. The question now is whether this is the only way of knowing God, or whether, besides mediated knowledge, there is also another, immediate kind by which the existing God is directly perceived immediately in himself.

Mediated and immediate knowledge are understood in this thesis in the strict sense with respect to every created objective medium. In a less proper sense, immediate knowledge can be called a natural, spontaneous, obvious inference, when it is compared with scientific knowledge acquired through investigation (someone who sees smoke “immediately” knows that fire is present); moreover, knowledge without an inference or conclusion properly so called can be called immediate, as distinct from knowledge reached by a proper inference (cf., e.g., above, nr. 60, note 63); finally, in a certain sense one could also call immediate the knowledge drawn from analysis of the subject alone, as opposed to knowledge that is a posteriori (for example, the “ontological” argument for God's existence). But in knowledge of the existence of an object that is immediate in the strict sense, every objective medium is absent, that is, an object which itself must be known in order to arrive at knowledge of the thing; such knowledge cannot be through a form belonging to something else. In this strict sense we deny knowledge of God without any created objective medium, and specifically “naturally, in this life.” The discussion, then, concerns only knowledge that can be attained by purely natural means; what can or does take place supernaturally is not asked in this thesis. Further, it says in this life, that is, during the soul's union with the body, leaving aside what may be true of the separated soul.

79. EUNOMIUS is said by some to have taught immediate perception of God, which others deny; it is beyond doubt, however, that he taught comprehensive knowledge of God¹.

The ONTOLOGISTS certainly asserted an immediate, natural perception of God; see above, nr. 10 ss.

G. C. UBAGHS²: “The idea of God is that intelligible light, always present to our mind, by which it comes about that God can be known by us, even if he is not always known. Many regard this idea as a kind of intellectual form representing God, distinct from God and naturally implanted in our mind; to us, however, this idea seems to be God himself, never absent from our mind, although not always known to us” (nr. 8; cf. nr. 14).

“The existence of a self-existent being can be proved in many ways. First, if the idea of a self-existent being is an immediate idea, a self-existent being must exist just as necessarily as it is necessary that what we see exists, provided that we truly see it. For it can hardly be denied that we have within us a true and clear idea of a self-existent being; moreover, if this idea is immediate, as I maintain it is, the object of this idea—or rather, this idea—is the very self-existent being whose existence we see” (nr. 93; similarly nr. 101 and 107, from the idea of an infinite being; in his Ontologia, ed. 4, Lovanii 1854, nr. 63; nr. 35, 6 and 7; nr. 5).

The Ontologists nevertheless said that this immediate perception of God is wholly different from the beatific vision: it is natural knowledge, which (according to some) is continuously present in the soul as direct knowledge, but becomes reflexive on the occasion of objects presented by the senses; it is obscure knowledge; it is not a vision of the divine essence itself; it is a perception of divine being under the aspect in which it is the exemplar of every being, whereas the blessed see God's inner life; it does not make a person blessed.

ROSMINI taught an immediate perception of God. According to him, indeterminate being, which manifests itself immediately to the intellect in created things, is something divine in itself, belonging to the divine nature, an actuality not distinct from the rest of divine actuality (above, nr. 12)³.

Since the thesis is expressed in universal terms, among the positions opposed to it one may also include the view that the beatific vision itself is natural for a person living in this life. Such was the view of the Beghards and Beguines condemned at the Council of Vienne. We shall discuss them later, when we treat the supernatural character of the beatific vision.

CHURCH DOCUMENTS

80. The propositions of the ONTOLOGISTS cannot safely be taught (above, nr. 11; Denz 1659 ss.); the corresponding propositions of ROSMINI were condemned (above, nr. 12; Denz 1891 ss.). The VATICAN Council, however, did not treat Ontologism in a formal conciliar manner (above, nr. 33).

The decree of the Holy Office against the Ontologists does not seem to address directly every doctrine holding that immediate knowledge of God is naturally possible for a human being. The decree speaks directly of the doctrine that immediate knowledge of God, at least habitual knowledge, is said to be essential to the human intellect, so that without it the intellect can know nothing; the doctrine at issue is therefore that this immediate knowledge of God is essential to the human being and is the principle and foundation of all certain knowledge. Thus someone who affirmed that some immediate knowledge of God is naturally possible for a human being, but denied that it is essential to the human intellect, such that all certain knowledge depends on it, and who denied the Ontologists' doctrine concerning being and universals, would not be proposing the doctrine which, according to this decree of the Holy Office, could not safely be taught. One would have to judge otherwise, however, if it could be proved that the meaning of this decree is: because all immediate knowledge of God is naturally impossible for a human being, this particular doctrine of the Ontologists cannot safely be taught. But this does not appear from the words of the decree.

The doctrine of the BEGHARDS and BEGUINES condemned at the Council of VIENNE (Denz 475) cannot be reconciled with the doctrine of immediate perception of God. What is directly condemned there is the claim that the beatific vision of God is natural, whereas the Ontologists wish to establish a perception of God that is immediate yet different from the beatific vision. But the immediate intellectual perception of an infinitely simple being is necessarily perception of his whole essence; it is impossible to perceive something of God immediately—for example, this or that attribute—without seeing the whole God immediately. Indeed, not even between the divine essence and the persons is there any distinction on the part of the thing itself: the divine essence is the Father, is the Son, is the Holy Spirit, so that whoever sees the essence immediately cannot fail to see the persons. Thus the distinction the Ontologists claim for immediate perception of God is impossible. Therefore anyone who says that some immediate perception of God is natural for a human being must consequently say that the beatific vision is natural for a human being. The Ontologists' doctrine is consequently opposed to the teaching of the Council of Vienne. Hence a doctrine asserting that immediate perception of God is natural for a human being, whether in the manner proposed by the Ontologists or in another manner, cannot indeed be called heretical by the definition of the Council of Vienne, but must be called erroneous; and the opposite doctrine is theologically certain.

HOLY SCRIPTURE

81. Holy Scripture says nothing about any natural, immediate perception of God; when it speaks of our natural knowledge of God, it always indicates mediated knowledge (Wis 13; Rom 1): from creatures to God, not from God to creatures. Through this mediated knowledge, “the invisible things of God” are perceived by the intellect. It presents as immediate, however, the knowledge of God that the blessed will have in heaven, and sets it against even the supernatural knowledge of this life (1 Cor 13; more on this text at nr. 126).

FATHERS

82. According to the holy Fathers, we do not naturally see God by intellectual vision; rather, we are led from sensible things to knowledge of God.

St. IRENAEUS (above, nr. 53) says that angels know God naturally only from his works, from his providence; likewise, human beings came to know God from the created world.

St. ATHANASIUS, Oratio contra gentes 35: “For God, who is good and gracious, cares for the souls he created. Since his nature cannot be seen or comprehended and surpasses every created substance, it was to be expected that the human race would not attain knowledge of him, since man was made from nothing, while God is without any beginning. For this reason he so aptly ordered created nature by his Word that, since he cannot be seen by his own nature, he might at least be known by human beings from his works. For often the artist is known from his works, even when he is not seen; and, as they say of the sculptor Phidias, his works presented him, though absent, to those who looked at them, through the mutual proportion and arrangement of their parts. So too, from the structure of the world one must understand God, its maker and creator, even though he is not seen by bodily eyes. For God has not misused his invisible nature (let no one allege this), nor has he left himself wholly unknown to human beings. Rather, as I was saying, he so ordered created nature that, although he cannot be seen by his own nature, he may nevertheless be known from his works”; in support of this teaching he appeals to Rom 1, 20; Acts 14, 14–16 (MG 25, 69; R 747).

83. St. BASIL, Adversus Eunomium, 1. 1. n. 14: “I believe that comprehension of him exceeds not only human beings but every rational nature. By ‘rational’ I mean created. For the Father is known only to the Son and to the Holy Spirit... For... it is established that the essence itself can be conceived by none but the Only-begotten and the Holy Spirit; but, being raised up by God's works and understanding the Creator through the things that have been made, we thus perceive his goodness and wisdom. For what is known of God, God has made manifest to all human beings”⁴ (MG 29, 543; R 931). Epistula 234 (ad Amphilochium) nr. 1: “We say that our God is known by us from his works, but we do not promise that we shall reach his very essence. For his works descend to us, while his essence remains inaccessible” (MG 32, 870; R 923); cf. epist. 235, 1 (MG 32, 871; R 924; above, nr. 54).

St. GREGORY NAZIANZEN, Oratio theologica 2, 12: “For us, who are held fast by earthly bonds, to use Jeremiah's words,⁵ and are covered by this gross flesh, it is clear that it is as impossible to be joined to things understood by mind and reason without the aid of bodily and sensible things as it is impossible for anyone, however quickly he walks, to pass beyond his own shadow (for as far as you overtake it, it always remains just as far ahead); or for the eye to join itself to visible things without the intervening light and air; or for fish to swim outside the water” (MG 41, 42; R 986).

St. CHRYSOSTOM, In act. apost. hom. 2 nr. 4: “See what Paul says: ‘His invisible things are clearly seen, being understood from the things that have been made, from the creation of the world’⁶. Surely the devil says that both are made of matter, so that we may know God from nothing at all”; similarly nr. 5 (MG 60, 31 s.). De incomprehensibili hom. 3 n. 1: “Let us therefore call him the ineffable, unintelligible, invisible, incomprehensible God, surpassing the power of human speech, exceeding the comprehension of mortal minds, untraceable by angels, invisible to the Seraphim, unintelligible to the Cherubim, unseen by the Principalities, Powers, and Virtues, and, in short, by every creature; known, however, only to the Son and the Holy Spirit” (MG 48, 720; R 1125); similarly hom. 4, 3 (MG 48, 730; R 1128); in In Ioan. hom. 15, 1 (MG 59, 98; R 1161) he says that God is invisible to creatures.

84. St. JEROME, Com. in epist. ad Galatas, on ch. 3 v. 2: “Someone might ask: if faith comes only from hearing, how can those born deaf become Christians? One can indeed understand God the Father from the greatness and beauty of creatures, and the creator is consequently recognized from the things he has made. But Christ's birth, cross, death, and resurrection cannot be known except by hearing” (ML 26, 349).

PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS, De divinis nominibus, c. 7 nr. 3: “Moreover, we must ask how we know God, who is perceived neither by sense nor by intellect, and is not at all among the things that exist. Or is it not truer to say that we know God not from his nature (for what his nature is remains unknown and surpasses every account and mind), but from the order of things, as though from an arrangement made by him, which contains in itself certain images and likenesses of his divine exemplars? In order to know that highest good and end of all goods, we ascend according to our ability, by way and order, through negation and transcendence of all things, to the cause of all” (MG 3, 870 s.; R. 2284).

GREGORY THE GREAT, Moralia, 1. 27 cap. 5 (al. 3), on Job 36, 25 (“All people see him; each one beholds him from afar”): “Every human being, by the very fact of being created rational, ought to infer by reason that the one who created him is God. To see him in this way is, surely, to discern by reasoning that he holds dominion⁷. Since it has been said, ‘All people see him,’ it is rightly added, ‘Each one beholds him from afar.’ For to behold him from afar is not yet to see him in his form, but still to estimate him solely from admiration of his works. Here even the elect behold him from afar, because they do not yet grasp his glory through the keenness of inward vision. Although they are close to him through love, they are still separated from him by the burden of their earthly dwelling; and, though they cling to him by living well, they sigh at being far from the vision of his presence... But when it is said, ‘Remember that you do not know his work,’ and then added, ‘All people see him,’ to see him, as we have said, is to infer by reason his essence, which transcends all things. It is a matter of great wonder that we both perceive him and do not know his work... We see by reason that he exists, though we do not comprehend his judgments; yet we still behold him from afar, because the cloud of our weakness separates us from his strength” (ML 76, 403).

85. But the Fathers seem to have taught an immediate perception of God⁸; for 1. they teach that the idea of God is innate in human beings. Yet it is by no means certain, and indeed in many cases improbable, that they understood “innate idea” in the strict sense. Rather, they describe the ease—and hence the universality—of this knowledge in a person who truly possesses human nature and a developed human intellect⁹. Further, even if one supposed that these Fathers taught an innate idea in the strict sense, it would still not follow that knowledge of the existing God is immediate.

St. JUSTIN, Apologia 2 nr. 6: “Father, God, Creator, Lord, Master are not names, but appellations drawn from his benefits and works... The appellation ‘God’ is not a name, but an inborn natural opinion among human beings of a thing that cannot be described” (MG 6, 453; R 130).

TERTULLIAN, De testimonio animae 5: “These testimonies of the soul are as true as they are simple; as simple as they are common; as common as they are shared by all; as universally shared as they are natural; as natural as they are divine... But whoever did not think that such outbursts of the soul were a doctrine silently entrusted to nature and to a congenital and inborn consciousness, will rather say that the use of speaking in this way has been strengthened as a kind of habit, indeed a fault, by opinions dispersed among the people and made public through literary works” (ML 1, 616)¹⁰.

86. 2. The Fathers posit a spontaneous, obvious, common knowledge of God, which seems immediate. But this may indeed be called immediate in a broad and improper sense, not in the proper sense.

87. 3. Specifically concerning St. AUGUSTINE¹¹ It is asserted that he taught immediate knowledge of God, common to all human beings and natural to them. For according to him intellectual knowledge is knowledge in eternal, immutable truth, which is God himself, the sun of truth who enlightens us, in whose light we see truth. The Ontologists invoke St. Augustine's authority in support of their doctrine.

Conf. 1. 12 nr. 35: “If we both see that what you say is true, and both see that what I say is true, where, I ask, do we see this? Certainly not in you, nor in me, but both in the immutable Truth itself, which is above our minds,” which he later calls the very light of the Lord our God (ML 32, 840). De vera religione, nr. 56 s.: “Now, when the square forum, the square stone, the tablet, and the square gem are judged according to the whole rule of squareness, and again the movements of the feet of a running ant and of an elephant walking by the same rule are judged to correspond to one another according to the whole rule of equality, who would doubt that this rule is neither greater nor smaller according to distances of place and time, since its power surpasses all things? Since this rule of all the arts is wholly immutable, while the human mind, which has been granted the ability to see such a rule, can undergo the mutability of error, it is clear enough that above our mind there is a rule called truth. Nor should we doubt that the immutable nature above the rational soul is God, and that the first life and first essence are there, where the first wisdom is. For this is that immutable truth rightly called the rule of all the arts and the art of the almighty Artificer. Thus, when the soul perceives that it does not judge the appearance and movement of bodies by itself, it must at the same time recognize that its own nature is superior to the nature it judges, while a nature by which it judges—and which it cannot itself judge in any way—is superior to it. I can explain why the limbs of every body must correspond to one another in likeness on both sides: I delight in the highest equality, which I contemplate not with the eyes of the body but with the mind. Therefore I judge the things I see with my eyes to be better insofar as, according to their nature, they are closer to those I understand with my mind. But no one can say why those things are so, and no one would soberly say that they ought not to be so, as though they could be otherwise” (ML 34, 147)¹².

88. Such statements and similar ones, considered in themselves alone, might perhaps be understood as referring to an immediate perception of God; but not within St. Augustine's own doctrine. The immediate knowledge of God known to St. Augustine is in no way natural to human beings or common to all, nor is it the beginning and foundation of intellectual knowledge. In this life it is granted only to a few perfected persons and belongs to the blessed life: it is the beatific vision itself. The natural knowledge of human beings, however, proceeds not from God to creatures but from creatures to God. For St. Augustine, “seeing” God does not always mean immediate knowledge, but also mediated knowledge through creatures.

Epistula 147 (ad Paulinam) De videndo Deo, nr. 3: “Since, then, we do not now see God either with the eyes of the body, as we see heavenly or earthly bodies, or with the mind's gaze, as we see those things I have mentioned, some of which you most certainly perceive within yourself (that is, yourself living, willing, seeking, knowing, and not knowing), why do we believe that he is seen, unless because we put our faith in Scripture, where it is written: ‘Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God’?”; similarly nr. 12. Cap. 13 nr. 31: “Then one may ask how the very substance of God could have been seen by certain people who were in this life, because it was said to Moses: ‘No one can see my face and live’¹³, unless the human mind can be snatched by divine power from this life into the angelic life before it is released from the flesh through the common death of this life. For this is how the one who heard there unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a human being to speak, was snatched away. There was such a withdrawal of attention from the senses of this life that he said he did not know whether he was in the body or outside the body—that is, whether, as often happens in a more intense ecstasy, his mind had been removed from this life into that life while the body's bond remained, or whether he had been wholly released, as happens in full death¹⁴. Thus what was said is also true: ‘No one can see my face and live’; for the mind must be withdrawn from this life when it is taken up into the unspeakable vision of that life. Nor is it incredible that this excellence of revelation was granted to certain saints who had not yet died in such a way that their bodies remained to be buried” (ML 33, 610); cf. epist. 92 (ML 33, 318 ss.).

Sermo 141 (above, nr. 57): The philosophers of this world saw God, the stable truth in which are all the reasons of created things, but they saw him from afar; “they too saw the creator through the creature, as far as a human being can see.” De Genesi ad litteram 1. 4 n. 49: “The human mind first experiences through bodily senses the things that have been made and apprehends knowledge of them according to the measure of human weakness; then it seeks their causes, to see whether in some way it can reach those causes which abide principally and immutably in the Word of God, and thus perceive his invisible things, understood from the things that have been made¹⁵. Who does not know how slowly and with what difficulty it does this, and how much time it takes because of the corruptible body that weighs down the soul,¹⁶ even when the soul is seized by the most ardent zeal to do this eagerly and perseveringly?” (ML 34, 316 s.).

89. There is much disagreement about how St. Augustine's doctrine of “illumination” should be explained positively. Some think that the light is nothing different from the soul itself; others say that it is distinct from the soul but created; still others say that it is uncreated light. Just as the sun makes bodies visible to us by its light, so that we see bodies illuminated in the sunlight without seeing the sun itself immediately, God is the sun of our intellect, radiating a light by which eternal, immutable truths are made “visible” to our intellect. Thus, in the light of eternal truth, we know such truths without gazing upon the sun itself, God himself¹⁷.

THEOLOGIANS

90. Among the scholastics, many embraced St. Augustine's doctrine of illumination for the “higher reason,” while maintaining the doctrine of abstraction for the “lower reason”¹⁸. The doctrine of knowledge in the eternal reasons, in the uncreated light, is proper or distinctive to “Augustinianism” (especially in the Franciscan school: Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure), as distinct from “Aristotelianism,” which posits the theory of abstraction universally¹⁹.

In the Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ, q. 4²⁰, St. Bonaventure sets out three interpretations of knowledge in the light of the eternal reasons. The first mode is “to understand that the evidence of the eternal light concurs in certain knowledge as the whole and sole reason for knowing.” This mode must not be admitted, because according to it the knowledge of the wayfarer would not differ from the knowledge of the blessed. The second mode is “to understand that the eternal reason necessarily concurs in certain knowledge by its influence, so that in knowing, the knower does not attain the eternal reason itself, but only its influence.” This explanation is not sufficient according to St. Augustine's words. “And so there is a third mode of understanding, as it were holding the middle between the two ways: namely, that the eternal reason is necessarily required for certain knowledge as a regulating and moving reason, not alone and in its full clarity, but together with a created reason, and as contemplated by us in part, according to the state of the wayfarer.”

“Since, then, certain knowledge belongs to a rational spirit insofar as it is the image of God, it therefore attains the eternal reasons in this knowledge. But because, in the state of the wayfarer, it is not yet fully conformed to God, it does not attain them clearly, fully, and distinctly; rather, the more or less it approaches conformity to God, the more or less it attains them, yet always in some way, because the character of an image can never be separated from it. Thus, because in the state of innocence it was an image without the deformity of sin, though it did not yet possess the full conformity to God of glory, it attained them in part, but not in an enigma. In the state of fallen nature, however, it lacks conformity to God and bears deformity; therefore it attains them in part and in an enigma. In the state of glory, it lacks all deformity and possesses full conformity to God; therefore it attains them fully and clearly. Again, because the soul is not wholly an image of God by itself, it attains along with these reasons the likenesses of things abstracted from the phantasm, as proper and distinct reasons for knowing. Without these, the light of the eternal reason is not sufficient for it to know while it remains in the state of the wayfarer—unless perhaps it were to transcend this state through a special revelation, as in those who are carried away and in certain prophetic revelations.

Therefore, as reason shows and Augustine's authorities expressly assert, we must concede that in every instance of certain knowledge the knower attains those reasons for knowing, although the wayfarer and the one who comprehends, the one who knows and the wise person, the prophet and the person who understands commonly attain them in different ways.”

To objection 15—“A proper reason for knowing corresponds to each knowable thing, so that certain knowledge of it may be had; but no intellect of a wayfarer distinctly perceives those reasons for knowing; therefore nothing can properly and determinately be known in them”—he replies: “Because we do not see the reasons in themselves with complete distinctness, they are not the whole reason for knowing. Along with them, therefore, the created light of principles and the likenesses of the things known are required; from these one has a proper reason for knowing with respect to each thing known.”

To objection 16—“If whatever is known with certainty is known in the eternal reason, and that by which each thing is known is itself better known, then the eternal reasons are better known to us; this is plainly false, since they are most hidden from us”—he replies: “As is already clear, the eternal reason does not move us to know alone, but together with the truth of principles; in the state of the wayfarer it does not do so in a particular way with respect to itself, but in a general way. Hence it does not follow that it is known to us in itself, but rather as it shines forth in its principles and in its generality. In this way it is, in a certain respect, most certain to us, because our intellect cannot in any way conceive that it does not exist; this cannot be said of any created truth.”

In his reply to objection 19, he says: “For intellects of those who know attain such reasons as guiding, but the intellects of the wise attain them as leading back and bringing to rest. And because few attain them in this way, there are few wise people, although many know. Few indeed know that they attain those reasons; indeed, what is more, few are willing to believe this, because it seems difficult to an intellect not yet raised up to contemplate eternal things that it should have God so present and near, although Paul says in Acts 17 that he is not far from each one of us.”

91. Just as St. Augustine's doctrine has been explained in different ways, so too St. Bonaventure's doctrine has different interpretations. LUYCKX summarizes it roughly as follows:

What is the ground of certainty in our knowledge of truth? Creatures cannot provide absolute certainty; therefore it comes from God's immediate illumination. Few inquire into this ground: simple people do not think about it, the learned rely on the certainty of first principles, but the wise understand that even these are not sufficient, since they too are created. By “resolving fully,” the wise person clearly understands that his absolute certainty of truth has its immediate ground in a special, immediate illumination from God himself. The wise person is astonished at the blindness of people who fail to notice what they see first, without which they can know nothing. The wise person first sees God, the first cause of truth; he sees how we know with absolute certainty through God's illumination. The eternal reasons are not the natural object of our knowledge in this life; rather, they are the medium by which we obtain absolute certainty of truth.

According to others (ROSENMÖLLER, SCHWENDINGER), however, in every certain act of knowledge a person intuits eternal truth as an object; the eternal ideas in certain knowledge are indeed a direct object (that is, not reached by way of a conclusion), but a secondary object, known only implicitly and without awareness.

