Tractatus de divina traditione et Scriptura

1. For the freedom of the formal assent of faith it is necessarily presupposed and required that the assent to the formal object be free at least in one or the other of its parts, the divine authority and the revelation. For under evidence the freedom of assent has no place; yet it is wholly evident that, with the infallibility of God posited and the locution of God posited, what is contained in this locution is true. Therefore when each of these two actual judgments is necessary: «whatever God says cannot but be true; God says that there are three divine persons;» then surely the assent to the truth, that there are three divine persons, is also necessary. For in order that the assent be free with the freedom of specification, of which we treat here, it is necessary that the negation of the object or doubt about it be also in the power of the mind. But negation or doubt in the conclusion (there are three divine persons) already contains negation or doubt concerning one or the other of the premises; by this very fact, that one doubts or denies that there are three divine persons, one already doubts or denies either that whatever God says is true, or that God has said this, or both together. For no one can doubt the evident consequence: if whatever God says is true, and if God says that there are three divine persons, it evidently follows that it is true, as said by God, that there are three divine persons. But now, by hypothesis, each of those judgments in the premises would be evident, and therefore necessary without possibility of doubt or negation; therefore doubt or negation in the consequent would also be impossible, and by this very fact there would be no freedom of specification.

2. Someone might perhaps, conceding all that we have said, further contend that with an actual assent to the formal object, however necessary, there could still stand not indeed freedom of contrariety, but nevertheless freedom of exercise in the formal act of faith, because the assent to the revealed truth itself can be suspended on account of the special difficulty which is found in it. But is this suspension of assent only a diversion of the mind from the object, or is it doubt about the truth? Where the freedom of assent on account of defect of evidence is in question, there is never question of the freedom of turning thought away from the object; for in that way we are free even in the judgment 2+2=4. But doubt about the truth of a singular proposition together with an actual and most firm judgment that it is contained in the general proposition and that the general proposition is most certain — e. g. doubt about the truth of the Trinity together with the actual judgment that the Trinity is revealed by God and that whatever is revealed by God is necessarily true — surely cannot stand together. For while you assent to each formal object, you already virtually assent to the revealed truth itself; if therefore that prior assent were necessary, the posterior could not be free, except perhaps with that freedom of diverting thought, of which we do not treat. Moreover this very diversion of thought from the revealed object is necessarily at the same time a diversion from the formal object; therefore even this qualified freedom of exercise could not stand together with an actual necessary consent to the truth of each premise. For it cannot actually be judged: the infinitely truthful God says that this is true; and at the same time the judgment be turned away from this truth. At most the judgment could be not explicit but only implicit.

What is said of the special difficulty which is usually found in the material object can indeed effect that assent be denied or suspended, if it is free; but by that very fact assent to one or the other of the premises is also suspended or denied. One can indeed be induced by a special difficulty to doubt e. g. concerning the unity of nature in three persons, but by that very fact one already doubts whether this doctrine is revealed by God; for as to the other point, whether God is truthful in revealing, no one can doubt unless perhaps one very ignorant or delirious.¹

It is commonly said that the freedom of the assent of faith comes from the fact that we do not understand the material object in itself and intrinsically. But this, first, those who hold with us that even things which from their inward reason are elsewhere evident can be believed by divine and free faith (cf. Tract. de Deo th. IX. n. II) cannot admit universally; then, even in truths which we in no way understand in themselves, although from this reason a special difficulty in assenting can arise, the freedom of faith cannot be explained from it, except insofar as there is at the same time supposed the inevidence and the freedom of assenting in one or the other formal object. For if the formal object in each of its parts were evident, even though it manifested the existence with evidence, although it did not declare the inward reason of the object which is believed, there would already be no freedom in believing the existence of such a truth as evidently manifested. When therefore St. Thomas or other theologians consider the freedom of faith in relation to that inward inevidence of the material object, they are to be understood to speak, with the inevidence of the formal object supposed, of that special difficulty which arises from the reason of the truth to be believed not being seen through. That the evidence of the divine locution suffices to take away the freedom of assent even to the revealed thing, although this remain obscure in itself, see in St. Thomas 2. 2. q. 5. a. 2. Moreover, as I have already said, the inward inevidence of the truth to be believed, or of the material object, is not necessary in order that it be able to be the object of a free act of faith, provided the formal object be not evident. For although one evidently knows rational truths, one can nevertheless believe them by a free act of faith, if at the same time they are proposed by a revelation which one knows certainly but not evidently to be divine; then indeed faith will be called «the evidence of things that appear not» Heb. XI. 1, not indeed by reason of the material object, but nevertheless by reason of the formal object.

