Tractatus de divina traditione et Scriptura

1. Every assent of our intellect is either immediate, where the objective truth is manifested to the intellect from itself, and not through another truth precognized, or it is a mediate assent, where the truth is manifested not through itself, but through another truth precognized. Mediated knowledge of truth, therefore, can have place only insofar as it rests upon another truth precognized as upon a principle; and thus unless there be some truth immediately known, upon which as upon a principle the subsequent mediate knowledges rest, no knowledge at all (through judgment) can have place (see above, ch. II). The declaration of what, in each mediate knowledge, that immediately known truth is, is and is called the resolution of knowledge into its principles.

Every assent of faith properly so called is necessarily mediate, and thus bound up with another, immediate assent to some truth which is the principle or formal object on account of which the assent of faith is rendered (above, ch. II. §. III). The inquiry, therefore, into and the determination of the immediately known truth, to which assent is no longer rendered on account of another distinct formal motive, and which is the formal motive of the assent of divine faith, is called the analysis of the act of faith or the resolution of the assent of faith into its (intrinsic) principles.

2. The revealed truth which we believe, e. g. that there are three divine persons, is the material object of faith. The assent to the revealed truth rests upon another truth precognized. This, however, is twofold: a) that God is infallible in knowing and in revealing (infinite knowledge and veracity, which, as the infinite majesty and dignity to which assent is due, is called in one word the authority of God); and b) that God has revealed this truth to be believed, e. g. the Trinity of persons. Each complex together is called and is the authority of God revealing. This authority of God revealing, therefore, is the reason on account of which belief is given, or is the formal object of divine faith.

Every act of divine faith, therefore, necessarily includes assent to three truths distinct from each other: to the revealed truth itself (in the material object), which is the formal act of faith; to the authority of God, and to the existence of such a divine revelation, which latter assent to each of these two truths can be called the assent to the principles of faith. Whether now this act be a twofold distinct act, or one complex act having for its object the authority of God revealing this or that; there is always required, at least prior in reason, the knowledge of this twofold truth. For neither the authority of God considered in itself, unless it be considered in the revelation of this determinate truth, nor the existence of revelation, unless it be known as of a God infallible in knowing and in revealing, can be the reason for believing with divine faith this revealed truth as such. Hence in every act of faith there is, as they say, a virtual discourse, or an assent to one truth on account of another twofold truth precognized, to which the assent either explicitly precedes, or is implicitly included in the very act of faith.

3. Concerning this matter there never ought to have been, and much less after the definitions of the holy Vatican Council, ought there to be disputation among Catholic men. For what? Is it not evident that faith in God revealing this or that truth, e. g. the Most Holy Trinity or the incarnation of the Word, can in no way be rendered, unless the assent of the mind to this revealed article be rendered on account of authority, i.e. on account of the infinite truth (in knowing and in speaking) of God revealing this very article to be believed? Do not all catechisms teach, and have not all the faithful always and everywhere elicited and do they not elicit the act of faith in this one way: I believe this proposed thing, this article, e. g. that there are three divine persons, that the Word is incarnate, because God, the infinite truth, who can neither be deceived nor deceive, has revealed this very thing? The definition of the holy Council is so lucid that no place is left for ambiguity. « Faith, which is the beginning of human salvation, the Catholic Church professes to be a supernatural virtue by which, with God breathing upon and helping by grace, we believe the things revealed by Him to be true, not on account of the intrinsic truth of things seen by the natural light of reason, but on account of the authority of God Himself revealing, who can neither be deceived nor deceive. » « If anyone shall have said that divine faith is not distinguished from natural knowledge concerning God and moral things, and therefore that it is not required for divine faith that the revealed truth be believed on account of the authority of God revealing; let him be anathema » (Vatican Council, sess. III. ch. 3 and can. 2 on Faith).

Now it is indeed evident that these three things to which the act of faith is said to be referred—the revealed thing, e. g. the incarnation of the Word; the authority of God who can neither be deceived nor deceive; the fact of God actually revealing, or the fact of revelation—are three truths wholly distinct from each other. Further it is declared: we believe the revealed thing to be true; we therefore render the assent of the mind to one of those three distinct truths, on account of the other two truths, namely on account of the authority of God Himself revealing, who can neither be deceived nor deceive; not on account of the authority of the infallible God considered only in itself, nor on account of the fact of revelation considered apart from the authority of the infallible God, but on account of the authority of God revealing, who namely not only can reveal truths, but actually reveals this truth to be believed, so that the authority of God, of infinite and substantial truth, as it were informs the fact of revelation, or the word of God.

