Isagoge Philosophica
Pedro da Fonseca (1528–1599)
First published 1591
Pedro da Fonseca's Isagoge is a scholastic work conceived as a systematic introduction to the doctrine of universals and intended for the general use of the sciences. Fonseca presents it as richer in doctrine, more reliable with regard to truth, and better suited to teaching than Porphyry’s work of the same name. Its first part defines and explains the five predicables, while the second compares them, examining their common features and differences; chapters 7 through 11 are devoted individually to each predicable. Although he acknowledges that much of the material derives from the earlier logical tradition, Fonseca regards chapter 12 as especially original, since it addresses kinds of universals unknown to pagan philosophers and related to the nature of Christ. The work thus combines logic, metaphysics, and Christian theology, offering an orthodox and systematic reworking of Porphyry’s Isagoge while maintaining close thematic ties with the Jesuit philosophical tradition and with the later Conimbricenses Commentary.
Prooemium
Caput I: Quid sit universale
Caput II: Quotuplex sit universale
Caput III: De particularibus
Caput IV: De abstractione universalium a singularibus
Caput V: De triplici consideratione universalium, et particularium, et quo pacto ea ad Dialecticam pertineant
Caput VI: De duplici rerum universalium unitate
Caput VII: De genere
Caput VIII: De specie
Caput IX: De differentia
Caput X: De proprio
Caput XI: De accidente
Caput XII: De aliis quibusdam universalium speciebus, quas ethnici philosophi non agnoverunt
But since by divine incarnation it has come about that divine and human nature are joined in one person of Christ the Lord, so that we truly say him to be both God and man (which all have learned even in the very catechesis of Christian faith) it is fitting that we explain for the sake of the locus what kind are these predicatings, and all the others by which attributes either of divine or of human nature are said of Christ; whether they pertain to those genera of universals which have been explained thus far and handed down by the ancient philosophers; or whether to others which were unknown to them, which therefore it is necessary to explain what they are. For these things are not at all to be dissimulated and hidden from those who have already passed the preludes of philosophy and begin to join hands in disputing, since this doubt can be proposed to them as of a thing altogether known to all, that they may understand how many and what finally are the species of universals.
And from those things said above, it can be easily known that whenever God and attributes of divine nature are said of Christ, none of those predicatings can pertain to any genus of universals, since the divine nature, with which all its attributes are the same, is not only singular but also most singular.
But when man and human predicatings are affirmed of him, the use and acceptation of the name of Christ, or JESUS D.N. must be distinguished. For if that is taken for Christ the Lord insofar as he is some singular man, not only man but human predicatings also which are enunciated of him behave in the same way toward him as toward other men. For Christ the Lord is subjected to man taken in this way as to his species, just as other men; in the same way to animal as to its genus, and so to the rest. If truly it is taken as he is God, the second person in divine things; first indeed it must be confessed that man has a true universal reason with respect to him, and in the same way attributes of human nature which are said of him, since they could equally be distributed and predicated of other divine persons by the same reason, if each had assumed a singular human nature.
When, however, it is inquired to what genera of universals they pertain, there are those who would wish all these to be referred to the fifth of the common species, because man and human attributes are said of the divine Word not necessarily but contingently. In which sentiment although there is no error if it is understood as they explain it; one must abstain nevertheless from the name of accident, since we attribute to Christ the Lord our genera, and the human species, and its specific differences, lest we seem to assert that he united our nature to himself not substantially but accidentally (which it is impious to believe) nor in another way copulated it to himself than that by which Angels put on those bodies by which they are accustomed to appear to men in human species.
These are therefore all certain contingent predicatings by comparison of the divine Word, or rather spontaneous and free; therefore none of them is predicated of him quidditatively, or essentially, or necessarily, so that either it be genus, or species, or difference, or property with respect to him, insofar as these four genera of universals have been explained by pagan philosophers and by us thus far. Yet nevertheless in another wonderful way, unknown for many centuries (unless to whom it pleased the divine goodness to premonstrate it) the prior three can be said to be genera, species, and differences, namely assumptive genera, assumptive species, and differences, which agree with the divine Word through the assumed nature, not through the innate divine nature; and this not by accidental union but substantial, and in ways so diverse among themselves that they pertain by right to three other species of universals. For these genera and species, although contingently, nevertheless substantially predicate, and that in the question what the suppositum is; genera indeed of things differing in species, or incompletely; species truly of things differing in number, or completely: but differences contingently and substantially in the question what kind it is.
For one inquiring what the suppositum is of the divine Word, or of whose nature the suppositum; since this question seeks substance, he will aptly answer, although incompletely, who shall say it to be a suppositum of sensitive nature, and therefore animal, which by the same reason could have been predicated of things differing in species, if just as the divine Word substantially united human nature to itself, so the Holy Spirit had united the nature of a dove, whose form appeared in the baptism of Christ the Lord. Completely truly (which pertains to the assumed nature) he will answer who shall say it to be a suppositum of human nature, and therefore man, since in man is contained the whole common nature of singular men. Finally one inquiring what kind of suppositum the divine Word is by substantial quality, will rightly answer who shall say it to be rational or sensitive.
From which thing it is clear that the mystery of divine incarnation has opened to us that there is no immediate opposition between essential and accidental predication, if one must speak properly in the schools of Christian philosophy, since between the two there is a certain middle predication substantial which neither is essential nor accidental properly with the sincerity of orthodox faith to be called.
The same reason does not seem to hold in properties and accidents of the assumed nature as in genera, species, and differences, so that from them two other genera of assumptive universals should be constituted. For all properties and accidents of the assumed nature if they are compared with the divine Word are truly comprehended in the common species of accident. For both the capacity for laughter and the other properties of man, white and the other common accidents of his are predicated of the divine Word accidentally and contingently, although they do not agree with it with true inhesion by which most of them agree with the divine Word as man is and with other men. For true inhesion is not necessary for the true and proper reason of the fifth common predicable; as from those things said in its explanation is clear.
And let these things about universals have been said in the manner of an Isagoge, not only as they are handed down by pagan philosophers, but also as they ought to be explained in the academies of Christian philosophy.