Prolegomenon: On the Objective Principles of Christian Knowledge and of Theology in General

On truth

Truth is commonly defined as « the assimilation of thing and intellect. » Truth can therefore be considered in things or objects, and in the intellect.

Truth as it is in objects is their relation to intellect insofar as, as they are, they can be known, or it is their cognoscibility. Whatever has the character of being is knowable before some intellect; and conversely whatever is knowable has the character of being. This truth therefore extends as widely as the character of being; whence being and true are convertible.

Because the character of being and consequently the relation of being to intellect transcends all the categories, this truth is called transcendental.

Because cognoscibility is not formally but only fundamentally an assimilation of thing and intellect, this truth is also called fundamental.

Truth as it is in the intellect, i. e. in the act of understanding or in cognition, consists in the conformity of cognition with the object or with fundamental truth. This conformity is formal truth, which is set forth in the definition placed at the beginning.

If a knower manifests his cognition, the conformity of the manifestation with the cognition is moral truth or truthfulness, which pertains more to the will than to the intellect. With formal truth in the intellect presupposed, in the manifestation of cognition there is also conformity with the object. This conformity of the manifestation with the object is truth of manifestation simply, which arises from formal truth in the intellect and from moral truth or truthfulness pertaining to the will.
God, insofar as He is infinite and necessary Being (ὁ ὢν), infinitely knowable, on whom as on principle and end every character of being essentially depends, is the first fundamental truth. Insofar as He is the infinite intellect identified with the infinite essence, and therefore the substantial intellection of the infinite true and in it of all truth, and likewise insofar as under this character of infinite intellection He is the exemplar, fount and origin of all participated intellectual light, God is substantially the first formal truth. Insofar as He is rectitude itself, the norm, exemplar, principle and end of all rectitude, God is the first moral truth. For this reason every manifestation of God, every word of God, is necessarily true with moral truth and with truth of manifestation in the unqualified sense. God is truth (ἡ ἀλήθεια). By appropriation the Father could be called the first fundamental truth, the Word the first formal truth, the Holy Spirit the first truth of rectitude or holiness. See Tract. de Deo th. XXVIII. XXXVI. seqq.

The created intellect ¹ is not truth itself; yet it is the natural image of God, insofar as by its nature it is made for truth, which it possesses by knowing, and through which from potency (i. e. possibility and ordination to further connatural perfection) it comes into act (i. e. into its own proper perfection). Truth is therefore the proper good of the intellect, and the greater, the nobler the truth; whence the supreme truth, i. e. God objectively, and the possession of God through cognition subjectively, is the ultimate end of the intellect ².

Corollary 1. Formal truth is in a certain measure also in the simple apprehension of the object. For simple apprehension is conformed, and indeed always, to its object; whence no simple perception, whether of the senses or of the imagination or of the intellect, can in itself be false, although it can furnish the occasion of a false judgment. Since, however, such simple representation is rather the beginning and element of human cognition than cognition, which is only completed through judgment, it is therefore sometimes said that in simple perception there is neither truth nor falsity. Cognition, then, in the more proper sense in our present condition is perfected through composition and division or through judgment, when we compare one concept with another, and thus judge one to agree or not to agree with the other. In judgment there can be conformity or difformity of the intellect with the object, i. e. there can be formal truth or falsity. This conformity of judgment, therefore, more properly than the conformity of simple perception, is and is called formal truth. « Our intellect, says St. Thomas, has a twofold operation. One by which it forms the simple quiddities of things, as what man is (το τι ἦν εἶναι), or what animal is; in which operation indeed the true is not found of itself, nor the false, just as neither in incomplex utterances. The other operation of the intellect is that according to which it composes and divides by affirming and denying, and in this the true and the false are already found, as also in complex utterance (enunciation or sentence), which is its sign » S. Th. de Veritat. q. 14. a. 1. Θ.

Corollary. 2. Truth in things, as we have said, is their relation to intellect; whence it is clear what falsity can and what cannot underlie things. In relation to the divine ideas and to the divine practical intellect, the truth of things is their conformity with the divine intellect, which (as practical) is either efficient or precept-giving. Difformity from the divine efficient ideas is repugnant (λόγοι οὐσιοποιοί Dionys. div. nomin. c. 5. n. 8). But with free created will supposed, there can be in the moral order difformity from the divine precept-giving reason and from the divine norm of rectitude. Whence in the Scriptures every sin is called a lie. In relation to the ideas of the created intellect, even the practical, there can be and often is difformity in things depending on that practical intellect. In relation to the speculative intellect, whether divine or human, no falsity properly so called can underlie things themselves, although they can be the occasion of falsity in the created intellect. In relation to the divine intellect what we say is evident of itself; for He is by His inmost essence and perfection determined to comprehend all truth. In relation also to the created intellect what we have affirmed is easily understood. For truth in things is the cognoscibility of being, to which falsity is opposed not contradictorily but contrarily. The negation of cognoscibility, therefore, would not yet be falsity; then too this negation itself is not in the object, but arises from the imperfection of the created intellect; for being in itself is knowable only insofar as it is being. A falsity contrary to truth, however, would be such a relation arising from the very nature of being that it would elicit a false judgment from a rightly knowing intellect; but this is evidently absurd. No falsity, therefore, can be in things according to their relation to the speculative intellect. Many things, however, can be and are so constituted as easily and frequently to furnish occasion to an imperfect intellect of attributing to them predicates which in reality do not belong to them, or conversely of denying those which do belong. Those to which other and especially nobler predicates than befit them are attributed, if they easily furnish occasion for erring thus, are denominated by those who know by that predicate as false which is attributed to them by the erring as true: false gods, false friends, false virtue, false gold.

On self-evident truths

The internal reason in some truths shines forth immediately from the perceived terms themselves. There are namely truths in which either every intellect in possession of itself, or at least one somewhat more cultivated, sufficiently perceives by an easy intuition the comprehension of the notes in the one and the other idea — which are compared and are the terms of the judgment and of the proposition — so that from the very perceived notion their agreement or disagreement is immediately evident to it. Evident in this way to any intellect whatever are those truths whose elements are the most universal ideas, and therefore simplest in comprehension of notes, which the intellect first forms as it goes forth into act. These are the first principles, from which the intellect advances to understanding other things. Whence it appears why the simply first principle for us (in the logical order) is this: « that the same thing cannot at once be and not be. » For in the idea of being, which the intellect forms first of all, this principle is founded, and from it is immediately understood; in it, moreover, all subsequent cognitions are founded. For all subsequent concepts are formed by addition to being taken most universally and therefore most abstractly — not indeed by addition of something which is outside the character of being, outside of which there is nothing, but through a more express conception of the modes which effect all being (thing, one, something, true, good), or through the conception of the grades of being according to which there are the diverse genera of things. See S. Th. de Verit. q. 1. a. 1. θ.

Because the light of the intellect, or the intellectual power connatural to us, connaturally forms such fundamental concepts and first principles without study and the culture of discipline, as soon as it puts itself forth into its own proper acts, and because all subsequent activity connatural to the intellect advances from those first principles, they are therefore called principles innate in us. « There pre-exist in us certain seeds of the sciences, namely the first conceptions of the intellect, which are known at once by the light of the agent intellect through species abstracted from sensibles, whether they be complex as dignities (ἀξιώματα or principles), or incomplex as the character of being, of one, and the like, which the intellect apprehends at once. From these universal principles, moreover, all principles follow as from certain seminal reasons » S. Th. de Verit. q. 11. (de Magistro) a. 1. cf. q. 10. a. 6.

Sometimes the ideas to be compared, or the terms of the judgment and of the proposition, are sufficiently perceived according to their notes not by any intellect in possession of itself, but only by an intellect already preformed and cultivated by many notions, so that from the perceived terms themselves their agreement or disagreement is evidently understood. Truths of this kind, immediately evident not to all but only to the learned, are many in all disciplines.

Both classes of truths which are self-evident St. Thomas sets forth. « As Boethius says, some are dignities (ἀξιώματα) or propositions self-evident commonly to all, and of this kind are those propositions whose terms are known to all... But some propositions are self-evident to the wise alone, who understand what the terms of the propositions signify... In those things, moreover, which fall into the apprehension of men, a certain order is found. For that which first falls into apprehension is being, whose understanding is included in all things whatsoever one apprehends; and therefore the first indemonstrable principle is that it is not at once to affirm and to deny, which is founded upon the character of being and non-being, and upon this principle all others are founded » S. Th. 1. 2. q. 94. a. 2.

In truths which are understood from the perceived terms themselves, or which are self-evident, the material object (which is manifested to the intellect and which is known) is also the formal object (under which it is manifested and known); they are therefore rightly called truths known through themselves. Nevertheless even in these the material and formal object can be distinguished by the reason and consideration of the mind.

