Tractatus de divina traditione et Scriptura

1. For the formal act of faith it does not suffice to have known the infinite veracity of God as the formal object on account of which the assent of faith is rendered, unless the truth of God be known as revealing some truth, i.e. unless at the same time the existence of revelation be known. For it is not because God is truthful that I can believe e.g. the Most Holy Trinity, unless I know that the truthful God has revealed this mystery. We believe therefore a determinate truth on account of the authority of God revealing this truth (see above p. 645 sq.). Hence it remains to be asked how the existence of revelation is known, insofar as it enters into the very act of faith. That the very existence of revelation cannot ultimately¹ be believed on account of a divine testimony really or rationally distinct — because God has said that He has revealed this or that truth — but must be known from itself and from its own inward reason, and likewise that this cognition must be supernatural, is proved in the same way in which we demonstrated this of the divine authority.

While God speaks to men, whether immediately as to the prophets and His first legates or through His legates, He must indeed, as becomes Him, render His word recognizable to the men for whom it is destined, by certain characters and as it were seals, as divine; or, what comes to the same, render it recognizable to men that it is God Himself who speaks either immediately or through His legates. «He hath placed in us the word of reconciliation; for Christ therefore we are ambassadors, as though God exhorted through us» 2. Cor. V. 20. «When you had received from us the word of the hearing of God, you received it not as the word of men, but as it truly is, the word of God, who worketh in you who have believed» 1. Thess. II. 13. Now the signs and characters by which the word, as though sealed, is presented as recognizable as the word of God revealing, are the manifold supernatural facts and charisms which are understood to be able to be from none but God bearing witness through them on behalf of His word. «Dealing confidently in the Lord, who gave testimony to the word of His grace (ἐπι τω κυριω, τω μαρτυρουντι τω λογω της χαριτος αὐτου), granting signs and wonders to be done by their hands» Act. XIV. 3. «How shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation, which, having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed unto us by them that heard, God also bearing them witness (συνεπιμαρτυρουντος του θεου) by signs and wonders and divers powers (δυναμεσι) and distributions of the Holy Spirit» Heb. II. 3. 4.

2. That what we say of the conspicuous characters of the divine locution may be conceived a little more distinctly, and how the existing divine revelation manifests itself from itself, it must be noted that the divine locution is composite of words enunciating truth and of facts by which the words are exhibited as divine locution. «As human custom speaks by words, so the divine power speaks also by facts, and as words new or less in use, sprinkled moderately and becomingly into human discourse, add splendor to it, so in wondrous facts that signify something the divine eloquence is in a certain way more brilliant» Aug. to Deogratias, ep. 102, q. 6, n. 33. Whence also in the same sense it was said: «our faith consists not by hearing only, but also by sight» (St. Maximus or another, serm. on the Epiphany n. 3, in the Works of St. Ambrose, Appendix, serm. 10).

If the summit of divine revelation in Christ be considered: first of all the whole life of Jesus Christ, the miracles, the death, and above the rest the resurrection; the choice of a few rude men for the conversion of the human race; the mission of the Holy Spirit beheld in its evident effects; then the whole history of the human race and above all the history of the people of Israel with all its supernatural manifestations as preparation and pedagogy unto Christ, and the whole subsequent Christian history as an effect flowing forth from Christ Himself; the apostolic preaching, the wondrous propagation of religion, the means to the proposed end all contrary to those which men employ, and which, humanly viewed, would seem fitted not so much to obtain as to impede the effect; while the effect, from no human cause, was immense and universal in the human race — amid iron and fire, amid every kind of torments by which rage was vented for three centuries and more — the conversion of all ideas of the theological and moral order, the transformation of the whole of public and private life; no less wondrous the preservation of the whole institution through the course of the centuries, in every age a morally perpetual sanctity and the constant heroic exercise in many, the esteem in all, of virtues nowhere known outside this religion, and supernatural charisms manifesting themselves even by external effects; finally this whole complex of divine things, both universally and in the individual facts, long before promised and foretold — all these things, I say, viewed together are so many rays by which the word proposed as divine shines forth and manifests its divine origin² (cf. Tract. de Deo th. VIII.). See the Vatican Council, Const. de Fide ch. 3, can. 3; the Encyclical Letter of His Holiness Pius IX, 9 Nov. 1846.