Thus the very possibility of doubts concerning the truth of revealed doctrine, which doubts arise from the difficulty ingrained in the doctrine, supposes and shows the freedom of assent to one or the other of the two truths constituting the formal object. See Suarez disp. III. sect. 8. n. 19-21; de Lugo disp. II. sect. 1. n. 9. sqq. But now, since the act of faith is from its nature a free act, as is confirmed not only by experience and facts, alas all too much, but is altogether certain from Scripture, from the doctrine of the Fathers and the consensus of theologians, and from its intimate reason, because it is a meritorious act of virtue (see Suarez disp. VI. sect. 6), and finally from the express definition of the ecumenical Vatican Council (Constit. de Fide ch. 3. can. 5.); and since moreover the veracity of God is perhaps evident to all, or at least can be, and therefore assent to it, considered in itself and not considering its supernatural firmness above all things, is or at least can be necessary; it follows that the divinity of the locution is not, and insofar as it pertains to the formal object of the free act of faith cannot be, evident, although it is and is known most certainly.

3. But how the divinity of the locution is certain and yet not evident is easily explained from what has been declared above. If the word or doctrine be considered as clothed with that sacred apparatus, so to speak, of which we spoke, evidently the dignity of the reasons before every intellect demands a firm assent and excludes prudent fear of the opposite; there is therefore objective certitude (above ch. I. n. II. 2.) shining upon the intellect from the very inward reason of the revelation viewed in the complex, as it stands composed of words and facts. But although so many reasons manifesting the existence of revelation shine forth that the exclusion of prudent fear of the opposite is evident, so that while the reasons are discerned, and at least while the reasons are actually considered, assent is ravished to this truth: «that the existence of revelation can and ought prudently to be held without fear of error;» and although therefore in the composite sense, together with the actual consideration of the reasons, there remains no freedom for this other judgment: «that it can prudently be doubted concerning the existence of revelation;» nevertheless the existence itself of revelation is not directly evident, but only objectively certain, i. e. the manifestation of the reasons is not clear to the degree that it excludes even the possibility of imprudent fear. Therefore the assent of the intellect is not ravished, with freedom taken away, to this judgment: «revelation exists;» it is not ravished, I say, necessarily, at least where the question is not of revelation in the abstract and viewed generally, but of the revelation of singular truths in the concrete.² Whence the intellect, remaining of itself indeterminate to rendering or denying assent, must be inclined to the one or the other by the will; if however, with the reasons seen through, it denies assent, it necessarily judges at the same time that it acts imprudently and against a certain duty. While therefore the complex locution of God, i. e. the formal locution by doctrine and the real locution by facts, is exhibited to the mind, it is understood immediately from itself and from its ingrained reason, and not through another distinct motive, with certitude yet not through evidence, as the word not of men but, as it truly is, the word of God. The first judgment: «due is a firm assent: this locution is divine,» is a judgment from evidence; the other judgment: «this locution is divine,» must be a judgment certain with fear of the opposite excluded, yet it is not from direct evidence, and therefore for a firm assent the command of a free will is required.