The cognition of truth manifested through itself, or self-evident, is, as is clear, immediate cognition, and this is specifically called intellection or intellect by the ancients in distinction from science (of which presently); whence they say: intellect is of principles. Hence also the faculty of the mind, or the mind itself insofar as it is referred to the intuition of self-evident truth, is called intellect in distinction from reason, which is referred to the science of truths known from others as from principles.

Corollary. When simply and without qualification we speak of self-evident truths, we mean truths self-evident for our human intellect. In themselves all necessary truths would be self-evident; for with the quiddity of the terms sufficiently understood, the agreement or disagreement of the same would thereby be understood. But when the human intellect does not sufficiently penetrate the quiddity of the terms, it comes about that neither can it understand the agreement and disagreement from the terms themselves; and thus truths of this kind for us are not self-evident. S. Th. de Verit. q. 10. a. 12.

On truths known through others

In the ontological order there exists a connexion, dependence, and relation of beings among themselves. In the most general signification of the terms we can for the present matter reduce all relations to the connexion of cause and principle with effect and principiate. Whence also in the order of cognition truths, or beings insofar as knowable, are mutually connected, so that the human mind can advance from one known truth to the cognition of another. For a cause, considered according to its perfection, contains the effect in itself at least in potency, and insofar as it is a univocal cause, i. e. operating according to the perfection of its nature to produce a homogeneous effect of the same character as itself, its perfection simply determines the perfection of the effect; when however it is an equivocal cause, i. e. one not acting according to the whole perfection of its power and producing a heterogeneous effect of a character diverse from itself, its perfection in a certain measure determines the perfection of the effect. Further, a necessary cause, and a cause insofar as it is in act although not acting necessarily, is connected with the existence of the effect; but a cause in potency and not acting necessarily coheres with the possibility of the effect. Conversely the perfection of the effect is connected with the perfection of the cause, and the existing effect with the existence of the cause and of the series of causes up to the first, which has no cause. Hence in the order of cognition the effect can be known in such a way that its nexus and relation to the cause is understood, and with this nexus supposed, from the known nature and perfection of the effect the perfection of the cause is known, insofar as it is manifested from that nexus and from the perfection of the effect; conversely too the cause can be known in its perfection and formal character in such a way that its nexus with the effect is known, and from its perfection and action the proper character and perfection of the effect is known. What we say of the efficient cause holds in its own way of the formal cause in relation to what depends on it, and of the final cause in relation to what is for the end, and generally of any relation whatever of principle to principiate.

When human reason from that which is prior only in cognition but ontologically posterior knows that which is ontologically prior and posterior only in cognition, the cognition is said to be a posteriori. A priori cognition descends from that which is prior both in being and in cognition to the cognition of the posterior.

Insofar as a cause or principle is the medium from which the effect or principiate is known, or vice versa — in sum, insofar as one truth is the formal object under which another is manifested and known — the cognition is mediate. The faculty of the mind, moreover, insofar as it reaches from one or more known truths to others to be known, is specifically called reason, at least among writers before our age, as has already been said above. Cf. S. Th. 1. q. 79. a. 8.

The cognition of those things which depend on others as on causes and principles in the ontological order is never perfect, nor is the knowing mind fully satisfied, unless they are known from their very causes and principles. Then indeed not only the causes and the truths which are the medium of knowing in which, as they call it, but the effects themselves and the truths understood from principles are known in themselves and according to their inmost character. The higher the causes known up to the supreme, and the more fully the dependent effects and consequences are known from them, the more perfect is the cognition.

Cognition from causes is properly called science by the ancients. If it be science from the highest causes, on which all orders of knowable things depend — and so science from the eminent universality of principles, which contain under themselves as a norm the lower principles of particular sciences — it has the name of wisdom.

« Truth is doubly considerable, says St. Thomas: in one way as self-evident, in another way as known through another. What is self-evident holds itself as a principle and is perceived at once by the intellect, and therefore the habit perfecting the intellect for the consideration of truth of this kind is called intellect, which is the habit of principles. But truth which is known through another is not perceived at once by the intellect but through the inquiry of reason, and holds itself in the character of a term. This indeed can be in two ways: in one way as it is ultimate in some genus, in another way as it is ultimate in respect of the whole of human cognition. And because those things which are known later for us are prior and more known according to nature... therefore what is ultimate in respect of the whole of human cognition is what is first and most knowable according to nature. And about things of this kind is wisdom, which considers the highest causes... But for what is ultimate in this or that genus of knowable things, science perfects the intellect; and therefore according to the diverse genera of knowable things there are diverse habits of sciences, although wisdom is but one » S. Th. 1. 2. q. 57. a. 2.

You will notice from this by the way how God also in this sense is wisdom itself (ἡ αὐτοσοφία), namely insofar as in His essence as in the supreme reason He beholds the whole amplitude, all orders, and all relations of knowable things. All created wisdom, moreover, is a certain assimilation to and participation of that divine wisdom (see Lessius de Perfection. divin. l. IV.). In God there is not as in us a wisdom of reason advancing from understood causes to the understanding of effects and of whatever depends on causes and principles; but there is a wisdom of intellect beholding all things in His own essence as in the representation of all truth — beholding, moreover, not only as all truth is in the divine essence as in the supreme reason, but also as it is in itself (cf. Tract. de Deo th. XXXVI-XXXIX.).

All those who assume that the mode of our cognition is the most perfect, and that its order from its very first beginnings corresponds to the ontological order of knowable things, thereby also maintain that the first inception and progress of our cognition begins from the immediate intuition of absolute being, which is the supreme cause and reason of all knowable things; and consequently that whatever we know is known by us first of all under the character and through the idea of absolute being. Since, however, on the one hand absolute being cannot be beheld immediately in itself by the intellect without, on account of its very simplicity, being beheld according to all perfection as it is in itself (Tract. de Deo th. XVII.), and since on the other hand it is altogether evident that that character of being which we first know, from which we advance to knowing all grades of being, and under which we know all things, is abstract universal being; there is indeed imminent danger lest absolute being — infinite in intensity of perfection, one and singular, and eminent above the whole character of being which we can naturally know immediately in itself — be confounded with universal being, least in intensity of perfection of all things that can be conceived, as being the most abstract, consisting of a single note (Tract. de Deo th. XXIV.). Cf. Concil. Vatican. Constit. de Fide cap. 1. can. 3. 4.

The mode of our rational cognition, therefore, is not such that it begins from the highest cause and advances from it to the understanding of the rest, which depend on that supreme cause; but on the contrary those things which are ontologically posterior are prior in our cognition. From phenomena and operations we first understand the substance underlying them, from effects the cause; from sensibles begins the progress of cognition to supersensible things, from lower to higher things to be in some measure understood. Most of all, indeed, we can know the first cause itself by the natural light of reason only a posteriori, insofar as it manifests itself in effects and in all things depending on it. From the known reality of the posterior we can know the reality of the prior, from the existence of the effect the existence of the cause; the perfection, however, and quiddity of the cause is known from the effect only insofar as the perfection of the transient action or effect manifests it. Where therefore the effect is equivocal, i. e. of a character altogether other than is the essence of the cause, the cognition of the cause from the effect — what it is — cannot be but imperfect, concluding from the foreknown perfections of the effect or action to analogous but eminent perfections of the cause itself (Tract. de Deo th. X. sqq.). Moreover the effects themselves and what depends on causes are not perfectly known, so that the mind is fully satisfied, so long as they are not known from their causes.

This a posteriori cognition, therefore, so long as one rests in it alone, is indeed imperfect in the character of science, yet is the necessary beginning of human science; it can however without doubt be called science simply, although this name belongs to it in a less strict sense than to cognition from causes. Once the cause is known at least in some measure from the effect, reason itself by more diligent consideration of the perfections of the cause can advance to a deeper cognition of the same, from them advance to knowing others, and finally turn back and as it were descend to the science of effects from causes. See S. Th. in Boëth. de Trin. lect. 2. q. 2. a. 1. solut. 3.

From what has been said it is also clear how mediate rational cognition, where one truth is manifested to the intellect through another, is nevertheless cognition from internal reasons. For the light of reason understands one truth which is to it the principle of cognition in such a way that it at once sees its inward nexus with another truth, and understands this truth by its own force from that inward nexus beheld with the truth foreknown as a principle. It is nevertheless true that the effect from its cause is known more in itself and therefore more from its inmost reason than the cause from its effect.

On the formal nature of faith considered in general

We can indeed know a truth not only inasmuch as it manifests itself to our intellect, through internal reasons, immediately or mediately in itself; but also from an external reason, inasmuch as we are rendered certain that it is known as true by some other intellect. Thus anyone, even one altogether without astronomical science, can know a future eclipse of the sun, inasmuch as he is rendered certain that it is known by astronomers as about to occur from fixed and (physically) immutable laws. The knowledge of the astronomer is knowledge of the truth in itself, from the causes seen through, and so is science from internal reasons; the knowledge of the unlearned man rests solely on the foreknown science and truthfulness of the astronomers. Although the science of the astronomers may be said to be connected with the future eclipse as the posterior with the prior, this foreknown connection does not, however, effect that the unlearned man understands the truth (that there will be an eclipse at such an hour) in itself, why it is so and how it is so; but for his intellect that authority of the astronomers is an external reason for knowing the existence of the object to which they testify.

