Tractatus de divina traditione et Scriptura

As regards this former question, it is altogether repugnant that the first knowledge, as the foundation of all certitude, should be knowledge of faith; for there can be no assent of faith, unless there precede in the mind, if not in time at least prior in reason, an intellectual knowledge of many truths, which is not through assent from the external motive of authority in one testifying, but is altogether through assent from truth inwardly seen by the power of the inborn light; and the denial of this principle is fitted to undermine all certitude and faith itself.

1. Indeed faith is not assent to the believed truth from a seen internal reason, and much less assent to a truth known through itself and by immediate manifestation of itself; but it is essentially and from its formal character mediated assent to a truth on account of another truth foreknown as a foundation, on account namely of the foreknown authority of the testimony. Whence necessarily every assent of faith, and therefore also the first, is preceded in the mind by manifold intellectual concepts or ideas required for understanding in some measure the sense of the testimony, then by certain knowledge of the authority of the one testifying, and by certain knowledge of the existence of the testimony, as was said a little above. « No one believes anything, unless he first think that it is to be believed » Augustin. de Praedest. SS. c. 2. « Although no one could believe in God, unless he understand something, yet by the very faith by which he believes, he is healed that he may understand greater things » Id. in Ps. CXVIII. serm. 18. n. 3. « We could not even believe, unless we had rational souls.... If it is reasonable that, unto certain great things which cannot yet be grasped, faith precede reason, without doubt even the reason itself, however small, which persuades this (that we believe), itself also precedes faith » Id. ep. 120. n. 3. Namely « faith has not the inquiry of natural reason demonstrating what is believed; it has, however, a certain inquiry into those things by which man is induced to believe, e.g. because they have been said by God and confirmed by miracles » S. Th. 2. 2. q. 2. a. 1. ad. 1.

If anyone should perchance except that that preceding knowledge of the authority of the testimony is itself knowledge of faith, the equivocation must be cleared up. It can be called knowledge of faith, inasmuch as it is supposed as a foundation and thus enters as a necessary element into every assent of faith; but it cannot of itself be knowledge of faith formally, i.e. assent on account of the known authority of the testimony of another, without a halt being made at last in knowledge from an inwardly understood reason. For I ask, if you believe and receive the authority of testimony A on account of the authority of testimony B, how do you know this authority? whether from a known internal reason? Then I have what I contend. Or on account of the authority of a third testimony C? Then the same question will return, and there will be a progress to infinity. By this very fact it is evident that the authority of no testimony would be certainly knowable, in altogether the same way in which, in the singular contingent beings of any series whatever, there is no sufficient reason of existence, unless arrival be made at last at a necessary being. It is evident, therefore, that the first knowledge cannot be affirmed to be knowledge of faith on account of the authority of testimony, without the very foundation of faith being withdrawn ¹. The same argument recurs in the question how the existence of the testimony is certainly known, and whence originate the precognitions necessary for understanding the sense of any and consequently also of the first testimony.

This reason is altogether evident and ineluctable, at least as long as it is a question of merely natural faith. Nevertheless, to elude it, some have invented a new theory concerning immediate knowledge. They have said, namely, that the first knowledge is indeed through faith, yet is not from foreknown authority of testimony, but from a certain instinct of soul, which most obscure business they have called by a learned term immediate knowledge. But that assent to the true either is from discernment of the truth in itself, and then it will not be faith in the proper sense, of which it is a question, but immediate knowledge of truth known through itself by the light of the intellect (cap. II. §. I.), nor is there need of another instinct of soul; or if it is said to be assent, while the true in no way, internal or external, manifests itself to the intellect as true, assent of this kind would indeed be from a surpassingly blind instinct, but neither would it be faith (although Jacobius called that assent by this name), nor any knowledge of the true, and much less certain knowledge (cap. I. §. II.). It is equally absurd, if it is said to be assent to a thing proposed by testimony, yet from blind instinct, without the credibility and truth of the testification (science and truthfulness in the one testifying) being known ². Surely such a mode of assenting is indifferent to the true and to the error proposed, nor can it be in any way certain or necessarily connected with truth. Accordingly, however you conceive the assent of faith (at least as long as it is a question of the natural assent of reason), to which there is not supposed some certain knowledge from the internal reason of the true manifesting itself to the intellect, namely the oft-mentioned knowledge of the authority of the testimony, the certitude of the knowledge of faith cannot subsist; and when they posit such knowledge of faith, resting on no certain foundation, as the foundation or necessary condition of all certitude, this itself is subverted ³.