For a) to the infinite truth considered only in itself neither ought nor can any other assent of the mind be rendered in order to revelation than this universal one: whatever God the truth shall have revealed is necessarily true and to be believed by the created reason wholly subject to the uncreated truth. This, however, with the fact of revelation not yet supposed, is in the end a conditional assent: if God the truth reveal anything, it is necessarily true and to be believed; but in no way is it or can it be an absolute assent to this or that truth, e. g. to the Trinity of persons or the incarnation of the Word. Hence St. Thomas concedes that even unbelievers hold « that God (if He speaks) speaks nothing but the truth »; but he places the distinction between the believer and the unbeliever in this, that the unbeliever « does not believe God speaking (actually) in man » (3. dist. 23. q. 2. sol. 2. ad 3). Likewise the Angelic Doctor joins, as one included in the other, these two: « to adhere to the testimony of God speaking, in which the truth is infallibly found; » and « to adhere to the truth which consists in the divine knowledge » (St. Th. De Verit. q. 14. a. 8. O). On the other hand, therefore, b) the reason for believing with divine faith (as is evident of itself) neither is nor can be conceived to be testimony, unless formally considered as the revelation or word of God Himself. « I have given them Thy word... sanctify them in the truth, Thy word is truth... yet I ask not for these only, but also for those who shall believe in Me through their word » ¹ (through the word which was given to them by Christ, and to Christ, albeit otherwise, by the Father) (Jn. XVII. 14 ff). « When you had received from us the word of the hearing of God ², you received it not as the word of men, but, as it truly is, as the word of God » (1 Thess. II. 13). Further c), since the act of faith is elicited by ourselves (with the grace of God inwardly breathing upon and helping), we certainly cannot, on account of the authority of God revealing, who can neither be deceived nor deceive, believe the things revealed by Him to be true, e. g. the mysteries of the Trinity or of the incarnation of the Word, except insofar as the authority of God (actually) revealing, on account of which we believe, is known to us. « The formal object cannot exercise the office of object... unless it be known by the intellect under that character under which it can move it, because by an unknown object the intellect is not moved » (Suarez, disp. 3. sect. 6. n. 1). And thus God the infallible truth, and God actually revealing by His word the truths to be believed, is the objective reason, and the same, applied to us through (supernatural) knowledge, is the formal reason in us (subjective) on account of which we believe the things revealed by Him to be true.³.

These things I do not see how they can be called into doubt by any theologian, since as to the matter itself they are the Catholic doctrine declared and defined anew by the holy Vatican Council. Hence it is indubitable, as we have said, that the assent of faith properly so called is necessarily from its very essence a mediate assent, i. e. an assent to one truth on account of another truth, and that not only objectively existing, but also subjectively known, upon which the very formal act of faith rests: « we believe the things revealed to be true on account of the authority of God revealing. » The same is thus expressed by St. Thomas. « Faith of which we speak assents to nothing except because it is revealed by God; hence faith rests upon the divine truth itself (namely revealing, as the antecedent member has it) as upon a means » (St. Th. 2. 2. q. 1. a. 1).

4. By the name of discourse in the act of faith, concerning which certain theologians now again dispute many things less rightly, nothing else is understood than assent to one truth on account of another known truth, since namely the one is laid open to us only through the other.

If by one act of the mind assent is rendered to one truth on account of another, since one, e. g. the incarnation of the Son of God, is laid open and as it were illuminated to us through another known truth, namely through the infallible truth revealing this mystery, this we call a virtual discourse; if by distinct acts assent is rendered to the infallible authority of God, to the existence of the word of God revealing this mystery, and finally, on account of the authority of God revealing, to this mystery itself, it is called a formal discourse (see Card. de Lugo, disput. 7. sect. 1). In every act of faith properly so called, therefore, at least a virtual discourse is contained, by the very fact that we believe the things revealed by God to be true on account of the authority of God Himself revealing. « For what is a virtual discourse concerning the incarnation, except to be moved by the divine authority to believe it; or how can the divine authority move to believing the incarnation, except insofar as such a connection appears between the one and the other, that God supremely truthful revealing the incarnation cannot be, without the incarnation being true? » (Card. de Lugo, disput. 7. sect. 1. n. 7). « The act of faith, although it seems simple, includes in it a virtual discourse » (Suarez, disput. 3. sect. 12. n. 10).