If anyone thinks that at least for the first promulgators of the faith, the prophets and Apostles, the divinity of the revelation was evident in the strict sense, on this hypothesis the assent to the thing said could indeed be called an act of faith, because it would have been assent on account of the known authority of God revealing; yet the assent would not have been free, and would therefore be of another nature — which he would necessarily have had to defend from the principles which he lays down concerning the analysis and the proper nature of our faith.³ Nor does the other theologian to whom appeal is made, Aegidius Coninck, enounce anything other than full certitude and moral evidence (as Suarez calls it) of the fact of revelation, when he says (de Fide disp. II. dub. 2. n. 68.) that learned and pious men after long meditation and exercise can arrive, from the motives of credibility, at gathering the truth with so great certitude and evidence as almost to convince their intellect, so that they cannot doubt of it, according to that (Ps. 92), thy testimonies are become exceedingly credible. With equal truth one might say that holy men are often furnished with so great grace that they almost cannot commit mortal sin. Finally, I do not think the authority of St. Thomas 2. 2. q. 5. a. 2. is rightly adduced for that evidence of demonstration in the faith by which the faithful are praised and of which we speak, since the Angelic Doctor there most clearly teaches that the faith in which the intellect would be convinced by the evidence of signs «so as manifestly to know that this is said by God, who does not lie,» is not that «which is praised in the faithful of Christ;» but that in this way faith is not free, as e. g. in the demons; «for they see, he says, many manifest (i. e. to them evident) signs, from which they perceive that the doctrine of the Church is from God,» and therefore they do not believe freely, «but are compelled rather to believe from the perspicacity of their natural intellect,» to which namely the evidence of signs shines forth for demonstrating the truth of the fact of revelation, «although they do not see the very things themselves which the Church teaches.» It ought to be reckoned of another nature than the virtue of our faith is; whence some prefer to call such assent prophetic cognition rather than faith. But from this very fact it appears that even those holy men of God did not, at least in all revealed truths, have such strictly so-called evidence of the revelation, since surely no one can deny that they had the meritorious virtue of faith and of the same nature as our faith. Suarez disp. III. sect. 8. n. 5. sqq.; de Lugo disp. II. sect. 1.

From all that has been said it is clear how the command of the will stands in the formal act of faith. The will strengthened by grace must incline the intellect to a most firm assent to be rendered to the revealed truth on account of the authority of God speaking; whence the command of the will cannot incline the intellect to assent to the revealed truth without at the same time inclining it to assent to the divinity of the locution; and therefore a free act of the will has place with respect to the material object of faith, because there intervenes a free act of the same will with respect to the formal object, i. e. with respect to the divinity of the proposed revelation.

Corollary 1. Men do not commit the sin of internal negation of faith in such a way that, retaining assent to the existence of the revealed word, they deny to be true the things which God says by His word; for that cannot be done. Whence we have seen St. Thomas concede «that no one is so unbelieving as not to believe that God speaks only truth.» But unbelievers sin in that, with revelation sufficiently proposed as evidently credible and to be believed, they nevertheless deny assent to the existence of such revelation, and consequently deny assent to the truth proposed by revelation. For the supreme majesty and authority of God exacts this absolute obedience of the rational creature, that when the word of God is sufficiently proposed, a most firm assent be rendered. «The believer believes a man insofar as God speaks in him, which he can gather from certain experiences; but the unbeliever does not believe God speaking in man» St. Th. l. c. (above p. 646.). Hence it is also clear that the authority of God, as the formal object of faith, is indeed with respect to the intellect of the believer (as we have said) infinite truth in knowing and veracity in revealing; but with respect to the will, that it may command assent, the motive included in the authority is also the supreme majesty of God. Thus too by St. Thomas, in the place presently to be cited, the «reason inclining the will» is called «the first truth itself or God.»⁴

From these things it further follows that habitual faith consists in that disposition of soul effected through a permanent supernatural gift, according to which a voluntary subjection of the intellect under the authority of God is as it were connatural to man, and a promptness, under the aid of actual grace, to believe whatever is sufficiently proposed as divinely revealed. From this it is understood that habitual faith remains the same, whether the explicit knowledge of the material objects of faith be more ample or less ample; and at the same time the intimate reason is rendered why the habit of faith is utterly lost when, by deliberately denying assent even to a single sufficiently proposed truth, sin is committed against faith.