However one explains St. Bonaventure's doctrine, it is certain that he does not teach immediate knowledge of God. In 2 dict. 23 art. 2 q. 3, on the question “whether Adam in the state of innocence knew God by the kind of knowledge by which we expect to know God in the state of glory,” he replies that Adam's knowledge of God lay between the knowledge belonging to the state of misery and the knowledge that will belong to the state of glory. “Only in the state of glory will God be seen immediately and in his substance, so that there will be no obscurity. In the state of innocence and in fallen nature, however, God is seen through a mirror, but differently: in the state of innocence God was seen through a clear mirror, for there was no cloud of sin in the soul. In the state of misery, however, he is seen through a mirror darkened by the sin of the first man; and therefore now he is seen through a mirror and in an enigma.” Opp. omnia 2, 544 s.

92. It is clear that the “Aristotelian” scholastic theologians do not teach immediate perception of God. According to St. THOMAS, natural knowledge of God is mediated and comes from creatures alone: in 1 d. 3 q. 1 a. 1–4; De veritate, q. 18 a. 2. The immediate vision of God is not natural to a human being: De veritate, q. 13 a. 3; Contra gent., 1. 3 c. 47; 52; Summa Theol., 1 q. 12 a. 4; 11. Immediate knowledge of God is the same as vision: in 4 d. 49, q. 2 a. 1; Contra gent. 1. 3 c. 53. In In Boethium de Trinitate, q. 1 a. 3, he explicitly denies that God is the first thing known by the mind:

“Some have said that the first thing known by the human mind, even in this life, is God himself, who is the first truth, and that through him all other things are known. But this is plainly false, because to know God through his essence is the happiness of a human being; it would follow, then, that every human being is blessed. Moreover, since in the divine essence all the things said of it are one, no one would err concerning what is said of God; experience shows this to be false. Again, the things that are first in the intellect's knowledge must be most certain; hence the intellect is certain that it understands them, which is plainly not the case here. This position also conflicts with the authority of Scripture, Exod 33, 20: ‘No man shall see me and live.’”

He then rejects another opinion: “that the divine essence is not the first thing known by us in this life, but rather the influence of its light; on this account, God is the first thing known by us. But this too cannot stand.” For how St. Thomas understands knowledge “in the eternal reasons,” see 1 q. 84 a. 5; Contra Gent. 1. 3 c. 47.

93. St. Thomas's words contain the arguments theologians usually bring against immediate perception of God: knowledge of God would be the most certain knowledge; error concerning God would be impossible; everyone would be blessed.

How Ontologism prepares the way for Rationalism, Pantheism, and Eclecticism is explained in the “Postulatum” presented at the Vatican Council (above, nr. 33).

Objections

94. It seems possible to show from the beatific vision itself that an immediate perception of God, distinct from and inferior to the beatific vision (that is, obscure and not necessarily a vision of the whole God), is possible. For in the beatific vision not everything that God eminently or virtually includes in his perfection is known, and there are different degrees of clarity²¹; therefore the argument from the Council of Vienne (nr. 80) seems ineffective.

I answer: every blessed person sees God wholly, and there is nothing of God that he does not see. The degrees, however, are within the clear vision of God; obscure knowledge is not a lower degree of clear knowledge.

We have already discussed what is commonly objected to the thesis from the doctrine of the Fathers and theologians; the objections drawn from reason (that the first thing known is the first ontological principle, that knowledge of the finite does not lead to knowledge of the infinite, and the like) have been discussed in philosophy.

S. TH. 1 q. 13 a. 1-6; 12; PETAVIUS, De Deo, 1. 7 c. 1; FRANZELIN, thes. 12; 13; BILLOT, thes. 17; 18; PESCH, prop. 15; VAN DER MEERSCH, nr. 280-291; 316-324.

After it has been proved that by the natural light of reason we can know God, and indeed only mediately, from creatures, we must now inquire more precisely what this knowledge is like and what it can accomplish.

95. The EUNOMIANS, as was already said supra nr. 79, claimed that they possessed wholly perfect (quidditative), comprehensive knowledge of God.

Concerning Eunomius himself, St. CHRYSOSTOM says, On the Incomprehensible, hom. 3 nr. 2: “A man has dared to say: ‘I know God as God knows himself’” (MG 48, 712; R 1124); and of the same man SOCRATES says, Hist. eccl. 4, 7: “God knows nothing more of his own substance than we do; nor is it better known to him, while more obscure to us. But whatever we know about him, he knows all of it; and conversely, whatever he knows, you will find the same knowledge in us, without any difference” (MG 67, 474). Concerning Aëtius, Eunomius’s teacher, EPIPHANIUS says, Adv. haeres. Panarion, haer. 76 c. 36: “This man, together with his followers, fell into such madness that he said he knew God not by faith but naturally, by knowledge, just as one knows whatever is visible, as if one were to take a stone or a piece of wood in one’s hands. Thus speaks this rash man: ‘I know God as well as I know myself; indeed, I do not know myself as well as I know God’” (MG 42, 634).

96. The extreme contrary position is AGNOSTICISM¹, which, in our subject, may be distinguished well with CHOSSAT into Pure Agnosticism (neither God’s existence nor his nonexistence can be proved; all the more, every knowledge of the divine nature is impossible; the reason is that cognition cannot transcend phenomena) and Dogmatic Agnosticism (the existence of the absolute can indeed be known, but not what it is like; we cannot form true judgments about the divine nature). Such was MAIMONIDES in the twelfth century, in whom much of what is proposed by more recent agnostics is found. Agnosticism is also the Modernists’ theological Symbolism, about which Pius X says in the encyclical “Pascendi”: “For the philosopher it is certain that the representations of the object of faith are merely symbolic; for the believer, likewise, it is certain that the object of faith is God in himself; therefore the theologian concludes that the representations of divine reality are symbolic. Hence theological symbolism … Since these are symbols with respect to their object, but instruments with respect to the believer, they say that the believer must first beware of adhering too strongly to the formulas as formulas, but must use them solely in order to adhere absolutely to the truth which the formula both reveals and veils, and strives to express without ever attaining it” (Denz 2087). “If all intellectual elements, as the Modernists say, are nothing but symbols of God, would not even the very name of God or of the divine personality be a symbol? If so, one could now doubt the divine personality, and the way to pantheism would be open” (Denz 2108).

97. Against these extreme positions this thesis asserts that our natural knowledge of God is indeed imperfect knowledge (against the Eunomians), but is true knowledge (against Agnosticism).

St. THOMAS explains how something can be known, In Boeth. de Trin., q. 1 a. 2 c.: “A thing is known in two ways. In one way, through its proper form, as the eye sees a stone through the species of the stone; in another way, through the form of something else like it, as a cause is known through the likeness of its effect—for example, a man through the form of his image. A thing is known through its own form in two ways. In one way, through a form that is the thing itself, as God always knows his own essence, and an Angel knows himself; in another way, through a form that is other than the thing itself, whether abstracted from it—when, that is, the form is more immaterial than the thing itself, as the form of a stone is abstracted from the stone—or impressed upon the knower by it, as when the thing is simpler than the likeness through which it is known, as Avicenna says that we know intelligences through their impression in us … An effect is of two kinds. One is proportionate to the power of its cause, and through such an effect the power of the cause is known fully and, consequently, its quiddity; the other effect falls short of the aforesaid proportion, and through such an effect the agent’s power cannot be comprehended and, consequently, neither can its essence, but only that it exists can be known of the cause”²

Immediate cognition is cognition through the proper form of the object. Mediate cognition, by contrast, is through an alien form, at least if the object can be known only mediately; but if the object is one that can also be known immediately, it may perhaps be disputed whether its mediate cognition is also had through its proper form.

If cognition is through a proper form, the object’s proper concept is had per se, by which the thing is conceived as it is in itself. In cognition through an alien form, however, a distinction must be made: if it arises from an effect proportionate to the cause’s power (a univocal effect), and if the object can also be known immediately, the concept is proper per se (proper from proper things); but if it arises from an effect not proportionate to the cause’s power (an equivocal effect), and the object can be known only mediately, the concept is not proper per se, nor univocal. Such a concept, insofar as it is solely a concept of this object, may be called proper in opposition to a concept common to several things (proper from common things).

We shall show in three parts: 1) we do not know God through a proper form; 2) but through the form of creatures; 3) we truly know God’s quiddity.

I. We do not know God through a proper form.

98. Cognition through a proper form is either through a form that is the thing itself, or through a form impressed by the thing to be known, or abstracted from that same thing (supra nr. 97). But God’s proper form cannot be abstracted from God, because there cannot be a form more immaterial than God; nor can it be a form created by God and impressed upon the human intellect, because such a finite likeness cannot be the proper form of an infinite being. Therefore, the only proper form of God is his very essence. But cognition of God through his essence is natural to God alone, and is granted to the blessed supernaturally. Therefore, we do not know God naturally through God’s proper form (S. THOM., In Boeth. q. 1 a. 2).

Natural knowledge of God is only mediate (thesis 3); therefore, it is not through a proper form. Hence it is clear that the qualification of this part of the thesis is the same as that of thesis 3: it is theologically certain.

SACRED SCRIPTURE

99. This doctrine is contained in Sacred Scripture insofar as it establishes that our natural knowledge of God is only mediate.

FATHERS

100. The Fathers explicitly deny that we can know God’s very essence; such is especially the case with those who wrote against the Eunomians. Many passages are found in R ser. 109, of which some may be selected.

St. CYRIL OF JERUSALEM, Cat. 6, c. 2: “For we do not speak of God as much as is fitting—for these things are known to him alone—but as much as human nature can grasp and as much as our weakness can bear. For we do not declare what God is, but frankly confess that we lack exact knowledge of him; for in relation to God, it is great knowledge to confess ignorance” (MG 33, 540; R 821).

St. HILARY, De Trinitate, l. 2 nr. 7 (ML 10,56; R 861).

101. St. BASIL, Epist. 234, 1 s.: “God’s operations are various, but his essence is simple. We say that our God is known to us from his operations, but we do not promise to approach his very essence. For his operations come down to us, while his essence remains inaccessible … Know, then, that this is the word of mockers: ‘If you are ignorant of God’s essence, you worship what you do not know.’ I know that he is; but what his essence is, I consider to be beyond understanding. How, then, am I saved? By faith. Faith, moreover, is fully adequate for knowing that God is, though not what he is, and that he rewards those who seek him. Knowledge of the essence, then, consists in perceiving that he cannot be comprehended; and we worship him of whom we have learned, not what his essence is, but that this essence exists” (MG 32, 869; R 923).

102. St. GREGORY NAZIANZEN, Orat. theol. 2, nr. 17: “But what God is by nature and essence, no human being has ever discovered, nor can discover. Whether anyone will ever discover it, let whoever wishes ask and investigate. In my judgment, he will discover it only when this Godlike and divine element—that is, our mind and reason—is joined to its kindred nature, and the image has ascended to that archetype of its own which it now longs for. And it seems to me that this is the foremost principle of philosophy: that one day we shall know only as much as we have been known. But in this mortal life, whatever reaches us is nothing other than a small stream, as it were, or a little ray of a great light” (MG 36, 48; R 988).

St. GREGORY OF NYSSA, Contra Eunomium, l. 12: “The human intellect, carefully investigating by whatever reasonings it can, seeks and reaches toward the inaccessible and exalted nature; it does not see so keenly as to behold the invisible clearly, yet it is not so wholly removed from approach that it can grasp no likeness of what it seeks” (MG 45, 956; R 1048, cf. 1049).

103. St. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM, De incomprehensibili, hom. 1 nr. 3: “For after saying, When I was a child³, he added, ‘Now we see through a mirror, in an enigma.’ For this is shown by the example of our present weakness, and by the fact that knowledge is imperfect; thirdly, it is proved by these words: ‘In an enigma.’ For a child sees, hears, and speaks many things, yet sees, hears, and speaks nothing clearly; and indeed has understanding, but none of it fully. So I too know many things, but do not know their manner. I know that God is everywhere, and likewise that he is wholly everywhere, but I do not know how; I know that he is without beginning, unbegotten, everlasting, but I do not know how. Nor can human reason grasp how there can be a substance that received its being neither from itself nor from anyone else. I know that he begot the Son, but I do not know how; I know that the Spirit is from him, but I do not know how he is from him … nr. 5: Therefore, he knows God in part⁴; he said ‘in part’ not because he knows one thing of God’s substance and is ignorant of another—for God is simple—but because he knows that God exists, while he is ignorant of what he is in substance” (MG 48, 704; 706; R 1121; 1122).

St. CYRIL, Thesaurus de sancta et consubstantiali Trinitate, ass. 31 (MG 75, 452; R 2073; 2074).

104. These passages also show that when the Fathers deny that we know what God is, they are not professing Agnosticism, but, against the Eunomians, denying that we have a quidditative concept of God. They themselves affirm many things about God’s attributes, as will appear below.

THEOLOGIANS

105. On the substance of the doctrine in this part, everyone agrees; there is, however, some difference in the manner of speaking, insofar as the earlier disciples of St. THOMAS said that we can know of God that he is, but not what he is, whereas the disciples of SCOTUS said, on the contrary, that we can also know what he is. The former denied quidditative cognition; the latter affirmed cognition of the quiddity.

If we do not have quidditative knowledge of God, we have all the less comprehensive knowledge. God’s incomprehensibility was defined by the FOURTH LATERAN COUNCIL (Denz 428) and the VATICAN COUNCIL (Denz 1782).

II. God is known through the form of creatures.

106. Since God is not known by us naturally through a proper form, he is known through an alien form, which can only be that of creatures. As effects of God, they have some likeness to their cause; in some way they manifest the cause’s perfection, and so they can also lead to some knowledge of the cause. But since they are equivocal effects, not proportionate to the cause’s power, they manifest the cause’s perfection only imperfectly. Hence the concept of God and of the divine perfections which we form by this way do not represent God and his perfections as they are in themselves, but according to the manner in which the perfections are found in creatures that imitate God.

107. These concepts are formed by a threefold way. The way of causality or affirmation: Whatever pure and simple perfection is found in creatures must be found in God as their cause; therefore, such perfections can be affirmed of God: God is wise, powerful; God is wisdom, power. The way of negation: In creatures, however (God’s equivocal effects), perfections are not found in the manner in which they are in God; consequently, our concepts do not present them in the manner in which they are in God, and hence they can rightly be denied of God. “We deny, however, not perfection insofar as it is perfection, but that imperfection which is mixed into every concept of perfection we form. Thus, first of all, we deny of God whatever objectively contains imperfection; so we say: God is immaterial, immense, infinite. Next, we also deny simple perfections of God insofar as these perfections are limited by our manner of conceiving. Thus, we deny wisdom, life, and substance of God, not because God falls short of the nature of wisdom, but because wisdom as conceived in our manner falls short of God’s nature. For God’s wisdom is wholly identical with all the divine perfections. But we cannot form such a concept. Therefore, wisdom as conceived in our manner is not in God. Properly speaking, then, we deny nothing of God except negations, which is the most emphatic manner of affirmation” (PESCH, nr. 97).

The way of eminence, excellence, or excess: Since God is an infinite being, we further determine the perfection we attribute to God in such a way that it transcends every limit and every created manner of conceiving: God is omniscient, omnipotent.

These three ways do not stand separately nor are they adequately distinct, but each includes the others. When I affirm some perfection of God, I deny its imperfections and deny that it is in God in the manner in which I conceive it; indeed, I attribute this perfection to God in such a way that it surpasses both created perfection and created cognition. St. Thomas says: “According to the teaching of Dionysius (c. 1, myst. Theol. et cap. 2 caelest. Hierarch. et cap. 2 et 3 de div. Nom.), things are said of God in three ways. First, affirmatively, as when we say, ‘God is wise’; this must indeed be said of him because there is in him a likeness of wisdom flowing from him. Yet, because there is not in God wisdom such as we understand and name it, it can be denied, so that we say, ‘God is not wise.’ Again, since wisdom is not denied of God because he falls short of wisdom, but because it is in him in a more eminent way than it can be said or understood, we must say that God is supremely wise” (De potentia, q. 7 a. 5 ad 2).

SACRED SCRIPTURE

108. The way of affirmation is found in Rom. 1 and Sap. 13; in the latter passage, the way of eminence may perhaps also be indicated in some fashion: from beauty, the source of beauty is known.

FATHERS

109. The way of affirmation:

St. BASIL, Adv. Eunomium, l. 1 nr. 14 (supra nr. 83).

St. GREGORY OF NYSSA, Contra Eunomium, l. 12: “Since, as the Apostle says, his eternal power and divinity are perceived and seen through the creation of the world⁵, therefore every creature, and above all, as the text says, the adornment that is in the heavens, through the portion shown in created things, demonstrates the wisdom of the Creator” (MG 45, 985; R 1050).

St. AUGUSTINE, Confessiones, l. 11 c. 4 (supra nr. 70).

PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS, De div. nominibus, c. 7 nr. 3: “… from the order of all things … we ascend, as far as we are able, by a path and order toward knowing that supreme good and the end of all goods, through the denial and transcendence of all things, and through the cause of all” (MG 3, 869; R 2284; supra nr. 84).

St. JOHN DAMASCENE, De fide orthodoxa, l. 1 c. 12: “Accordingly, some divine names are spoken by way of negation, declaring that he surpasses every essence: for example, when he is called beyond essence, timeless, without beginning, invisible—not because he is inferior in any respect or lacks anything (for all things are his, and from him and through him they are, and in him they subsist)⁶, but because he is exalted above all things in an eminent manner. For he is none of the things that exist, but is above all things. There are other names, however, which are expressed by way of affirmation, namely, those said of him as the cause of all things … These are the affirming and denying names. From both, moreover, a most delightful conjunction is formed, such as superessential essence, superdivine deity, a principle higher than every principle, and other similar expressions” (MG 94, 845; R 2347).

110. The way of negation:

CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS, Stromata, 5, 11, 71, 3 ss.: “If, therefore, after removing everything belonging to bodies and everything called incorporeal, we cast ourselves into the greatness of Christ and from there advance in holiness into his immensity, we shall somehow attain to an understanding of the Almighty—not, however, so as to know what he is, but what he is not. Figure and motion, position and seat, place, right and left are not even to be conceived of the Father of all, although these things are written of him; but what each of them signifies will be shown in its proper place” (MG 9, 109; R 423, cf. 424).

S. EPHRAEM, Carmina nisibena, carm. 3 (R 718).

S. GREGORIUS NYSSENUS, Contra Eunomium, 1, 12: “From the negation of what is not in him and the affirmation of what is piously understood of him (that is, God), what he is is apprehended” (MG 45, 956; R 1048).

S. AUGUSTINUS, De Trinitate, l. 5 c. 1 n. 2: “What, then, we do not find in our better nature, we ought not to seek in him who is far better than our better nature; thus, if we can, let us understand God as far as we can: good without quality, great without quantity, creator without need, presiding without position, containing all things without posture, wholly everywhere without place, everlasting without time, making mutable things without any change in himself, and suffering nothing. Whoever thinks of God in this way, even if he cannot yet discover in every respect what he is, nevertheless piously takes care, as far as he can, not to think of him as something he is not” (ML 42, 912; R 1658).

S. CYRILLUS ALEXANDRINUS, Thesaurus de s. et consubstantiali Trinitate, ass. 31 (MG 75, 452; R 2074).

PS-DIONYSIUS, S. IOANNES DAMASCENUS, in the places cited above (nr. 109); IOANNES DAMASCENUS, also De fide orthodoxa, l. 1 c. 4 (MG 94, 800; R 2340).

111. Way of eminence:

EUSEBIUS CAESAREENSIS, De ecclesiastica theologia, l. 2 c. 14: “We must necessarily acknowledge⁷ one divine reality, ineffable, good, simple, uncompounded, uniform, which is above all things, which is God himself, mind itself, the Word itself, wisdom itself, light itself, life itself, beauty itself, goodness itself, and whatever better than these anyone might conceive, and which is moreover above every mind and beyond every inquiry and thought” (MG 24, 928; R 674).

S. EPHRAEM, Adversus scrutatores, sermo 45 (R 734).

S. GREGORIUS NYSSENUS, Oratio catechetica, 1: “In the supreme nature, whatever is said of it is at once exalted in proportion to the greatness contemplated” (MG 45, 13; R 1028).

S. AMBROSIUS, De fide, ad Gratianum, l. 1 c. 16 nr. 106: God is “incomprehensible to sight, indescribable in speech, immeasurable to sense, to be followed in faith, to be venerated in religion; so that whatever can be thought with greater piety, whatever is more excellent in beauty, whatever is more exalted in power, you may understand to be fitting to God” (ML 16, 552; R 1266).

S. AUGUSTINUS, De Trinitate, l. 8 c. 3 n. 4 (ML 42, 949; R 1671).

PS-DIONYSIUS and S. IOANNES DAMASCENUS in the places cited above (nr. 109).

III. We know not merely extrinsic denominations, but truly, though imperfectly, the quiddity of God.

112. Up to this point we have considered how we arrive at our concepts of God, how we think about God, and what the nature of this knowledge is. We now ask about its value. Our answer is: although it is imperfect, it is nevertheless true knowledge.

That our knowledge of God is imperfect is clear from the first and second parts. But this imperfection is not such that nothing is known that truly and intrinsically belongs to God himself. Thus, although our knowledge proceeds also by way of negation, it is not merely negative—that is, we know of God not only that he is not a stone or something similar. Nor are our concepts merely relative, so that nothing absolute can be predicated of God himself (for example, only that God is the cause of life, while we do not know whether the perfection of living belongs to him absolutely). In general, we know not merely extrinsic denominations, which say nothing absolute that intrinsically belongs to God himself; rather, we truly know also God's absolute attributes, which belong to God positively and formally. In this sense we truly know the quiddity of God—that is, not only what God is not, but also what God truly is. We do not, however, know God's quiddity quidditatively. For quidditative knowledge of an object is that by which a thing is known as it is in itself, according to its own proper mode; therefore it can be had only of objects that can be known immediately, that are known through their own proper form, or of which one has a proper per se concept. It is already clear from the first part of the thesis that our natural knowledge of God is not of this kind.

CHURCH DOCUMENTS

113. THESIS 1a SUBSCRIBED BY BAUTAIN: “Reasoning can prove with certainty ... the infinity of his (God's) perfections” (Denz 1622).

Pius IX, letter Gravissimas inter: “It is the task of philosophy ... to demonstrate, vindicate, and defend the existence, nature, and attributes of God ... by arguments drawn from its own principles” (Denz 1670).

THE VATICAN COUNCIL established the possibility of natural knowledge that gives rise to the obligation to worship God and to tend toward God; therefore God can be known as personal, as principle and end, as Lord.

LEO XIII, encyclical Aeterni Patris: Reason “shows God to be singularly preeminent in the sum of all perfections, above all in infinite wisdom, from which nothing anywhere is hidden, and in supreme justice, which no perverse desire can ever overcome; and hence it shows that God is not only truthful, but truth itself, incapable of being deceived or deceiving.”

PIUS X, encyclical Iucunda sane: “That invincible force of argumentation is rejected by which the cause is inferred from its effects, that is, God and his attributes, bounded by no limits.” Encyclical Pascendi on the “Symbolism” of the Modernists (supra nr. 96). PIUS XII (nr. 41).

SACRED SCRIPTURE

114. 1) It speaks of the natural knowledge of God, from which follows the obligation of religious worship of God: a personal God.

2. Wis 13: the beauty of God; the power of God; Rom 1: eternal power; divinity.

FATHERS

115. ORIGEN, De principiis, l. 1 c. 3 nr. 1: “Although no one can speak worthily about God the Father, nevertheless some understanding can be gained through consideration of visible creatures and from what the human mind naturally perceives” (MG 11, 147; R 455); cf. Contra Celsum, l. 6 c. 62 (MG 11, 1393; R 532).