A virtual discourse of this kind, namely the ascent from one known truth, and on account of that truth which we precognize (at least prior in reason), to another truth which is laid open to us solely through it—this virtual discourse, I say, is certainly declared in the doctrine of the Council, by which it is said that « it is required for divine faith that the revealed truth be believed on account of the authority of God revealing. » For « that on account of signifies a connection; otherwise one thing would not be believed on account of another, » as de Lugo rightly notes (disp. 1. sect. 13. n. 293).

5. Certain recent theologians, more or less perverting the opinions of others, think they must demonstrate with great contention that the act of faith is not a « logical conclusion. » There is no leisure to examine the new opinions of these theologians ⁴; but lest the errors of the « logical conclusion » which they suppose and impugn be attributed to us or to the ancient theologians, I may note three things still, clear of themselves.

a) In the analysis of the act of faith there is no question of the « practical judgment » which precedes faith, when from the motives of credibility a man judges these truths to be credible and to be believed as revealed by God of infallible truth. In impugning the « logical conclusion, » the recent theologian seems to exhibit the state of the question as if Card. de Lugo or anyone else had ever said that the unbeliever, from the motives of credibility, forms the practical judgment that the proposed thing is credible and to be believed, and thence by a « logical conclusion » attains the act of faith. But certainly none of the ancient theologians ever said this, nor can anyone of sound mind say it. For from that practical judgment there does not follow a « logical conclusion »: it is the duty to believe, therefore God is three in persons, because God the truth Himself has revealed this; but the « logical conclusion » would only be this: therefore, unless by free will I incline the intellect to faith on account of the authority of God revealing, which has been sufficiently proposed to me, I violate my gravest duty toward God, and expose myself to eternal damnation. The question, therefore, is not concerning the acts which precede, but in no way enter into the very act of faith; but in faith itself, when we already believe the revealed truth not indeed on account of the motives of credibility, but on account of the authority of God revealing, it is asked whether and what is the order of the objects of faith to which we assent, whether by one complex act or by several distinct acts. Here, therefore, we say that the assent of faith to the revealed thing rests upon another truth which in the very act of faith is precognized, namely that the infallible God has revealed this thing to be believed; and therefore the formal assent of faith is not, nor can it be, immediate, but is necessarily mediate, as rendered on account of another truth (prior in reason) precognized.^[322. The theologian who lately disputed at length against the « logical conclusion » considers the assent of faith in relation to the antecedent practical judgment concerning credibility and the duty of believing, and through that judgment says the thing to be believed is presented in the same manner as in an immediately evident judgment (e.g. the same thing cannot at once be and not be) the ap-⁵.

b) The adversaries at times seem so to dispute as if the question were whether the act of faith is a logical assent to a consequent truth on account of a naturally seen legitimate consequence. The suspicion of this error seems to be thrust upon them by that oft-repeated warning: the act of faith [is but] the apprehension of the terms. Whence he concludes: « the assent of faith according to its logical character is not a mediate assent, but is to be considered and held as an immediate assent. » But certainly these things wholly pervert the state of the question, and are not true in themselves, nor do I see in what sense they can be understood. That practical judgment is indeed presupposed before the act of faith, but it does not enter into the very formal assent of faith concerning whose elements the question is; and if it were introduced, it certainly would not stand in the manner of the apprehension of terms in an evident judgment, but as a judgment concerning one thing joined to a judgment concerning another thing. But as we have said, the question concerns the elements of the very act of faith, when we believe the revealed truth (and thus render assent to it) « not on account of the intrinsic truth of the thing seen, but on account of the authority of God revealing. » Where indeed the authority of God revealing is enunciated by the Vatican Council itself, not only objectively as existing, but also subjectively as apprehended by us through assent, as the cause, i.e. as the reason, on account of which we render assent to the revealed truth. And thus one truth (or rather twofold: God infallibly actually revealing), apprehended by (supernatural) assent, is to us the reason on account of which we assent (by the formal act of faith) to another truth (e.g. that the Word is incarnate); which assent of faith is therefore essentially mediate.

