Tractatus de divina traditione et Scriptura

1. The ultimate end of the rational creature cannot be constituted except in the knowledge of God, the supreme truth, and in the love of God, the highest good, in such a way that the destination of intellect and will to the true and the good be fully satisfied, and thereby the creature attain its ultimate perfection, and in its ultimate end of the true and good be fully blessed. But the mode of final knowledge and love can be twofold: a) so as not to exceed the exigency of created rational nature, but to be accommodated to its powers constituted in ultimate natural perfection; b) so as, above all exigency of nature and of natural faculties, through a superadded gift and through a singular participation (assimilation) of the divine light by which God sees Himself, the created intellect be elevated to seeing the divine essence, the infinite truth, intuitively in itself (not by ideas acquired from elsewhere), clearly as it is in itself, and consequently the supernaturally elevated will love God, the infinite good, with a love corresponding to the intuitive vision; and thus the creature be blessed with supernatural fruition of God. The ultimate end of the creature considered in the former mode is the natural end, following upon the supposition of creation, not from a free destination of God distinct and diverse from the creating will, but from the necessary objective order, namely from the necessary perfections of God and from the perfection of the rational creature. Hence this end can be known by the light of reason from the very perfection of God insofar as He manifests Himself in the works of creation, and from the perfection of the rational creature. Considered in the latter mode it is the supernatural end, to which, even supposing creation, the creature could have not been destined, and to which it has been elevated only by the free largess of God; and hence this end can be known by us only from the revelation of God through faith.

Now if the rational creature—and since we treat of man alone now, if man—is constituted on the way to that term, the state of the way must needs in some proportion answer to the state of the term; the means by which man is directed by God to the end must be fitted to the end to which they are ordered; the dispositions of man by which he is prepared for attaining the end, both in intellect and in will, must pertain to that order as inchoation, in which is the final vision and fruition as consummation.

Since therefore in the present order man has not been left in his merely natural destination, but elevated to that which we have called the supernatural end, and constituted on the way to it, natural knowledge and the love corresponding to knowledge does not suffice, but the knowledge and love directly tending to that end must be supernatural, first subjectively, by reason of the eliciting principle and of the powers which, superadded to intellect and will, constitute faculties apt for supernatural acts proportioned to that end. Then objectively, besides the manifestation of God in His works of creation corresponding to the natural end of man, there is required another, immediate manifestation of God, corresponding to the final manifestation face to face, in which we shall see Him as He is. But this manifestation on the way is not such that we intuit God as He is; for such intuition is the end, not the means and preparation for the end; but revelation on the way is through the testimony of God Himself, by which (as St. Thomas says, 1, q. 1, a. 2) the truth, as known in the knowledge of God, becomes known to us, to which revelation, accordingly, no longer vision but faith corresponds. « There is therefore a threefold knowledge of man concerning divine things. The first of which is according as man by the natural light of reason ascends through creatures to the knowledge of God; the second is according as the divine truth, exceeding the human intellect, descends into us by way of revelation, yet not as demonstrated for seeing, but as uttered in speech for believing; the third is according as the human mind is elevated to the perfect intuiting of the things revealed » S. Th. contr. Gent. l. IV. c. 1.

2. More distinctly, the necessity of revelation and of the supernatural faith corresponding to it, on the hypothesis of elevation to a supernatural end, can be considered both according to the end itself and according to the means proportioned to the end.

a) The supernatural end itself, to which man was to be directed in a rational manner, had necessarily to be known to him, nor could it be known except through revelation and the faith corresponding to revelation. Moreover, if not absolutely necessary, it was yet certainly highly consonant with the very nature of the end that man should know, already on the way to this end, God, his objective end to be possessed in the term by the fruition of immediate vision and of corresponding love, also according to those perfections which are not manifested from the works of creation to the light of reason; not only according to the « known of God » (Rom. I. 19) which of itself corresponds to the natural end, but also according to the « depths of God » (1 Cor. II. 10) which correspond to the supernatural end, where « we shall see God as He is » and « we shall know even as we are known. » But these depths of God, as they can become known for understanding, as they are in themselves, only by supernatural and immediate vision, so can they become known for believing only by the testimony and revelation of God¹. But hence also, after they have been revealed to our faith, they are yet not understood by the light of the intellect in themselves from their own proper reason, because with creatures, from which the intellect receives its knowledges, they have not such an intrinsic connection that the intellect could either discern their essence—what they are—with proper notions, or demonstrate their existence—whether they are—from its own principles. They are therefore simply superrational truths, which in the proper sense are called mysteries (see Tract. de Trin., th. XVII).

b) The means ordered to the supernatural end and proportioned to it, and hence at least in the formal character of means, are supernatural. That the knowledge of these is necessary for man tending to the end is evident; yet they could become known only through revelation and faith. For partly they are not necessary from themselves and from the nature of the end, but are constituted in the character of means by the free will of God, by which very fact what we say is manifest. Partly indeed they are necessary from themselves and from the nature of the end; but first, the end itself is known only by revelation, whence the knowledge of the means ultimately rests upon revelation; then, since the nature of the end, even with revelation supposed, is not known in its proper and intrinsic character, it is not a consequence that, with the end revealed, the necessity of such means, however of themselves pertinent to such an end, would already be known without explicit and special revelation; and much less is it a consequence that the inborn character and nature of the means be understood².