S. ATHANASIUS, Epistula de synodis, nr. 35 (MG 26, 753; R 786).

S. BASILIUS, Adversus Eunomium, l. 1 nr. 10: “There is indeed no name that can express the whole nature of God by encompassing it; but many and varied names, each with its own particular signification, together provide us with an understanding that is altogether obscure and very slight when compared with the whole, yet sufficient for us. Thus, among the names said of God, some signify what is in God, while others, conversely, indicate what is not in him. From these two—the denial of what is absent and the confession of what is present—a kind of imprint of God is formed in us” (MG 29, 533; R 930).

S. GREGORIUS NYSSENUS, Contra Eunomium, l. 12 (MG 45, 953 ss.; R 1047-1049). S. IOANNES CHRYSOSTOMUS, De Incomprehensibili, hom. 1, nr. 5 (MG 48, 706; R 1122). S. CYRILLUS ALEXANDRINUS, In Ps 11, 3 (MG 69, 792; R 2049). Texts from the second and first parts may also be compared.

116. This part of the thesis seems to be a matter of faith; as regards God's relative attributes, it is explicitly defined at the Vatican Council, and is also explicitly found in sacred Scripture and Tradition; as regards the absolute attributes, it is explicitly found in sacred Scripture and Tradition and seems to be defined at the Vatican Council, at least it is contained in that Council’s definition.

117. From what has been said, we know God through concepts drawn from creatures, which present perfections as they are found in creatures, not as they are in God. Our concepts of God and his perfections are inadequate: they are neither univocal nor merely equivocal (which would be Agnosticism), but analogical (cf. S. TH. 1 q. 13 a. 5; De pot. q. 7 a. 7). If perfections were attributed to God in the same way as they are found in creatures and conceived by us, our knowledge would be false. This is avoided by the threefold way described in the second part, by which our judgments about God are brought into agreement with the objective order, that is, are made true. “Now, the perfections that we conceive through inadequate and analogical ideas truly belong to God, although they are in him in a more perfect mode than we conceive or can conceive. Therefore, when we affirm that these perfections are in God, while at the same time denying that they belong to him in the imperfect mode in which we perceive them, and understanding that they are in God in a far more eminent way, although we do not distinctly grasp how they are in God—that is, while we know that they are, but do not know what they are through proper notions according to their infinite account—our judgment certainly corresponds to its object, even though the ideas we combine in it do not present the object as it is in itself. Thus knowledge is true, but imperfect” (FRANZELIN, De Deo uno, p. 168).

This imperfection of our knowledge is also the reason why we must think of the supremely simple divine being through different concepts. These concepts (of divine omnipotence, uncreated wisdom, infinite mercy, etc.), although they imperfectly present the same supremely simple object, are not identical, nor are the names said of God synonyms. For different concepts present the object through different, deficient likenesses of the divine essence, reflected in creatures as in a mirror (S. TH. 1 q. 13 a. 4; De pot. q. 7 a. 6).

Names signify God “according to the way our intellect knows him. Now, since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows him in the way creatures represent him. But it was shown above that God possesses beforehand in himself all the perfections of creatures, as one who is simply and universally perfect. Hence each creature represents him and is like him insofar as it has some perfection—not, however, as representing him as something of the same species or genus, but as an eminent principle whose effects fall short of its form, though the effects attain some likeness to it ... Thus the foregoing names signify the divine substance, though imperfectly, just as creatures also represent it imperfectly. Therefore, when it is said that God is good, the meaning is not that God is the cause of goodness, or that God is not evil; rather, the meaning is: what we call goodness in creatures preexists in God, and does so in a higher mode” (S. Th. 1 q. 13 a. 2 c.). Our intellect, “since it knows God from creatures, forms, in order to understand God, concepts proportionate to the perfections proceeding from God into creatures. These perfections preexist in God in a unified and simple way, while in creatures they are received in a divided and manifold way. Thus, just as the diverse perfections of creatures correspond to one simple principle represented variously and manifoldly through the diverse perfections of creatures, so our intellect's various and manifold concepts correspond to one altogether simple reality, imperfectly understood according to such concepts” (S. Th. 1 q. 13 a. 4). It follows that our predication of God must conform to the formal aspect under which we represent the simple divine being by different concepts. Although the divine intellect and divine will are one and the same supremely simple divine perfection, it would nevertheless be false to say: God knows by his will, God loves by his intellect; rather, God knows by his intellect and loves by his will.

118. Our concepts of God are analogical; much is debated in philosophy about this analogy. Our representation falls short of divine reality in that our concepts present perfections according to the mode of creatures, which is essentially potential, whereas divine reality contains them according to the mode of pure act, with every potentiality excluded. We do indeed know that perfections are in God according to the mode of pure act, but we know this very thing not according to the mode of pure act, but of a potential being. From the fact that perfections are verified in God in a different way than they are conceived by us, it follows that we cannot affirm a priori that it is impossible for perfections to be affirmed of God at the same time which, if they were found according to the mode of creatures, could not coexist in the same subject and therefore also seem to us to exclude one another in an infinite being. For this reason, then—that is, because we do not understand how these can be true of God at the same time—such a fact, if it seems otherwise well established, is not yet to be denied, but we must inquire why they seem to us incapable of coexisting in the same subject. If the reason lies precisely in potentiality, which every created perfection implies, it is clear that this reason does not hold in an infinite being and therefore there is no reason to deny these perfections of God. At the same time, however, we understand that our concepts cannot tell us how they can coexist; in this sense, then, there is a difficulty here, which is not objectively in the thing itself, but arises precisely from our mode of conceiving⁸. This “difficulty,” however, is perfectly resolved if it is shown to arise precisely from the nature of our knowledge of God (for example, freedom and immutability). In this sense, therefore, it follows from the very nature of our knowledge that it cannot be proved impossible for mysteries to be found in God.

Objections

119. 1. The Fathers deny that we can know what God is; therefore we do not know his quiddity.

I answer: they deny quidditative and comprehensive knowledge of God, which their opponents asserted, I grant; they deny imperfect knowledge of the quiddity, I deny (cfr. nr. 104).

2. The Fathers teach that “our knowledge is more perfect when we have come to know that God cannot be understood.”

I answer: “This is not said as though complete ignorance were a more perfect knowledge—for what could be imagined more absurd? Rather, the more perfectly we know God, the more perfectly we understand the reason why in this life he can neither be comprehended nor understood as he is in himself. That reason is, of course, God's own infinite perfection in comparison with our finite and imperfect mode of knowing. Accordingly, in the reverse order as well, the more fully and deeply we understand this reason for our relative ignorance, the more truly and deeply we understand God's perfection” (FRANZELIN, p. 160 s.).

S. THOMAS sets out very many objections of the agnostics, De potentia, q. 7.

120. In the first section the discussion concerned natural knowledge of God, that is, the knowledge whose principles and sources are natural: natural human reason and God's natural manifestation in creation. This knowledge of God, however, is very imperfect. “Therefore, since, as St. Thomas says, the knowledge of God to which man could attain by the foregoing ways through a certain intellectual, quasi-intuitive insight was weak, in his superabundant goodness, so that man's knowledge of God might be firmer, he revealed to men certain things about himself that exceed the human intellect. In this revelation, moreover, a certain order is observed in keeping with man's condition, so that he may gradually pass from the imperfect to the perfect, as happens in other mutable things. First, then, these things are revealed to man in such a way that they are not understood but are believed merely as if heard; for, in this state, in which the human intellect is joined to sensible things, it cannot at all be raised to behold what exceeds every proportion of sense. But when it has been freed from its connection with sensible things, then it will be raised to behold what is revealed. There is, therefore, a threefold human knowledge of divine things. The first is that by which man ascends to knowledge of God through creatures by the natural light of reason; the second is that by which divine truth, exceeding the human intellect, descends to us by way of revelation, not as something demonstrated for us to see, but as something uttered in speech for us to believe; the third is that by which the human mind is raised to behold perfectly the things that have been revealed” ¹.

Faith and vision are supernatural kinds of knowledge, and in the present order, according to God's will, they are ordinary and common kinds of knowledge, indeed necessary for all human beings: faith in this life, on the way; vision in the other life, at the goal.

Besides these, however, other kinds of knowledge also seem to have been or to be granted by God, namely, the knowledge of the first parents before sin, and that of the prophets, as well as the special knowledge found in “infused contemplation.”

The section on the supernatural knowledge of God could therefore² be divided as follows: 1) on common supernatural knowledge, a) in this life: faith; b) in the other life: vision; 2) on special supernatural knowledge, a) of the first parents and the prophets; b) of mystics. The kinds of knowledge indicated under 2) belong to other treatises³, while faith is discussed at length in the treatise on the virtues, so that in the present treatise only intuitive vision of God need be treated. 121. It nevertheless seems appropriate briefly to indicate here certain things about knowledge of God through faith. God manifested himself to wayfarers not only in the very work of creation, but it pleased “his wisdom and goodness to reveal himself and the decrees of his eternal will to the human race by another, supernatural way, as the Apostle says: ‘In many parts and in many ways of old God spoke to the fathers in the Prophets; in these last days he has spoken to us in the Son’” ⁴ (Conc. Vatic. s. 3 cap. 2; Denz 1785). This is positive revelation, God's attesting word. To embrace it, God infuses faith, a supernatural virtue, into man, so that knowledge through faith is supernatural both as to its principle and as to its source. The object of this knowledge is not only those things “to which natural reason can attain,” but also “the mysteries hidden in God, which cannot be known unless divinely revealed” (ibid. cap. 4; Denz 1795; cf. cap. 2; Denz 1786) ⁵. This knowledge excludes every error, affords greater certainty than natural knowledge of God, and makes knowledge of God much easier for everyone. But the “mode of knowing” in faith does not change: it too is knowledge through an alien form, analogous and imperfect, just as natural knowledge was described above. “For although by revelation we are raised to know something that would otherwise be unknown to us, we are not thereby enabled to know in a different way than through sensible things” (St. Thomas, In Boethium de Trinitate q. 6 a. 3). Even in knowledge through faith, God and divine things are conceived after the manner of a creature. Hence, for all knowledge founded on faith, and for theology as a whole, those things said supra nr. 118, about natural knowledge of God apply and must be given great attention.

On the supernatural knowledge of God through intuitive vision

122. The common supernatural knowledge of God possessed by the blessed in the other life is intuitive vision of God. Insofar as this is man's beatitude and eternal life, it is considered in the treatise On the Last Things; here, however, it is to be treated insofar as it is knowledge of God. We shall establish first the fact, namely, that such knowledge of God is possible for human beings; then we shall treat its supernaturality; third we shall inquire further into the nature of the vision; and fourth, into the object that is seen.

PETRUS LOMBARDUS, 1. 4 d. 49; S. TH., 1 q. 12 a. 1; SUÁREZ, De Deo, tr. 1, 1. 2 c. 7; PETAVIUS, De Deo, 1. 7 c. 5-7; FRANZELIN, thes. 15; KLEUTGEN, nr. 409-417; BILLOT, thes. 13; PESCH, prop. 10; MUNCUNILL, nr. 214 ss.; VAN DER MEERSCH, nr. 292-296; BERAZA, Tractatus de Deo elevante, de peccato originali, de novissimis, Bilbao, 1924, pag. 57 ss.

123. BENEDICT XII, in the Constitution Benedictus Deus (1336), describes the intuitive vision of God as follows. The blessed in heaven “see the divine essence by intuitive and also facial vision, with no creature serving as an object seen, but with the divine essence itself immediately showing itself nakedly, clearly, and openly” (Denz 530). It is therefore knowledge of God that is immediate in the strict sense: every created objective medium is denied, that is, a medium which, once known, would lead to knowledge of God (a medium from which), and a medium in which God would be known through what is known. A medium under which (light) is not excluded; a medium by which, since it does not hinder immediate knowledge, should not for this reason be denied in the vision; it will, however, be shown later that it must be ruled out for another reason. God is known neither from creatures, nor through creatures, nor in creatures; rather, knowledge has divine being itself as its immediate term. Such knowledge is not analogous, but proper per se: a thing is known as it is in itself. Thus God is not known as a creature, a finite being, but in God's own manner, as an infinite being. Since the divine essence shows itself nakedly, clearly, and openly in this vision, that knowledge is clear and distinct, neither obscure nor confused. It is readily understood that such knowledge is most aptly called “intuitive vision”: clear intellectual knowledge is called “vision,” by a transferred use of a word drawn from bodily, sensible sight; this word already indicates to some extent that the knowledge is immediate, and the added word “intuitive” emphasizes this still more, while also indicating that the object is physically present to the intellect. The same is expressed by the term “facial vision” (cf. 1 Cor 13), which expresses both the object's presence and the denial of an objective medium.

We affirm that such knowledge is possible for man. We prove this possibility by proving as a fact that God grants this vision to human beings (the blessed). We do not in any way prove this possibility a priori, nor do we claim that we can grasp this possibility intrinsically; rather, only the fact, known through revelation, that man is raised by God to the vision shows us its possibility. This thesis does not ask whether it is naturally possible.

124. The adversaries of this thesis, then, are those who deny the possibility of an intuitive vision of the divine essence itself. Such was THEODORET, who grants that angels see God's splendor, his glory (δόξα), but not the essence itself, which is distinct from that splendor.

In his work Eranistes, dial. 1: “Orth. We, for our part, using pious thoughts and believing the divine testimonies—which expressly affirm that no one has ever seen God ¹—say that those who saw did not see the divine nature, but certain visions accommodated to their capacity. — Eran. That is what we say. — Orth. So let us understand this also of the angels, when we hear that they always see the face of your Father ². For they do not see the divine substance, which can neither be circumscribed nor comprehended nor grasped by the mind, and which comprehends all things, but a certain splendor accommodated to their nature” (MG 83, 49; R 2150).

Likewise the HESYCHASTS (Palamites), Greek monks devoted to mystical contemplation, distinguish between the divine essence and a certain uncreated light that proceeds from the divine essence and is really distinct from it, yet not separate from it. The divine essence can be seen neither in this life nor in the next; mystics and the blessed, however, see that uncreated light.

JUGIE ³ describes the light as follows: “This divine light is the same as sanctifying grace, the light of glory, and glory itself, or the beatitude of the saints. It is something divine and uncreated, not separate from the divine essence, but really distinct from it. For the divine essence as such is wholly imparticipable, invisible, and incommunicable. Yet by supernatural power this divine light was seen with bodily eyes raised and strengthened: by Stephen, by Saul near Damascus, and by the Apostles on Mount Tabor. For the light in which our Lord appeared transfigured and radiant was the glory, effulgence, and ray of his very divinity; therefore it was something uncreated, although distinct from the divine essence” ⁴.

Church documents

125. BENEDICT XII, the Constitution Benedictus Deus, supra nr. 123; the same author, in the booklet Iam dudum to the Armenians (1341), lists as the eighth error of the Armenians: “The Armenians say that the souls of baptized children and the souls of many perfect men will enter the kingdom of heaven after the general judgment ... Yet they will not see the essence of God, because no creature can see it; instead they will see the brightness of God, which emanates from his essence, just as sunlight emanates from the sun and yet is not the sun ... And they say that in this consists the beatitude of perfect saints and baptized children” (Msi 25, 1196).

COUNCIL OF FLORENCE, Decree for the Greeks (1439): “And their souls ... are at once received into heaven and clearly behold God himself, triune and one, as he is” (Denz 693).

HOLY SCRIPTURE

126. 1 Cor 13, 9 ss. After speaking in cap. 12 about charismatic gifts, the Apostle points out in cap. 13 a more excellent way, namely, charity. From verse 2 he compares it with the gifts of knowledge in this life: prophecy, knowledge, and faith. But all these will one day cease, for they are imperfect kinds of knowledge and will not remain when that which is perfect comes. Charity, however, will remain forever, for it is itself perfect. Hence it is clear that the more excellent way is the way of charity.

The Apostle's thought can be set out in this form: When the perfect comes, the imperfect ceases (v. 10; 11); but our present knowledge is imperfect, whereas future knowledge will be perfect (v. 9; 12); therefore, our present knowledge will one day cease. As to the major premise: v. 10 states a universal principle, which v. 11 illustrates with an example. As to the minor premise: v. 9 had already indicated the imperfection of knowledge as the reason why it will one day cease; v. 12 shows in what the imperfection of present knowledge and the perfection of future knowledge consist, comparing the two kinds of knowledge. This part contains the argument for our thesis. Present knowledge is imperfect, for it is through a mirror: whatever one may think about mirrors in antiquity, St. Paul undoubtedly means knowledge through an instrument, mediated knowledge ⁵; the perfection opposite to it, therefore, is that future knowledge is immediate. Another imperfection of knowledge in the present life consists in its being in a riddle: truth in a riddle does not appear clearly and openly, but is wrapped up in other truths. Knowledge in a riddle is therefore understood as obscure, mediated through other truths, and improper; the opposite perfection will be clear and proper knowledge. The Apostle himself expresses the opposition to “through a mirror, in a riddle” by “face to face,” which means seeing “in such a way that face is turned toward face, immediately, in person” (ZORELL). It is, then, an immediate intuition of a person ⁶. In part: From the described character of present, imperfect knowledge it follows that by this knowledge God is known “partially,” that is, something of God is known: God under this or that aspect, in this or that respect. To this is opposed perfect knowledge, which concerns its object in such a way that the whole object is known and nothing of the object remains unknown. Even as I have been known: just as we have been known immediately by God, so we shall know God immediately. The Apostle always contrasts different modes or kinds of knowing, not different degrees of perfection within the same kind. Therefore, he does not say that our mode of knowing is at the same degree of perfection as God's; he does not affirm that our knowledge of God is comprehensive. The object of the imperfect knowledge of which the Apostle speaks is divine things, above all God himself; hence the object of perfect knowledge is the same. And since it is knowledge “face to face,” “even as I have been known,” it concerns knowledge of a personal being; hence it is knowledge of God himself.

Therefore, the future knowledge of God described by the Apostle in 1 Cor 13 is immediate, facial, clear, and proper knowledge; but this is precisely intuitive vision of God (supra nr. 123); therefore, this vision is possible for man.

127. 1 Io 3, 2: The text seems clear; nevertheless, the force of the argument from this text depends to some extent on how the words “when it appears” are interpreted. If they mean “when what we shall be appears,” then “to him” and “him” are rightly understood of God, and the intended conclusion follows. But if they mean “when Christ appears,” then “to him” and “him” seem to be understood as seeing Christ in glory at the Second Coming. Even so, however, the Apostle hardly seems to be speaking of seeing Christ's bare humanity.

The Roman Catechism understands these words in the former way: “For he (St. JOHN) means that beatitude consists of these two things: that we shall gaze upon God as he is in his nature and substance, and that we shall be made, as it were, gods” (P. 1 c. 13 nr. 7).

The intuitive vision of God possessed by angels is referred to in Mt 18, 10; see also Io 17, 24; Apoc 22, 4; 2 Cor 5, 6 ss.

THE FATHERS

128. ST. IRENAEUS, Adversus haereses, 1. 4 c. 20 nr. 5: “In view of his greatness and wondrous glory, no one will see God and live ⁷; for the Father cannot be grasped. But in view of his love and kindness, and his power over all things, he grants even this to those who love him, namely, to see God, as the prophets also foretold. For what is impossible with men is possible with God ⁸. Man does not see God by himself. But God is seen by men at his will, by whom he wills, when he wills, and as he wills. For God is powerful in all things: he was seen then through the Spirit of prophecy; he was also seen through the Son by adoption; and he will be seen in the kingdom of heaven in the paternal manner, with the Spirit preparing man in the Son of God, the Son bringing him to the Father, and the Father bestowing incorruptibility unto eternal life, which comes to each person from seeing God” (MG 7, 1035; R 236).

ST. CYPRIAN, Epist. 58, 10 (al. 56): “What glory and how great a joy it will be to be admitted to see God ...” (ML 4, 357; R 579).

129. PSEUDO-BASIL (Evagrius Ponticus?), Epist. 8, 7: Neither the Lord considered according to the Incarnation, nor the contemplation that is in angels, is the highest good to be desired. “For even knowledge of these things is crude when compared with that which is face to face. The Father alone, he says, knows, for he himself is both the end and the highest beatitude. For when we no longer know God in mirrors or through things other than himself, but approach him as though alone and one, then we shall also know the ultimate end. For they say that Christ's kingdom is all material knowledge, whereas the Father's is immaterial contemplation of God and, so to speak, of divinity itself. And our Lord himself is also the end and the highest beatitude when considered as the Word” (MG 32, 256; R 913) ⁹.

ST. GREGORY NAZIANZEN, Orat. theol. 2, n. 17, 31 (MG 36, 48. 72; R 988, 989).

130. ST. EPIPHANIUS, Adv. haeres. Panar., haer. 70, c. 7: “For God to be seen, especially by human nature, is impossible, nor is it permitted for the visible to see the invisible. But this invisible God, out of kindness and power, strengthens the weak, enabling them by his power to behold the invisible and infinite God—not insofar as he is infinite, but to the extent that their weak nature can grasp him, once strengthened with such force and power that it can attain knowledge of that mighty one. And there will be no discrepancy in divine Scripture, nor will one statement be found opposed to another” (MG 42, 349; R 1106).

ST. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM, Ad Theodorum lapsum, 1. 1 nr. 11: “Listen to what blessed Peter says: It is good for us to be here ¹⁰. If he, after seeing an obscure image of future things, immediately cast everything else from his mind because of the pleasure infused by such a vision, what will be said when the very truth of things is present, when the royal halls are opened and it will be possible to behold the King himself, no longer in a riddle or through a mirror, but face to face, no longer through faith but through direct sight?” (MG 47, 292; R 1114).

131. ST. AUGUSTINE, De civitate Dei, 1. 22 c. 29 nr. 1: “... Their angels in heaven always see the face of my Father who is in heaven ¹¹. Just as they see, so we too shall see, although we do not yet see in that way. For this reason the Apostle says what I said a little earlier: Now we see through a mirror, in a riddle, but then face to face. This vision is therefore reserved for us as the reward of faith. Speaking of it, the Apostle John also says, when he appears, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is ¹². The face of God is to be understood as his manifestation, not as some bodily member like the one we have and call by that name” (ML 41, 797; R 1786). At least this much is to be understood of spiritual vision, according to St. Augustine; he then discusses whether, and in what sense, God is also seen by the blessed through bodies. Cf. Retractationes, 1. 1.c. 14 nr. 2 (ML 32, 606; R 1971).

132. ST. GREGORY THE GREAT, Moralia, 1. 2 c. 3 nr. 3 (ML 75, 612; R 2303); 1. 18 nr. 90 ss.: “It must be known, however, that there were some who said that God is indeed seen in his splendor in that region of beatitude, but is not seen in his nature. They were misled by a lack of subtlety in their inquiry. For in that simple and immutable essence, splendor is not one thing and nature another; rather, its very nature is splendor, and its splendor is nature. Since this Wisdom of God would one day show himself to those who love him, he himself promises, saying, whoever loves me ... I will manifest myself to him ¹³, as if to say plainly: you who see me in your (human) nature still have to see me in my (divine) nature. Hence he says again, Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God ¹⁴. Hence Paul says, Now we see through a mirror, in a riddle, but then face to face. Now I know in part, but then I shall know even as I have been known” ¹⁵ (ML 76, 93 ss.).

