Isagoge Philosophica

To each universal there correspond, on the other side, many particulars, just as many parts correspond to each whole, whether essential or integral. For the universal, which in Greek is τὸ καθ’ ὅλου, as it were means what can be predicated of a whole multitude; and the particular, called τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον, means what is numbered through individual things, or one by one. They are related in turn as a common whole and a part subjected to it. A particular is one thing that can be subjected to some universal, as Socrates to man, and man to animal or to one who is awake. For just as something need not actually inhere or be predicated in order to be universal and predicable, but need only be capable of inhering and being predicated, so something need not actually be subject or actually receive predication in order to be particular and, so to speak, subjectible; it need only be capable of being a subject and of being subjected in predication. Thus, even if “awake” is not a universal predicate in relation to man, nor man a particular subject in relation to “awake,” if no one is actually awake; “awake” always remains universal and predicable in relation to man, and man particular and subjectible in relation to it.

Just as among universals some are less universal, such as man and whiteness; some more universal, such as animal and color; and some most universal, such as substance and quality, so among particulars some are less particular, such as those two just mentioned, animal and color; some more particular, such as man and whiteness; and others most particular, such as this man and this whiteness. These are called singulars and individuals.

A singular, or individual, is something which, being one, cannot by its nature exist in many or be predicated of many. All this is to be understood in the same way as in the definitions of the universal. Something is also called an individual when it is, or can be, predicated of one alone. In this explanation, the difference that distinguishes it from the universal combines an affirmative claim that it is predicated of one with a denial that it is predicated of anything else. Although predicating something wholly identical of itself is unartful and in a way tautological—and Aristotle does not deign to include it under the name of predication when he says that there is no predication of primary substances—it must nevertheless be included here under the verb “to predicate,” so that the definition agrees with Aristotle’s account of all individuals. For since he holds that primary substances, which are the principal individuals, cannot be predicated of anything by natural and direct predication, and altogether rejects indirect predication, as contrary to nature and accidental, it follows that the one thing of which each of them is said to be predicated according to this definition is that very primary substance which is predicated.

Accordingly, from predication of one—which this latter definition joins to a denial of predication of anything else—four kinds of individuals can be derived in keeping with Aristotle’s account. First, things predicated in their own way in answer to “What is it?”, as Socrates of himself (for nothing is so one as the very thing itself). Second, things predicated in answer to “What sort of thing is it?” when something essential is being asked about, as Socrates’ individual difference of Socrates himself. Third, things predicated in answer to “What sort of thing is it?” when something accidental but necessary is being asked about, as “this true thing” of this gold. Fourth, things predicated contingently, as “this white thing” of this stone. All these are truly and properly singulars or individuals, also called designated, pointed out, and determinate.

There are also other individuals called partly “vague” and partly “by supposition.” Although in fact and by their nature both kinds can be said of many, they are sometimes used as true individuals. Vague individuals are universals themselves with a mark of particularity added, such as “some man” or “some animal.” Yet things that can be said of many things differing in species should rather be called vague particulars than vague individuals, since they are sometimes taken as universals—as when we say that some animal is a species. Properly speaking, then, vague individuals are formed not from genera but from the lowest species. Thus Aristotle, when he gives “a certain man” and “a certain horse” as examples of primary substances, takes “horse” not for the whole genus of horses (if horse is predicated of many things differing in species), but for a definite species of horse.

Those called individuals “by supposition” are actually said of one alone, because at that time there is nothing else of which they can be predicated, but by themselves are apt to be said of many. An example is “the son of Sophroniscus,” which was said of Socrates alone because Sophroniscus had no son other than Socrates. From this one can infer that an individual is not rightly defined as something whose several attributes are each said of many, but which, when joined together, will never belong to anything else—unless the definition is given only by supposition of an individual. For although many common attributes may at some time be joined together in a way that describes only one person, and may never in fact belong to anything else—for example, if someone described Paris as the eldest son of Priam, king of Troy, and Hecuba, or Aristotle as the son of Nicomachus and Phaestis and the tutor of Alexander the Great—it is nevertheless clear that, considered by the nature of the common attributes, they can be said of many. Priam could have had another eldest son by the same wife if he had first had a son at a different time; and Nicomachus could have had another son by Phaestis who was also Alexander’s tutor. However many common attributes are joined together, they never lose their common nature so as to confer on one another a singularity they do not possess in themselves. This is enough about the account and distinction of universals and particulars, and about singulars, most of which are known and evident to the senses themselves.