2. Others say that the foundation of faith is most certain, revelation itself of God the infinite truth; for this faith posits itself as the foundation of all certitude. But a) according to this doctrine, positive revelation and faith in it would have to be called the absolutely necessary complement of human reason, by which it is completed and rendered fit for its natural functions; in this principle, however, is contained the root of the confusion of the natural and the supernatural order. b) I ask, how are the authority of God revealing and the existence of revelation certainly known? For truth formally is in the intellect; nor can we affirm anything concerning an object, except inasmuch as it is known. If the authority of revelation is certainly known from internal reasons manifesting themselves to the intellect, then the first knowledge and the foundation of all certitude neither is nor can be faith formally taken, which is assent on account of testimony; if that authority of revelation is known through another revelation, the same question will return, until a halt is made in some knowledge from internal reasons, as declared above.

But they rejoin; if so, certitude is reduced to subjective knowledge, nor does man now believe God but himself. The very proposal of this difficulty betrays the confusion of all notions. Certitude formally is in knowledge, but knowledge is the vital act of the intellect; and so formal certitude repugns which is not subjective, i.e. which is not in the knowing subject; but there is simply no certitude, except inasmuch as firm assent answers to the objective dignity of the reasons demanding firmness of assent; and so subjective certitude answering to the known authority of the divine testimony is the certitude of faith of which it is a question. It is not, however, merely subjective certitude, which we do not admit, but which the adversaries are compelled to admit, if they assert firm assent to testimony without knowledge of the objective reasons by which the truth of the testimony manifests itself to the intellect (cap. I. §. II.). Further, for man to believe himself is an absurd locution derived from confusing formal certitude and the reflex knowledge of certitude with the motive or formal object of assent. In all certain knowledge man indeed himself knows with certitude, and can reflexively know this certitude; but no one believes or can believe except another, since to believe in its proper signification is nothing else than to give assent on account of the known authority of another testifying.

3. Lastly it could be said that not natural but supernatural faith is that foundation of all certitude; but that in this faith the infused light of faith itself determines the intellect to assent to the revealed truth, and therefore no previous knowledge of the reasons demanding assent is required. But a) if supernatural faith is thus constituted the necessary foundation of all certitude, by that very fact such faith is asserted to be due to rational nature, and so natural, not supernatural. Since, however, supernatural faith is the foundation and root of all supernatural justice (Conc. Trident. sess. VI. cap. 8.), from that doctrine follows the subversion of the whole truly supernatural and gratuitous order. b) Since nevertheless in words at least it is called supernatural faith, we say that assent of this kind without known reason demanding assent cannot be supernatural, because it is imprudent. For although the light of faith can supply what in the mode of proposing the object is perchance accidentally lacking, provided the knowledge of the reasons here and now excluding prudent fear precede (cap. II. §. III.), yet the light of faith cannot concur to assent, unless the object be manifested as credible. c) Nay, assent of faith without knowledge of the formal object, and without some knowledge by which the true sense of the material object is perceived, is impossible. « For it would follow, says Suarez, that faith (the habit of faith) does not give assent in a rational and intellectual manner but after the manner of a natural agent, which can neither be said nor thought; for how will the intellect give assent, unless it see and know some sufficient motive for assenting? » de Fide disp. III. sect. 3. n. 2. Whence d) the light of faith is so far from being ordained to excluding the necessary knowledge of the objective reasons (of the authority of God and of God revealing), that on the contrary it is given and is necessary for the supernatural elevation and conformation of the knowledge of those same reasons. Vide Conc. Vatican. Constit. de Fide cap. 3. can. 3.