What we have said is confirmed by the words of the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX in the letter to the Archbishop of Munich (11 Dec. 1862), where, after speaking of the superrational things of faith, he immediately subjoins: « and to dogmas of this kind those things especially and most openly pertain which regard the supernatural elevation of man and his supernatural intercourse with God, and are known as revealed to this end. And indeed, since these dogmas are above nature, they cannot therefore be attained by natural reason and natural principles. »

It is established, therefore, that with the order of elevation to a supernatural end supposed, some revelation of the mysteries of faith, at least of the supernatural end itself, was simply necessary for the human race; and revelation was necessary in that extension in which God willed the inchoate knowledge of the « depths of God » on the way by reason of the object to correspond to the vision in the homeland—the knowledge « in enigma » to the hoped-for vision « face to face. » This necessity of revelation as means and objective principle for the knowledge of those truths must be judged absolute, and as it is commonly called physical, since the mysteries are above the compass of the natural light, and hence the powers for knowing them from its own principles are simply lacking to reason.

3. But he would err wholly who would restrict the fact itself or the necessity of revelation to truths alone superrational of themselves, or mysteries properly so called. There is another, yet most true necessity of revelation in the present order, also with respect to those truths pertaining to religious and moral doctrine which of themselves do not transcend the powers of reason.

Without doubt, both concerning God, who is the ultimate end of all created things also in the natural order, and concerning the means necessary to this end, many things are of themselves intelligible by the light of human reason apart from revelation—such as the existence of God and His absolute attributes, the natural ordination of man to God, the natural law—which therefore are in themselves simply rational truths. The question is, then, what is the necessity of revelation and of faith with respect to these truths. We say the necessity is threefold: from the nexus of these truths with the superrational; from the mode in which they are to be known; from the very necessity of knowledge considered simply and (as they say) as to substance.

a) These truths would have to be known also on the hypothesis that only a natural end had been appointed to man, whence they are commonly said to constitute natural religion. But now, as the supernatural end of man is not the negation but the elevation of the natural end, so also natural religion must be judged not excluded but elevated to a superior order through revealed supernatural religion. Hence truths of this kind are contained as at least implicitly revealed in the very revelation of superrational and preterrational truths; these cannot therefore be revealed without those also being revealed.

b) All truths of this kind, insofar as they are now referred to the supernatural end of man, are to be known in a mode proportioned to the end, and hence by supernatural knowledge. But since the proper supernatural mode of knowledge on the way is faith, or at least has faith for its foundation³; therefore these truths also are to be believed by faith, and hence, that the mode of our knowledge might answer to the end, the divine revelation of these also was necessary.

c) But not only with the supernatural mode of knowledge considered, but with knowledge simply considered in itself, must revelation be affirmed necessary in the present order—of truths although rational of themselves—which for brevity we can call the truths of natural religion. There is no question of all rational truths without distinction: that all of them taken in the complex can be known by no one without extraordinary charism is so evident that it is a wonder arguments are sought by theologians to prove the thesis by which they establish that « no one without grace can attain all natural truths in the complex. » Our question is of the theoretical and practical truths, religious and moral, not of themselves impervious to human reason. Moreover, concerning these very truths it is not asked whether all in the complex can be known by all and singular men by the light of reason alone; for that is neither necessary, and that it cannot morally be done is almost equally evidently established as what we said a little above. Finally, neither is it asked to which truths individuals could and should attain by the light of reason apart from revelation, so that ignorance of the rest would be excused in them as invincible; for this invincibility of ignorance in the greater or greatest part of men with respect to truths necessary of themselves, although it could excuse individuals from sin, would yet itself be the reason why the revelation even of rational truths for the human race should be judged necessary. The state of the question, then, is this: whether in the present order the rational religious and moral truths can be judged sufficiently manifested to the human race taken in common through the light of reason, so that revelation would not be necessary for attaining the substance of knowledge. What is and what is not the necessity of revelation thus considered is declared from certain principles.

α) Revelation considered in the mode we have said is a certain aid toward the knowledge of truths; but the degree of necessity of an aid for an act answers to the degree of potency in the subject for the same act. In the human race there is no physical impotence for attaining rational truths; for they are called rational precisely because the powers of human reason can attain them; therefore, with only the substance of knowledge considered—that is, abstracting from the supernatural mode of knowledge which is required in the present order—there would not be, with respect to these rational truths, a physical necessity of revelation. Yet at least for the greatest part of men, and hence for the human race taken in common, for attaining these truths in due time, with sufficient amplitude, with sufficient clarity and full certitude, without admixture of errors, so great are the difficulties that, after the manner and fashion in which men always act in difficulties of this kind, the physical potency, at least in the greatest part of men, would never without special aid arrive at the second act of such knowledge. Difficulties so constituted make up a moral impotence. To moral impotence answers the moral necessity of an aid. Therefore in the present condition of the human race, for that sufficient knowledge even of rational truths, there is a moral necessity of a special aid. Moreover, although many sufficient aids were at hand to the divine omnipotence, where it has chosen one before all other possibles, that one must indeed be called the necessary aid. Since therefore God has in the present order chosen revelation before other aids, revelation also with respect to these rational truths, with knowledge considered simply and according to substance, must be called morally necessary for the human race in the present order.