On the opinions of medieval theologians as to whether the beatific vision of God is without a medium, see DONDAINE¹⁶, L'objet et le “medium” de la vision béatifique chez les théologiens du XIII siècle. Rech. de Théol. anc. et méd. 19 (1952) 60-99; text 100-130. The same author, Hugues de S. Cher et la condamnation de 1241. Revue des sc. phil. et théol. 33 (1949) 170-174. In 1241 the University of Paris condemned the proposition: The divine essence in itself will be seen neither by man nor by angel. (Chartul. Univ. Paris. I nr. 128).

Objections

133. 1. From 1 Cor 13 it seems that perfect and imperfect knowledge differ only in degree; but imperfect knowledge of God is mediated; therefore perfect knowledge is mediated too. Hence it is not intuitive vision.

Proof of the major: According to v. 11, future knowledge relates to present knowledge as the knowledge of a man to that of a child, and according to v. 12 as knowledge in part to knowledge in full; but these are differences of degree; therefore.

I answer. I deny the major; I grant the minor. As to the proof of the major: a) regarding v. 11, I distinguish the major: he directly introduces that comparison to show the difference between the two kinds of knowledge, I deny (supra nr. 126: he introduces it directly to illustrate the universal principle stated earlier); perhaps the difference between the kinds of knowledge is also indicated to some extent in this example; I distinguish further: under some universal notion of the perfect and imperfect, I grant or pass over; by indicating precisely what that perfection and imperfection consists in, I deny. I pass over the minor. I distinguish the conclusion according to the distinction made in the major: one could conclude that the difference is a difference of degree if he introduced the example to show the difference between perfect and imperfect knowledge, and what it consists in, I grant; if he introduces it directly for another end, I deny.

b) Regarding v. 12: I grant the major; I distinguish the minor: it can be a difference of degree, I grant; it must be a difference of degree, I deny. I distinguish the parallel conclusion in the same way: if “in part” and “in full” necessarily expressed a difference of degree, I grant; if not, I deny. It is indeed possible that, within the same mode of knowing, the object is known in part by one act of knowledge and in its entirety by another. Nevertheless, it is also possible that the nature of one mode of knowing necessarily entails that such an object is known and can be known only in part (knowledge partial by its nature), whereas another mode of knowing is by its nature knowledge of the whole object. Hence, from the words “in part” one cannot by themselves infer anything about the nature of the knowledge; one must attend to the kind of knowledge to which they are opposed in context (cf. supra nr. 126).

2. If St. Paul's words are understood strictly, they prove comprehensive knowledge (v. 12: “even as I have been known”); but this is impossible even for the blessed; therefore, the Apostle's words must be restricted.

I answer. I distinguish the major: if the Apostle were speaking directly of different degrees of perfection in the same mode of knowing, I grant or pass over; if he is speaking of a different kind of knowing, I deny (cf. the explanation of the text).

134. 3. The same terms occur in Exod 33 and Num 12 as in 1 Cor 13; but Moses did not see God intuitively; therefore, neither do they signify intuitive vision in St. Paul's passage.

I answer. Those who affirm, with St. Thomas (1 q. 12 a. 11; 2, 2 q. 174; q. 175 a. 3) and others, that Moses¹⁷ and Paul saw God himself intuitively, pass over the major and deny the minor, and the difficulty disappears. Many theologians, however, deny that Moses had an intuitive vision of God (because of Io 1, 18; 1 Tim 6, 16); they concede the minor but deny the major. For Ex 33, 11 says that God spoke with Moses face to face, while v. 20 explicitly denies him the vision of God's face; Num 12, 8 says, “openly and not through riddles and figures he sees the Lord” (from which text some conclude that there was a true vision of God), but it does not say “face to face.” According to those who deny that Moses had a vision, those words contain nothing more “than a comparison between the more exalted intellectual manifestation made to Moses and the more symbolic manifestations made to the other prophets” (FRANZELIN, p. 189, nota 3). Moreover, in these texts one must attend to whether the subject is intellectual vision or sensible apparition, for example in Num 14, 14. Further, “it must be noted that the angel of the Lord (Maleach Iahve), who appeared to Moses and others in the Old Testament, was not God, but an angel who appeared in visible form, performing a divine mission and speaking in God's person: ‘I am the God of your fathers.’ The Jews knew this well (Act 7, 30. 34. 53; Gal 3, 19; Hebr 2). Therefore, when Jacob says, ‘I saw God face to face’ (Gen 32, 30), the context shows that he saw the visible form of the angel with whom he wrestled” (PESCH, nr. 66) ¹⁸.

135. 4. According to Holy Scripture, God is invisible: Rom 1, 20; 1 Tim 1, 17; 6, 16.

I answer. He is invisible to bodily eyes and to the created intellect by nature, I concede; that he is not visible even supernaturally, I deny.

5. Comparing 1 Cor 13 with 2 Cor 5, 7, the subject seems to be Christ; therefore, the passage concerns not intuitive vision of the divine essence, but seeing Christ glorified.

I answer. From what was said in the explanation of the text (nr. 126), the subject is knowing God himself. But if the text were applied to Christ, it would have to be understood of his divinity.

136. 6. The holy Fathers deny the vision of God. For example, ST. CYRIL OF JERUSALEM, Catech. 6, c. 6 (MG 33, 545; R 822); ST. CHRYSOSTOM, De incomprehensibili, hom. 1 n. 6: “But, if you will, leaving Paul and the prophets aside, let us ascend to heaven and see whether there may perhaps be anyone there who knows God's substance. Even if there are any there who know it, they have nothing in common with us, for there is a great difference between angels and men. Yet, so that you may learn all the more that no created power there knows it, let us listen to the angels themselves. What, then? Do they discuss that substance there and question one another about it? Not at all” (MG 48, 707; R 1123).

I answer. Attention must be paid to how they understand “vision.” When they argue against the Eunomians, it often means comprehension of God, which is rightly denied even to the blessed without denying intuitive vision; sometimes they deny only intuitive vision in this life, or bodily vision (cf. VÁZQUEZ, in 1 disp. 37 c. 1 ss.; PETAVIUS, De Deo, 1. 7 cap. 5 et 6; DONDAINE, supra nr. 132).

7. The arguments by which it is contended that intuitive vision of God is impossible cannot yet be explained here; see nr. 197 ss. for these arguments.

S. TH., 1 q. 12 a. 4; SUÁREZ, tr. 1, 1. 2, c. 8, 9; FRANZELIN, thes. 14; KLEUTGEN, nr. 398-408; PALMIERI, Tractatus de Deo creante et elevante, Romae 1878, thes. 34-39; 43; BILLOT, thes. 13; PESCH, prop. 8; MUNCUNILL, nr. 199 ss.; VAN DER MEERSCH, nr. 297-302; BERAZA, pag. 65 ss.

137. The supernatural is distinguished from the natural insofar as “natural” signifies what is due to created nature. Things belong to a nature constitutively (essential and integral parts), consecutively (properties, faculties, acts), and exigentially (things external to nature itself, but required by it, whether physically—as necessary for its sustenance, development, or attainment of its natural end—or morally, as a due reward). The supernatural is what does not belong to created nature in any of these ways; it can therefore be described as a gift of God positively undue to created nature and superadded to it.

St. Thomas explains well the reason for this due or undue character, which in our day has not always been correctly understood: “Once it is supposed that God wills to do something, it follows from the supposition of his liberality, by way of a certain debt, that he does those things without which the thing he wills cannot exist—as, if he wills to make a human being, he gives him reason. But wherever there is something without which another thing willed by God could exist, this does not proceed from him by reason of any debt, but from sheer liberality. The perfections of grace and glory, however, are goods of this kind, since nature can exist without them; for they exceed the limits of natural power. Hence, when God wills to give someone grace and glory, this proceeds from sheer liberality.” De veritate q. 6 a. 2 c.

The supernatural is not distinguished from the natural insofar as “natural” means what was present from birth, from the first origin, or from the beginning; its opposite in this sense is what was added or acquired later. In this sense, therefore, supernatural gifts can be natural.

Nor is it distinguished from the natural insofar as “natural” means what is fitting to nature, whose opposite is what is violent; in this sense too the supernatural can be natural.

Finally, it is not distinguished from the natural insofar as “natural” means what proceeds necessarily from nature—for example, from a faculty—and is necessarily posited, whose opposite is what is free.

138. The supernatural is divided into the supernatural in mode, when the gift itself that is conferred is natural to the subject, but the mode in which it is conferred is undue (the miraculous restoration of sight); and the supernatural in substance, when what is conferred belongs to nature neither constitutively, consecutively, nor exigentially, but is positively undue to nature. The supernatural in substance is relative supernatural if it is undue in the stated way to the particular creature to whom it is conferred, though it need not be undue to every created being (freedom from the necessity of dying in a human being); it is supernatural simply, or better, absolutely supernatural, if it is undue to every created and creatable being: it exceeds the order of creatures and hence belongs to the divine order.

Attention should be paid to the terminology of different authors. Sometimes what was called above “supernatural in mode” is called “supernatural in a qualified sense”; accordingly, “supernatural in substance” can be called “supernatural simply.” The risk of such confusion seems reduced if the terms “supernatural in a qualified sense” and “supernatural simply” are avoided.

139. In the thesis we affirm that the intuitive vision of God is absolutely supernatural. On this point there are various opinions.

1. The BEGUARDS AND BEGUINES denied that the vision which is final beatitude is supernatural. Their opinion was condemned at the Council of Vienne (1311–1312). According to them, vision belongs consecutively to nature. “That every intellectual nature is naturally blessed in itself, and that the soul does not need the light of glory to raise it up to see God and enjoy him in beatitude” (Denz 475; cf. 474) ¹.

140. 2. The denial that vision is supernatural is contained in the teaching of BAIUS, whose fundamental error seems to have been that he falsely conceived the relation of human nature to the supernatural end actually given by God, insofar as he held this to be the only possible end and the gifts corresponding to this end to be due to integral nature. Cf. prop. 21, 23, 24 (Denz 1021 etc.) ². Vision therefore belongs exigentially to nature. Similarly, JANSENIUS, who says in De statu purae naturae, bk. 2, c. 3: “Here we shall prove that the beatitude of the clear vision itself cannot be denied even to an innocent creature in the kingdom of God” ³.

141. 3. RIPALDA did not extend the concept of nature (the natural order) to all creatable substances, but restricted it to existing substances and possible substances akin to those that exist (De ente supernaturali, disp. 3, sect. 2). There may therefore be possible substances superior to them, for which the vision of God would be connatural; he calls such a creature a supernatural substance. According to him, if one follows the authorities, one might say that such a substance is impossible; but if one follows natural reason, he says he finds no repugnance, while the contrary authority does not seem such as to make it rash to depart from it (Disp. 23; 132, sect. 4). On this opinion, vision would no longer be supernatural for every possible creature; it would therefore have to be called supernatural only relatively.

“Nature, then, is better explained in theological usage if it is said to be the collection of substances that now exist and of the possible substances attached and akin to those that exist. Those possible substances are akin and attached to existing ones whose impossibility would necessarily entail the impossibility of some existing substances, because of the transcendental order by which they are related to them. These, in turn, are the substances contained essentially within the natural physical or intentional powers of existing substances. I mean that those substances are contained essentially within the physical powers of existing things which, as to their essence, can be made adequately or inadequately by the natural power of existing things. Those, meanwhile, are contained essentially within the natural intentional powers which can be attained essentially by some cognition natural to existing things. For this reason possible angels, though superior to existing things, are not beyond nature … But a substance able to produce by its own powers the vision of God, an act of faith, or another salutary act would be beyond nature and supernatural, because such a substance is contained essentially neither within the natural physical powers nor within the natural intentional powers of existing things. For just as justifying grace, the habits of the light of glory, charity, and faith are not now known essentially, so neither could that substance, equivalent in power and perfection to these supernatural gifts, if it were possible, be made or known essentially by the natural power of existing things” (Disp. 3, sect. 2). “If we follow authority, the opinion that denies a possible supernatural substance must be defended absolutely, and consequently affirms that supernatural things are beyond every creatable substance … The authority for this opinion that denies it is not so great that an opinion freely affirming it cannot be defended without a mark of rashness … (For) the only authority that openly opposes the opinion affirming a supernatural substance is that of recent authors. But the authority of recent authors alone does not suffice to brand an opinion with any rashness” (Disp. 23, s. 2). “Following reason, I do not find a supernatural substance repugnant … Moreover, if we are guided only by the light of reason, it would not be improbable that such a substance is possible … For if a limited and finite accidental perfection can contain something supernatural, limited and finite, by some kind of connection, why, by the same reasoning, could not a substantial perfection, however finite and limited, contain the same?” (sect. 3). Cf. disp. 132, sect. 40. On this question, see also Molina, In 1 q. 12 a. 5 disp. 2.

142. 4. Vision is absolutely supernatural. This is by far the most common opinion among theologians.

Teaching of the Church

143. THE COUNCIL OF VIENNE, condemnation of the errors of the BEGUARDS AND BEGUINES (above, nr. 139); PIUS V in the condemnation of the errors of BAIUS (above, nr. 140); cf. CLEMENT XI, Constitution “Unigenitus” (1713), nr. 35, 37 (Denz 1385; 1387); PIUS VI, Constitution “Auctorem fidei” (1794), nr. 16 (Denz 1516); THE VATICAN COUNCIL, s. 3 cap. 2: “By his infinite goodness God ordained man to a supernatural end, namely, to share in divine goods that utterly surpass the understanding of the human mind” (Denz 1786). Here “the supernatural end to which man is ordained” is taught (above, nr. 31). From the Council of Vienne, our thesis is de fide at least with regard to existing intellectual creatures. PIUS XII, Encyclical “Humani generis,” 12 August 1950: “Others corrupt the true ‘gratuitousness’ of the supernatural order when they claim that God cannot create beings endowed with intellect without ordaining and calling them to the beatific vision” (AAS 42, 1950, 570).

PRELIMINARY NOTE ON THE ARGUMENT FROM SACRED SCRIPTURE AND THE FATHERS. The thesis can be proved from Sacred Scripture and the Fathers in two wholly independent ways: one, by showing that in the present order absolutely supernatural gifts are conferred on man, and therefore the vision which is the end of this order must have the same supernatural character; the other, by showing directly that vision itself is supernatural.

Sacred Scripture

144. First way: Since this matter is usually explained in other treatises as well, it is enough here to give a brief account of the principal idea.

In the present order, the just person is a child of God, regenerated and born of God: Rom 8, 15-17; Gal 4, 5-7; Tit 3, 5 ss.; Io 1, 12; 1 Io 2, 29; 3, 1. 2. 8. 9; 4, 7; 5, 12. Although the mere name “child” could be understood metaphorically, this is ruled out by the fact that this sonship is adoptive, which is not usually understood in an improper sense, especially when said of individuals (theocratic adoptive sonship is said of the people, Rom 9, 4). Indeed, it is clear that in the present case adoptive sonship must be taken in the proper sense from the fact that, according to St. Paul, the right of inheritance follows from this adoption (Rom 8; Gal 4; Tit 3). Adoption, however, is the taking of an outsider into the rights of a natural child; by its very concept, then, it is undue to those who are not natural children. In human adoption it is only morally undue, insofar as the adopted person is not a natural child; but the nature of the rights and the goods to which the right is granted remain within the human order. The goods proper to the natural Son of God, however, belong to the divine order and exceed the whole natural order. Hence adoption as a child of God, by which the just person becomes an heir of God and a co-heir with Christ (Rom 8), and by which the goods of the natural Son of God are or will be shared (cf. Io 14, 2; 15, 1 ss.; Apoc 3, 21), exceeds the order of creatures and is absolutely supernatural (cf. 2 Pet 1, 4, partakers of the divine nature). The intuitive vision of God is, in concrete terms, that inheritance, that beatitude (cf. Denz 530, 693); it is the end of this supernatural order, its perfection and summit, and must have the same supernatural character. Therefore the vision of God is absolutely supernatural.

145. Objection. According to the explanation given above, adoptive sonship seems opposed to the servitude proper to a creature as creature. But 1) this opposition does not seem to accord with St. Paul’s intention, since he opposes sonship either to slavery to sin or to slavery under the old law (Gal 4), which nevertheless presupposes slavery to sin; therefore sonship is in itself due to man before sin, and thus is not absolutely supernatural; 2) if, however, one admitted that this sonship is opposed to the servitude of a creature, one would establish that by this adoption the creature ceases to be a servant, which seems impossible in itself.

I answer. To 1: In either case, it is supposed that sonship is natural to man; but if that were so, its conferral after sin and slavery under the law could not be called adoption, but only restoration, namely, of the rights of a natural child. Now in fact it is called adoption; in the present order this also has the character of restoration, because before Adam’s sin man had already been established as an adoptive child of God. It is therefore a restoration of adoption.

To 2: “Servant” is said a) in opposition to “free,” and signifies one who is subject to a master and must “serve”; b) in opposition to “child,” and signifies one who does not belong to the “family” and has no family rights. In both senses a creature is naturally God’s servant: adoption removes the latter servitude, while the former remains. An adoptive child of God too must “serve” God.

146. Second way: 1) The vision of God belongs exclusively to the divine persons; therefore it is natural to no creature, that is, it is absolutely supernatural.

Proof of the antecedent. In Matth 11, 27 (Luc 10, 22), Christ attributes to the divine persons a certain knowledge that belongs exclusively to them; but this is the intuitive vision of God; therefore. Proof of the minor. That knowledge cannot be understood as mediated knowledge of God, for a) this belongs to creatures, and b) it does not lead to knowledge of divine paternity and filiation, as does the knowledge of which Christ speaks. Still less can it be understood as knowledge through faith, since this too is mediated and can in no way have a place in the divine persons. Therefore it must be understood as immediate knowledge by which the divine persons themselves are known, that is, intuitive vision. This is in fact comprehensive, but Christ does not consider it here under this aspect; he considers it precisely insofar as it is knowledge of divine paternity and filiation. For the object of this knowledge can be made known to human beings through revelation and believed by them through faith, which is not true of this knowledge insofar as it is comprehensive. Therefore the knowledge which Christ here presents as belonging exclusively to the divine persons is precisely the intuitive vision of God itself.

From the fact that vision belongs exclusively to God, it does indeed follow that it cannot be proper and natural to any creature; it does not follow, however, that it cannot be communicated to a creature supernaturally. We have positively proved in the preceding thesis that this can happen.

2. God is invisible to the human intellect: Rom 1, 20; 1 Tim 6, 16. Neither passage concerns bodily invisibility: the things invisible in Rom 1, 20—the eternal power and divinity—are perceived intellectually through creatures; and in 1 Tim 6, 16, dwelling in inaccessible light is listed among the perfections proper to God alone, which cannot be said of bodily invisibility. Cf. Io 1, 18; 6, 46; 1 Io 4, 12.

3. 1 Cor 2, 7 ss. is now commonly understood by exegetes of the plan of redemption; in tradition, v. 9 is often applied to the beatific vision (as at the Vatican Council concerning the supernatural end).

The Fathers

147. First way: The argument can be framed in the same way as above (nr. 144), from Sacred Scripture. SCHEEBEN explains this matter well, Handbuch der Dogmatik, II, § 163; for patristic texts, see also R: in justification, man becomes a partaker of the divine nature (ser. 358), an adoptive child of God (ser. 359), an heir of the heavenly kingdom (ser. 360); supernatural gifts (ser. 353); the vision of God is beatitude (ser. 607).

148. Second way: According to the teaching of the Fathers, no creature can see God naturally.

ST. IRENAEUS (above, nr. 128); ORIGEN, De principiis, 1. 1 c. 1 nr. 6: “Since our mind cannot by itself contemplate God as he is, it understands the Father of the universe from the beauty of his works and the splendor of creatures” (MG 11, 124; R 451). ST. ATHANASIUS (above, nr. 82); ST. GREGORY NAZIANZEN (above, nr. 83); DIDYMUS OF ALEXANDRIA, De Trinitate, 1. 3 c. 16: “Since God exists above the invisible, above what is most hidden, and above every mind, he cannot fall under vision or any sense at all, nor even be seen by the minds of the angels themselves, because he is incomprehensible and inaccessible” (MG 39, 873; R 1075). ST. CHRYSOSTOM, De incomprehensibili, hom. 3 nr. 1: “Let us therefore call him the ineffable, unintelligible God, invisible, incomprehensible, surpassing the power of human speech, exceeding the grasp of mortal thought, untraceable by angels, invisible to seraphim, unintelligible to cherubim, unseeable by principalities, powers, and virtues, and simply by every creature, but known by the Son alone and the Holy Spirit” (MG 48, 720; R 1125).

Reason

149. Vision is not natural to man during the state of union: The intuitive vision of God is immediate cognition, proper per se, through its proper form, by which God is known as he is in himself. The proper and proportionate object of the human intellect in the state of union, however, is the intelligible as found in sensible things. Hence the intuitive vision of God is not natural to the human intellect during the state of union.

150. Vision is absolutely supernatural: Natural cognition is according to the mode of being of the knower; but the mode of being of every creature is potential; therefore the natural cognition of every creature is according to the mode of a potential being. But the mode of being proper to God is not potential; rather, it excludes all potentiality. Therefore no creature naturally knows God according to the mode of being proper to God. But the intuitive vision of God is precisely the cognition by which God is known according to the mode of being proper to God, as he is in himself. Therefore the intuitive vision of God is natural to no creature: vision is absolutely supernatural.

151. The principle from which the argument proceeds is sometimes stated as follows: “The mode of knowing does not exceed the perfection of being.” This can readily be understood as an application of the principle “the mode of operation does not exceed the mode of being.” The principle, so stated, can also be understood in the same sense as the form given above. More immediately, however, it seems to say something about the entitative perfection of the cognitive act, not immediately and directly about the perfection of the mode by which it reaches its object; yet the entitative perfection of an act can be essentially different without an essential difference in the mode by which it is directed to its object (the act of bodily vision in a brute animal and in an infant who has no use of reason at all). The principle “natural cognition is according to the mode of the knower,” however, says something directly about the mode in which the cognitive act is directed to its object. It considers the act precisely as cognition, that is, as the “living representation” of an object, and asserts that this living representation of the object follows not the being of the object but the being of the subject. In other words, different perfections of being correspond to different proper and proportionate objects; here “different perfections of being” does not mean every different physical perfection, but perfection in the very character of being, a different simplicity of being itself.

152. God is his own being; angels are beings that exist not in matter; human souls in the state of the present life are beings that exist in individual matter. The cognitive power of the human soul which is the act of a bodily organ, namely, sense, knows things insofar as they are in matter, as singulars. The cognitive power of the human soul which is not the act of a bodily organ, namely, intellect, knows natures that do indeed exist in individual matter, but not insofar as they are in individual matter; it knows them insofar as they are abstracted from matter. It is connatural to angelic intellect to know what exists not in matter; it is proper and connatural to God to know subsistent being itself (S. TH. 1 q. 12 a. 4; cf. 1, 2 q. 5 art. 5).

153. St. THOMAS gives the reason (ibid.): “Cognition takes place insofar as the thing known is in the knower (not insofar as the thing known is in itself). The thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower (for whatever is received is received according to the mode of the recipient). Hence the cognition of every knower is according to the mode of its nature.”