This mode of knowledge is not science and understanding of the truth in the proper sense, because it does not read within, as the Scholastics are wont to say; but it is faith, because, trusting in the science and truthfulness of another, it gives assent to a truth, which assent itself is signified by the verb to believe. Inasmuch as the formal object is regarded, we believe someone; inasmuch as it is assent to the material object, we believe something ¹. Comprehending both we are said to believe in someone; but this is not properly said except in relation to the first truth which is God, inasmuch as by faith in God we tend toward Him as toward the supreme truth and the ultimate end; whence also in the Creed we believe in God, and we believe the holy Church (cf. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 1. a. 9. ad 5.). See on this whole manner of distinguishing Gregor. Nazianz. or. 31. (al. 37.) n. 6; Rufinum in Symbol. n. 36; s. Aug. in Io. tract. 29; serm. 144. c. 2; theologos in 3. dist. 23; in S. Th. 2. 2. q. 2. a. 2.

As therefore in the intellect specifically so called the formal object or motive of assent is the internal reason of the true immediately manifesting itself to the intellect, and in science specifically so called the formal object is principles a priori or at least a posteriori manifesting the truth to be known intrinsically and in itself, though mediately and through another; so the formal object or motive of assent in faith is the foreknown science and truthfulness (authority) of another, which, because it does not render the truth intelligible in itself for the intellect assenting, is for that intellect an external reason demanding assent to the truth. Faith, therefore, taken generically, is assent to the object of a judgment as true, given on account of the authority of one testifying. Cf. S. Th. de Verit. q. 14. a. 1.

It is established from what has been said that the knowledge of a truth to be believed is, from the very nature of faith, always mediated; we know, namely, the truth to be believed as the material object through another foreknown truth as through the formal object, by which the former is manifested as to be believed.

There is therefore presupposed to every assent of faith (whether natural or supernatural, whether of divine or of human faith) a manifold knowledge. For there is prerequired a) knowledge that the other neither errs in his acquaintance with or science of the truth, nor deceives in his manifestation of it; b) knowledge of the existence of such a manifestation; c) that in some way, if not distinctly at least confusedly, the sense of the testimony be understood; which cannot be done unless the mind apprehend, by at least analogical concepts, the very things signified by the external or internal terms or words. It is manifest, moreover, that these very prerequisite knowledges, namely in divine faith, i.e. to be rendered on account of the authority of God speaking, suppose the mind already informed by many ideas and intellectual principles. Whence the doctrine of those is evidently repugnant who think that either the first knowledge of the human mind, as the condition for explaining the use of reason and as the foundation of all certitude, or altogether all certain knowledge, must be derived from faith, in which the formal object and motive of assent is authority whether divine or human (the authority of the consensus, as they think, of the human race). As regards divine faith, hither pertains the proposition subscribed by order of the Holy See (8. Sept. 1840. and 11. Iunii 1855.): « The use of reason precedes faith, and leads man to it with the help of revelation and grace. » Cf. Encycl. S. P. Pii IX. 9. Nov. 1846.

Corollary 1. Faith differs from science by its formal object, by which the material object is manifested and on account of which it is to be believed, and consequently by its mode of knowledge. Nor does it follow thence, however, that there cannot be some science of faith, namely of the divine faith which is believed. For there can be a science of the foundations of faith; and, faith being supposed, there can be some science of the very truths of faith, while some are assumed as principles for understanding others as consequent upon them; and finally the truths of faith can serve as principles for understanding more fully and more profoundly other truths which of themselves are not of faith. Cf. Concil. Vatican. Constit. de Fide cap. 4. This science of divine faith is sacred theology, which according to its accidental form, and according to its amplitude and even profundity, can be various in various ages, yet simply can never fail in the Church of God, because the guardians of the faith are by divine institution also teachers of the faith, and because from the sweet divine providence the human element is required for the custody of the deposit under the assistance of the Holy Spirit by this very fact, that the Church is governed not by perpetual new revelations and inspiration properly so called, but through the assistance of the Holy Spirit (de Tradit. th. XXV.).

Corollary 2. The Rationalists, of all the most diverse classes, can admit no faith which would be assent on account of the authority of God revealing, since they deny the very foundation, namely revelation. When, therefore, many of them are nevertheless loud in commending religious faith, they necessarily pervert its essential notion. They distinguish faith as it is in the common run of men, as knowledge of religious truths under symbolic coverings without scientific knowledge and therefore in the lowest grade; then the rational faith which others call metaphysical, as it is in learned men and philosophers, faith already refined and elevated to science. Since therefore this faith, to which alone they attribute pure truth, is nothing else than the science of divine things pertaining to religion, according to the diverse account by which they explain religion and the science of divine things, they hand down ever different definitions of religious faith. For the speculative Rationalists there is in its full truth no other faith than speculative science; whence for the pantheists the supreme perfection of religion and the ultimate refinement of faith consists in this, that man knows himself to be identical with God. The Kantians acknowledged no faith other than the approval of religious (moral) ideas on account of practical exigency, that man may preserve his own dignity. Those called Pietists place faith in a certain religious sense of soul or interior sensible experience, which is traced back to a certain blind instinct, whether fanatics derive it from the Holy Spirit (Methodists, Quakers etc.), or rationalistically place it in a certain vague sense of dependence, which, cohering with rational nature, is said to be the one essential mark of true religion (Schleiermacher). The Rationalists called vulgar say that faith in general is the assent of the mind to an object which is understood to be true not immediately in itself but mediately from demonstration; whence they declare religious faith to be the persuasion of reason concerning divine things (Wegscheider Instit. §. 2. et alii plurimi.)

Little different from these, as regards the very notion of faith, is the doctrine of George Hermes. For he calls every firm persuasion induced by constraining reasons, theoretical or practical, faith in the proper sense. « Excluding false credulity, he says, even that which by accident believes what is true, but according to reason is no less worthy of reprehension, the definition of faith must be this: faith is in us the state of certitude or persuasion concerning the truth of the thing known, into which state we are brought through the necessary assent of theoretical reason or through the necessary consent of practical reason. This rational faith is the supreme end of all philosophy, the one true norm of man in this life, and the necessary condition for his elevation » (Hermes Introd. philos. in theolog. p. 259.).

Other recent writers call faith the immediate knowledge of truths which have not been deduced and demonstrated from principles at least logically prior. In inverted order others (namely the Güntherians) signify by the same name of faith the knowledge of the cause from the effect, of the ontological foundation from phenomena, of what is ontologically prior from what is posterior; namely what is called faith by them is nothing else than science a posteriori. Such knowledge of the cause from the effect, where it has religious truths for its object, they think to be that faith by which we are named and are faithful. Thus one of them (in Lexico Ecclesiastico Friburg. T. IV. p. 522.). « What is faith in the sublimest sense? Faith is the apprehension of those things which underlie phenomena and experience. The Christian knows and believes the existence of God, while he beholds His majesty and divinity in the universe. » But this is certainly not the virtue of Christian faith; nay, knowledge of the cause from even supernatural effects, formally as it is an inference of reason, is not faith properly so called; but it pertains under one account to science, under another account to the motives of credibility, and again under another to the foundations of faith (Tract. de Deo th. VIII.).

In all these theories the formal object of divine faith, namely that the assent is on account of the authority of God revealing, is removed, another formal object, that of science, being substituted for it. By this very fact the essential character of faith properly so called, which is a theological virtue, is wholly perverted, and in place of the Christian there is introduced a philosophical faith, if it please to call that science, improperly and from some analogy, faith. Vide Conc. Vatican. Constit. de Fide cap. 3. can. 2.

There is indeed, between the twofold mode of knowledge which, as we have said, is called faith by these recent writers, and faith properly so called, some analogy, which could have been the cause of the interchange of the name. For as to the former mode, where immediate understanding of truth is called by the name of faith, there is some analogy in this, that just as the immediately evident truth, so the truth of the word of God is not demonstrated from another ontologically prior principle. In this sense faith is called by Clement of Alexandria « grace leading from indemonstrables to the principle of the universe » Strom. 1. II. p. 364; l. VII. p. 757. 772. cf. inter Opp. s. Basil. comment. in Ps. 115. n. 1. The other mode, namely knowledge of the cause from effects, can be compared with faith, in that just as substance as the ontological principle manifests itself in its phenomena and operations, and from these manifestations we understand it (ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων το νοούμενον) cf. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 8. a. 1; so God manifests Himself and His truth in the word of the hearing of faith, and from this we know God. Further, just as knowledge of substance from its phenomena is direct and in a qualified sense immediate, as far as can be done for the present condition, yet in comparison with intuition of substance in itself is imperfect and mediated knowledge; so knowledge through faith in comparison with knowledge of God from creatures is more direct and immediate, but in comparison with intuitive vision is itself also mediated and imperfect « through a glass in a dark manner » 1. Cor. XIII. 12. But such analogies do not remove the essential distinction between faith and the rational knowledge of the cause from the effect, according to the formal object; which distinction is much greater still, if faith formally inasmuch as it is supernatural be compared with natural knowledge, of which matter there is no place to speak now. The name of faith, therefore, can be judged common to each mode of knowledge not univocally but only analogically.

