Tractatus de divina traditione et Scriptura

From what has gone before it might seem to follow that revelation, even on the supposition of a merely natural end, would be necessary to the human race with moral necessity. But if this be conceded, it will seem that it must further be inferred that the immediate revelation of God is not supernatural, as being due to human nature from its very creation and essential destination to its natural end; or if revelation is nevertheless called supernatural, it will seem that it must be conceded that the state of pure nature would be such that in it the attainment of the natural end would be morally impossible for the human race. But with this posited, such a state, considering the divine perfections, would have to be called simply impossible, although its possibility cannot be denied without disturbing the distinction between the natural and the supernatural order.¹ 1. To solve this difficulty and to declare the whole matter, the notion of what a supernatural gift is must be kept before the eyes. Supernatural is whatever, creation supposed, exceeds the exigency and powers of nature (taken in the theological sense, as the complex of created substances and of the accidents which belong to them of themselves); exceeds, I say, the exigency and powers of the whole of nature, whether considered ontologically in itself (entitatively and as to substance, as they say), or as to the mode in which it is effected and conferred. A gift can therefore stand in a threefold relation.

a) There can be a gift of such a kind as ontologically in itself to exceed the exigency of nature, and thus to perfect the creature beyond the whole order of nature. For just as there are in nature itself grades of diverse orders differing in whole genus, from inorganic material substance and its accidents up to pure spirit, so there is a certain order of divine communication and of fellowship with the divine nature, superior to all natural orders. In this sense are to be understood those definitions of theologians, of whom some call supernatural what is constituted in the divine order, others what participates the divine nature as it is in itself, others what pertains to the order of the intuitive vision of God (see Ripalda, De Ente supernatur. disp. IV. sect. 3. n. 22.). Hither pertain first of all the beatific vision itself, and then all gifts proportioned to it as inchoation and preparation for consummation. This is the deification (θεωσις) preached by the holy Fathers through grace, and the adoption of sons through intimate transformation and the impression of likeness with God, and through the indwelling Holy Spirit who has been given to us. See Tract. de Trin. th. XLIII. With this grace are connected or referred to it other gifts and aids and charisms and virtues and acts, whether as dispositions or as effects and consequences. Besides these, ontologically supernatural in the highest, albeit in a diverse, order is the hypostatic union of the human nature of Christ, and whatever intrinsically coheres with it.

b) There can be an undue gift, beyond the exigency of nature, which indeed neither follows from nor is exacted by any principles of nature, yet does not elevate nature to that higher and divine order. These can be called preternatural gifts, or supernatural secundum quid, or are called by others supernatural quoad modum, although this latter appellation will more fittingly be reserved for the mode of gifts, of which we shall speak at once. Thus supernatural secundum quid would be a habitual exemption from an imperfection consequent upon the principles of nature, which exemption should be effected by God not through an infused quality supernatural in itself, but only by a tempering and directing of the natural faculties, and that in the nature of the whole species. In this way supernatural was the state of integrity ² (immunity from concupiscence and from the necessity of dying) in human nature.

c) Supernatural only quoad modum is what is indeed in itself natural, yet is effected in a mode exceeding the exigency and powers of nature, as are very many miraculous effects properly so called.

Further, the supernatural can moreover be distinguished into what is intrinsic and what is only extrinsically supernatural. The former is supernatural in itself in one of the three modes indicated; the latter will be so, insofar as from the divine will it is ordered to a supernatural end. Hence in the present order even natural goods are extrinsically supernatural; whence it is clear that what is only extrinsically supernatural is not supernatural simply and in the proper sense. Conversely, in another order even preternatural and supernatural quoad modum things could be directed to a natural end, and thus not be even extrinsically supernatural.

Moreover, from what has been said you will gather that a thing is not already supernatural because it is an undue and gratuitous benefit to him on whom it is conferred, unless it be at the same time above the exigency and above the powers of the whole of nature. Whoever thought otherwise would have to call supernatural very many goods of soul and body, and even external goods, in almost the same way as the Pelagians called natural gifts, indeed human nature itself, by the name of grace, than which no greater confusion of the two orders could be devised (see Ripalda l. c. disp. I. sect. 4. n. 27.).

