Since, therefore, whatever is universal, by some mode of reason one and the same can be in many; from the multiplicity of the modes of being, so to speak, in many of one and the same reason, it must be gathered how many are the genera of universals.
But the same one reason can be said (if indeed it be understood fully) in four ways. For either it is one and the same in a certain way, namely by sole attribution to some one thing, or proportion of many among themselves, simply however many and diverse, as the reasons of the healthy and the sick: for some things are called healthy or sick because they are affected by health or sickness; others because they produce or preserve these; others because they indicate: and just as the body behaves with respect to such external affections, so in a certain way the soul with respect to internal ones, and its own. Or it is indeed the same simply in those to which it agrees, whether equally participated by them, but not one simply, that is, in itself, such are the reasons of house, ship, world, army, and other things of this kind; because although they agree with them in the same way; none of them is one in itself, or declares some one nature: but many things coagmented and disposed in a certain way or order, from which no one nature results. Or on the contrary it has the nature of the thing, that it is one simply and in itself, but not the same simply in those of which it is said; such is the reason of the colored by comparison of the white and the coal. For although it declares a truly one nature, yet it agrees with the white by essential relation, with the coal however by accidental. Or finally it is both one simply and the same simply, or (as it is wont to be said) wholly one and the same; because it is both one in itself, and is participated in the same way by those of which it is said; such are the reasons of man and animal.
And those things indeed which are of the first mode of one and the same reason, although they are often called universals by Aristotle, and sometimes excluded from equivocals; as when he says, being and one are most universal; and being indeed is said in many ways, but not equivocally: we, however, do not treat them more fully here; partly because they are not properly called universals, but by opinion of some, and imitation of properly so-called universals; partly because they are more truly numbered in equivocals than in univocals, and are comprehended under the name of equivocals at the very beginning of the book of Categories by Aristotle, that they may be excluded from the treatise of Predicaments. Wherefore it is enough if Dialecticians understand here that many things also of this kind of universals fall under the science, and are apt that demonstrations be made of them and from them: which Aristotle often teaches. Those things, however, which are of the second mode of one and the same reason, because they are not of some one true nature, nor per se (if the thing indeed is expended more diligently) have a place in the predicaments; are not properly to be treated here: yet nevertheless, because their reasons are communicated in the same way to those of which they are said, they must be held as it were proper universals; and to them must be attributed a certain dissimulation, which here will be said of genera, species, and other universal forms; especially since in so great ignorance of universals, these are often brought forth by philosophers as example, and treated as true genera and species. Those things, however, which are of the third mode of one and the same reason, although inasmuch as they are not participated in the same way, nor are said univocally, have no place in this treatment, just as neither in the predicaments; simply however, because they are of one true and sincere nature, they regard both disputations, because they can be conferred with those by which they are communicated equally, as the colored with the white and black. But those which are of the fourth, extreme mode, are one and the same reason, are reckoned truly and properly universal in every respect, those alone absolutely and simply are understood in the definition of the universal; so those alone are henceforth to be distributed by us into various forms, and to be treated commonly and divisively, insofar as it will be permitted.
These same things, however, are rightly divided into the five common species, from the diverse mode of being in their particulars, in this manner it will be understood. For either they pertain to their essence, or not at all: if they pertain, either they are predicated of them in the question what it is, or in the question what kind it is: if in the question what it is, either they contain their whole common quiddity, or a part: if a part, they are genera; if the whole, species. But if they pertain to their essence, yet not in the question what it is, but in the question what kind it is, they are said of them, they are differences. Finally if they do not pertain to their essence, and yet necessarily agree, they are properties; if contingently, accidents. So there is no reason why more or fewer species of true and properly so-called universals should be posited.
Nor is any specific distinction of them taken from this, that some are predicated of things different in number alone, as man; others of things different or diverse in genus, as white or relative; because although this distinction is enough for judging some to be more universal, others less universal; it is not enough for discerning the natures of universality, as it were, or communality, since it is not taken from the diverse mode of being in particulars, but from the greater or lesser multitude of particulars. All these things will become more open from the proper explanation of each species.