On the necessity of faith asserted by some, in general and namely of faith in revelation in relation to the whole order of our knowledge

As regards this former question, it is altogether repugnant that the first knowledge, as the foundation of all certitude, should be knowledge of faith; for there can be no assent of faith, unless there precede in the mind, if not in time at least prior in reason, an intellectual knowledge of many truths, which is not through assent from the external motive of authority in one testifying, but is altogether through assent from truth inwardly seen by the power of the inborn light; and the denial of this principle is fitted to undermine all certitude and faith itself.

Indeed faith is not assent to the believed truth from a seen internal reason, and much less assent to a truth known through itself and by immediate manifestation of itself; but it is essentially and from its formal character mediated assent to a truth on account of another truth foreknown as a foundation, on account namely of the foreknown authority of the testimony. Whence necessarily every assent of faith, and therefore also the first, is preceded in the mind by manifold intellectual concepts or ideas required for understanding in some measure the sense of the testimony, then by certain knowledge of the authority of the one testifying, and by certain knowledge of the existence of the testimony, as was said a little above. « No one believes anything, unless he first think that it is to be believed » Augustin. de Praedest. SS. c. 2. « Although no one could believe in God, unless he understand something, yet by the very faith by which he believes, he is healed that he may understand greater things » Id. in Ps. CXVIII. serm. 18. n. 3. « We could not even believe, unless we had rational souls.... If it is reasonable that, unto certain great things which cannot yet be grasped, faith precede reason, without doubt even the reason itself, however small, which persuades this (that we believe), itself also precedes faith » Id. ep. 120. n. 3. Namely « faith has not the inquiry of natural reason demonstrating what is believed; it has, however, a certain inquiry into those things by which man is induced to believe, e.g. because they have been said by God and confirmed by miracles » S. Th. 2. 2. q. 2. a. 1. ad. 1.

If anyone should perchance except that that preceding knowledge of the authority of the testimony is itself knowledge of faith, the equivocation must be cleared up. It can be called knowledge of faith, inasmuch as it is supposed as a foundation and thus enters as a necessary element into every assent of faith; but it cannot of itself be knowledge of faith formally, i.e. assent on account of the known authority of the testimony of another, without a halt being made at last in knowledge from an inwardly understood reason. For I ask, if you believe and receive the authority of testimony A on account of the authority of testimony B, how do you know this authority? whether from a known internal reason? Then I have what I contend. Or on account of the authority of a third testimony C? Then the same question will return, and there will be a progress to infinity. By this very fact it is evident that the authority of no testimony would be certainly knowable, in altogether the same way in which, in the singular contingent beings of any series whatever, there is no sufficient reason of existence, unless arrival be made at last at a necessary being. It is evident, therefore, that the first knowledge cannot be affirmed to be knowledge of faith on account of the authority of testimony, without the very foundation of faith being withdrawn ¹. The same argument recurs in the question how the existence of the testimony is certainly known, and whence originate the precognitions necessary for understanding the sense of any and consequently also of the first testimony.

This reason is altogether evident and ineluctable, at least as long as it is a question of merely natural faith. Nevertheless, to elude it, some have invented a new theory concerning immediate knowledge. They have said, namely, that the first knowledge is indeed through faith, yet is not from foreknown authority of testimony, but from a certain instinct of soul, which most obscure business they have called by a learned term immediate knowledge. But that assent to the true either is from discernment of the truth in itself, and then it will not be faith in the proper sense, of which it is a question, but immediate knowledge of truth known through itself by the light of the intellect (cap. II. §. I.), nor is there need of another instinct of soul; or if it is said to be assent, while the true in no way, internal or external, manifests itself to the intellect as true, assent of this kind would indeed be from a surpassingly blind instinct, but neither would it be faith (although Jacobius called that assent by this name), nor any knowledge of the true, and much less certain knowledge (cap. I. §. II.). It is equally absurd, if it is said to be assent to a thing proposed by testimony, yet from blind instinct, without the credibility and truth of the testification (science and truthfulness in the one testifying) being known ². Surely such a mode of assenting is indifferent to the true and to the error proposed, nor can it be in any way certain or necessarily connected with truth. Accordingly, however you conceive the assent of faith (at least as long as it is a question of the natural assent of reason), to which there is not supposed some certain knowledge from the internal reason of the true manifesting itself to the intellect, namely the oft-mentioned knowledge of the authority of the testimony, the certitude of the knowledge of faith cannot subsist; and when they posit such knowledge of faith, resting on no certain foundation, as the foundation or necessary condition of all certitude, this itself is subverted ³.

Others say that the foundation of faith is most certain, revelation itself of God the infinite truth; for this faith posits itself as the foundation of all certitude. But a) according to this doctrine, positive revelation and faith in it would have to be called the absolutely necessary complement of human reason, by which it is completed and rendered fit for its natural functions; in this principle, however, is contained the root of the confusion of the natural and the supernatural order. b) I ask, how are the authority of God revealing and the existence of revelation certainly known? For truth formally is in the intellect; nor can we affirm anything concerning an object, except inasmuch as it is known. If the authority of revelation is certainly known from internal reasons manifesting themselves to the intellect, then the first knowledge and the foundation of all certitude neither is nor can be faith formally taken, which is assent on account of testimony; if that authority of revelation is known through another revelation, the same question will return, until a halt is made in some knowledge from internal reasons, as declared above.

But they rejoin; if so, certitude is reduced to subjective knowledge, nor does man now believe God but himself. The very proposal of this difficulty betrays the confusion of all notions. Certitude formally is in knowledge, but knowledge is the vital act of the intellect; and so formal certitude repugns which is not subjective, i.e. which is not in the knowing subject; but there is simply no certitude, except inasmuch as firm assent answers to the objective dignity of the reasons demanding firmness of assent; and so subjective certitude answering to the known authority of the divine testimony is the certitude of faith of which it is a question. It is not, however, merely subjective certitude, which we do not admit, but which the adversaries are compelled to admit, if they assert firm assent to testimony without knowledge of the objective reasons by which the truth of the testimony manifests itself to the intellect (cap. I. §. II.). Further, for man to believe himself is an absurd locution derived from confusing formal certitude and the reflex knowledge of certitude with the motive or formal object of assent. In all certain knowledge man indeed himself knows with certitude, and can reflexively know this certitude; but no one believes or can believe except another, since to believe in its proper signification is nothing else than to give assent on account of the known authority of another testifying.

Lastly it could be said that not natural but supernatural faith is that foundation of all certitude; but that in this faith the infused light of faith itself determines the intellect to assent to the revealed truth, and therefore no previous knowledge of the reasons demanding assent is required. But a) if supernatural faith is thus constituted the necessary foundation of all certitude, by that very fact such faith is asserted to be due to rational nature, and so natural, not supernatural. Since, however, supernatural faith is the foundation and root of all supernatural justice (Conc. Trident. sess. VI. cap. 8.), from that doctrine follows the subversion of the whole truly supernatural and gratuitous order. b) Since nevertheless in words at least it is called supernatural faith, we say that assent of this kind without known reason demanding assent cannot be supernatural, because it is imprudent. For although the light of faith can supply what in the mode of proposing the object is perchance accidentally lacking, provided the knowledge of the reasons here and now excluding prudent fear precede (cap. II. §. III.), yet the light of faith cannot concur to assent, unless the object be manifested as credible. c) Nay, assent of faith without knowledge of the formal object, and without some knowledge by which the true sense of the material object is perceived, is impossible. « For it would follow, says Suarez, that faith (the habit of faith) does not give assent in a rational and intellectual manner but after the manner of a natural agent, which can neither be said nor thought; for how will the intellect give assent, unless it see and know some sufficient motive for assenting? » de Fide disp. III. sect. 3. n. 2. Whence d) the light of faith is so far from being ordained to excluding the necessary knowledge of the objective reasons (of the authority of God and of God revealing), that on the contrary it is given and is necessary for the supernatural elevation and conformation of the knowledge of those same reasons. Vide Conc. Vatican. Constit. de Fide cap. 3. can. 3.

On the necessity of faith said to be included in the necessity of social institution

Some have attempted to prove that the whole of our knowledge, at least of the metaphysical, theological, and ethical order, is received from faith, or rests upon faith as its necessary ultimate foundation, from that opinion which establishes the absolute necessity of instruction and erudition in human society, in such a way that without this instruction man would perpetually and necessarily remain devoid of all ideas and knowledge of this kind, and thus be deprived of the use of reason¹. A fuller disputation concerning these opinions being remitted to psychology, where the origin of ideas is treated, it will suffice for our present scope to declare the function of instruction ordered to the knowledge of the true from internal reasons, which for brevity's sake we shall call scientia, and the distinction of this instruction from tradition, by which an object is proposed as to be believed on account of the authority of testimony, to which faith corresponds.