Hence neither can we follow, nor (I frankly confess) understand, the doctrine of some theologians who think the « virtual discourse » in the act of faith is excluded for this reason. « Since the divine revelation is not the cause of the revealed thing, but a pure attestation, and the believing faithful does not perceive any connection between the revelation and the revealed thing; but revelation is as it were the light under which he knows the revealed thing, and the faithful immediately believes by reason of the divine testimony: therefore, just as the eye in seeing colors by means of light does not discourse virtually even on the part of the object, so neither does faith in believing by reason of the divine testimony » (Card. Gotti, De Fide q. I. dub. IV. §. 2. n. 12). Certainly the divine revelation is not the efficient cause of the revealed thing, yet it is nevertheless for believers the objective cause or reason, and indeed the sole one, through which the truth of the revealed thing is manifested to them, and on account of which, once known, they assent believingly to the revealed thing as true. Hence the faithful does not indeed perceive the connection as between cause and effect, but certainly perceives in every act of faith, at least virtually with his believing mind, the absolutely necessary connection between the attestation of God who can neither be deceived nor deceive, and the truth of the thing which He attests. « It cannot be believed with certain faith, unless it be believed with certainty on account of authority »—and this is not to be a « logical conclusion. » But those very theologians who teach that in the act of faith there is or can be a formal discourse (as Card. de Lugo, Vasquez and others) never dream of such an absurdity of a « logical conclusion. » Namely the mind, elevated through the light of faith, holds with firmness above all things both the truth of God essentially infallible and the existence of the divine testimony (the formal object of faith) concerning the thing to be believed (the material object of faith), or in the complex, the authority

of God; nor can it be believed with certainty on account of the authority of God, unless the connection of the divine authority with the truth of the revealed mystery be believed with certainty (that is, be held most firmly) » (Card. de Lugo, disp. 7. sect. 3. n. 40). Further, similitudes devised by us are not proofs, but can be employed to illustrate a truth demonstrated from elsewhere, if rightly used; but if applied preposterously, they neither prove nor illustrate, but obscure and pervert. The eye indeed proceeds to the vision of a body without the light being seen, but the body, by reflecting light into the eye, forms an image of itself; hence this similitude can be employed to illustrate the mode by which the true from its intrinsic character manifests itself to our mind. But as regards faith, it holds insofar as nothing can be the object of faith unless it be manifested to us and as it were illuminated by the divine testimony (St. Th. Verit. q. 14. a. 8. ad 4). But the testimony of God does not illuminate the revealed thing in such a way that it shines forth to us from its intrinsic character (which will come to be in the light of glory); for in the act of faith the mind does not assent to the proposed thing on account of its intrinsic character seen (which would not be an act of faith), but solely on account of the authority of God revealing, which is a reason extrinsic to that thing, e.g. to the fact of the incarnation, and a distinct truth; and thus « faith in believing by reason of the divine testimony » assents to one truth in such a way that this assent rests wholly upon another truth as upon the reason on account of which assent is given. This, however, is a mediate assent, and this we call a virtual discourse. That the faithful « immediately believes by reason of the divine testimony » can indeed be said, insofar as there is no other medium (under which), no other objective formal reason for believing besides the testimony of God revealing; yet by this very fact the assent is not immediate, because it is not from the intrinsically seen truth of the thing itself, but mediate, because it is from infallible extrinsic testimony. In this way St. Thomas also indicates that there is discourse in faith. For as the first among the reasons why the Apostle (Heb. XI. 1) calls faith an argument, the Angelic Doctor assigns this. « Argument sometimes signifies the very act of reason discoursing from principles to conclusions... Faith can be called an argument in the first (this) way (namely as a discoursing act), in inasmuch as reason assents to something from the fact that it is said by God, and thus from the authority of the speaker assent is effected in the believer; because even in dialectics some argument is taken from authority » (St. Th. De Verit. q. 14. a. 2. ad 9). ...the authority of God actually revealing this truth to be believed. This is what St. Thomas calls « the intellect adhering to the truth which consists in the divine knowledge, » and « adhering to a testimony in which the truth is infallibly found » (St. Th. Verit. q. 14. a. 8. O). In this adherence there is indeed already implicitly contained adherence to the very revealed thing by the testimony, just as assent to the premises contains implicit assent to the consequent. But the believer does not therefore assent to the thing proposed by the divine testimony because by natural reason he sees through the rules of logic and their firmness; but the intellect, from the command of the will, under the light of grace supernaturally and with firmness above all things adhering to the testimony of God revealing, who can neither be deceived nor deceive, on account of the authority of God attesting in particular this or that truth, as on account of the formal reason for assenting, under the same light of grace assents also to the truth revealed by God. By the same supernatural act, therefore, by which it holds the infallible revelation of God as the formal motive for believing the revealed truth, it also holds the connection of the infallible revelation with the truth of the revealed thing; for to be the formal motive for believing a truth, and to have this necessary connection with the truth to be believed, is one and the same. But that it is necessary for divine faith that the revealed truth be believed on account of the authority of God revealing is established among all Catholics and has been declared anew by the holy Council. (See de Lugo, disput. 7. sect. 3.).