The reason for the assertion still needs to be supplied: cognition takes place insofar as the thing known is in the knower. This reason seems to be a principle of sufficient reason. In natural cognition, the first act must contain a sufficient reason for this determinate second act; therefore the object too must in some way be contained in the first act (whether in itself, by its likeness, or in some other way). For if it were in no way present in the first act, the first act would no longer be the sufficient reason why this object was known. Hence the object is also known in the mode in which it is in the first act (that is, not in another mode, and at least not in a more perfect mode). In other words, cognition is not according to the thing known as it is in itself, but according to the thing known as it is in the knower.

154. It must be noted that the argument holds for natural cognition, in which natural principles are applied in a natural mode. It cannot be applied in itself to cognition in which principles of a higher order intervene. Therefore one cannot conclude that the vision of God is absolutely impossible for a creature, but only that it is impossible for a creature naturally, with only natural principles applied in a natural mode. A priori, we do not know whether God can supply by some special influx what is not yet contained in the creature’s first act, so that cognition according to the mode proper to God follows, although God according to his proper mode is not contained in the creature’s first act. If the fact of such cognition is established, its possibility is established as well; and by that very fact it is established that God can supply what is lacking, while the argument just given does not contradict this.

Objections

155. 1. The supernatural character of vision is not proved from Matth 11, 27; for the text can be understood of the comprehensive knowledge of God, which belongs exclusively to the divine persons. Therefore it does not prove that intuitive, non-comprehensive vision is natural to no creature.

I answer. I deny the antecedent, according to what was said at nr. 146.

156. 2. If the argument from reason proves anything, it proves metaphysical impossibility; therefore it proves too much. The answer is given at nr. 154.

Yet according to the explanation given for the argument from reason, vision seems to be impossible. Proof. No faculty can go beyond its object; but God according to his proper being is beyond the object of every created intellect; therefore vision is impossible for every creature.

I answer. I distinguish the major: beyond its adequate object, I grant; beyond its proper and proportionate object, I distinguish: naturally, I grant; supernaturally, I ask for proof. I contradict the minor: beyond its adequate object, I deny; beyond its proper and proportionate object, I grant.

157. 3. Vision does not seem supernatural to every creatable substance (RIPALDA); therefore it is not absolutely supernatural in the sense intended by the thesis.

The antecedent is proved from the fact that man, endowed with an accidental perfection, can see God: if a created accidental perfection can contain such an ordering to the vision of God that an intellect endowed with this perfection can see God, there is no reason to deny the same ordering to a created substance of the same order of perfection as that accidental perfection. But a vision of God is possible to such a substance from its natural principles; that is, vision is not supernatural for it. Therefore vision is not absolutely supernatural for every creatable substance.

I answer. I deny the antecedent. To its proof, I deny the major. For even if we set aside the question whether a created substance in the same order of perfection as the accidental perfection of the human intellect seeing God is possible at all (which many deny), the vision of God would not be natural to such a created substance (assuming, not conceding, that it is possible). For the mode of being of a created substance that sees God through its own principles applied naturally would have to equal God’s mode of being; that is, such a created substance would have to be God. Thus it seems possible to show a contradiction in the claim that a created substance sees God by acting naturally; but no contradiction can be shown in the claim that a created substance, while remaining a creature, sees God through accidental supernatural elevation, not by acting through natural principles alone applied naturally (cf. the argument from reason).

158. 4. In man there is a natural appetite for the vision of God; but the object of a natural appetite is natural and proportionate to nature; therefore the vision of God is natural to man ⁴.

I answer. I distinguish the major: an innate appetite, I deny; an elicited appetite can be present in a merely natural way, I distinguish: if man certainly knows by reason alone that this vision is possible for him, I grant; if he cannot know this in that way, I deny. I contradict the minor: the object of an innate appetite, I grant; of an elicited appetite, I distinguish: it can be natural, I grant; it must be natural, I deny.

An innate appetite is the ordering of a nature toward some good prior to the subject’s cognition of that good. It is often divided into an appetite of exigence and an appetite of aptitude or capacity. The former requires the good, and if the good is denied, something is lacking to the nature; the latter says only that the nature is capable of receiving such a good (that such a good is not repugnant to this nature). The latter is called an appetite in a very improper sense; of itself it abstracts from whether the object is proportionate and due, and it can concern a good that is not proportionate and is undue. An innate appetite of exigence, however, expresses a positive inclination toward an object (the weight of nature); it is necessarily directed toward a good proportionate and due to nature. From such an appetite, then, one rightly infers that the object is natural.

An elicited appetite is a second, vital act, following cognition and tending toward a known good. From an elicited appetite one cannot in itself conclude that its object is proportionate and due to the nature, because any good, provided it is known, can be desired. But if man could certainly and positively know the possibility of the vision of God by a purely natural way and by purely natural principles (hence without any positive revelation and without any communication based on revelation), it seems that one would have to conclude that this vision is at least exigentially natural. For on that supposition it seems that man could no longer attain final beatitude without the vision of God; if he knows in the stated way that intuitive vision of God is possible for him, he seems necessarily to have to say that it is destined for him as his ultimate end ⁵.

If, however, man has learned from revelation that the vision is possible supernaturally, an elicited appetite for so great a good can indeed arise; but one can no longer infer from such an appetite that this good is natural or due to man.

159. According to the teaching of the Baianists, one must undoubtedly admit in man a natural appetite for the beatific vision, and indeed a natural appetite in the strict sense, so that this vision is due to integral nature and is man’s natural end. Whoever posits such an appetite in fact denies the supernatural character of vision. BERTI explains the opinion of the Augustinians as follows: “What, I ask, do the Augustinian theologians teach when they say that the state of pure nature is impossible, unless that the ultimate end of a rational creature is God and the intuitive vision of him; that this end is natural as regards the inclination and appetite of the rational creature, but supernatural as regards its attainment and the means by which it is acquired; that without such attainment rational creatures would be most miserable and worse off than the other things created by God that attain their natural end; and that in this, therefore, the nature of angels and human beings surpasses irrational and corporeal substances, namely, that the most excellent end has been established for them, which they cannot attain by the powers of nature alone. Hence supernatural helps of grace had to be conferred on integral nature, uncorrupted by any sin, so that it might attain its end—not because such helps are natural or belong to the constitution of nature, but rather because rational creatures need aids exceeding the order of nature in order to attain their end, and these are in some way due to them: either by title of Providence, which denies no one the means necessary to attain the end, as Fulgentius Bellelli argues, or by the fittingness of the Creator, as Noris taught” ⁶.

To support the doctrine of a natural appetite for the vision of God, BERTI appeals to the opinion of several scholastics. Thus SCOTUS seems to have taught some natural (innate) appetite for vision (Prol. q. 1; in 4 d. 49 q. 10); hence the vision of God can be called man’s natural end as regards appetite, but supernatural as regards attainment; his disciples taught similarly. Moreover: DURANDUS (in 4 d. 39 q. 2), PETRUS DE PALUDE (in 4 d. 49 q. 7 a. 1), DOMINICUS SOTO (in 4 d. 49 q. 2 a. 1); De natura et gratia, 1. 1 c. 4 nr. 8: “It must not be denied that that end is natural to us with respect to appetite, but it is nevertheless above the powers of our nature if you consider its attainment”; TOLETUS (in 1 q. 1 a. 1; tom. 1 pag. 17 ss.); GREGORY OF VALENTIA (De beatitudine, q. 5, punctum 1). ST. BELLARMINE (De gratia primi hominis, 1. 1 c. 7 obi. 13): “I answer that beatitude is man’s natural end as regards appetite, but not as regards attainment. Nor is it new or unworthy of human nature that one naturally desires what one can attain only with supernatural help.” To the objection, “Let it be so: man needs supernatural means; yet it would follow that he could not have been created without those means, and hence could not have been created as he is now born; for he could not have been made for a lower end unless his nature were changed, nor could the means for attaining a natural end have been denied,” he replies: “It was wholly fitting that God should not deny necessary means to man, ordained to so lofty an end; yet nothing absurd would have followed if he had denied them. For although that supreme beatitude is man’s natural end, it is nevertheless a disproportionate end, and besides it man has another natural end wholly proportionate to him, which is to seek truth by reasoning. Therefore God could have led man by natural means to an end proportionate to his nature, without raising him higher.”

160. These words show that this opinion posits no exigence for the vision of God. Hence the natural appetite affirmed by these authors cannot be understood as a natural appetite in the strict sense. Perhaps, at least for some of them, the natural appetite they affirm can be understood as the capacity of intellectual nature for the vision of God (cf. what was said above concerning the appetite of exigence and of capacity, nr. 158). In this sense RIPALDA (De ente supernaturali, disp. 9 sect. 4) considers the scholastic controversy over a natural appetite for the vision of God to be largely about words rather than the matter. If, however, an innate appetite were understood in the strict and proper sense, one would have to conclude that there is a true exigence for vision, and it could no longer be called supernatural in the strict sense.

The same seems to have to be said if the vision is posited as man’s natural end. If this is understood to mean that vision is man’s sole end, to which he is destined as his natural end in every order, so that another natural end for man is impossible, the strict supernatural character of vision does not seem to be preserved. Therefore the doctrine of the Augustinians, as set out above by BERTI, is not to be accepted ⁷. If, however, “natural end” is understood in a certain broader sense, as an end of nature that is not proportionate to it, while some other natural end is admitted as possible, one proportionate to nature, the supernatural character of vision is not necessarily denied. Yet this way of speaking no longer seems suitable today; rather, the vision of God should be called man’s supernatural end.

161. Support for affirming a natural appetite for the vision of God is also drawn from the teaching of ST. THOMAS, who teaches in 1 q. 12 a. 1: To say “that no created intellect can see the essence of God” is foreign to faith and contrary to reason. It is foreign to faith because “if a created intellect can never see the essence of God, then it will either never attain beatitude or its beatitude will consist in something other than God, which is foreign to faith.” He proves that it is contrary to reason in this way: from the natural desire to know the cause when one sees an effect, one would conclude that this desire remains empty if the intellect cannot reach the first cause; from the context it is understood that this means seeing the first cause. Similar statements occur in 1, 2 q. 3 a. 8. Contra Gentiles, bk. 3, c. 50 shows that the desire of separate substances does not rest in the natural cognition they have of God, and hence c. 51 says: “Since it is impossible for a natural desire to be empty—which it would be if it were not possible to attain understanding of the divine substance, which all minds naturally desire—it must be said that it is possible for the substance of God to be seen by the intellect and by separate intellectual substances.” Cf. Comp. Theol. cap. 104 and his manner of speaking about the resurrection of bodies, cap. 151; 152. In 1 Cor c. 13 lect. 4.

162. In these texts, however, the subject does not seem to be an innate appetite in the proper sense; for the appetite or desire under discussion follows cognition, and is therefore an elicited appetite. Moreover, he explicitly denies a natural appetite (the one we called innate above) for the vision of God. De Verit. q. 22 a. 7: “Other things have an implanted natural appetite for some determinate thing, as the heavy for what is below, so that each animal naturally desires what suits it according to its nature. But in man there is implanted an appetite for the ultimate end in general, namely, that he naturally desires to be perfected in goodness. What this perfection consists in—whether in virtues, knowledge, pleasure, or other such things—is not determined for him by nature. When, therefore, by his own reason, aided by divine grace, he apprehends some particular good as his beatitude, in which his beatitude truly consists, he then merits—not because he desires beatitude, which he naturally desires, but because he desires this particular thing, which he does not naturally desire, such as the vision of God, in which his beatitude in fact consists.”

Earlier he had written: “Charity … includes friendship, love, and desire. Natural desire, however, can be only for something that can be had naturally; hence a natural desire for the highest good is in us by nature, insofar as the highest good can be shared by us through natural effects” (In 3 d. 27 q. 2 a. 2 ad 4). “Virtues … are necessary for us so that our natural powers may be directed to the good; therefore no other virtues are needed where natural powers are by their nature already directed to the good. The will has the good, which is the end, as its object; hence, as far as it is concerned, it is naturally directed to the good that is the end proportionate to human nature. For this reason the philosophers posited no virtue in the will with respect to the ultimate end … According to the teaching of faith, an ultimate end that exceeds natural inclination is posited; and so according to theologians one must posit a virtue in the will to raise it to the end in question, and this we call charity” (In 3 d. 27 q. 2 a. 3 ad 5; cf. In 4 d. 49 q. 1 a. 3 qc. 3 in c.).

163. From the natural elicited desire discussed in the passages cited above (nr. 161), one cannot conclude, according to St. Thomas’s meaning, that its object, namely the vision of God, is natural and due. For such an interpretation would contradict what St. Thomas clearly teaches: that seeing the divine essence is proper to God alone and natural to no intellect: 1 q. 12 a. 4; Contra Gent. 1. 3 c. 52; De Veritate q. 8 a. 3. De Malo q. 4 a. 1 ad 14 explains in what sense the absence of vision is a punishment, and in what sense it is not: “The absence of the divine vision pertains to someone in two ways. In one way, he has nothing in himself by which he could attain the divine vision; in that way the absence of the divine vision would pertain even to one who existed with only natural gifts and without sin. For in this way the absence of the divine vision is not a punishment, but a defect consequent upon every created nature, since no creature can attain the divine vision by its natural powers. In another way, the absence of the divine vision can pertain to someone because he has in himself something on account of which he is due to be deprived of the divine vision; in this way the absence of the divine vision is the punishment of both original and actual sin.” Similarly q. 5 a. 1 ad 15; cf. ibid. in corp. and ad 1; art. 2 in corp.: “grace and the divine vision are above human nature.” In art. 3 he explains that those who die with original sin alone suffer no grief or distress from the absence of vision: “The souls of children are not deprived of the natural cognition due to a separated soul according to its nature, but they are deprived of supernatural cognition, which is planted in us here through faith, because they neither had faith in act here nor received the sacrament of faith. It belongs to natural cognition that the soul knows it was created for beatitude and that beatitude consists in the attainment of the perfect good; but that the perfect good for which man was made is the glory possessed by the saints is above natural cognition. Hence the Apostle says, 1 ad Cor 2, 9, that neither eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor has it entered the human heart what God has prepared for those who love him; and he adds: But God has revealed these things to us through his Spirit; this revelation belongs to faith. Therefore the souls of children do not know that they are deprived of such a good, and so they do not grieve; rather, without pain they possess what they have by nature”; ad 4: “Children who die in original sin are separated from God forever as regards the loss of glory, of which they are ignorant, but not as regards their participation in natural goods, which they know.”

Contra Gent. 1. 1 c. 5: “No one tends toward anything by desire and effort unless it is known to him beforehand. Since, therefore, by divine providence human beings are ordained to a good higher than fragile human nature can experience in the present life … the mind had to be called forth to something higher than our reason can attain in the present, so that it might learn to desire and strive for something that exceeds the whole state of the present life.” “Eternal life, however, is a good exceeding the proportion of created nature, since it also exceeds its cognition and desire, according to 1 ad Cor 2, 9” (1, 2 q. 114 a. 2). Therefore the “natural” desire of which St. Thomas speaks has a supernatural object, whose existence can be known only by faith; for a man established in pure nature who dies without sin, its absence would be neither a punishment nor a cause of sadness.

164. Moreover, just as St. Thomas distinguishes two ultimate ends, namely, the natural and the supernatural (1 q. 23 a. 1), so too he distinguishes two kinds of beatitude, 1 q. 62 a. 1: “By the name ‘beatitude’ is understood the ultimate perfection of a rational or intellectual nature; hence it is naturally desired, because each thing naturally desires its ultimate perfection. The ultimate perfection of a rational or intellectual nature, however, is twofold. One it can attain by the power of its nature, and this is called beatitude or happiness in a certain sense. Thus Aristotle (lib. 10 Eth. cap. 8) says that the most perfect contemplation available to man, by which he can contemplate the best intelligible object, which is God, in this life, is man’s ultimate happiness. But above this happiness is another, which we await in the future, when we shall see God as he is; this is above the nature of every created intellect.” And art. 2: “The natural movement of the will is the principle of all the things we will; the natural inclination of the will is toward what is fitting according to nature. Therefore, if something is above nature, the will cannot be borne toward it unless helped by some other supernatural principle … To see God through his essence, in which the ultimate beatitude of a rational creature consists, is above the nature of every created intellect. Hence no rational creature can have a movement of the will ordered to that beatitude unless moved by a supernatural agent; this we call the help of grace.”

Similarly, De Veritate q. 14 a. 2 distinguishes, as it were, two ultimate ends: “There is a twofold ultimate human good that first moves the will as an ultimate end. One is proportionate to human nature, since natural powers suffice to attain it; this is the happiness of which the philosophers spoke … The other is a human good exceeding the proportion of human nature, since natural powers neither suffice to attain it nor to conceive or desire it; it is promised to man by divine liberality alone.” Similarly, q. 14 a. 10, in reply to the objection “man by the nature of his condition was made to be a partaker of eternal beatitude; for God established a rational creature capable of himself, as is stated in 2 Sent. dist. 1; therefore the principles by which he could attain that end had to be implanted in his nature,” he replies: “From its very first establishment, human nature was ordained to the end of beatitude—not as an end due to man according to his nature, but by divine liberality alone; hence the principles of nature need not suffice to attain that end unless aided by gifts superadded through divine liberality.” De Verit. q. 27 a. 2: “Since different natures have different ends, three things are presupposed in natural things for attaining an end: a nature proportionate to that end, an inclination to that end, which is the natural appetite for the end, and movement toward the end. Thus the earth has a nature by which it belongs in the middle, and this nature is followed by an inclination toward the middle place, according to which it naturally desires such a place when it is held outside it by force; hence, if nothing prevents it, it always moves downward. By his nature, man is proportionate to an end for which he has a natural appetite and toward whose attainment he can act by his natural powers: this end is a certain contemplation of divine things, such as is possible for man according to the capacity of his nature, and in which the philosophers placed man’s ultimate happiness. But there is an end for which man is prepared by God that exceeds the proportion of human nature, namely, eternal life, which consists in the vision of God through his essence and exceeds the proportion of every created nature, being connatural to God alone. Hence something must be given to man not only by which he can act toward that end or by which his appetite may be inclined toward it, but by which man’s very nature is raised to a dignity according to which such an end is fitting for him.” Cf. In 3 d. 23 q. 1 a. 4. Nor can one infer from the fact that the vision of God is the end of a rational creature that the creature can reach this end through pure natural powers (De Verit. q. 8 a. 3 ad 12).

“Vision, or beatific knowledge, is in one respect above the nature of the rational soul, insofar as the soul cannot attain it by its own power; in another respect it is according to the soul’s nature, insofar as by its nature it is capable of it, since it was made in the image of God” (3 q. 9 a. 2 ad 3).

165. From what has been said, it is clear that St. Thomas’s doctrine of the natural desire to see God cannot be explained as making the vision of God in some way due to man or naturally exigential. Such an explanation would contradict his clear teaching about its absolute supernatural character: it is an end not proportionate to human nature, to which man is destined by divine liberality alone. The theologians do not agree on how his doctrine of natural desire should be positively explained; the authors cited above may be consulted on this question.

Whether the intuitive vision of God can be proved possible

to the human intellect by reason alone

166. In the fifth thesis the possibility of vision was proved only from the fact that God destined man for this beatitude, a fact proved from revelation itself. In the sixth thesis the strictly supernatural character of this vision was proved: nr. 158 ss. showed that there is no natural appetite, in the strict sense, for the vision.

Whoever denies the supernatural character of vision is readily led to attribute to human reason the ability to know the possibility of vision independently of revelation; the same seems true of those who affirm a natural appetite for the vision. Although the questions are related, however, it is not the same thing to affirm that the possibility of vision can be known by reason alone and to affirm a natural appetite for the vision; one may affirm the former and deny the latter.

The question whether the possibility of vision can be known by reason alone has again been much debated in recent years ⁸; and is in a certain sense the same as the question whether and in what sense the vision of God is a mystery. If reason alone proves that the vision of God is possible to the human intellect, though not by its natural powers alone but through a special divine intervention, it also proves that there are no mysteries in God whose internal possibility is absolutely inaccessible to the human intellect; in other words, it proves that the human intellect can be raised in such a way that no mysteries remain in God for it.

Since the vision of God is cognition according to the mode proper to God, the question whether its possibility can be proved by reason alone can also be stated as follows: Whether it can be proved by reason alone that cognition is possible to the human intellect according to the mode of knowing proper to God as God.

Stated in this way, it also becomes clearer what the question properly means than when one merely says “to see God or God’s essence.”

To prove this possibility by reason’s principles alone, it is not enough to show that such cognition seems fitting to reason; from the fact that something seems fitting to us, it does not yet follow with certainty that it is possible. Nor is it enough to prove that impossibility cannot be proved or that no intrinsic repugnance appears in the intuitive vision of God; from the fact that impossibility is not proved and no intrinsic repugnance appears to us, positive possibility does not follow. Thus reason alone cannot prove that a unipersonal being from itself is intrinsically repugnant; nevertheless, it does not follow in any way that a unipersonal being from itself is possible. Indeed, from what revelation teaches, it is clear that the notion of a unipersonal being from itself contains an intrinsic repugnance. Finally, showing that the incapacity for the vision of God found in non-intelligent beings is not found in an intelligent creature does not yet prove that there is no incapacity in it at all.

167. The possibility of vision would be proved by reason alone if it could be proved independently of revelation that man is in fact destined for the intuitive vision of God. From what is, one may infer what can be. If possibility is proved in this way, it does not in itself follow that reason also understands the internal possibility of vision.

But it is impossible to prove by reason alone that man is in fact destined for the vision of God. For according to the teaching of the Vatican Council, revelation is absolutely necessary to know the supernatural end to which God freely destined man in the present order (Conc. Vat. s. 3 c. 2; Denz 1786). Moreover, for such a proof to be possible, a necessary connection would have to be supposed between the existence or creation of intellectual beings and the fact of their being destined for the vision, so that, on the supposition that God freely created intellectual beings, God would no longer be free to destine them to vision but would have to destine them to see him as a consequence of their free creation. But there is no such connection: an order in which man is not destined for the vision of God is possible.

168. Another way of proving the possibility of vision by reason alone would be to show its internal possibility directly. In itself, this might say nothing, at least immediately, about whether man is in fact ordered to that end. But this way too is impossible.

In the letter “Gravissimas inter” (1862), PIUS IX censures the doctrine of Frohschammer: that “philosophy, if it is rightly understood, can not only perceive and understand those Christian dogmas which natural reason has in common with faith (as a common object of perception), but also those which most especially and properly constitute the Christian religion and faith—namely, man’s supernatural end itself and all that pertains to it, as well as the most sacred mystery of the Lord’s Incarnation—as belonging to the province of human reason and philosophy, and that reason, once this object (namely, through revelation) has been given, can by its own principles scientifically reach it” (Denz 1669). He judges such a doctrine as follows: “In this most serious matter we can never tolerate that everything be rashly confused, or that reason seize and disturb even those things which pertain to faith, since the limits beyond which reason has never advanced by its own right and cannot advance are most certain and well known to all. Among these dogmas, everything that concerns man’s supernatural elevation and his supernatural commerce with God, revealed as pertaining to this end, belongs especially and most clearly. Since these dogmas are above nature, they cannot be reached by natural reason and natural principles. Reason can never be made competent by its natural principles ⁹ to treat such dogmas scientifically” (Denz 1671). After citing texts of Sacred Scripture, he continues: “Adhering to these and almost countless other divine utterances, the holy Fathers, in handing on the Church’s teaching, continually took care to distinguish the knowledge of divine things common to all by the power of natural understanding from knowledge of those things received by faith through the Holy Spirit. They consistently taught that through this faith the mysteries are revealed to us in Christ which transcend not only human philosophy but also the natural understanding of angels, and which, even when made known by divine revelation and received by faith itself, nevertheless remain covered by the sacred veil of faith and wrapped in a dark obscurity as long as we are pilgrims in this mortal life, away from the Lord” (Denz 1673; cf. Conc. Vat. s. 3 c. 4 Denz 1796). But a truth whose internal possibility we positively understand can no longer be said to be wrapped in dark obscurity. Moreover, such truths belong to the province of human reason and philosophy, which PIUS IX expressly denies of man’s supernatural end. What is said in this letter against Frohschammer’s doctrine—that such an object must first be given through revelation—applies all the more if someone wishes to affirm that, independently of revelation, man can demonstrate the internal possibility of the vision of God.