²

Any instruction whatever, that is, any proposal of truth made from without, does not effect but supposes the subjective powers of understanding. But, the adversaries reply, instruction is necessary for unfolding the powers of human reason; for without instruction, as experience shows, man never arrives at the use of reason. Be it so; I now ask, what does it mean for man to have the use of reason? I think nothing else than that, with a sound harmony of the cognitive faculties supposed, his intellect is already informed with a sufficient amplitude of ideas and of truths (judgments in habit), which he can rightly use according to the inborn power of reason, and from which he can advance to the knowing of other truths. What is said, therefore, namely that instruction, whether connatural and common in human society or artificial and scientific, is necessary for unfolding the use of reason, cannot signify anything else than that instruction is necessary for acquiring a sufficient amplitude of ideas and of knowledge of the true (or judgments). Instruction must therefore be considered in relation to acquiring ideas or intellectual concepts, and in relation to forming judgments or knowing the relations of ideas and of the objects which are exhibited to the ideas.

a) Ideas cannot be formed except by the intellect itself, by its inborn power, from objects logically present to it, that is, knowably exhibited³. Instruction, therefore, for the forming of ideas, can contribute nothing else than to exhibit objects in a fitting manner to the cognitive faculties: first indeed those which fall under experience; then, once the intellectual concepts of those things have been formed by the inborn power of the intellect, and thereby relations already discerned and judgments and first principles formed by the intellect of its own accord, to represent knowably to the intellect, in fitting connection with things already known, other objects also, even those subject to no experience, that by its own power the intellect may conceive the ideas of them. In sum, the whole business of instruction in the conceiving of ideas is reduced solely to the fitting exhibition of objects. An idea, therefore, is not nor can be conceived from the authority of testimony, and hence not through actual faith; but the intellect, by its natural power or supernaturally elevated, forms the concept from the object represented to itself.

There are indeed objects which are exhibited to the intellect by divine revelation alone, and to whose apprehension it would never have attained without revelation; yet the simple apprehension, by which nothing is affirmed or denied, the intellect does not form from the authority of revelation; but while through revelation the object is exhibited in connection with other ideas and knowledge already possessed, it forms some analogous concept of the exhibited object itself. Thus we form some idea, for example, of the generation of the Son of God, of the procession of the Holy Spirit, of a person constituted by relation, of a human nature united to the Word according to hypostasis, etc. « Our intellect has a twofold operation: one by which it forms the simple quiddities of things, as what man is or what animal is; in which operation, indeed, the true and the false are not found of themselves, just as neither in incomplex words. The other operation of the intellect is that according to which it composes and divides by affirming and denying; and in this the true and the false are now found, as also in the complex word (in the proposition), which is its sign. Believing, however, is not found in the first operation, but in the second; for we believe true things and disbelieve false things » S. Th. de Verit. q. 14. a. 1. θ.

It is therefore altogether evident that external instruction and teaching, as regards the formation of ideas, cannot be of such a sort that ideas are conceived through faith or through assent on account of authority, since there is as yet no assent there; but that instruction pertains solely to the fitter exhibition of the object.

b) With respect to judgments, or the knowledge of truths properly so called, which we placed in the second place, instruction can be of two kinds; it can tend, namely, to ingenerate knowledge or to provoke faith. This second mode of proposal and instruction certainly has place in a great many objects of our knowledge, which we know only by faith, whether divine or human; but it neither is nor can be universal with respect to all knowledges, and namely with respect to those knowledges of truth which are necessarily presupposed to faith as its foundations and precede it, as has been sufficiently demonstrated above. But in the proposal and instruction directed to the knowledge of truths, everything holds that we have said of the function of instruction in relation to conceiving ideas. The whole business, namely, consists in the fitting exhibition of the true to the intellect, that by its own power it may discern the true from intrinsic reasons.

We can consider this instruction, both in relation to ideas and in relation to the knowledge of truths, more distinctly, as it is effected by things or by signs. Insofar as it is effected by things, it is nothing else than the representation of sensible objects and of natural signs (for the account of these is the same as of things) to the senses, that the inborn power of the intellect may form intellectual concepts and certain first judgments and principles; in which instruction, if yet it is to be called by this name, authority and faith have no part, no otherwise than when objects are exhibited of themselves with no one showing them.

Instruction properly so called then begins when it already uses arbitrary signs, among which words and the contexture of words (that is, speech) hold the first place. Concerning this properly so called instruction the following things are manifest.

a) It is repugnant that by instruction through arbitrary signs, of which kind words principally are, the first ideas and the first intellectual knowledges should be conceived. For unless the mind of the learner be already informed with many intellectual concepts and knowledges of truths, arbitrary signs (e.g., vocables) will not be signs to him formally, but things only, sound, I say. « When first those two syllables, when we say head, struck my ears, I knew not what they signified, any more than when I first heard or read saraballas (Dan. III. 27). But when head was often said, noting and observing when it was said, I found the word to be of the thing which was already most known to me by seeing. Before I had found this, this word was to me only a sound; but I learned that it was a sign when I found out of what thing it was the sign, which indeed, as I have said, I had learned not by signification but by aspect. And so the sign is learned rather by the thing known, than the thing itself by the sign given » s. Aug. de Magistro n. 33. Read the rest there.

b) When the mind already knows the nature of a sign, and what the words heard signify, and hence has already had many ideas beforehand, and is furnished with the understanding of many truths and principles, speech ordered to ingenerating knowledge can only exhibit to the learner, in connection with truths already known, through known signs, other truths in a fitting manner, that his intellect may discern these other truths from those already known and from intrinsic reasons. By instruction through words, therefore, which is directed to knowledge, nothing else is effected but the fitting exhibition of the true in connection with truths already known; but the light of the intellect, given, preserved, and aided by God (by natural or supernatural concurrence), discerns the truth from its innermost reason. By this instruction, therefore, neither the first ideas nor the first knowledges of the true can be acquired, but these are supposed to it as a foundation or necessary condition; nor does the knowledge to which instruction helps rest upon authority or have the character of faith.

St. Augustine discourses most subtly concerning this whole matter, l. c. nn. 38 ff., whose sense you have set forth by the Angelic Doctor. « In the acquisition of knowledge, the teacher leads another to the knowledge of things unknown in the manner of discovery, just as if someone leads himself to the knowledge of the unknown. But the process of reason arriving at the knowledge of the unknown in discovery is to apply common principles known of themselves to determinate matters, and thence to proceed to certain particular conclusions and from these to others. Hence also in this way one is said to teach another, in that he expounds to the other through signs that discursion of reason which he makes in himself by natural reason; and thus the natural reason of the disciple, through such things proposed to him as through certain instruments, arrives at the knowledge of things unknown... The knowledge of things is not effected in us through the knowledge of signs, but through the knowledge of certain things more certain, namely of principles, which are proposed and applied to us through certain signs, to other things which were before unknown to us simply, although known in a certain respect (in principles already known).... In the disciple intelligible forms are described, from which the knowledge received through teaching is constituted, immediately indeed by the agent intellect (of the disciple) but mediately by him who teaches. For the teacher proposes the signs of intelligible things, from which the agent intellect receives intelligible intentions and describes them in the possible intellect⁴; whence the very words of the teacher, heard or seen in writing, are related to causing knowledge in the intellect in this way, as are the things which are outside the soul... That something be known through certitude is from the light of reason divinely imparted within, in which God speaks in us, but not from man teaching outwardly, except insofar as he who teaches us resolves conclusions into principles; from which, however, we would not receive the certitude of knowledge, unless there were in us the certitude of the principles into which conclusions are resolved » s. Thomas de Verit. q. 11. a 1. Θ. et ad 2. 11. 13.

From all that has been said thus far we conclude as follows. It is one thing by far whether ideas and our first knowledges of truths, or indeed all certain knowledges at all, are received or can be received through faith, that is, on account of the authority of testimony; and it is another question whether and how far instruction, whether connatural in human society or artificial through discipline, is necessary for informing the intellect with a sufficient amplitude of ideas and of knowledge of truth in any order whatever. The former is evidently false, and would have to be denied even if the absolute necessity of instruction were affirmed. For this necessity would follow solely from the fact that the objects of knowledge could be exhibited knowably to the intellect in no other way than through instruction, as is clear from the declared function of instruction; but it would not have its origin thence, that truth is certainly knowable to us only from authority and through faith.

It remains for us to say, concerning this necessity of instruction for acquiring a sufficient amplitude of knowledge, what seems true to us. The necessity of instruction for acquiring a sufficient amplitude of ideas and principles, that the use of human reason may be judged sufficiently unfolded, does not arise from a defect of intellectual power for understanding the true in objects rightly proposed; for if it were so, all instruction would also be useless. But whatever be the necessity of positive doctrine and instruction, as regards truths rational and naturally knowable it is reduced to the necessity of a fitter manner in the proposal and exhibition of objects, that the intellect may arrive at the knowledge of truths more easily and promptly, and hence also more amply and distinctly.