Corollary 2. The firmness of assent can be understood in two ways: first, so that from the very mode of knowing the physical possibility of fear of the opposite is excluded; secondly, insofar as the assent is free, and therefore from its nature does not exclude the physical possibility of fear, but from the command of the will adheres to its object with the exclusion of all actual fear. That former firmness is proper to evidence, and therefore there is no question of it in the act of faith. Firmness viewed in the other way, in the assent of divine faith, is estimatively above all things, i. e. the will strengthened by grace so commands the firm assent of the supernaturally illuminated intellect, with exclusion of fear of the opposite, that, so far as depends on freedom,⁵ it would hold as false all things known by natural science, if they were opposed to the truths of faith sufficiently proposed, because the infinite authority of God is worthy of this absolute obedience of the mind. «The certitude which is in science and intellect is from the very evidence of those things which are said to be certain; but the certitude of faith is from the firm adherence to that which is believed. In those things therefore which we believe through faith, the reason inclining the will, as has been said, is the first truth itself or God, in whom there is belief, who has greater firmness than the light of the human intellect, in which principles are beheld, or than human reason, according to which conclusions are resolved into principles; and therefore faith has greater certitude as to firmness of adherence than is the certitude of science or intellect; although in science and intellect there is greater evidence of those things to which assent is given» St. Th. 3. dist. 23. q. 2. a. 2. sol. 3. Cf. Ripalda de Fide disp. XI. sect. 3. n. 37. 43. 45. sq. From these things two points are understood.

a) The reason appears why formal heretics who refuse assent to some truth of faith sufficiently proposed to them do not, even concerning the other truths of faith to which they assent, elicit acts of faith above all things, as supernatural acts of divine faith must be. For as it is repugnant that God the supreme good be loved with charity above all things in the observance of the other commandments while one is violated, and thereby God is appreciatively not preferred to some good; so God the first truth cannot be honored with obedience and subjection of mind appreciatively above all things in believing the other truths, while this obedience is denied in some one truth sufficiently proposed. For in this very thing consists the disposition of soul through habitual faith and the firmness above all things which is included in every act of divine faith, that man on account of the authority of God alone be equally prompt to subject himself to every truth as soon as it is sufficiently proposed as revealed. Cf. de Lugo disp. XVII. sect. 6. n. 122. ⁶

b) Likewise from what has been said it is clear why the possibility of doubt, and even actual indeliberate doubt, does not hinder the firmness of faith. For the exclusion of fear of the opposite, as we have said, is from the command of the free will; as long therefore as the deliberate resistance of the will against the fear of error perseveres, the firmness proper to faith also remains. Cf. St. Th. l. c. ad 2.; Ripalda disp. XI. sect 2. n. 18. 19.

Corollary 3. Although the authority of God and the divine locution are the motive and formal object of faith, and under that aspect these motives, at least in the first act of faith, are understood not through an assent of faith on account of the authority of God revealing, but from a manifestation knowable from within, in the way we have declared; nevertheless under another aspect both the authority of God and the existence of the divine locution are also the material object of faith, and thus truth to be believed on account of the authority of God revealing. For God has revealed, whether explicitly or at least by exercised act, both His infinite veracity and the existence of His revelation. But in this act of faith the authority and locution of God, as the formal object on account of which belief is given, is known in the way explained above from inward reasons, and the same authority and locution is believed as the material object. There is therefore in such an act of faith a twofold supernatural assent to the same object viewed under a twofold different aspect. By one act I know beforehand the authority of God revealing from inward reasons; then by another act at least virtually distinct (the act of faith), on account of the authority of God revealing I assent to each of these truths: «God is infinite veracity,» «God has manifested Himself by supernatural revelation.» See Tract. de Deo th. IX.

Corollary 4. Although from what has been said the cognition of the formal object is ultimately not mediated through an act of faith on account of the motive of the authority of God revealing, but immediate from inward reasons; yet that supernatural and most firm assent to the authority of God, and still more the inevident and free assent to the divinity of the proposed locution, can in the wider signification of the name be called assent of faith, both because each truth is the formal object of faith and enters as motive into the very act of faith, and especially because each assent is elicited by the intellect under the supernatural light of faith. Cf. de Lugo disp. I. sect. 7. n. 129.