3. According to this St. Thomas explains the act of faith: that the faithful man knows God speaking «by sure tokens,» and thus receiving the word as the word of God, believes God Himself (this namely is the formal object and motive of faith) in the things which are said by this word (the material object of faith). The difficulty proposed was this. «There is none so unbelieving as not to believe that God speaks nothing but the truth; therefore to believe that the things which God speaks are true is not an act of faith; but rather to believe that the things which the messenger of God speaks are true; and thus to believe man is more an act of faith than to believe God.» The Angelic Doctor answers. «It is to be said that the faithful man believes man not insofar as he is man, but insofar as God speaks in him, which he can gather from sure tokens; while the unbeliever does not believe God speaking in man» S. Th. 3, dist. 23, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 2, ad 3. Moreover, according to the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor, faith as regards the material object has no inquiry of reason, because namely we assent to it solely on account of the testimony of the first truth; but as regards the locution of God, which is the formal object on account of which it is believed, it has inquiry to this extent, that the divine locution is not to be believed on account of testimony but is to be known from divine facts. «Faith has no inquiry of natural reason demonstrating what is believed; it has however a certain inquiry into those things by which man is induced to believe, for example that they are said by God and confirmed by miracles» 2. 2, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1. But he had said a little before that this very fact, that they are said by God, is the formal object of faith in all things which are believed: «in faith, if we consider the formal nature of the object, it is nothing else than the first truth; for faith does not assent to anything except because it is revealed by God» ibid. q. 1, a. 1, Θ.

4. When therefore a word distinguished by the characters of divine locution is presented to man, it is knowable from itself — not indeed evidently but certainly (as we shall presently explain) — as a word not of men, but, as it truly is, the word of God. It is therefore an object sufficiently proposed, not so as necessarily to determine the assent of the intellect, but so that the will, moved and strengthened through grace, may command with a pious affection of credulity and from the debt of obedience to the infinite truth the most firm assent; and thus the intellect, likewise enlightened and strengthened by grace, may most firmly assent to the truth that it is God who has revealed this (e.g. the dogma of the Most Holy Trinity). Whence it appears, and is well to be noted, that this assent is not merely philosophical (as the Hermesians substituted for the reasonable service of faith a faith of natural reason, necessary from evident arguments), and that no less as regards this assent than as regards the act of formal faith is that proposition damnable: «the will cannot effect that the assent of faith be in itself more firm than the weight of the reasons impelling to assent deserves» Prop. XIX among those condemned 2 March 1679.

If it is asked about the name, whether such a supernatural assent of which we speak is to be called an act of faith, we say that it is not faith formally, because it is not from the formal motive of the one testifying; for it is not here believed that God has revealed the Trinity because God says that He has revealed it. Such an act of faith can indeed without doubt also be elicited, of which we shall speak afterwards; but then for that material object of faith — «God says that He has revealed the Trinity» — the formal motive of assenting must again be a locution of God knowable from itself, or at least must ultimately be presented in a locution of God knowable from itself, lest there be a progress to infinity, as was declared above concerning the cognition of the authority of God. But as regards that immediate assent of which the question is: if by the name of faith is understood a supernatural assent from the habit and light of faith, commanded by the free will from the debt of obedience toward the supreme majesty, and an assent to the divinity of the locution which is presented as knowably divine, indeed an assent entering into the very act of formal faith as its principle and foundation — all these properties belong to such an immediate assent. For these reasons Card. de Lugo too says that this assent is better designated by the verb to believe than by the verb to know (disput. I, sect. 7, n. 129), just as St. Thomas and other theologians very often take the verb to believe in a broader sense. But because that assent is immediate, it is not properly and formally an act of faith, which would have to be elicited from the formal motive — because God says that this locution is His — not insofar as the locution is known from itself as divine. The divine testimony therefore, apprehended from itself through a supernatural assent, holds itself as the principle through which and on account of which the truths enunciated by the testimony are believed by the formal act of faith.