The connatural state of man, for which he is made from his very nature, is certainly social, in communion and conjunction with other men. Since man, from the very condition of his composite nature as a rational animal, needs external supports for the unfolding, as of his other powers, so also of his intellectual powers, he has connatural supports for the congruous unfolding of the cognitive faculty in human society itself: that objects in the first place be proposed in sufficient amplitude and variety; that constant attention to objects be roused and fostered; that by fitting coupling of the same reason be led from some knowledge to others. But if there be supposed—an hypothesis which some wonderfully abuse—a man from infancy an outcast from human society, by that very supposition he is supposed destitute of the connatural supports for the fitter proposal of objects, for the rousing of attention, for the fitting comparison of ideas and judgments with each other. A great many objects, from which the formation of ideas and of principles, especially moral, is easier and prompter, will never be proposed to him; from those objects which of themselves thrust themselves upon him, he will abstract ideas and form judgments hardly other than those which arise spontaneously by the inborn power of the intellect; for consideration and any more constant attention cannot, in the present condition of nature where the lower appetites draw and distract far more vehemently, be expected in a man thus, as is supposed, destitute of external supports, unless God supply by special internal aids what is lacking in external subsidies.

For a more distinct declaration we can consider in man the subjective faculties of intellect and will, then the external proposal of objects to the intellect and the excitation of the will, and lastly the internal aids of God. The physical faculties, both of intellect and of will, belong to man from his very nature, yet so that for the intellect a fitting proposal of objects is necessary, that then a sufficiently constant attention and consideration be fixed and held by the will; but the will by moral necessity needs excitation and supports, even external ones. Now in that abnormal state the proposal of objects for the intellect does not indeed wholly fail, but it is exceedingly meagre; the external excitation and subsidies for the will, which in society are very many, are there almost wholly lacking. The intellect will therefore form intellectual concepts and first rational judgments only insofar as they arise spontaneously and necessarily from the proposal of objects, however meagre. The amplitude of these ideas and judgments cannot be defined by any certain norm. Without doubt there belong thither the universal ideas of sensible things; the consciousness of self and of one's acts, and the judgments spontaneously arising from these. That to cognitions of this spontaneous kind there must also be referred an obscure and confused notion of some superior being on whom all things depend, and thence likewise a confused knowledge of moral good and evil, is both philosophically persuaded from the nature of human reason as the image of God and from its natural destination, and theologically deduced from the manner in which the holy Fathers, with the Scriptures leading, constantly describe the first confused notion of God as inborn and congenital to rational nature, spontaneous, needing no instruction (ἐμφύτον, αὐτόματον, ἀδίδακτον χρῆμα). See Tract. de Deo, th. VI–VII. Once the mind is informed with first ideas and judgments, man could (by physical possibility), by fixing attention upon objects with free and deliberate will and by reflecting upon himself and his knowledge already acquired, arrive at some further progress and refinement of knowledge; yet from the very confusion and obscurity of his knowledge, from the less accommodated manner in which the objects to be considered present themselves, from the defect of all external excitation for the will, from the vigor of sensual desires, so great difficulties arise that there originates a moral impotence of arriving, in a condition so abnormal and destitute of connatural external supports, at any sufficient degree of clarity and distinctness of ideas and knowledge.

But in this consideration abstraction has been made from the special internal aids of God. These internal aids are to be considered insofar as they would rouse and direct man, that he might morally be able to apply sufficient attention for acquiring a clearer knowledge of God and of moral actions, that then he might morally be able to apply diligence in observing the natural law according to the knowledge already acquired; which if he should perform, God would promote him with more abundant aids, and in the present order of supernatural elevation would either provide him the external doctrine of revelation, or supply the external grace by extraordinary internal illumination. So indeed teach St. Thomas and other theologians. For they do not regard men of this kind, in relation to divine providence, as infants destitute of the use of reason, concerning whom, dying before baptism, how one must judge is explained in the Treatise on the salvific will of God (Tract. de Deo, th. LIII); but they consider them as sufficiently in possession of reason for meriting and demeriting, and hence as capable of and in need of actual grace. To the objection that, if explicit faith is necessary for salvation, consequently a man « brought up in the woods » would lack things necessary for salvation, St. Thomas responds in this sense: « It does not follow as unfitting, it being posited that each is bound to believe something explicitly, if he be brought up in the woods or among brute animals; for this pertains to divine providence, that to each it provide what is necessary for salvation, provided on his part there be no impediment. For if someone thus brought up were to follow the guidance of natural reason in the appetite for good and the flight from evil, it is most certainly to be held that to him God would either reveal by internal inspiration the things necessary to be believed, or direct to him some preacher of the faith » S. Th. de Verit. q. 14. a. 11. ad 1; 3. dist. 25. q. 2. a. 1. sol. ad 2. In the same way speaks Hugh of St. Cher in the Scholia on Rom. II. 12: « Should there be someone brought up in a grove by some beast, and have been there long afterwards; such a one knows nothing of Christ, such a one seems to be excused... I respond, in such cases the judgments of God are a great abyss; yet that not even such a one is excused, because he had natural reason, which if he had acted according to it, doing what was in himself, the Lord would have conferred grace. »

For the rest, concerning this whole hypothesis of an abnormal state outside the society connatural to man, we hold the following. a) Such a condition is ineptly assumed as a term of comparison for judging the natural powers of human reason; no otherwise than if someone were to contend that the vegetative and animal power is to be learned, from the consideration of a man from infancy bound with the tightest bonds over his whole body. b) The unfolding of reason in men of this kind will be various according to diverse native character and diverse external conditions in which they live. But whatever that unfolding be, this one thing we can learn, which from elsewhere is most certain: that man needs a fitting proposal of knowable objects, and that according to the diverse degree of a more or less fitting proposal there are also diverse degrees of the unfolding of reason, of the acquisition of ideas and knowledge. If the objects proposed to the intellect were fewest and altogether uniform—as happened some fifty years ago to that poor young man Gaspar Hauser in Germany, shut up from infancy in a darksome prison—and if thence man in fact remained devoid of all ideas of the superior order, that would not prove the absolute necessity of instruction in human society for acquiring them, but would only demonstrate that some sufficiently ample proposal of objects is required. c) Ineptly is appeal made to experience, by which it would be proved that no ideas of the metaphysical, theological, ethical order can be acquired apart from instruction in human society. For the examples as terms of comparison are very few; but even if in them the supposed fact of the defect of all ideas of this kind were conceded, it would not yet be proved that they could not or could have been acquired, since besides the privation of instruction there are many things which could have impeded the acquisition. But the proof itself of the fact cannot be had from experience alone; for it is established that the memory of obscure and confused ideas and knowledge is obliterated by supervening clear and distinct ideas; the later testimony, therefore, of those men declaring that they were destitute of all ideas of this kind, is worth no more than our forgetfulness, in that we do not recall our obscure ideas and knowledge from earliest childhood.

On the necessity of revelation and of the corresponding supernatural faith for attaining the last end in the present order of elevation

The ultimate end of the rational creature cannot be constituted except in the knowledge of God, the supreme truth, and in the love of God, the highest good, in such a way that the destination of intellect and will to the true and the good be fully satisfied, and thereby the creature attain its ultimate perfection, and in its ultimate end of the true and good be fully blessed. But the mode of final knowledge and love can be twofold: a) so as not to exceed the exigency of created rational nature, but to be accommodated to its powers constituted in ultimate natural perfection; b) so as, above all exigency of nature and of natural faculties, through a superadded gift and through a singular participation (assimilation) of the divine light by which God sees Himself, the created intellect be elevated to seeing the divine essence, the infinite truth, intuitively in itself (not by ideas acquired from elsewhere), clearly as it is in itself, and consequently the supernaturally elevated will love God, the infinite good, with a love corresponding to the intuitive vision; and thus the creature be blessed with supernatural fruition of God. The ultimate end of the creature considered in the former mode is the natural end, following upon the supposition of creation, not from a free destination of God distinct and diverse from the creating will, but from the necessary objective order, namely from the necessary perfections of God and from the perfection of the rational creature. Hence this end can be known by the light of reason from the very perfection of God insofar as He manifests Himself in the works of creation, and from the perfection of the rational creature. Considered in the latter mode it is the supernatural end, to which, even supposing creation, the creature could have not been destined, and to which it has been elevated only by the free largess of God; and hence this end can be known by us only from the revelation of God through faith.

Now if the rational creature—and since we treat of man alone now, if man—is constituted on the way to that term, the state of the way must needs in some proportion answer to the state of the term; the means by which man is directed by God to the end must be fitted to the end to which they are ordered; the dispositions of man by which he is prepared for attaining the end, both in intellect and in will, must pertain to that order as inchoation, in which is the final vision and fruition as consummation.