β) Scripture itself, in the passages in which it teaches the manifestation of God afforded to the light of reason through the things that have been made (see Tract. de Deo, th. II ff.), everywhere distinguishes the possibility of knowledge, and actual imperfect knowledge itself, from the fact of knowledge sufficient for rendering the worship naturally due to God. Possibility it affirms; but at the same time it teaches that men universally (by their own fault, indeed) have not arrived at such sufficient knowledge and at its practical application, and to this infirmity and indigence it opposes, as a salutary and necessary medicine, the merciful aid of God through revelation, which in the present order is indeed given to a supernatural end even with respect to these truths natural of themselves. « For since in the wisdom of God (poured out upon all His works) the world through wisdom (through human wisdom, by which it could and should have known) knew not God; it pleased God (εὐδοκησεν ὁ θεος—God mercifully decreed) through the foolishness of preaching to save those who believe » 1 Cor. I. 21.⁴; Acts XIV. 15; XVII. 30; Wis. IX. 14–19.

The causes from which arises that moral impotence, and consequently the moral necessity of revelation answering to it, are customarily declared in the well-known words of St. Thomas, 1, q. 1, a. 1; 2-2, q. 2, a. 4; Verit. q. 14, a. 10, Θ; contr. Gent. l. I, c. 4: « It is necessary for man to receive through the mode of faith not only the things which are above reason, but also those which can be known through reason; and this for three reasons. First indeed... the science to which it pertains to prove that God exists, and other things of this kind concerning God, is proposed to be learned by men last, with many other sciences presupposed, and thus man would arrive at the knowledge of God only after much time of his life. Second, that the knowledge of God be more common; for many cannot profit in the study of science... Third, on account of certitude; for human reason is much deficient in divine things... That there might therefore be undoubted and certain knowledge of God among men, it was necessary that divine things be handed down to them through the mode of faith, as things said by God who cannot lie » S. Th. 2. 2. 1. c. To be compared is th. VI of the Tract. de Deo, where, n. III, you will also find explained how St. Thomas at one time affirms that God can be known « easily, » at another not except « with great labor. »

4. All, therefore, that has been said in this paragraph concerning the necessity of revelation and of supernatural faith for the present order of elevation is reduced to this sum. The proper supernatural mode of knowledge, for those tending to the supernatural end of the vision of God, is in the present order faith. The truths revealed by the word of God are in a threefold difference: truths, namely, superrational simply in existence and essence, superrational in existence, and rational of themselves. Hence for the supernatural mode of knowledge—that is, that the truths be apprehended by divine faith—the revelation of them all is necessary; that there exist a sufficient manifestation of them, and hence that knowledge simply as to substance (with abstraction made from mode) may have place, the absolute necessity of revelation holds in the truths of the first and second order, and moral necessity, for the human race taken in common, with respect to the truths of the third order also. Of the objects of the first order, even with revelation supposed, neither can existence be demonstrated from rational principles alone, nor can essence (τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι, or quiddity) be apprehended by proper ideas, but only by analogical ones; of the objects of the second order, existence indeed is certainly demonstrated only from revelation, but essence (what they are) can be understood by proper notions; of the objects of the third order, existence can also be demonstrated by reason, although essence is sometimes apprehended only by analogical ideas. See the Vatican Council, Constit. de Fide, ch. 2.

Corollary 1. For every finite intellect which does not comprehend all truth, absolutely speaking, there can be place for faith on account of the testimony of God, the infinite intellect comprehending all truth. In the present order, where divine faith is the preparation for the beatific vision as the way to the term, faith will be emptied in vision, as inchoation, insofar as it is something imperfect and in potency to perfection, ceases with perfection succeeding. 1 Cor. XIII. 10 ff.; cf. S. Th. de Verit. q. 14, a. 10, ad 8.

Corollary 2. With comparison instituted between knowledge and faith, if they are in the same order, knowledge perfects the intellect more than faith; but if faith is of a superior order, from it there arises for the intellect a greater perfection than from knowledge of an inferior order. « Concerning the most noble things, however imperfect the knowledge, it confers the greatest perfection of soul; and therefore, although human reason cannot fully grasp the things which are above reason, yet much perfection is acquired for itself, if at least in some manner it hold them by faith » S. Th. contr. Gent. l. I, c. 5. If this is true by reason of the nobility of the objects, much more is the soul perfected above natural knowledge by faith, which, both in habit and in act supernatural, inheres in the first truth.