In fact, no argument has so far been adduced that proves the possibility of vision. In the arguments commonly put forward (especially from the intellectual nature, as capable of all truth), the things noted above at nr. 166 are usually confused. One can indeed prove that intellectual nature does not have the incapacity found in non-intellectual natures precisely because they are not intellectual; but this still does not prove the capacity for vision. Perhaps an incapacity is already present in the fact that a being is a creature and not a being from itself; the vision of God is cognition according to the mode of an infinite being.

The object of an intellectual cognitive faculty is indeed truth; hence an intellectual creature is capable of knowing every truth. But this in itself says only that it is capable of knowing every truth according to the mode of knowing proper to this creature. It does not follow that a human being is capable of knowing truth according to the mode of cognition proper, for example, to pure spirits; still less that he is capable of knowing every truth according to the mode of knowing proper to God as an uncreated and infinite being.

Therefore the possibility of vision cannot be proved by reason, either by inferring its possibility from the fact of vision proved by reason, or by showing its internal possibility directly.

169. A third way still seems possible, by which neither the fact of vision itself nor its internal possibility is demonstrated directly: reason alone knows that the intuitive vision of God is the most perfect beatitude of an intellectual creature; but God must be able to confer the most perfect beatitude on a creature; therefore God can confer intuitive vision on an intellectual creature. Therefore it must be possible. Since this argument neither proves that God has in fact ordained human beings to the vision of God nor shows its internal possibility, it can be reconciled with the teaching of the Vatican Council and with the condemnation of Frohschammer’s doctrine.

But the major premise of the argument—namely, that the vision of God is the most perfect beatitude of an intellectual creature—is not proved by reason alone; indeed, it can be proved only on the supposition that the vision of God is possible to an intellectual creature, or rather, this possibility is already implicitly asserted in the major proposition itself. For no one says that the most perfect beatitude consists in something intrinsically impossible. The argument in its formal structure must therefore be answered as follows: I distinguish the major: reason alone knows that the vision of God is the most perfect beatitude of an intellectual creature if this vision of God is possible and its possibility is certainly known by reason alone, independently of revelation—I grant; otherwise, I deny. I grant the minor; I distinguish the conclusion: if vision is possible, I grant; if it is not possible, I deny ¹⁰.

How great a mystery the vision of God was for St. THOMAS appears from the words he wrote while enumerating the causes of the Incarnation of the Son of God (Comp. Theol., cap. 201): “Through this (that is, the Incarnation) a certain example is given to man of that blessed union by which a created intellect will be united to an uncreated spirit in understanding. For it is not incredible that a creature’s intellect can be united to God by seeing his essence, since God was united to man by assuming his nature.” It is not very probable that one who taught this also taught that the possibility of this vision can be known by reason alone (cf. above, nr. 163 s.).

On the act of vision itself

S. TH., 1 q. 12 a. 2; SUÁREZ, De Deo, l. 2 c. 10-16; FRANZELIN, thes. 16; PESCH, prop. 12; BERAZA, Tractatus de Deo elevante etc., nr. 163-186; 187-202; BAUTZ, Der Himmel. Mainz 1881; pag. 31-51; 57-58; E. SCHNÜTGEN, Die visio beatifica, ihr Wesen und ihre theologisch-philosophische Berechtigung. Würzburg 1867; COMMER, Zur Theologie der visio beatifica. Divus Thomas (Freiburg) 1918, 288 ss.; ZYCHLINSKI, Die species impressa und expressa beim beseligenden Schauakt nach dem hl. Thomas. Breslau 1918.

170. Once the possibility and supernatural character of vision have been proved, we must inquire as far as possible into the act of vision itself. First, as the foundation of every explanation, we must observe that the act of vision is a vital act of the creature itself that sees God. This seems evident, since it is a cognitive act (1 Cor. 13). It is therefore an immanent act, proceeding from an internal vital principle of the subject and received in that subject.

This act is impossible for a creature by its natural way and principles. Since this impossibility is not based on a lack of knowability in the object, but on the insufficiency of the subject’s cognitive faculty, the created faculty itself needs some help. This help is called the light of glory; the need for some help is proved precisely by the fact that vision is supernatural (S. TH., 1 q. 12 a. 5).

171. ON THE LIGHT OF GLORY. Just as the word “vision” has been transferred from sensible things to signify intellectual cognition, so the word “light” is used for what is in some way the cause of vision. It is called the “light of glory” because it helps in the cognition proper to those who are in the state of glory (theologians usually distinguish three intellectual lights: of nature, of grace, and of glory). The name “light of glory” can in itself refer to 1) God himself, insofar as he illuminates the mind and offers himself to be seen; 2) the help by which vision is made possible to creatures; 3) the very act of vision, since clear cognition is often called “light.” In what follows, we understand the light of glory to mean the help by which the vision of God is made possible to a creature.

172. The opinions of theologians about the nature and function of this light of glory are closely bound up with their opinions about the act of vision itself.

Some have taught that the beatific vision is not created but uncreated. GREGORY OF RIMINI (1358) reports of them: “a rather recent opinion which held that the beatific vision by which a creature sees God is not a created but an uncreated vision, namely, God himself, who is seen. This is proved first as follows: According to the law ordained by God, any creature can be known distinctly in the Word by any blessed person through his beatific cognition, and not through a created beatific cognition; for otherwise that cognition would either be corruptible by the common law, in which case it would not be beatitude, since beatitude is beatitude only if it is to endure forever without end, or it would be a cognition of infinite perfection, because it is cognition of infinitely many things and of each thing distinctly” ¹¹. In favor of a similar opinion, CAJETAN ¹² names JOHN OF RIPA and others ¹³.

This opinion might be supported by the following argument: “If the blessed saw God by a created vision, that vision would be of finite perfection and therefore could not represent God, who is infinite. Hence it must be infinite, in order to be proportionate to its object. If infinite, then uncreated, because nothing created can be infinite” (LESSIUS, loc. cit.). Against this is the fact that the act of vision would then no longer be a vital immanent act of the creature; it seems contradictory that someone should see by a vision communicated to him by another. What should be said in reply to the argument given will become clear later.

173. The opinion of THOMASSIN (De Deo, l. 6 c. 16), if its words are understood as they sound, also seems to consist in the blessed seeing by the uncreated divine act of vision. For according to him, the blessed see God “by no intelligible species other than the Word himself informing the mind.” In explaining the words of Gregory of Nyssa, he says that the light of glory, “by which the mind of any creature, of itself powerless and weak for seeing God, is strengthened and made strong,” is “the Holy Spirit, since no created powers are equal to this, and this is the sense of David’s mind when he invokes the Father: In your light—that is, in the Spirit who proceeds from you, Father—we shall see light. This light is not so much a gift or some created light infused by the Holy Spirit into the mind as the Holy Spirit himself entering the mind. For light is seen in your light, that is, in the Spirit who proceeds from the Father; God is seen in a light equal and akin to God, whereas every created thing is far unequal to him. God is seen in such a way that the evangelical and apostolic axiom remains true: no creature can see God. For the mind, informed by and attuned to the Holy Spirit himself, has already been raised above creatures and carried up into God. Thus it is clear how the blessed see God, and yet God can be seen only by himself; these statements otherwise at odds are reconciled in this way: God is seen only by God because the power and capacity by which he is seen is the Holy Spirit; the species in which he is seen is the Son himself; and yet the created mind, hidden beneath this species in this light, sees God.”

174. Another opinion says that the act of vision is indeed created, but the intellect does not produce it; God himself produces it immediately and infuses it into the intellect. The intellect can be said to see because it receives the vision and is informed by it. This opinion is usually attributed to WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, DURANDUS, and others ¹⁴. “The principal basis of these authors,” says SUÁREZ, “seems to be that the vision is so supernatural in its whole substance that it seems impossible in any way for a natural power to produce it. Paludanus confirms this reason: that vision is made by creation, and no created power can be a principle of creating, either as principal or as instrumental.”

But this opinion too contradicts the vitality of the act of vision: an act produced and infused by another is not an immanent act of the subject.

175. According to SUÁREZ (l. 2 c. 10 nr. 9), some have said that the light of glory “is not only a habit, but a power in the order of understanding, and thus a kind of supernatural intellect infused into the soul, by which it can immediately elicit a supernatural act of understanding in a vital way, just as it produces natural acts through its natural intellect. For what is repugnant to the infusion of a supernatural power into the soul, just as supernatural habits are said to be infused into the powers?”

Even in this way, the vital act of the subject itself does not seem to be present. For it is not enough for this that the soul sustain some externally added faculty which produces an act; the soul itself must influence the production of the act through its own faculties.

176. If there are theologians (SOTO?) who have said that the light of glory is the total proximate principle of vision and understood this to exclude the intellect’s immediate influx into the act of vision, the vital act is no longer preserved. For a vital act must proceed immediately from a vital faculty. The same judgment would apply to the opinion (CAPREOLUS?) which distinguishes the act of the blessed as cognition from the act as the vision of God: under the former aspect it proceeds from the created intellect, but under the latter from God alone. For vision is cognition, and if vision does not proceed from the created intellect, it is not a vital act of the creature.

177. Hence the light of glory is to be conceived as supernatural help by which the natural cognitive faculty, the intellect, is elevated and made fit for the act of seeing God, so that the intellect and the light of glory—or better, the intellect elevated by the light of glory—is the elicitive principle of the act of vision. For the act of vision cannot be produced partly by the intellect and partly by the light of glory, since it is a simple, not a composite, act.

178. This supernatural help, however, can be conceived in various ways ¹⁵.

First, as actual supernatural help that does not elevate or intrinsically change the faculty. This opinion seems in fact to be rejected by all theologians. For the supernatural acts of the just on earth already proceed from an intrinsically elevated faculty; all the more, then, must the same be said of the supreme supernatural act. Moreover, the Council of Vienne, when speaking of the light of glory that elevates the soul, does not seem to mean such concurrence or external elevation. But if the question is about possibility, theologians hold different opinions.

Second, the light of glory could be conceived as actual supernatural help that intrinsically elevates the faculty, as actual grace elevates it. Theologians generally say that this opinion would satisfy the definition of the Council of Vienne, but it is generally not accepted. For vision is not an act that ceases after a short time; it continues in the blessed for all eternity.

Hence, third, the light of glory is usually conceived as a permanent operative quality, an operative habit. This is the common explanation among theologians. The reasons for this opinion are: 1) in the present order of grace, God confers a permanent internal supernatural principle for continuous supernatural operation, intrinsically elevating the faculties (the virtues); the same should therefore be said of the next life; 2) just as the act of vision succeeds the act of faith, so the supernatural habit of the light of glory succeeds the habit of faith.

179. The light of glory is therefore “a certain supernatural power of understanding, superior to every natural power, superadded to the intellect of the blessed, informing the mind as a habit and raising it to the intuitive vision of God as he is in himself. For since the rational mind, as the image of God, also has by its nature an imperfect and incipient power to know God, this power of knowing can be raised, completed, and perfected by a superadded supernatural power, so that it can now contemplate God himself clearly and perfectly. Hence this power superadded to the intellect is a certain supernatural assimilation of the created mind to the divine intellect in the very mode of knowing the divine essence, and thus a supreme participation in that infinite light by which God sees himself; and so we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is” (Franzelin, p. 211 s.).

180. ON THE IMPRESSED SPECIES. The cognitive faculty alone does not yet suffice for an act of cognition; the object to be known must in some way also concur, determining the faculty to know it. In human intellectual cognition, this influx is exercised through an impressed species, whose function is to unite the faculty with the object in the proper way and determine it to the cognition of this object. It is related to the faculty as a form, “assimilating” the faculty to the object, so that the power informed by the species is the adequate principle of such cognition of this determinate object. A species of this kind is necessary when the object cannot in itself immediately concur in the act, either because it is material and therefore not immediately intelligible, or because it is not present to the faculty. It is therefore rightly said to take the place of the object.

181. In the intuitive vision of God, there is no created intelligible species; so theologians almost universally teach ¹⁶. A species is plainly superfluous, since God himself is intimately present to the intellect that sees him and is supremely intelligible.

If one asks whether an impressed species is possible in vision, some (S. TH., l. c.) deny it, while others (TOLETUS, in 1 q. 12 a. 2; SUÁREZ, l. c., cap. 13) affirm it, or at least say that its impossibility cannot be strictly proved.

The answer is in some way connected with the doctrine about the nature of the impressed species. For if it is conceived strictly as a likeness representing the object, it seems impossible in vision, since no created likeness can represent God as he is in himself. But if it is conceived only as a determination of the faculty to know precisely this object, without being formally like it, it will be more difficult to prove absolute impossibility (but note that its possibility has not yet thereby been proved). Nevertheless, it would still remain to explain why such a species is necessary or useful.

182. The intelligible species in the vision of God is therefore the very essence of God, so that it is both what is seen and that by which it is seen. The essence of God does not inform the created intellect, but a certain special union or relation between God’s essence and the intellect seems necessary in order for the intellect to be determined to see this object. This union does not arise through a change on the part of the divine essence, but on the part of the intellect. “If two things were previously not united and later become united, this must happen through a change in both or in one alone. But if it is supposed that some created intellect begins anew to see God’s substance, the divine essence must, according to what was set out above, be newly joined to it as an intelligible species. But it is impossible for the divine essence to be moved, as was shown above (bk. 1 c. 13). Therefore such a union must begin to exist through a change in the created intellect. This change can happen only by the created intellect’s newly acquiring some disposition” (Contra Gentiles, bk. 3 c. 53). He then says that this disposition is the light of glory; thus here he seems to locate that change in the intellect’s receiving the light of glory. (Cf. chap. 54; Comp. theol., chap. 105; De Verit., q. 10 a. 11.)

183. ON THE EXPRESSED SPECIES. What has been said so far concerns the prerequisites of vision itself, the first act; in producing the second act, the created intellect, the light of glory, and the divine essence concur ¹⁷. The actual vision itself follows. The first question disputed about it is whether an expressed species should be admitted in it. This question is not so much theological as an application of a philosophical opinion to the act of vision; nor does this discussion provide any further explanation or understanding of vision. Those who, like SUÁREZ, identify the expressed species with the vital act of understanding must affirm such a species in vision insofar as it is identical with actual understanding. On this supposition, however, the expressed species cannot seem to be understood as a formal likeness of the divine essence, because, as was said of the impressed species, a created likeness representing God as he is in himself seems impossible. Those, however, who, like ST. THOMAS, say that the expressed species is a distinct term of the intellective operation, the term in which the object is known, must deny an expressed species in the vision of God, since God is intimately present to the blessed and cannot be known in any created being as he is in himself. There remains some difficulty because this gives us a vital action without a created immanent term; this is usually resolved to some extent by saying that understanding, as such, is not an action that produces a term, but a quality. An expressed species must therefore be denied as that in which God is seen and as a likeness representing God as he is in himself.

184. But then vision would be an act of understanding without intentional assimilation to its object, which seems to contradict the definition of cognition. PALMIERI replies ¹⁸, with an argument from ST. THOMAS’s opinion that can also be applied in some way to SUÁREZ’s opinion: “Is it certain that an act of cognition, insofar as it is abstracted from the word proceeding from it, is a likeness of the object known? I do not see how this can be proved. For that we bear a likeness of what is known in the mind must refer to the word of the mind which the mind forms for itself when the object is not present or recalls it. And in fact, in simple cognition, once the word is set aside, nothing appears but a certain vital apprehension of the thing; it is not apparent why this apprehension should be a likeness. Otherwise, what purpose would the word serve when it supervenes? Hence those theologians who deny that simple cognition is a likeness do not grant that the blessed produce a word, because no likeness can represent God as he is in himself; such are the Thomists, who do not deny that the blessed have an act of understanding.” For in the vision of God we have that marvelous thing, unintelligible to a created intellect, that by some finite act the infinite is seen according to the mode of the infinite, in a finite mode.

The object of vision

185. The object of vision is God as he is in himself, God one and three, and therefore both the divine essence and the divine persons. The Council of Florence says that souls without stain are “immediately received into heaven and clearly behold God himself, three and one, as he is” (Decr. pro Graecis; Denz 693). This, then, is a matter of faith. Theologians dispute, however, whether it is possible, at least by a special miracle, to see the divine essence intuitively without seeing the persons: SCOTUS (in 1 d. 1 q. 2) affirms it; ST. THOMAS, 2, 2 q. 2 a. 8 ad 3, denies it (cf. 3 q. 3 a. 3; 1 q. 12 a. 7 ad 2 and 3 speaks only of the fact), and this is by far the more common opinion ¹⁹. For whoever sees the utterly simple God immediately as he is in himself sees the divine being itself, which by its very concept is absolute and relational (a being from itself that is non-personal or unipersonal is repugnant, like a square circle). Just as it is impossible for someone who sees a circle immediately as it is in itself not to see it as round, so it is impossible for someone who sees God immediately as he is in himself not to see the three persons (cf. above, nr. 80). The arguments usually raised to the contrary seem to consider vision as cognition according to the mode of a creature, as cognition through reason and faith is in this life, whereas it is cognition according to the mode of God.

The vision of God admits degrees

186. The Council of Florence defines that souls behold the triune and one God “with one more perfectly than another, according to the diversity of merits” (Decree for the Greeks; Denz 693). The EUNOMIANS must deny this inequality insofar as they teach a perfect comprehension of God. JOVINIAN, who said that merits and rewards, sins and punishments, are equal, must also have denied inequality in the vision of the blessed; but it does not yet seem that he would have had to deny that possible degrees exist in the vision of God considered in itself and not under the aspect of reward.

187. That the vision of God admits degrees is contained in the doctrine of merit for heavenly glory: Conc. Trid. s. 6 can. 32 (Denz 842); S. Scriptura: Matth 16, 27; 1 Cor 3, 8; 2 Cor 9, 6. The Fathers explicitly teach inequality of beatitude, and hence of the vision of God; in support of this teaching they appeal to Io 14, 2, “many mansions,” and 1 Cor 15, 41, “star differs from star in brightness” (cf. Rouet, ser. 612).

188. APHRAATES, Demonstratio evang., dem. 22 n. 19: “Now hear the Apostle say: Each will receive his reward according to his labor ²⁰. Whoever has labored little will receive according to how much he has been wearied. Whoever has run much will take a reward according to the measure of his course … And again the Apostle says: Star surpasses star in brightness; so too is the resurrection of the dead ²¹. Know, then, that when people enter into life too, reward will be greater than reward, glory more distinguished than glory, and one prize greater than another” (R 696).

ST. EPHRAEM, Sermo de magis etc. 11: “Some will sit in the second rank, others in the third; others will be raised up to the fifth rank, others to the tenth, others to the thirtieth; others will sit in the heights … For each will obtain from justice itself a reward according to his labor” (R 710).

189. ST. JEROME, Adversus Iovinianum, bk. 2 nr. 32 ss.: “It is now the work of our labor to prepare different rewards for ourselves according to the diversity of our virtues … If we are all to be equal in heaven, we humble ourselves here in vain in order to be greater there … Why do virgins persevere? Why do widows labor? Why do married women practice continence? Let us all sin, and after repentance we shall be the same as the Apostles” (ML 23, 329; R 1383).

ST. AUGUSTINE, In Ioann., tract. 67 nr. 2: “That denarius is indeed equal for all: the master of the house commands it to be given to all who worked in the vineyard, not distinguishing between those who labored less and those who labored more ²². By that denarius, eternal life is signified, where no one lives longer, since the measure of living is not different in eternity. But the many mansions ²³ signify differences in the ranks of merits within one eternal life” (ML 35, 1812; R 1831); Sermo 87, 4, 6 (ML 38, 533; R 1502); Enchiridion 111 (ML 40, 284; R 1931).

ST. GREGORY THE GREAT, Moralia, bk. 4 c. 36 nr. 70: “Since in this life there is a distinction among our works, in that life there will undoubtedly be a distinction among our ranks, so that just as one surpasses another here in merit, so there one will surpass another in reward. Hence in the Gospel Truth says: In my Father’s house are many mansions ²⁴. But among those many mansions the very diversity of rewards will somehow be harmonious, because such power unites us in that peace that each rejoices in another having received what he himself has not received. Hence those who do not labor equally in the vineyard ²⁵ all receive the same denarius. There are indeed many mansions with the Father, and yet workers who have labored unequally receive the same denarius, because the happiness of joy will be one for all, though the sublimity of life will not be the same for all” (ML 75, 677; R 2308).

190. Objection. In Matth 20, 1 ss., the workers in the vineyard receive the same reward, although some labored longer than others.

I answer. There are various explanations of the parable ²⁶: some explain it not as referring to beatitude but to the call to faith; others say the denarius means objective beatitude, which is the same for all, namely God himself (cf. 1, 2 q. 5 a. 2 ad 1); others take the denarius to mean subjective beatitude. Knabenbauer, on this passage: “… it must necessarily be held that the same reward is given to all, that is, the same subjective beatitude, that the same reward in every respect is declared by the parable, and consequently that it is supposed that those who labored for one hour acquired the same merit as those who applied themselves to their work in the proper manner throughout the whole day. I say ‘in the proper manner,’ for one cannot suppose that the former were very idle or that the last workers performed as much work in one hour as the others did, as I have already said above. It must then likewise be assumed, from truths known elsewhere, that God gives a reward according to the merits acquired by each person. From this it necessarily follows that each person’s merit is reckoned and assessed not by the length of time, but from another source, whereby it can happen that someone who has labored for a short time has the same degree of rank and the same measure of merit as another who has worked for a long time. We are therefore taught by this parable that such a source and standard underlies actions. What this source is, from which actions receive a certain excellent dignity, cannot be doubted: it is the supernatural principle by which supernatural excellence is communicated to works, namely, the grace of God. The greater and more abundant it is, by God’s liberality and will, in each person, the more worthy become the works that proceed from or are informed by that grace. God bestows this interior grace, according to the hidden counsels of providence, in greater or lesser abundance; hence there are also various degrees of glory in the heavenly homeland … Christ shows, therefore, by that equality of reward, that through the grace of God, which God by his liberality and goodness grants in greater and fuller measure to whomever he wills, it comes about that someone perfected in a short time completes many years; hence in the kingdom of God it is not external labor and a long duration of time that confer dignity on works, but the interior fervor that proceeds from grace.”