Since therefore in the present order man has not been left in his merely natural destination, but elevated to that which we have called the supernatural end, and constituted on the way to it, natural knowledge and the love corresponding to knowledge does not suffice, but the knowledge and love directly tending to that end must be supernatural, first subjectively, by reason of the eliciting principle and of the powers which, superadded to intellect and will, constitute faculties apt for supernatural acts proportioned to that end. Then objectively, besides the manifestation of God in His works of creation corresponding to the natural end of man, there is required another, immediate manifestation of God, corresponding to the final manifestation face to face, in which we shall see Him as He is. But this manifestation on the way is not such that we intuit God as He is; for such intuition is the end, not the means and preparation for the end; but revelation on the way is through the testimony of God Himself, by which (as St. Thomas says, 1, q. 1, a. 2) the truth, as known in the knowledge of God, becomes known to us, to which revelation, accordingly, no longer vision but faith corresponds. « There is therefore a threefold knowledge of man concerning divine things. The first of which is according as man by the natural light of reason ascends through creatures to the knowledge of God; the second is according as the divine truth, exceeding the human intellect, descends into us by way of revelation, yet not as demonstrated for seeing, but as uttered in speech for believing; the third is according as the human mind is elevated to the perfect intuiting of the things revealed » S. Th. contr. Gent. l. IV. c. 1.

More distinctly, the necessity of revelation and of the supernatural faith corresponding to it, on the hypothesis of elevation to a supernatural end, can be considered both according to the end itself and according to the means proportioned to the end.

a) The supernatural end itself, to which man was to be directed in a rational manner, had necessarily to be known to him, nor could it be known except through revelation and the faith corresponding to revelation. Moreover, if not absolutely necessary, it was yet certainly highly consonant with the very nature of the end that man should know, already on the way to this end, God, his objective end to be possessed in the term by the fruition of immediate vision and of corresponding love, also according to those perfections which are not manifested from the works of creation to the light of reason; not only according to the « known of God » (Rom. I. 19) which of itself corresponds to the natural end, but also according to the « depths of God » (1 Cor. II. 10) which correspond to the supernatural end, where « we shall see God as He is » and « we shall know even as we are known. » But these depths of God, as they can become known for understanding, as they are in themselves, only by supernatural and immediate vision, so can they become known for believing only by the testimony and revelation of God¹. But hence also, after they have been revealed to our faith, they are yet not understood by the light of the intellect in themselves from their own proper reason, because with creatures, from which the intellect receives its knowledges, they have not such an intrinsic connection that the intellect could either discern their essence—what they are—with proper notions, or demonstrate their existence—whether they are—from its own principles. They are therefore simply superrational truths, which in the proper sense are called mysteries (see Tract. de Trin., th. XVII).

b) The means ordered to the supernatural end and proportioned to it, and hence at least in the formal character of means, are supernatural. That the knowledge of these is necessary for man tending to the end is evident; yet they could become known only through revelation and faith. For partly they are not necessary from themselves and from the nature of the end, but are constituted in the character of means by the free will of God, by which very fact what we say is manifest. Partly indeed they are necessary from themselves and from the nature of the end; but first, the end itself is known only by revelation, whence the knowledge of the means ultimately rests upon revelation; then, since the nature of the end, even with revelation supposed, is not known in its proper and intrinsic character, it is not a consequence that, with the end revealed, the necessity of such means, however of themselves pertinent to such an end, would already be known without explicit and special revelation; and much less is it a consequence that the inborn character and nature of the means be understood².

What we have said is confirmed by the words of the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX in the letter to the Archbishop of Munich (11 Dec. 1862), where, after speaking of the superrational things of faith, he immediately subjoins: « and to dogmas of this kind those things especially and most openly pertain which regard the supernatural elevation of man and his supernatural intercourse with God, and are known as revealed to this end. And indeed, since these dogmas are above nature, they cannot therefore be attained by natural reason and natural principles. »

It is established, therefore, that with the order of elevation to a supernatural end supposed, some revelation of the mysteries of faith, at least of the supernatural end itself, was simply necessary for the human race; and revelation was necessary in that extension in which God willed the inchoate knowledge of the « depths of God » on the way by reason of the object to correspond to the vision in the homeland—the knowledge « in enigma » to the hoped-for vision « face to face. » This necessity of revelation as means and objective principle for the knowledge of those truths must be judged absolute, and as it is commonly called physical, since the mysteries are above the compass of the natural light, and hence the powers for knowing them from its own principles are simply lacking to reason.

But he would err wholly who would restrict the fact itself or the necessity of revelation to truths alone superrational of themselves, or mysteries properly so called. There is another, yet most true necessity of revelation in the present order, also with respect to those truths pertaining to religious and moral doctrine which of themselves do not transcend the powers of reason.

Without doubt, both concerning God, who is the ultimate end of all created things also in the natural order, and concerning the means necessary to this end, many things are of themselves intelligible by the light of human reason apart from revelation—such as the existence of God and His absolute attributes, the natural ordination of man to God, the natural law—which therefore are in themselves simply rational truths. The question is, then, what is the necessity of revelation and of faith with respect to these truths. We say the necessity is threefold: from the nexus of these truths with the superrational; from the mode in which they are to be known; from the very necessity of knowledge considered simply and (as they say) as to substance.

a) These truths would have to be known also on the hypothesis that only a natural end had been appointed to man, whence they are commonly said to constitute natural religion. But now, as the supernatural end of man is not the negation but the elevation of the natural end, so also natural religion must be judged not excluded but elevated to a superior order through revealed supernatural religion. Hence truths of this kind are contained as at least implicitly revealed in the very revelation of superrational and preterrational truths; these cannot therefore be revealed without those also being revealed.

b) All truths of this kind, insofar as they are now referred to the supernatural end of man, are to be known in a mode proportioned to the end, and hence by supernatural knowledge. But since the proper supernatural mode of knowledge on the way is faith, or at least has faith for its foundation³; therefore these truths also are to be believed by faith, and hence, that the mode of our knowledge might answer to the end, the divine revelation of these also was necessary.

c) But not only with the supernatural mode of knowledge considered, but with knowledge simply considered in itself, must revelation be affirmed necessary in the present order—of truths although rational of themselves—which for brevity we can call the truths of natural religion. There is no question of all rational truths without distinction: that all of them taken in the complex can be known by no one without extraordinary charism is so evident that it is a wonder arguments are sought by theologians to prove the thesis by which they establish that « no one without grace can attain all natural truths in the complex. » Our question is of the theoretical and practical truths, religious and moral, not of themselves impervious to human reason. Moreover, concerning these very truths it is not asked whether all in the complex can be known by all and singular men by the light of reason alone; for that is neither necessary, and that it cannot morally be done is almost equally evidently established as what we said a little above. Finally, neither is it asked to which truths individuals could and should attain by the light of reason apart from revelation, so that ignorance of the rest would be excused in them as invincible; for this invincibility of ignorance in the greater or greatest part of men with respect to truths necessary of themselves, although it could excuse individuals from sin, would yet itself be the reason why the revelation even of rational truths for the human race should be judged necessary. The state of the question, then, is this: whether in the present order the rational religious and moral truths can be judged sufficiently manifested to the human race taken in common through the light of reason, so that revelation would not be necessary for attaining the substance of knowledge. What is and what is not the necessity of revelation thus considered is declared from certain principles.

α) Revelation considered in the mode we have said is a certain aid toward the knowledge of truths; but the degree of necessity of an aid for an act answers to the degree of potency in the subject for the same act. In the human race there is no physical impotence for attaining rational truths; for they are called rational precisely because the powers of human reason can attain them; therefore, with only the substance of knowledge considered—that is, abstracting from the supernatural mode of knowledge which is required in the present order—there would not be, with respect to these rational truths, a physical necessity of revelation. Yet at least for the greatest part of men, and hence for the human race taken in common, for attaining these truths in due time, with sufficient amplitude, with sufficient clarity and full certitude, without admixture of errors, so great are the difficulties that, after the manner and fashion in which men always act in difficulties of this kind, the physical potency, at least in the greatest part of men, would never without special aid arrive at the second act of such knowledge. Difficulties so constituted make up a moral impotence. To moral impotence answers the moral necessity of an aid. Therefore in the present condition of the human race, for that sufficient knowledge even of rational truths, there is a moral necessity of a special aid. Moreover, although many sufficient aids were at hand to the divine omnipotence, where it has chosen one before all other possibles, that one must indeed be called the necessary aid. Since therefore God has in the present order chosen revelation before other aids, revelation also with respect to these rational truths, with knowledge considered simply and according to substance, must be called morally necessary for the human race in the present order.