c) Finally, that disputation and caution against the « logical conclusion » so exhibits the doctrine of the theologians whom it impugns as if they reduced the act of faith to certain abstract concepts of truths, and thus in the end not the living God, the revealing truth, but an abstract concept in our mind would be understood as the formal motive for assenting, as a logical antecedent to a logical consequent. Hence they say the doctrine of Cardinal de Lugo and others is to be reduced to a « logical and mechanical conception, » by which is corrupted the « transcendental character proper and necessary to faith, as elevation to intimate union with God. » These words, lest by pressing their signification we be compelled to ascribe graver errors to them, seem to be reducible to this sense. Faith transcends the natural mode of knowing; for it does not rest upon the proper powers of reason in knowing the truth, but with supernatural firmness rests upon, and is thus united to, the truth of God Himself revealing.⁶ Since this « transcendental character » of divine faith is said to be corrupted by Card. de Lugo and the other learned men impugned by the recent theologian in question, there seems consequently to follow against them an accusation too grave, as if they both imperilled in general the supernatural character of faith, concerning which we spoke a little above, and specifically, by reducing faith « to a logical and mechanical mode of conceiving through logical conclusions, » did not in believing rest upon the substantial uncreated truth revealing, but by a concept formed in the mind as by a formal motive « through a logical conclusion » were induced to hold another truth consequent upon that concept.

But certainly this latter objection, already once raised, as Card. de Lugo records (disp. 7. sect. 2. n. 23; cf. sect. 3. n. 38), turns upside down the whole human mode of thinking and knowing. Namely, we cannot conceive the infallible truth and revelation of God as certain and really existing except by a judgment of the mind (which in the act of faith is elicited under the light of grace and by supernatural powers), just as we cannot enunciate it except by some proposition and affirmation; but that to which we adhere and upon which we rest in believing is not our concept and our judgment, but the substantial truth itself actually revealing, which by our supernatural judgment we apprehend as really existing. This infallible revealing truth, therefore, is the formal motive under which we believe the thing revealed by it to be true. And in the same way, what we believe is the revealed thing itself, e.g. the Most Holy Trinity, which yet we cannot believe—or (as Augustine speaks) think with assent—except by some (supernatural) judgment of our mind. « The act of the believer is not terminated at the enunciable, but at the thing; for we do not form enunciables except that through them we may have knowledge of things, as in science so also in faith » (St. Th. 2. 2. q. 1. a. 2).

6. With the Catholic doctrine defined anew by the holy Council now supposed, that « the revealed truth is to be believed on account of the authority of God revealing, » there arises a great question—which indeed was not held among the ancients, but among rather more recent theologians since the sixteenth century has been held with great contentions, and is now again excited by some—how this very truth of the authority and utterance of God is to be known. If each is known through itself, and thus the assent to it is immediate, in it the analysis of faith rests as in an ultimate principle. But if even each of those truths, or either, is known through another truth as through a formal principle on account of which assent is rendered, and thus the assent is mediate, it must further be asked what that other precognized truth is, until there be arrival at some immediate assent, no longer rendered on account of another distinct truth, upon which as upon a principle and motive it rests (cf. above, ch. III. §. I. n. 1).

If the preceding assent to the formal object of faith is said to be mediate and rendered on account of another precognized truth, it will be most difficult to define what it is, and how then a progress to infinity is not admitted, without ever arriving at an ultimate immediate assent. But if each of those assents is said to be immediate, a twofold difficulty arises; for first it will seem to be an assent from the powers of reason alone, and therefore natural, which in no way can be admitted; then it can scarcely be conceived how that assent, especially as to the existence of the revelation or utterance of God, should be immediate. Concerning each of these, therefore, we must first speak.