Isagoge Philosophica

The usurpation of proper is also not the same, by which reason it is proper, and by which a certain species of universals. For insofar as it is proper, it agrees to one alone, to that namely of which it is proper; but insofar as universal, it is said of many.

The vocabulary of proper, insofar as it is proper, is founded, if it is taken altogether generally, not only to those things which accrue to things, but also to those which are contained in their essences, whether those universals are universal or singular (for nothing is in the nature of things which does not have something proper to itself) nor does it comprehend only simple or incomplex things, but complex also. By which general consideration even the specific and individual differences themselves are called proper to species and individuals which are proximately constituted from them; and not rarely with Aristotle even definitions of whatever kind are comprehended under the name of proper by comparison of things which are defined.

Those proper things, however, dismissed which pertain to essences of things, and all complex ones; which indeed pertains to simple and accidentary things, in the mouth of all is that fourfold division of proper, by which proper is said either to accrue to the species alone, but not to all or the whole; as to man to be lisping from birth, or a grammarian: or to all, but not to the species alone; as to be biped, or participant of intelligence: or to all and to the species alone, but not always; as to grow gray: or to all and to the species alone, and always; as to be capable of discipline or laughter. Which distinction is apt if it is partly explained rightly, partly corrected. For that which accrues to all but not to the species alone, that truly, if one must speak simply and absolutely, cannot be called proper, as Aristotle teaches; nor does the handed-down explanation of proper, insofar as it is proper, agree with it generally. It can, however, be called proper to something (as the same speaks) namely by comparison of those things to which it does not accrue, which is to be proper according to something; in which way proper is of man by comparison of quadrupeds or serpents, to be biped: and by comparison of plants or brute animals, to have intelligence; since otherwise to have two feet agrees with birds; intelligence truly with substances separated from matter.

The division will be corrected if by the name of species, by which infima is commonly understood, any universal thing whatever is conceived. For all species, whether infima or subaltern, and also all supreme genera, have their own accidentary properties.

Therefore a more accurate division will be if simple and accidentary proper is distinguished: first into proper simply, which agrees absolutely to the thing alone of which it is said to be proper: and into proper according to something or comparatively, which is already explained. Then proper simply into proper perfectly and imperfectly. Perfectly that is proper which lays claim to those three conditions, that it accrue to all and to the species alone and always.

For whatever is of this kind reciprocates with the thing of which it is proper, and has in it an adequate cause why it so agrees. Imperfectly, however, to which either the first condition alone is lacking, as lisping from birth with respect to man; or first and third; as grammarian of the same habit; or third alone; as growing gray. For if the second is lacking, that already will not be proper simply, but according to something. Thus another four-membered division of proper simply alone can be used, as either it accrues to the species alone and always, but not to all; or to the species alone indeed, but neither to all nor always: or to all and to the species alone, but not always; or to all and to the species alone and always, of which examples from things said are patent. By this truly the second mode of the prior division is rejected, because it is proper according to something; the first however is divided into the first and second of the posterior; the third and fourth truly are the same in both. And let these things about proper, insofar as it is proper, according to the first imposition of the name and reason, have been enough.

Insofar, however, as the name of proper is accommodated to the fourth species of universals, others thought it to be defined thus, that in the question what kind it is, it is said of those alone which differ in number alone. By which pact although the prior part of the definition rightly excludes genus and species; the posterior however does not rightly reject difference and accident, since these two do not always predicate of things differing in species, but often also of those which differ in number alone. The definition is usually corrected, the posterior part rejected, and substituted with these other words. Proper is the universal, or that which is predicated of many in the question what kind it is, accidentally and necessarily: so that by the first part individuals are rejected; second, genus and species; third, difference; fourth truly accident. Examples are properties of laughing, of undertaking disciplines, of sensing, of generating, of walking, of understanding, and other such; although some of these do not recur with any genus or species. Moreover by the name of necessary in this matter, not any necessity is understood, but that which is drawn from the very nature of the subjects.

And if proper is taken as proper is, and even as perfectly proper (for no account of imperfectly proper is proposed in this consideration of division) that is commonly called general which reciprocates with some genus; special which with some infima species. If truly as it is the fourth species of universals, general is called that which is predicated of many differing in species. Special, of those alone which differ in number alone. Whether they reciprocate with some genus or species, or not at all, as was said. For those which do not reciprocate, although they are not proper simply, as proper they are, they are nevertheless insofar as universals. So it comes about that it is not necessary that every universal of this species reciprocate with some first subject.