2. With the supernatural state and gifts hitherto declared is to be compared the state of pure nature.

Pure nature is so called in opposition both to integral nature through gifts supernatural secundum quid, and to nature elevated through gifts simply supernatural; by it, therefore, is understood nature without all these gifts, furnished only with the gifts coherent with the internal exigency and with the internal principles and powers of nature itself. It would therefore be first of all a nature destined to the natural end of the knowledge and love of God according to the exigency of nature. It would be under the providence of God the creator and natural ultimate end, by which it would be directed to this its end. God creating to this end, infinitely wise and infinitely good, who hates none of the things which He has made (Wis. XI. 25), would by His antecedent will will all men to attain to their end; and by that very fact He would have prepared sufficient means by which the attainment of the end would be rendered morally possible. Since the end would be far other than in the present supernatural order, the means to the end would also stand otherwise, and hence the order of providence would be other. All the means would answer to the character of the formal end itself (natural knowledge and love), and to the inborn character of composite human nature (the rational animal). Manifold external aids toward the apt proposal of objects, toward the removal of insuperable difficulties; internal aids through the honorable thoughts and affections excited by the very objects proposed, would render morally possible a sufficient knowledge of God and of the natural law, and the fulfilment of the law, so that men could attain their natural end. Nor would it be a supernatural gift, if God in men, according to special circumstances, should by immediate operation excite good natural thoughts and affections, and of the same character as are the affections excited through the representation of objects; indeed, neither would it be a supernatural gift, if God, under the condition of natural contrition, should in that state will to remit sins committed. For although these would be gratuitous benefits to single persons, they would nevertheless not exceed, for the whole of nature, the natural providence of God directing men to their natural end. Hence in that state there would without doubt also be place for the impetration of benefits from the divine merciful providence, both through prayer and through good works of the natural order. Nor does the objection hold, that these benefits are undue, and by that very fact supernatural. For that natural things are called due to nature is certainly not to be understood as if God were obligated to human nature; but by the name of due is understood both the exigency of connection from principles inborn in nature, and the exigency of necessity. Hence if the moral necessity of these subsidies for obtaining the natural end be considered in relation to the providence of God, infinitely good, directing to this end, such aids, which in themselves and ontologically would not be supernatural, would in that state be according to the exigency of nature and simply natural; and thus neither could they be reckoned supernatural quoad modum in such a way that through them the state would cease to be of pure nature. For although they would be conceded gratuitously to individuals, there would nevertheless be in human nature, in view of its destination to the natural end, a certain moral exigency of them, which suffices, according to what was said above, so that things which are (by hypothesis) ontologically natural could not either be reckoned supernatural quoad modum in the strict sense. See Suarez, De Gratia Prolegom. IV. c. 2. n. 15 and in 1. 2. disp. XV. sect. 2. n. 11; Ripalda, De Ente supernat. disp. I. n. 27; disp. V. n. 17. 31; disp. CXIV. n. 26-29; disp. CXVI.

3. Now at last, from the notions laid down, we must come to the very question proposed at the outset concerning revelation.

a) It is understood from what has been said that the revelation of supernatural truths is in itself and ontologically supernatural, because not only the mode of such a manifestation, but the manifestation itself of such truths is above the exigency of the whole of nature. This is clear both from the fact that the principles of nature do not exact the knowledge of simply superrational truths; and it is the more established, because to such a revelation, if not from an intrinsic necessity, at least from a great congruity, supernatural faith ought to answer, and hence with such external grace is connected supernatural internal grace, and thence further also destination to a supernatural end. Where, therefore, such revelation is given, there is now no longer the state of pure nature, but the state of the supernatural order.

b) The revelation of rational truths, considered in itself, is at least supernatural quoad modum; for although the manifestation and knowledge of such truths is not above the exigency of nature, yet such a mode of manifestation is above the exigency. By that very fact even the acquisition of knowledge, which is supposed to come about through external revelation and through connatural internal acts, would have to be called supernatural quoad modum. In the present order, however, and as it has in fact occurred, certainly even this revelation is simply and ontologically supernatural, inasmuch as it has an intrinsic relation to the supernatural act of faith, and, wholly directed to the supernatural end of man, is one of the elements constituting this order, in itself and ontologically supernatural. In another order of providence, where only a natural end had been appointed to man, such a revelation of rational truths could indeed have place only as an aid to the attainment of the natural end, yet in itself, as being above the exigency of nature, it would be supernatural at least quoad modum, and therefore such a state would not be simply of pure nature, but supernatural secundum quid.³.

c) From all these things it is now gathered why in the present order the revelation even of truths rational in themselves is necessary and yet supernatural, whereas in the state of pure nature it would not be necessary; and if it were affirmed to be necessary, by that very fact it would be denied to be supernatural. In the present order, namely, it is necessary first, because the knowledge ought to be supernatural, as we declared above (p. 630. 631.). Then it is necessary for the human race with moral necessity even for the sufficient knowledge of these truths simply and considered in themselves, abstracting from the supernatural mode of knowing, because in the present order God has willed to render morally possible to the human race in common a sufficient knowledge of these truths not by other natural aids apart from revelation, but through revelation itself; the other, remote aids which He imparts to individuals are directed to this, that men be led to the knowledge of revelation, and in it to the knowledge of faith proportioned to this supernatural state. On the contrary, in the state of pure nature, although the inborn natural powers would be the same as they now are, yet the providence of God in the direction of this nature would be other, answering namely to the appointed natural end, so that by natural aids the attainment of the end would be rendered morally possible. Among these natural aids, therefore, would above all be contained those which should prepare and lead to a sufficient knowledge of natural religion, so that this would be rendered morally possible to the human race. Without doubt, therefore, they err who compare the present order of providence with the state of pure nature in such a way that they consider the present state with all supernatural helps removed, and with no other natural aids substituted than those which now exist; and then persuade themselves that such would be the state of pure nature. With this supposed, it is indeed a consequence that the revelation of rational truths, just as it is now morally necessary to the human race for the very substance of sufficient knowledge, should likewise be deemed morally necessary for the state of pure nature; whence it follows either that such revelation is natural and according to the exigency of nature, or, what amounts to nearly the same, that the state of simply pure nature is impossible according to the wise and benign providence of God the creator. But if the diverse providence in each state, as just declared, be kept before the eyes, this whole difficulty ceases. See Ripalda l. c. disp. CXIV.