5. St. Thomas most certainly never taught that the divine testification itself, as the formal object, is in every act of faith to be believed with faith properly so called. He set himself to solve this difficulty. «The first truth (God) is compared to faith in two ways, namely as testifying, and as that about which faith is (as the formal object by testifying, and as the material object revealed by the testimony, e.g. that God is three in persons). But it cannot be posited as the object of faith as it is testifying; for thus it is outside the essence of faith³; nor again as that about which faith is, because thus whatever enunciations might be formed about the first truth would be believable, which is patently false. Therefore the first truth is not the proper object of faith.» In this objection two things are said: one is supposed as clear of itself, namely that God formally as testifying, or the existence of the divine testimony, is not that about which faith is; the other is intended to be proved, namely that God, the first truth, is not the object of faith even as the material object about which faith is, because thus every enunciable proposition about God would have to be believed by faith. Now in the answer, whoever should follow the opinion impugned by us would necessarily simply deny the supposition, that with reference to faith there can be distinguished God as testifying, about whom faith is not, and the same God as that about which faith is; for in that opinion God as testifying is first and above all that about which faith is. But in our opinion this distinction must be admitted, namely that God insofar as He is testifying is ultimately not that about which faith formally and properly so called is. What was further added in the objection, «as testifying it is outside the essence of faith,» is distinguished: it is outside the essence of faith as the material object of faith, I concede; as principle and formal object, I deny. Hence the whole solution, or at least principally, is to be referred to what is said of the material object, namely that God is not that about which faith is. But this very thing is the answer of St. Thomas. «It is to be said that the first truth is said to be the object of faith to the extent that faith is about it⁴; yet it is not necessary that whatever enunciation formed about God be believable, but only that which the divine truth testifies to (this is the solution of the reason adduced in the objection)... But the very testimony of the first truth holds itself in faith as a principle in the demonstrative sciences» S. Th. de Verit. q. 14, a. 8, ad 16. He says namely: as in the demonstrative sciences the principle is the object of the intellect immediately known, while the consequent is the object of science known from the principle (see above p. 597); so in faith the testimony of the first truth is the object known of itself by the intellect supernaturally elevated through grace; that to which the divine truth testifies is the object of faith formally so called⁵.

The same fallacy recurs in the other citation of the adversaries, no less patent, provided the context of St. Thomas be kept before the eyes. Namely in the 9th objection which he sets himself, it is again asserted that the first truth is indeed the medium of the cognition of faith, but that the truths about God are not the object of faith more principally than the truths about creatures: «in any cognition that into which we are led is the object; while that through which we are led into it is the medium. But in faith we are led to assent to certain truths about God and creatures through the first truth, inasmuch as we believe (hold by assent) that God is truthful. Therefore the first truth does not hold itself as the object of the cognition (of faith)» (as principal, about which is that whole disputation of Thomas). In the answer the Angelic Doctor concedes that the first truth is the motive or formal object of faith, insofar as it is attesting — how this attestation is to be known he does not say in this place — but at the same time says that the first truth (God) is the chief material object of faith, because it reveals the truths to be believed principally about itself and consequently about creatures. «It is to be said that although through the first truth we are led into creatures, yet principally through it we are led into itself, because it principally testifies about itself; whence the first truth holds itself in faith both as medium (insofar as it testifies) and as object» (insofar as about it principally is the testification or revelation) ibid. ad 9. But what those things are which the first truth testifies about itself, and into which through the very first truth attesting we are led, the holy Doctor declares in the following article 9, as also elsewhere very often. They are namely, for all the faithful, all and only those things which, revealed by God, simply surpass human reason, and for some are also those things which, though of themselves they do not exceed the power of reason, yet exceed their actual cognition; for the Angelic Doctor constantly holds the opinion that knowledge and faith about the same object cannot stand together. Whence we said above how falsely there is attributed to him that opinion of the more recent authors from the seventeenth century on, by which they contend that in every act of faith even the infallibility of God must be believed with faith properly so called. See the distinguished Fr. Kleutgen in the Appendices to the «Theology of Antiquity,» fascicle III, § XI, p. 197 sqq. (Beilagen zu den Werken über die Theologie und Philosophie der Vorzeit), in which Appendix, and much more in the work of Theology itself, Vol. IV, tract III, you will find what pertains to the doctrine of Faith excellently proved and explained. Perhaps as to the thing itself even Suarez, as we said above concerning the assent to the veracity of God, does not differ much from this explanation; although he speaks obscurely on account of that principle of his, that an assent which is supernatural and from the grace of faith must be an assent of faith. What he says in his principal explanation we certainly accept. «Even among men, although the speaker, by an express reflex act, does not say that he speaks, by speaking he sufficiently says it by an exercised act; and by this reason, when something is sufficiently proposed as said by God, by that very fact that locution is sufficiently proposed as the word of God; and therefore not only the thing said, but also the locution itself is to be received and believed (the thing said to be believed formally, the locution to be received as divine through the grace of faith and from the free obedience of the mind toward God, yet not to be believed ultimately from the formal motive, because God says that He speaks) according to that of Paul 1. Thess. II. 13: when you had received from us the word of the hearing of God, you received it not as the word of men, but as it truly is, the word of God. In this way therefore the divine word says both the thing said and itself, and by this reason through infused faith it is believed not through resolution into another word but through itself» disp. III, sect. 12, n. 12.