β) Scripture itself, in the passages in which it teaches the manifestation of God afforded to the light of reason through the things that have been made (see Tract. de Deo, th. II ff.), everywhere distinguishes the possibility of knowledge, and actual imperfect knowledge itself, from the fact of knowledge sufficient for rendering the worship naturally due to God. Possibility it affirms; but at the same time it teaches that men universally (by their own fault, indeed) have not arrived at such sufficient knowledge and at its practical application, and to this infirmity and indigence it opposes, as a salutary and necessary medicine, the merciful aid of God through revelation, which in the present order is indeed given to a supernatural end even with respect to these truths natural of themselves. « For since in the wisdom of God (poured out upon all His works) the world through wisdom (through human wisdom, by which it could and should have known) knew not God; it pleased God (εὐδοκησεν ὁ θεος—God mercifully decreed) through the foolishness of preaching to save those who believe » 1 Cor. I. 21.⁴; Acts XIV. 15; XVII. 30; Wis. IX. 14–19.

The causes from which arises that moral impotence, and consequently the moral necessity of revelation answering to it, are customarily declared in the well-known words of St. Thomas, 1, q. 1, a. 1; 2-2, q. 2, a. 4; Verit. q. 14, a. 10, Θ; contr. Gent. l. I, c. 4: « It is necessary for man to receive through the mode of faith not only the things which are above reason, but also those which can be known through reason; and this for three reasons. First indeed... the science to which it pertains to prove that God exists, and other things of this kind concerning God, is proposed to be learned by men last, with many other sciences presupposed, and thus man would arrive at the knowledge of God only after much time of his life. Second, that the knowledge of God be more common; for many cannot profit in the study of science... Third, on account of certitude; for human reason is much deficient in divine things... That there might therefore be undoubted and certain knowledge of God among men, it was necessary that divine things be handed down to them through the mode of faith, as things said by God who cannot lie » S. Th. 2. 2. 1. c. To be compared is th. VI of the Tract. de Deo, where, n. III, you will also find explained how St. Thomas at one time affirms that God can be known « easily, » at another not except « with great labor. »

All, therefore, that has been said in this paragraph concerning the necessity of revelation and of supernatural faith for the present order of elevation is reduced to this sum. The proper supernatural mode of knowledge, for those tending to the supernatural end of the vision of God, is in the present order faith. The truths revealed by the word of God are in a threefold difference: truths, namely, superrational simply in existence and essence, superrational in existence, and rational of themselves. Hence for the supernatural mode of knowledge—that is, that the truths be apprehended by divine faith—the revelation of them all is necessary; that there exist a sufficient manifestation of them, and hence that knowledge simply as to substance (with abstraction made from mode) may have place, the absolute necessity of revelation holds in the truths of the first and second order, and moral necessity, for the human race taken in common, with respect to the truths of the third order also. Of the objects of the first order, even with revelation supposed, neither can existence be demonstrated from rational principles alone, nor can essence (τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι, or quiddity) be apprehended by proper ideas, but only by analogical ones; of the objects of the second order, existence indeed is certainly demonstrated only from revelation, but essence (what they are) can be understood by proper notions; of the objects of the third order, existence can also be demonstrated by reason, although essence is sometimes apprehended only by analogical ideas. See the Vatican Council, Constit. de Fide, ch. 2.

Corollary 1. For every finite intellect which does not comprehend all truth, absolutely speaking, there can be place for faith on account of the testimony of God, the infinite intellect comprehending all truth. In the present order, where divine faith is the preparation for the beatific vision as the way to the term, faith will be emptied in vision, as inchoation, insofar as it is something imperfect and in potency to perfection, ceases with perfection succeeding. 1 Cor. XIII. 10 ff.; cf. S. Th. de Verit. q. 14, a. 10, ad 8.

Corollary 2. With comparison instituted between knowledge and faith, if they are in the same order, knowledge perfects the intellect more than faith; but if faith is of a superior order, from it there arises for the intellect a greater perfection than from knowledge of an inferior order. « Concerning the most noble things, however imperfect the knowledge, it confers the greatest perfection of soul; and therefore, although human reason cannot fully grasp the things which are above reason, yet much perfection is acquired for itself, if at least in some manner it hold them by faith » S. Th. contr. Gent. l. I, c. 5. If this is true by reason of the nobility of the objects, much more is the soul perfected above natural knowledge by faith, which, both in habit and in act supernatural, inheres in the first truth.

Prolegomenon: On the Objective Principles of Christian Knowledge and of Theology in General

Treatise on Divine Tradition

§ I: Section I

Caput I: Chapter I

The manifold notion of tradition is explained

On the stricter meaning of tradition, by which it is distinguished from doctrines handed down through Sacred Scripture

On the order between tradition actively considered and objective tradition in the method of treatment

On the mode and organ of propagating doctrine according to the divinely instituted Christian economy

The living magisterium is shown to be the perpetual organ of Christian tradition from the express evangelical and apostolic words

On the intimate connection of the principle of tradition with the necessary properties of the Christian religion

On the unchangeable perdurance of the same economy after the books of the New Testament were written

Caput II: Chapter II

The formal nature of tradition is demonstrated from the constitution and principles of the Church

On the visible constitution of the organ of tradition, most suited to the office enjoined on it

On the distinction between historical and dogmatic authority in the attestation of tradition

By synthesis from what precedes, the proper concept of tradition is gathered and confirmed from the sayings of the Fathers

On how the consensus of the faithful in the doctrine of faith is a criterion of divine tradition

Scholion I: Principles on the subject and object of the infallible magisterium

Scholion II: On the meaning of the various censures by which propositions are wont to be condemned

§ II: Section II

Caput I: Chapter I

On the monuments of tradition insofar as they exhibit the consensus of the guardians of the deposit, and insofar as they are instruments of doctrine for them

On the direct or indirect demonstration of consensus from the documents of antiquity

Caput II: Chapter II

On the authority of the holy Fathers taken singly

The opinion on the millennial kingdom of Christ among the Fathers before the fourth century compared with the opposite consensus of later Fathers

On how the consensus of the schools can exhibit divine tradition

§ III: Section III

Ecclesiastical preaching is the supreme norm of the interpretation of Sacred Scripture

The sufficiency of Scripture is preached by the holy Fathers not by excluding but by presupposing tradition and the ministry for guarding the deposit

On the existence of divine traditions not contained in Scripture

In manifold ways tradition precedes Scripture

§ IV: Section IV

Catholic revelation was completed through Jesus Christ and through the Holy Spirit in the Apostles

On how the doctrine of faith could at some time be proposed more obscurely, to be later explained and declared

On the true sense of the Vincentian canon

On the conjoined office of the guardians and teachers of the faith and on the mode of explaining the deposit

On the different way of explaining the deposit of faith before and after completed revelation

Dogmatic Treatise on the Divine Scriptures

§ I: Section I

Caput I: Chapter I

From the divine tradition of the Old Testament and from the doctrine of Christ himself and the Apostles, all the books and parts of books pertaining to Sacred Scripture must be believed with equal divine authority

The books of Scripture are inspired in such a way that God is the author of the books

The notion of inspiration is more distinctly declared through analysis of the dogmatic formula: God is the author of the books of Sacred Scripture

The notion of inspiration by mere divine assistance, called subsequent inspiration, is refuted

Caput II: Chapter II

On the inefficacy of internal arguments for demonstrating the inspiration of the books

On the necessity of the testimony by which inspiration becomes known

On the twofold way the divine testimony on the inspired books has been preserved to us

The principles of Protestantism are repugnant to the proof of the canon of Scripture retained by the Reformers

§ II: Section II

Caput I: Chapter I

The apostolic tradition on all the books of Scripture was declared by the Council of Trent

The apostolic tradition on the canon of the sacred books is demonstrated from the constant and universal use of the Church

The canons and express doctrine of Christian antiquity exhibit the apostolic tradition on all the divine books of the Old Testament

On the origin of the controversy on the deuterocanonical books of the Old Testament

The Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries exhibit deficient catalogues of the books of Scripture not as closed canons but as to be supplemented

The difficulties wont to be drawn from writers of a later age are resolved

Caput II: Chapter II

All the canonical books of the New Testament were handed down by the Apostles

The origin of doubts on the deuterocanonical books of the New Testament is explained

What Saint Jerome said on the custom of not receiving the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Apocalypse is explained

§ III: Section III

On the notion of authenticity and on the dogmatic declaration of an authentic edition of Scripture

On the extension of the authenticity of the Vulgate edition declared by the Council of Trent

Contribution I: The novel and false doctrine of the dissertation

Contribution II: The fallacy of the arguments for the new doctrine

Appendix: On the Relation of Human Reason to Divine Faith

Caput I: Chapter I

On truth

On assent, certainty, evidence

Caput II: Chapter II

On self-evident truths

On truths known through others

On the formal nature of faith considered in general

Caput III: Chapter III

On the necessity of faith asserted by some, in general and namely of faith in revelation in relation to the whole order of our knowledge

On the necessity of faith said to be included in the necessity of social institution

On the necessity of revelation and of the corresponding supernatural faith for attaining the last end in the present order of elevation

On the necessity of revelation and of natural faith on the hypothesis of pure nature, whether it follows from what has been said