191. Inequality in the vision of God arises proximately from the inequality of the light of glory alone, not also from the natural perfection of the intellect, as CAJETAN (in 3 q. 10 a. 4) and others held. For “This (namely, that one sees God more perfectly through his essence than another) will occur because the intellect of one person has greater power or capacity for seeing God than another’s. But the capacity to see God belongs to a created intellect not according to its nature, but through the light of glory” (1 q. 12 a. 6). A more perfect created intellect is no more apt for seeing God or receiving the light of glory than an intellect naturally less perfect; and this holds not only for the varying degrees of perfection among intellects of the same species, but also for intellective faculties differing in species ²⁷.

Creatures neither comprehend nor can comprehend God through intuitive vision

PETRUS LOMBARDUS, 1. 4 d. 49; S. TH., 1 q. 12 a. 7; SUÁREZ, De Deo, 1. 2 c. 5; 29; PETAVIUS, De Deo, 1. 7 c. 3 et 4; FRANZELIN, thes. 18; KLEUTGEN, nr. 390-397; BILLOT, thes. 14; PESCH, prop. 14; VAN DER MEERSCH, nr. 309-315.

192. That God is incomprehensible was defined at the Fourth Lateran Council (Denz 428) and at the Vatican Council, sess. 3 c. 1: “The holy Catholic Apostolic Roman Church believes and confesses that there is one God … eternal, immense, incomprehensible, infinite in intellect, will, and every perfection” (Denz 1782). From what has already been said, it is clear that there are various degrees in the vision of God. The scholastics explicitly raise the question whether those who see God comprehend him. The angels who see God do not know all the wisdom of God (Eph. 3, 10); although the holy Fathers grant that creatures see God in the life to come, they deny them perfect knowledge of God and attribute it to God alone.

193. ST. CYRIL OF JERUSALEM, Catech. 6, c. 6: “What then?” someone may say. “Is it not written that the angels of the little ones always see the face of my Father who is in heaven? ²⁸ But the angels see not as God is, but insofar as they can grasp him. For Jesus himself says: No one has seen the Father except the one who is from God; he has seen the Father ²⁹. The angels see as much as they grasp, and the archangels as much as they can; the thrones and dominations see more than the first, but less than is fitting. Only the Holy Spirit, together with the Son, can see as is fitting” (MG 33, 545; R 822). ST. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM attributes to no creature, not even to the angels in heaven, the knowledge that the Father has of the Son and the Son of the Father: In Ioannem, hom. 15 nr. 1 s. (MG 59, 98; R 1161); cf. De Incomprehensibili, hom. 1 nr. 6 (MG 48, 707; R 1123); hom. 3 nr. 1 (MG 48, 720; R 1125).

ST. GREGORY THE GREAT, Moralia, bk. 18 c. 54 nr. 92: “We shall therefore see God if by a heavenly manner of life we are found worthy to be above human beings. Yet we shall not see him as he sees himself. The Creator sees himself in a far different way from the way in which a creature sees the Creator. For a certain limit of contemplation is set for us by the immensity of God, since we are circumscribed by that very weight by which we are creatures” (ML 76, 95).

194. There is, therefore, a certain knowledge of God that is not communicated even to those who see God supernaturally, and is so proper to God that it cannot in any way be communicated to a created being: no creature knows God as perfectly as God knows himself. This knowledge, from which every creature is excluded, is comprehensive knowledge of God.

Comprehensive knowledge is knowledge that matches the object’s internal ³⁰ knowability: that is, “the object is known according to its whole perfection, intensively and extensively, to the extent that it demands to be known in itself, that is, to the extent of the cognition it can elicit from itself” (FRANZELIN, p. 234 s.). This internal knowability is commensurate with the perfection of the object. God is infinitely perfect; therefore his internal knowability is infinite. Hence comprehensive knowledge of God is infinite knowledge of God.

195. Thus ST. THOMAS: “That is comprehended which is known perfectly; and that is known perfectly which is known as much as it is knowable. Hence, if what can be known by demonstrative science is held as an opinion on the basis of some probable reason, it is not comprehended. For example, if someone knows by demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, he comprehends this; but if someone accepts the opinion that this is so on the probable authority of the wise or of the many, he does not comprehend it, because he does not reach that perfect mode of cognition in which it is knowable. No created intellect, however, can reach that perfect mode in which the divine essence is knowable, as is clear in this way. Each thing is knowable insofar as it is a being in act. God, then, whose being is infinite … is infinitely knowable. But no created intellect can know God infinitely. For a created intellect knows the divine essence more or less perfectly insofar as it is suffused with a greater or lesser light of glory. Since the created light of glory received in any created intellect cannot be infinite, it is impossible for any created intellect to know God infinitely; hence it is impossible for it to comprehend God” (1 q. 12 a. 7 c.).

196. “God is not called incomprehensible because there is something of him that is not seen, but because he is not seen as perfectly as he is visible; just as when a demonstrable proposition is known through some probable reason, there is nothing of it that is not known—neither subject, predicate, nor composition—but the whole is not known as perfectly as it is knowable” (ibid. ad 2). Whoever sees God sees him wholly, but not totally; here “‘totally’ refers to the mode of the object—not indeed in the sense that the whole mode of the object does not fall under cognition, but because the mode of the object is not the mode of the knower. Therefore, whoever sees God through his essence sees that he exists infinitely and is infinitely knowable. But this infinite mode does not belong to the knower, namely, that he should know infinitely. Just as someone can know probably that a proposition is demonstrable, even though he does not know it demonstratively” (ad 3).

197. The various degrees of created vision (nr. 186 ss.) do not therefore concern the extensive scope of the primary object of cognition; that is perfectly the same at every degree, namely, God wholly. Rather, various degrees of intensity and clarity are possible in the finite vision of this object, according to the perfection of the light of glory. Whoever knows God infinitely (comprehensively) also knows all truths founded in the divine essence, so that comprehensive knowledge of God is more perfect than non-comprehensive knowledge, even extensively, with respect to the secondary object. Hence it seems that a finite vision of God that is more perfect intensively is also more perfect extensively with respect to the secondary object (truths knowable in God). The formal reason for God’s incomprehensibility (and the same should be said of the inequality of vision) is therefore not that not all the things knowable in God are known extensively, but that God as a whole is not known intensively as he is knowable in himself.

Everyone seems to agree that God is absolutely incomprehensible in this sense. There is dispute, however, over whether this is the sense in which the Lateran and Vatican Councils are to be understood when they define God to be incomprehensible. The opinion explained above nevertheless seems to be by far the most common among theologians.

The whole doctrine of the intuitive vision of God can be summarized briefly in this way: The blessed see the whole infinite divine perfection, infinitely knowable in itself, according to the mode of the infinite, but in a finite mode.

Objections

198. 1. The vision of God is absolutely impossible for a creature, because the vision of God must be an infinite act.

a) The intellect that sees God necessarily sees all possibles, for they are nothing other than the essence of God, infinitely participable or imitable; but seeing God and infinitely many possibles seems to be infinite cognition; therefore.

I answer. I distinguish the major: it sees that the divine essence is infinitely participable and is the foundation of all possibles, I grant; it sees each participating term individually, I deny; and the reason added must be denied. The divine essence is indeed the foundation of possibles, but is not itself a possible thing: the divine essence is not a possible stone. I grant or pass over the minor; I distinguish the conclusion: if the one seeing God sees the foundation of all possibles, the act must be infinite, I deny; if that person necessarily saw infinitely many individual terms, I grant or pass over.

b) An act is specified by its object; but the object is infinite; therefore the act is infinite too.

I answer. I distinguish the major: immediately and directly according to its whole entitative perfection, I deny; according to the mode of acting or tending toward the object, I subdistinguish: the formal object confers that mode of tending, I deny; different formal objects correspond to different modes of tending or acting, I grant ³¹. I grant the minor; I distinguish the conclusion: if the object specified the act according to its whole entitative perfection, I grant; if not, I deny.

But at least entitative perfection cannot be below the order to which the formal object corresponds, or to which such a mode of tending toward the object corresponds. For if not even such a perfection were present, the faculty would not be capable of tending in that mode. Therefore the faculty that has infinite being itself as the formal object of cognition must be of infinite perfection.

I answer. I distinguish the subsequent minor: if the first act of the knower contains a sufficient reason for such a determinate act, that is, for such a mode of tending toward the object, I grant or pass over; if this is not so, as is in fact the case in the act by which a creature sees God, I deny or ask for proof (cf. nr. 153, 154).

c) The act of vision would have to represent God as he is in himself; but the representation of an infinite object according to the mode of this object must be infinite; therefore the act of vision must necessarily be an infinite act.

I answer. I distinguish the major: it must intellectually apprehend God as he is in himself, I grant; it must formally represent him, I deny. I contradict the minor: the intellectual apprehension of God as he is in himself must be infinite, I deny; formal representation, I grant. And I deny the conclusion and the consequent.

But it must formally represent him. For the act of vision is an act of cognition; cognition is essentially assimilation; therefore.

I answer. I deny the subsequent minor; as to the proof, I grant the major and deny the minor, according to what was said at nr. 184.

199. 2. Whoever sees God intuitively does not fail to see anything of God; but whoever fails to see nothing of the object comprehends the object; therefore the vision of God is necessarily comprehension; but comprehension of God by a creature is impossible; therefore vision itself is impossible too.

I answer. I grant the major; I deny the minor; cf. nr. 194 ss.

3. “The efficacy of an action is measured according to the form that is the principle of acting on the agent’s part, as is clear in the case of heat and heating. But the form by which the intellect understands is the principle of intellectual vision. Therefore the efficacy of the intellect that sees God will be as great as the perfection of the divine essence; therefore it will comprehend the essence itself.”

I answer. “That argument applies when the form which is the principle of an agent’s action is joined according to its whole mode. This must happen in all non-subsistent forms, whose being is to be in something. But although the divine essence is in a certain way a form of the intellect, it is not grasped by the intellect except according to the mode of the intellect that grasps it; and since the action belongs not only to the form but also to the agent, the action cannot be as perfect as the form that is the principle of the action, because there is a deficiency on the agent’s part” (De Veritate, q. 8 a. 2, 3 et ad 3).

On the universality of knowledge of God

200. After considering what revelation teaches about the possibility of knowledge of God, we now ask what it says in fact about this knowledge: that is, whether all human beings know the true God, or whether there are people who know absolutely nothing about the true God.

From the sixteenth century, some Catholic theologians proposed the view that the possibility of ignorance of God, even for a longer time, might have to be admitted in some people (peoples) who were wholly uncultivated, uneducated, and dull; for they thought that, in fact, such irreligious people were to be found in regions discovered at that time. GRANADO cites MOLINA, ZUMEL, TRIGOSUS, and MEDINA in favor of this view (Controv. 1 gener., disp. 1 sect. 3), though he himself does not follow it.

201. MOLINA (on 1 q. 2 a. 1): “From what has been said (namely, that God’s existence is not self-evident), it may be inferred that some people can be so uncultivated and uneducated that we may affirm with the greatest probability that invincible ignorance of God can be found among them, as we observed in the first and second discussions, when we treated of ignorance. They will, moreover, be excused by that ignorance from the sin of unbelief, and the fact that they do not worship God or render him the honor due will not be imputed to them as a fault. Yet, considering human nature—whose members are indeed placed in the hand of their own counsel—and the order of things established by God, God has provided sufficiently and abundantly for human beings with respect to the knowledge they ought to have of the divine nature. For he not only gave them natural light and intellectual acuity, by which those of greater prudence could arrive at knowledge of the true God through the things that have been made and communicate it to others; he also, from the beginning, endowed the first parent with supernatural knowledge and faith, so that knowledge of the true God and of the other things necessary for salvation might pass down to his descendants; and then, at intervals throughout time, by the extraordinary light of divine things, through both the Incarnate Word and other preachers, he abundantly enlightened the whole world.”

ARRIAGA (De Deo, disp. 2 sect. 3): “Very often we find many people who, though simply capable of reason, are nevertheless so dull-witted that even when someone tries to persuade them of easier matters, explaining them with the simplest examples, they either do not understand or understand with the greatest difficulty. On what basis, then, can we say that these people and others like them will, even without any teacher, begin and carry on by themselves a reasoning process and argument so metaphysical as to prove God’s existence? I myself scarcely doubt that many may be found in whom no shadow of such reasoning is aroused. They could therefore have invincible ignorance; but a person of average intelligence, once the idea of God has been aroused in him, cannot be invincibly ignorant of God.”

202. According to CLAUDIUS SEYSELL (De providentia divina, Paris 1520, part 2, article 3), very many adult Gentiles are indeed excluded from supernatural beatitude, but after death descend to limbo, like unbaptized infants. One or another theologian defended this doctrine of “limbo for adults,” although it was commonly opposed.¹

BILLOT² distinguishes two classes of people who are adults in body and mind. One class comprises those who are mentally adult with respect to earthly, everyday matters, but not with respect to higher, religious, and moral matters; the other comprises those who are simply adult in mind. The former cannot attain knowledge of God by reason alone, but need instruction about God, which is an indispensable condition. If, therefore, they are not taught, they remain without personal fault in invincible ignorance of God. The others, however, can know God by the light of reason alone and are obliged to communicate this knowledge to others; if they fail in this obligation, others remain ignorant of God through their sin. Those who are adults in other respects but infants in religious matters cannot sin; if they die without baptism, they die with original sin alone.

203. In this thesis we deny that there are adults who, for a long time, remain in complete invincible ignorance of God without personal fault. Atheism is non-knowledge of the true God. It is divided into practical atheism, which denies God in practice and is present when someone lives as if there were no God, and theoretical atheism. The latter is further divided into positive theoretical atheism, when someone positively asserts a doctrine or philosophical system that denies God’s existence, and negative theoretical atheism, which consists in not knowing God, in mere ignorance of God; it is present when someone invincibly, without personal fault, knows or has known nothing about God. The thesis concerns negative theoretical atheism.

Adult means someone who has truly attained the use of reason. The thesis does not determine how or when a person attains the use of reason; this varies with aptitude and with external circumstances such as place, education, and so on. We do not, however, admit a distinction between adults simply speaking and adults in secular matters but not in religious and moral matters, since knowledge of God, as will become clear from the thesis, is not difficult. A different question is whether, in special cases, a person’s natural development in religious and moral matters (whether because of a defective disposition in the subject or because of the corrupting influence of others) can be so impeded that such a person does not attain knowledge of God, although in other matters he appears entirely adult. This does not seem absolutely impossible, but neither should it be readily assumed. Such a person would belong to those few “in whom nature is excessively corrupted,” as St. Augustine says (below, no. 221). We do not say that this knowledge is present as soon as a person attains the use of reason, much less that it is his first intellectual knowledge; rather, this knowledge too will be present a relatively short time after he attains the use of reason.

Knowledge of God is not understood as scientific knowledge, but as ordinary, “primitive” knowledge, sufficient for a person to be able and obliged to begin a religious life (cf. above, no. 43). He must know God as superior to himself, as Lord, whose precepts (the natural moral law) he must follow, and who is the vindicator of this law. Knowledge of this absolutely binding moral law makes the presence of knowledge of its lawgiver, God, clearly manifest.

Nothing is directly asserted about the way in which people in fact attain knowledge of God: whether by their own reason alone, or through instruction, tradition, or revelation. Without doubt, this knowledge is first handed on to most people. Whether there are people who have reached their first knowledge of God by reason alone is difficult to know. But even if knowledge of God is not communicated to an adult by others, primitive knowledge of God through God’s natural manifestation in creatures is so easy, accessible, spontaneous, and universal that, in fact, there is no adult who is ignorant of God.

The thesis does not speak only of possibility or of purely natural powers, but of human beings as they exist in the present supernatural order after original sin, that is, in the state of fallen and redeemed nature; nor does it exclude the help of graces.

TEACHING OF THE CHURCH

204. The Church teaches God’s earnest universal salvific will (cf. Conc. Trid. s. 6 c. 2 et 3; Denz 794, 795; Err. Ians. 5; Denz 1096; Alex. VIII prop. damn. 4 et 5; Denz 1294, 1295). Moreover, actual faith is required for the salvation of adults (Conc. Trid. s. 6 c. 8; Denz 801), and knowledge of God is necessarily presupposed for this faith (Conc. Vatic. s. 3 c. 3 et 4; Denz 1790, 1799). It seems scarcely possible to reconcile this doctrine with the existence of people who are truly adults yet, without personal fault, remain in invincible ignorance of God.

Alexander VIII condemned the proposition: “Philosophical or moral sin is a human act at variance with rational nature and right reason; theological and mortal sin, however, is a free transgression of divine law. Philosophical sin, however grave, in someone who either is ignorant of God or is not actually thinking about God, is a grave sin, but is not an offense against God, nor a mortal sin dissolving friendship with God, nor deserving of eternal punishment” (Denz 1290). This proposition was condemned as erroneous, as VIVA explains: “It is erroneous because it does not directly contradict revealed doctrine, but does so indirectly; for it is opposed only to a theological conclusion drawn from one premise of faith and another known by natural reason. For it is of faith that whoever offends God is liable to divine hatred and hell; while it is most clearly known by natural reason, as we shall explain shortly, that one offends God, at least as supreme lawgiver, when one recognizes that the action one performs is at variance with rational nature and right reason and therefore forbidden by the supreme lawgiver, since reason’s judgment is, as it were, the herald of divine prohibition—even if God is then unknown under the concept of the supremely good being who exists of himself, or of the first cause, or one is not then actually thinking of him under that explicit concept. Or at least it is known by the light of nature that God exists and forbids what is contrary to right reason, so that, under the present providence, it cannot morally happen that there is invincible ignorance of God, or unawareness of him, while one sins.”³ If this is the sense of the condemnation, it seems to imply that whoever (under the present order of providence) knows the binding moral law in fact has some knowledge of God.

205. The decision in the Louvain question (above, no. 14). When the question arose whether the condemnations issued on 11 October 1864 and 2 March 1866 had also condemned the doctrine set forth by the professors on 1 February 1860, Cardinal PATRIZI replied on 30 August 1866: “These doubts are not such as to require a new interpretation and declaration of a matter already decided; the replies of the Sacred Congregations themselves are more than sufficient to resolve them completely … Everything, indeed, pertaining to the question debated at Louvain, and hence also the exposition of doctrine subscribed to by the four professors of Louvain on 1 February 1860, was brought under examination and kept in view when the question was decided by the aforementioned replies.” And when the bishops sent their response to the University, they said in their letter (17 December 1866): “Further, it is clear from other letters of the same Eminent Cardinal that the aforesaid exposition of doctrine of 1 February 1860 is included in the resolution issued by both the Congregation of the Holy Office and the Congregation of the Index on 2 March of this year. These decisions are so clear and explicit that the case must be regarded as definitively settled.” According to the doctrine condemned here, instruction—external intellectual assistance—is required for a person to attain such a development of reason that he can read the natural law inscribed in hearts and know God with certain and clear knowledge (above, no. 14). It therefore seems possible to conclude from the condemnation that knowledge of God and of the moral law is not so difficult as to require that special development of reason.

PIUS IX, in the encyclical “Quanto conficiamur maerore” of 1863 (on indifferentism), says that “the natural law and its precepts are inscribed by God in the hearts of all” (Denz 1677). (In the Roman Catechism, on observance of the Decalogue, no. 3: “For there is no one who does not feel that a law implanted by God in his mind enables him to distinguish good from evil, the honorable from the shameful, and the just from the unjust.”)

The Vatican Council dealt only with the faculty, not its exercise, and therefore altered the wording of the canon so that it could no longer be understood as referring to exercise (above, no. 27).

SACRED SCRIPTURE

206. 1) In his letter to the Romans, St. Paul shows the universal culpability of human beings, who have deserved God’s just wrath. God had also manifested himself to the Gentiles in creation in such a way that they are without excuse if they do not worship the true God.

Nor can it be said that he is speaking only of philosophers. For the corruption of morals he describes and the sins he enumerates were not peculiar to philosophers, nor were they committed chiefly by the educated and wise; rather, they were universal, reaching down to the lowest common people. This corruption, moreover, was punishment for their failure to worship the true God: this is explicit in v. 24, 26, 28. Nor is the passage in v. 21, 22 about philosophers alone (if by those “wise men” philosophers are meant at all), for they are the same people as those in verse 23; and it cannot be said that it was precisely philosophers who worshiped birds, four-footed animals, and serpents as gods.

But St. Paul describes only the historical event of the human race’s defection from God, the original beginning of idolatry; for he uses the aorist (v. 21, 22), which refers to a single historical event.

I answer. In vv. 18–20 he uses the present tense, and guilt is asserted not of the past alone but also of the present time, and universally. The corruption of morals is a punishment and presupposes guilt. Moreover, it cannot be admitted that the aorist has this as its sole and exclusive meaning; rather, it signifies an action completed and brought to an end in itself (cf. v. 24 ss., where he undoubtedly speaks of things that were still happening at that time; cf. v. 32).

207. Then in chapter 2 he shows how the Gentiles too, who do not have God’s positive law, nevertheless have the law inscribed in their hearts, distinguish between good and evil, and will be judged according to this law at the judgment of God. They must therefore answer before God for their actions; but before God a person who is invincibly ignorant of God through no fault of his own cannot incur guilt. Thus St. Paul emphasizes the universality of guilt, both among Jews and among Gentiles, 3, 9 ss. 23.

208. Objection. In chapter 2 St. Paul is not speaking of Gentiles who do not have the grace of faith, but of Gentile Christians; this is how the text is explained in the tradition.

I answer. The Greeks (Cornely cites Origen, St. Chrysostom, St. Cyril of Alexandria, Theodoret of Cyrus, St. John Damascene, Theophylact, Oecumenius, and Euthymius), most of the Latins (he likewise cites Tertullian, St. Hilary, St. Ambrose, and St. Jerome; and among later interpreters Hervaeus of Bourges, St. Thomas, Nicholas of Lyra, etc., Salmerón, Toledo, and Bernardino a Piconio), and almost all recent exegetes understand the text to refer to Gentiles who have not converted to the faith. Although St. Augustine does not seem to deny that this interpretation is probable, he absolutely prefers the opposing interpretation, of Gentile Christians.⁴ According to Cornely, St. Prosper and St. Fulgentius follow Augustine; then some Latins (Peter Lombard, St. Thomas, and others) present both views without making clear which they prefer; later writers (Estius, Natalis Alexander, and others) regard the view concerning Gentile Christians as much more probable; finally, Baius rejected the former view as Pelagian and said only the latter should be held.

209. But St. Augustine’s interpretation has no basis in St. Paul’s text. For “by nature” (v. 14) does not mean, as the Pelagians wished, that they perform good works and virtues “by natural powers alone, without the help of grace.” Rather, “nature” (φύσει) is said in contrast to “positive law,” and the sense is “with nature as teacher and guide” (St. THOMAS: “by nature, that is, through the law of nature, which shows them what must be done”; cited in CORNELY, p. 136). For St. Paul is not speaking of the principles of actions, but of their norm and of how that norm is known. Indeed, this interpretation cannot even be properly reconciled with the context. “Against the opinion of St. AUGUSTINE we first point out that throughout this earlier part of the letter the Apostle is not speaking of Gentile Christians as opposed to Jewish Christians. His whole concern is to show that the Jews, although they have the written Law, are under sin no less than the Gentiles, who lack the written Law. The flow of the argument therefore prevents us from interpreting the word Gentiles as meaning Gentile Christians. Further, these Gentiles are said not to have the supernaturally revealed law; this cannot in any way be said of Gentile Christians, since they, no less than Jewish Christians, are under the law of Christ (1 Cor 9, 21). Moreover, elsewhere Paul contrasts nature with grace and teaches that nature is corrupted, when he says that by nature we are children of divine wrath (Eph 2, 3). With what justification, then, is it claimed that here he used the same word, without any qualification or caution, to mean grace—or rather, nature restored and elevated by grace? Why, furthermore, is he supposed to have said emphatically that Gentile Christians who did not have the Law do by a nature restored through grace the things of the Law, as though Jewish Christians, because they had the Law, did not do the things of the Law by a nature restored through grace? Finally, if one may rightly conclude that Gentile Christians, because they do the things of the Law through grace, are a law to themselves, one may likewise rightly conclude that Jewish Christians, because they fulfill the Law through grace, are a rule of conduct to themselves; and it is in no way clear what this whole statement is meant to convey here. Therefore, although the doctrine St. Augustine sets forth in the cited passages is true in itself, we cannot admit that it is taught or suggested by the Pauline words he seeks to explain” (CORNELY, p. 141 f.).