6. Finally, lest what we have said about the locution of God composed of words and facts, wrongly understood, give occasion for confusing the formal motive of faith with the motives of credibility, the several diverse aspects of the divine facts are to be distinguished. That complex of facts of which we have spoken, insofar as they are referred to this word by which determinate truths to be believed are proposed, can and must be viewed in three ways. a) The facts can be considered as they are referred to the truth which is proposed as revealed; thus they exhibit to the intellect that truth as evidently credible, and consequently the intellect exhibits to the will the evident duty of believing. This judgment — that the truth is credible and to be believed — under the consideration of the motives is not immediately free but necessary, because it is evident. In this way, if those facts are viewed, they are and are properly called motives of credibility; but they are not the formal motive of faith, which is solely the first truth revealing. For we do not believe by divine faith e.g. the Trinity from the formal motive that miracles and the other signs were performed for confirming the truth; but solely because God has revealed this truth. Miracles so viewed only render evident the credibility of this truth. b) The facts can be considered in themselves, as they are referred to manifesting the existence of revelation. Thus they are the reason by which there is exhibited to the intellect as certain, yet not as evident, the existence of revelation, and consequently are the reason on account of which the intellect at the command of the will assents to the existence of revelation. In this way too, when viewed, they are wont to be called motives of credibility, although thus they rather exhibit the existence of revelation or the divinity of the locution as certainly intelligible, as has been said, than as believable by faith and to be believed. Finally c) the complex of facts can be viewed formally as in conjunction with the word it completes the divine locution. Thus they enter into and compose the locution of God, which is the formal motive of faith; for God speaks not by words alone but together with the words also by all those facts. Cf. de Lugo disp. I, sect. 7, n. 130, 131; Ripalda de Fide disp. III, sect. 4.

7. The whole series of the acts of intellect and will in order to the act of faith, which we have considered distinctly, we can now enumerate together.

a) The infallibility of God in knowing and speaking shines forth to the mind from its own inward reason, whether under the hypothetical form: «if God speaks, His word is infallible»; or under the absolute form (presupposing the acquired cognition of God existing as a condition): «God is infallible in speaking.» The mind assents by a supernatural act, not by natural powers but by the supernatural light of faith by which it believes the revealed truth itself; and through the same light of faith this assent, from submission toward the supreme majesty, is estimatively above all things. This authority of God is of itself indeed evident; accidentally for some it can be not evident but only certain. The command of the will supernaturally elevated is required as regards the assent itself simply, if the manifestation is not evident; but even if it be evident, there is still place for the command of the elevated will as regards the firmness of the assent. And so already this act is free either simply or in a qualified sense, and therefore meritorious.

b) Some locution (e.g. that there are three divine persons), composite of the formal word and of divine things and facts, is proposed to the intellect as a divine locution. The things and facts are referred both to manifesting the divine origin of the locution, of which in the complex, when viewed, they are an inward element; and to manifesting the credibility of the enunciated truth (e.g. of the Trinity of persons), and to manifesting the duty of believing. For as to the first, by those things and facts as inward reasons there is evidently excluded a prudent fear lest perhaps such a locution not be divine, and a firm assent to the divinity of the locution is demanded. As to the second, through those things and through those facts, insofar as they are referred to the enunciated truth (the Trinity of persons), the intellect, as through motives of credibility, evidently knows that this truth is credible and to be believed. Each of these judgments — namely the judgment about the worth of the reasons demanding a firm assent to the divinity of the locution, including the other about the credibility of the thing said and the duty of believing — each, I say, is from evidence; yet each is supernatural, because the intellect elicits the assent not by natural powers but strengthened by the powers of grace⁶. But although each object which we have mentioned is evidently known — namely the worth of the reasons for the divinity of the locution and the credibility of the thing said — yet the very divinity of the locution is not evident to us directly, but only objectively certain, of which we shall speak presently.

c) While therefore the intellect under supernatural illustration sees this worth of the reasons for the divinity of the locution, and the credibility of the thing said, and the duty of believing, the will through the inspiration of grace freely conceives a pious and supernatural affection of credulity.

d) The will supernaturally elevated, from submission toward the divine majesty, freely inclines the intellect to a most firm assent to the divinity of the locution, with all fear of the opposite excluded; and the intellect at the command of the will, through the superadded powers of grace, assents most firmly, estimatively above all things, to the truth: «such a locution as this is the locution of God.»

Grace both of the will and of the intellect for all the antecedent acts is given in order to the formal assent of faith itself.

e) Finally, with the supernatural assent to the formal object supposed — «God is infinitely truthful, and God has revealed this doctrine, e.g. that there are three divine persons» — there follows, with divine grace illustrating and inspiring, the supernatural assent, estimatively above all things, to the revealed truth itself from the formal motive of the authority of God speaking, and thus adhering solely to the first truth. This now is the formal act of faith.