Therefore, in answer to the objection above, we should say: 1) the prevailing tradition does not support the interpretation concerning Gentile Christians; the reason St. AUGUSTINE preferred it is understood from the circumstances of his time; 2) considered in light of St. Paul’s own text, that interpretation appears impossible.

The view of BAIUS, that interpreting the passage as referring to Gentiles who have not converted to the faith is Pelagian, was condemned (Denz 1022; cf. 1025; 1035).⁵

210. 2) In Sacred Scripture, knowledge of the true God is never presented as a very difficult matter, but as easier than other kinds of knowledge. Thus Sap 13, 9 speaks of the “wise,” and from v. 10 onward of others who act with the utmost folly.

211. 3) In Sacred Scripture, ignorance of God is never excused. On the contrary, idolatry, worship offered to one who is not the true God, is always presented as a sin, and “idolatrous peoples are not regarded as innocent children, but always as the worst of men, liable to the gravest punishments” (Pesch, no. 24). Cf. Ps 113, 4-8; Sap 12, 4, 23 ss.; 1 Petri 4, 3 s.

THE FATHERS

212. ST. JUSTIN, Apologia II, no. 6, calls the name of God “a conception of an ineffable reality implanted in human nature” (MG 6, 453; R 130).

THEOPHILUS, Ad Autolycum, book 1, nos. 6 and 7 (cf. above, no. 67), shows how God is known from his works: God “whose spirit gives life to all things; if he were to withhold it, this universe would perish. By his spirit, O man, you speak; you breathe his spirit, and yet you do not know him. This happens to you because your mind is blinded and your heart hardened. But if you will, you can be healed: give yourself to the physician, and he will pierce the eyes of your mind and heart …” (MG 6, 1034 f.).

ST. IRENAEUS, Adversus haereses, book 1, 2, no. 6: “all things know this very thing” (above, no. 53).

213. MINUCIUS FELIX, Octavius, chapter 17: “For what could be so manifest, so acknowledged, and so clear as this: when you lift your eyes to heaven and look around at what lies below and all about you, that there is some divine power of supreme intelligence, by which all nature is inspired, moved, nourished, and governed?” He develops this further; see chapter 18 above, no. 68. Then he concludes: “What of this: do I not have everyone’s agreement on this point? I hear the common people, when they raise their hands to heaven, say nothing but ‘God,’ ‘God is great,’ ‘God is true,’ and ‘if God grants it.’ Is this the natural language of the common people, or the prayer of a Christian making confession?” (ML 3, 285 ff.).

214. TERTULLIAN, Apologeticus, no. 17: “This is the whole substance of the offense of those unwilling to acknowledge the one they cannot be ignorant of. Do you wish us to prove it from his works, so many and so great, by which we are sustained, supported, delighted, and even terrified? Do you wish us to prove it also from the testimony of the soul itself? Although pressed by the prison of the body, hemmed in by corrupt teachings, enervated by lusts and desires, and enslaved to false gods, yet when the soul comes to its senses—as after drunkenness, sleep, or some illness—and recovers its health, it names God, with this name alone, because he is properly the one true God: ‘God is great, God is good,’ and ‘What God grants’ is on everyone’s lips. It also calls him to witness: ‘God sees,’ ‘I commend this to God,’ and ‘God will repay me.’ O testimony of a soul naturally Christian! Finally, when it utters these words, it looks not to the Capitol but to heaven, for it knows the seat of the living God; it descended from him and from there” (ML 1, 375; R 275). De spectaculis, no. 2: “No one denies it, because no one is unaware of what nature spontaneously suggests: that God is the creator of the universe” (ML 1, 631; R 287). Adversus Marcionem, book 1, no. 10 (above, no. 53); De testimonio animae, 5 (above, no. 85).

215. CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, Stromata 5, 13, 87, 1: “The manifestation of the one almighty God was entirely natural among all who think rightly, and many received the everlasting benefit of divine providence, those who had not wholly cast off shame before the truth” (MG 9, 128; R 425); 5, 14, 133, 7 f.: “All people everywhere perceive the Father and maker of all things by a certain inborn power and without the proof of instruction … No people anywhere—whether farmers, shepherds, or city dwellers—can live without having first been possessed by faith in a higher being” (MG 9, 196; R 425).

ORIGEN, Contra Celsum, book 1, chapter 4: “Those who bring God’s just judgment upon themselves would avoid the punishment due to their sins if all people did not have a sound understanding of moral matters according to common conceptions. It is therefore no wonder that God himself implanted in the minds of all people the things he taught through the prophets and the Savior, so that every person will be without excuse at the divine judgment, having the sense of the law written in his heart.”⁶ (MG 11, 661; R 512).

216. ARNOBIUS, Adversus Nationes, book 1, chapter 33: “Is there any human being who did not enter the day of his first birth with some awareness of this first principle? Who has not had it innate, fixed within him—or rather, almost imprinted and implanted in him while still in his mother’s womb—that there is a king and Lord, governor of all things that exist? If mute animals themselves could speak, if they could express themselves in our languages—or even if trees, clods, and stones, endowed with the sense of life, could utter sounds and form articulate words—would they not, with nature as guide and teacher and the faith of uncorrupted simplicity, understand that there is a God and proclaim him alone Lord of all?” (ML 5, 757).

LACTANTIUS, De divinis institutionibus, book 1, chapter 2, no. 5 (above, no. 68).

EUSEBIUS, Praeparatio evangelica, book 1, 2, chapter 6: “By nature and by thoughts taught by themselves, and even more by God, all people presupposed that something beautiful and useful exists, which the name and substance of God indicate; for all people, by common reasoning, have anticipated this, since the Creator of all things implanted it by natural thoughts in every rational and intelligent soul. Yet they did not make use of this presupposition, which is according to nature” (MG 21, 140; R 662).

217. ST. ATHANASIUS, Oratio contra gentes: he shows at length how God is to be known from created things and from the order of the universe, just as a ruler governing a well-ordered city is known though unseen. For order is the sign of a leader and governor. “Likewise, when we observe the harmony among the members of the body—how the eye does not oppose the ear, nor the hand disagree with the foot, but each member performs its own office without conflict—we necessarily conclude that there is a soul in the body governing them, although we do not see it. In the same way, from the order and harmony of the universe we must conceive of God as its governor, and as one, not many” (no. 38; MG 25, 75). “Since these things are so, and nothing exists outside him, but heaven and earth and all that they contain depend on him, foolish people nevertheless rejected knowledge and worship of him, preferring things that did not exist to things that did exist; and instead of the truly existing God, they made gods of things that were in no way real: they worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator⁷, which was certainly most foolish and impious. It is just as if someone considered a work worthy of admiration, but not its maker, and, admiring the buildings of some city, despised the architect; or as if someone thought a musical instrument worthy of praise, yet scorned its maker. They are truly insane and utterly blind!” (no. 47; MG 25, 94 f.)

218. ST. HILARY, In Ps. 52, no. 2: “⁸ The fool says in his heart, There is no God; for if he wished to say this aloud, he would be shown by the judgment of public consensus to be as foolish as he is. For who, when he looks upon the world, does not perceive that God exists? Yet it often happens that, although the necessity of truth compels us to confess God, the pleasure of our vices persuades us that there is no God for us, and that what we believe contrary to the faith we nevertheless say at the prompting of an impious heart” (ML 9, 325; R 888).

ST. BASIL, In Hexaemeron, homily 9, no. 3, on the words Let the earth bring forth living creatures⁹, describes purpose and instinct in animals; then he says: “What speech could encompass these things? What hearing could take them in? What length of time would suffice to recount and describe all the wonders of the Creator? Let us too say with the prophet: How magnificent are your works, O Lord! You have made them all in wisdom¹⁰. Thus we cannot excuse ourselves for not having been taught in writing those things that are useful, since we may choose what is useful to us by the law of nature, without instruction. Do you know what good you ought to do for your neighbor? What you would want another to do for you. Do you know what evil is? What you yourself would not wish to suffer at another’s hands” (ML 29, 195).

ST. GREGORY NAZIANZEN, Orat. 2 theol., above, no. 55.

219. ST. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM, Ad populum Antiochenum, homily 9, among other things asks why Sacred Scripture did not exist from the beginning. “What then, someone will say, are the Scriptures not useful? They are indeed most useful and quite necessary. And if they are useful, he says, why were they not given to us from the beginning? Because God wished to teach human nature not through letters, but through things. What does ‘through things’ mean? Through creation itself. For when the Apostle encountered this idea and addressed the Gentiles who said, ‘We did not learn knowledge of God from the Scriptures at the beginning,’ see how he answered (he cites and explains Rom 1, 18 ss.) … If he had taught through books and letters, the literate person would have learned from the writings, but the illiterate would have gone away without any help, unless someone else instructed him; the rich man would have bought a book, but the poor man could not have bought one. Again, one who knew what the written word signified would understand what was set down, but the Scythian, the barbarian, the Indian, the Egyptian, and all who lacked that language would have gone away without being taught. But this cannot be said of the heavens: the Scythian, the barbarian, the Indian, the Egyptian, and every person who walks upon the earth will hear this voice. For it enters our minds not through the ears but through our eyes. All share equally in visible things, without the differences found among languages. The uneducated and the wise, the poor and the rich, can alike look into this book; wherever one may go, by looking up at heaven one will receive sufficient instruction from the sight. The Prophet himself hinted at and showed this, that creation sends forth a voice intelligible to barbarians and Greeks and to all people everywhere, when he said: There are no speeches or languages whose voices are not heard¹¹. His meaning is this: there is no nation or language that cannot understand this voice; rather, its voice is such that all people can hear it” (MG 49, 105). In epistulam ad Romanos, homily 3, no. 2, above, no. 56.

220. ST. JEROME, Epistula ad Algasiam, chapter 8: “Beyond all this, the same Apostle teaches that the natural law is written in our hearts. For when Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature the things prescribed by the Law, they, though they do not have the Law, are a law to themselves, showing that the work of the Law is written in their hearts, while their conscience bears witness to them¹². This law, which is written in the heart, embraces all nations, and there is no one who does not know this law. Hence the whole world is under sin, and all people are transgressors of the law; therefore God’s judgment is just, since he writes in the heart of the human race: Do not do to another what you would not wish done to yourself” (ML 22, 1024 s.)¹³. In Ps. 95, 18: “Both we and the whole human race naturally understand God. For there are no nations that do not naturally understand their Creator. Although they may worship stones and wood, they nevertheless understand that something greater than themselves exists, and in their error they suppose that they possess wisdom; that is, there is no nation that does not naturally understand God” (R 1393). In epistulam ad Galatas, book 1, chapter 1, 15: “It is not the same to say that he might reveal his Son in me as to say that he might reveal his Son to me. For to someone to whom something is revealed, something may be revealed that was not previously in him. But in someone in whom something is revealed, that is revealed which had previously been in him and was later disclosed. A similar saying occurs in the Gospel: There stands among you one whom you do not know¹⁴. And elsewhere: He was the true light, which enlightens every person coming into the world¹⁵. From this it is clear that knowledge of God is present by nature in all people, and no one is born without Christ, or without having within himself the seeds of wisdom, justice, and the other virtues” (ML 26, 326).

221. ST. AUGUSTINE, In Ioannem, tractate 106, no. 4: “The name by which God is called the God of all creation could not have been wholly unknown even to all nations before they believed in Christ. For such is the power of true divinity that it cannot be entirely and completely hidden from a rational creature that has already begun to use reason. For, except for a few in whom nature is excessively corrupted, the whole human race acknowledges God as the maker of this world. In this, then, that he made this world visible in heaven and earth, God was known to all nations even before they were instructed in the faith of Christ” (ML 35, 1910; R 1841). De vera religione 69 (ML 34, 153): denial of religion is always due to fault. Sermo 69, 3: “Few are found to be so impious that what is written is fulfilled in them: The fool says in his heart: There is no God. This madness belongs to a few. For just as great piety belongs to a few, so too great impiety, likewise, belongs to a few” (ML 38, 441). In Ps. 73, no. 25, above, no. 70.

222. ST. CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA, In Genesim, book 1, no. 2: “Although among those who serve idols the faculty of discerning who is the maker of the universe is corrupted and does not seem to be true, nevertheless an innate and necessary law moves them, and spontaneous knowledge prompts them to conceive of something more excellent and incomparably better than ourselves, namely, God” (MG 69, 36; R 2093). Contra Iulianum, book 2: “We shall even find that Julian himself, the accuser of our religion, confesses this very point when he asserts that knowledge of God is something not taught, but learned by people of themselves. He uses these words: ‘Let this be our first argument, that knowledge of God cannot be taught, but is given to people by nature: the desire for the divine is common to all people, privately and publicly, individually and among nations. For we all believe in some divine power, though no one has taught us; to speak precisely about it is not merely difficult for anyone, but entirely impossible even for those who have been instructed in knowledge of it …’ (After citing another text of Julian, he continues:) ‘You see, then, that after casting aside the crude, circular, and, so to speak, sordid error, and abandoning the opinion of common people, they were not altogether without any knowledge of God; rather, they grasped how great and surpassing his power is, since by laws of order he subjected so vast and marvelous a mass of the world. The others of whom we speak, however, did not recognize God from created things; they were held in such stupor and had lost all human sensibility to such a degree that they not only gave divine honors to heaven, earth, the moon, and the other stars, but also placed various images in temples and sculpted figures not only of human beings in them, but also of brute animals, birds, and reptiles, calling them gods and saviors’” (MG 76, 579 f.).

223. THEOPHYLACT, In Rom. 1, above, no. 58.

ST. GREGORY THE GREAT, Moralia 11, chapter 4: “Who does not know that the hand of the Lord has made all these things?¹⁶ As if he said plainly: whether you look for those slow of understanding or those wise in sublime matters, those devoted to earthly activities or those occupied with the inquiries of this world, all alike confess the Creator of all things and agree in living under his power” (ML 75, 956); book 27, chapter 5, above, no. 84.

ST. JOHN DAMASCENE, De fide orthodoxa, book 1, chapter 1: “God did not leave us in utter ignorance. For there is no one in whom he has not naturally implanted the knowledge that God exists. Indeed, created things themselves, their preservation, and their governance proclaim the majesty of the divine nature” (MG 94, 789; R 2338).

224. The Fathers’ teaching therefore contains the following:

1. Some knowledge of God is natural to human beings, implanted in their nature and possessed along with that nature; it therefore belongs to all who have this nature, and there is no one who does not have it. This knowledge is acquired by innate and connatural powers, and does not depend on any circumstance imposed by the free choice of other people.

2. This knowledge is spontaneous, easy, and accessible; it requires no inquiry and is had without a teacher.

3. Atheism and polytheism are culpable errors.

4. The moral law, binding in conscience is inscribed in the hearts of all people; this law can be known easily and is in fact known by all.

Nothing else is asserted here than that all adult human beings have (or have had) some knowledge of God; that there is no inculpable invincible ignorance; and that there are no adult negative atheists.

225. Objection. The Fathers certainly do not speak of infants, but of adults who have the use of reason. Yet perhaps their statements can be understood of adults in moral and religious matters. Hence, notwithstanding the Fathers’ teaching, one could admit that there are people who are mentally adult and have the use of reason in earthly, common, ordinary matters pertaining to individual and social life, but are not adult in religious matters, so that in religious and moral matters they are to be considered equivalent to infants (above, no. 202).

I answer. If “adult” is understood in this sense¹⁷, the Fathers’ doctrine would be a mere tautology: namely, all adults (that is, those who are adults in religious matters, that is, who know God and the moral law) know God and the moral law. Furthermore, the objection assumes that this kind of knowledge is more difficult, so that many neither have nor can have it without a teacher. The Fathers, on the contrary, teach that this knowledge is easy, arises spontaneously and without a teacher, and is found even among those who were not counted among the educated.

THEOLOGIANS

226. The theologians of the Middle Ages profess the very same doctrine. They make their own the words of HUGH OF ST. VICTOR (De Sacramentis, book 1, part 3, chapter 1), that from the beginning God so tempered knowledge of himself “that while it could never be comprehended what he was, it could never be ignored that he was.”

ALEXANDER OF HALES, Summa, introductory treatise, question 2, member 2, chapter 1, in response to the question “whether it is within the natural power to know God, or whether superadded grace is required,” replies: “According to Hugh in his Sentences (De sacramentis christianae fidei), God from the beginning so tempered humanity’s knowledge of him that, just as it could never be comprehended what he was, it could never be ignored that he was. Therefore we must say that knowledge that God exists can be had through natural reason, but knowledge of what he is cannot.” He then also cites John Damascene (De fide orthodoxa, book 1, chapter 1): “Creation itself, and the permanence and governance of things, proclaim the greatness of the divine nature; hence knowledge that God exists is naturally implanted in all.” Cf. Part 1, inquiry 1, treatise 1, question 1, chapter 2.¹⁸

ST. BONAVENTURE, in 1 d. 8, part 1, art. 1, q. 2: “Our intellect fails in its consideration of divine truth with respect to knowledge of what God is, yet it does not fail with respect to knowledge that he is. Hence Hugh says: From the beginning God … could never be ignored. Since, then, our intellect never fails in its knowledge that God exists, it could neither be ignorant that he simply exists nor think that he does not exist.”¹⁹

ST. THOMAS. His doctrine that one must turn to God as soon as one attains the use of reason (1, 2 q. 89 a. 6) excludes the possibility that there are adults who are invincibly ignorant of God without fault.²⁰ Cf. c. g. 3, 38.

227. As stated above (no. 200), from the sixteenth century some theologians thought, on the basis of early reports about the inhabitants of newly discovered regions, that there were people who remained ignorant of God for a long time. Better investigation, however, showed that those peoples were neither irreligious nor without moral ideas. These theologians could not prove their opinion from the sources of revelation, but nevertheless thought it could be reconciled in some way with the doctrine of tradition. The difficulty of demonstrating God’s existence by a strictly defined argument was also often offered as evidence. It may more readily be granted that not all adults are capable of such scientific argumentation; but the primitive knowledge properly at issue here need not be scientific argumentation.

It is therefore easy to understand why a much larger part of the theologians retained and defended the traditional doctrine.

228. SUÁREZ, Metaphysicae disputationes 29, section 3: “Although, strictly speaking, it is not known to us that God exists as something altogether self-evident, this truth is nevertheless so consonant with natural light and the agreement of all people that it can scarcely be unknown to anyone … This knowledge of God can be understood in two ways: first, under some confused and common conception, such as that of a higher divine power who can help us or make us blessed, or something similar. Although this conception applies to the true God, it can also be applied to false gods. In another way, it can be understood as knowledge of the true God through the concept of the supreme being, than whom nothing greater can exist, and who is the principle of all other things; Augustine seems to speak in this way … In the same sense Tertullian said in Apologeticus, chapter 17, and Cyprian in De vanitate idolorum: ‘The height of sin is to refuse to know him whom one cannot be ignorant of’; and others whom I cited above said the same, namely, that knowledge of the true God is naturally implanted in human beings. This knowledge does not arise in everyone from demonstration, since not everyone is capable of it, nor from the self-evidence of terms alone (the ontological argument) … This knowledge, then, could have arisen from two sources. First, from the great affinity this truth has with human nature: once this truth is presented and its terms explained, although it may not at once appear altogether self-evident, it immediately appears inherently consonant with reason and is very easily impressed on a person not wholly ill-disposed. For nothing in this truth appears repugnant or makes it difficult to believe; on the contrary, many things immediately incline one to assent to it—many, I say, not only metaphysical and physical considerations, but moral ones as well, and not only external but internal ones. For if a person reflects on himself, he recognizes that he does not exist of himself, that he is not sufficient for his own perfection, and that none of the creatures he experiences is enough for him. Indeed, he recognizes in himself a nature superior to those creatures, though imperfect in its own degree, since he knows himself to be weak and frail both in knowing the truth and in loving the good. Hence a person very easily persuades himself that he needs a higher nature, from which he derives his origin and by which he is ruled and governed. Second, this general knowledge is founded on the tradition and instruction of our elders, both children by their parents and the uneducated by their teachers. From this the general sense that God exists has spread and been accepted among all peoples. Hence this knowledge seems for the most part to have come by human testimony, especially among the common people, rather than by direct evidence of the matter. Yet it seems to have been accompanied by a certain practical and moral evidence, sufficient to oblige one both to assent to the truth that God exists and to worship him.” On how the natural law is known to all, see De Legibus, book 2, chapter 8, nr. 5 ss.²¹

229. DE LUGO, De Incarnatione, disputation 5, section 6, no. 106: “I reply that very weighty theologians deny that invincible ignorance of God in fact exists in any adult, and many passages from the Fathers are cited which prove at least that such ignorance is extremely rare.” No. 107: “But let us grant that someone may have such ignorance for a short time; I deny that it can last a long time, much less an entire lifetime. For there will always be some doubt about the obligation to inquire, and Father Jacob Granado proves at length that this also occurs among barbarians and the most uncultivated Indians.” VÁZQUEZ, disputation 19, chapter 3; ESPARZA, De Deo, book 1, q. 1, ad 1; LESSIUS, De providentia, book 1, chapter 2; BILLUART, De Deo, dissertation 1, article 4; and theologians generally say the same. And when, in recent years, the opinion was proposed that a large part of “adult” human beings were invincibly ignorant of God without personal fault, it was not commonly accepted.²²

Objections

230. 1. Experience shows that there are peoples without any religion or moral knowledge; moreover, the history of religions teaches that only after many generations did the human race gradually attain ethical religion and monotheism.

I answer. Experience shows the contrary: the more thoroughly one investigates, the more it appears that there are no peoples devoid of religion. The hypothesis of an upward evolution in religious matters does not correspond to the facts and is increasingly being abandoned.²³

2. If knowledge of God is so easy and universal, the moral necessity of revelation is no longer intelligible.

I answer. “In apologetics it is established that, in the present condition of things, the whole human race cannot quickly and universally attain a religious and moral state as developed as is fitting for the human race without the admixture of serious error. Here, however, it is established that individual human beings endowed with the use of reason can naturally attain the first elements of religious and moral knowledge. These two points are in no way contradictory” (PESCH, Compendium Theologiae Dogmaticae II, no. 9).

3. St. Paul explicitly teaches that the Gentiles do not have knowledge of the true God: Eph 2:12; Gal 4:8; 1 Thess 4:5.

I answer. It must be denied that, according to St. Paul, they are without fault.