Tractatus de divina traditione et Scriptura

10. It remains to inspect very briefly the author's arguments, the chief of which — and, to confess the truth, the only one — is constituted in the rationale of the end which God is said to have proposed to Himself in the writing of the sacred books. But this end, assumed by the author as the foundation of the new theory, has no proof either in the very character of the sacred books or in explicit or implicit revealed doctrine; it is circumscribed solely from the general principle that God gave His revelation for our eternal salvation; whence it is at once inferred that no truths which of themselves have no connection with the eternal salvation of men are or can be proposed to us by God, and therefore not even written under inspiration, or at least under a divine assistance premunient against errors.

This consequence — that God neither willed nor was able to inspire the writing of things not of themselves pertaining to religion — is deduced by the author from the posited principle as if by certain steps. First, from the fact that « the end of the inspiring God is uniquely the communication of religious truth, » it is only inferred that God could without contradiction with the proposed end have left the writers to themselves in other matters (p. 98), which perhaps might be conceded, although on this hypothesis the end would have to be said to stand somewhat otherwise than it really is in the present providence. But soon the author, with no added reason, concludes from the same principle (p. 100) something far different: that God could not, without acting senselessly (swecklos), have willed to propose to us what is contained in the sacred books besides matters of faith and morals. Again (p. 101) the same inference is repeated: just as the Church, so too revelation universally (i.e. God revealing), if it treated such profane matters, « would deservedly seem to have treated what lies outside its art, » and to have acted against its own end. But how greatly these two differ from each other — « God could without contradiction with the end not have inspired the things it pleased him to call profane, » and « God could not without contradiction with the end have inspired them » — everyone sees, and is taught by logicians.

Only this second claim — that God, by reason of the end He set for Himself in inspiring the Scriptures, could not extend His charism of inspiration to those « profane things » — would be valid to demonstrate the adversary's thesis; but in that very claim is contained an error and an absurdity which no one will ever prove. At most it could be said in this matter that we do not understand all the reasons and ends for which God willed to propose to us by His word and supernatural revelation even truths of themselves rational and empirical and historical, immediately pertaining to the natural order, just as in general we attain the reasons of divine providence in the order of nature, and much more in the order of grace, only most imperfectly. But it is surely intolerable to convert this very ignorance of ours into a rash wisdom by which we make ourselves « counsellors of God, » and define a priori which truths He could hand down to us by His word, and which He could not have inspired to be written without injury to the end which He Himself most freely set for Himself in inspiring the Scriptures. It is a question of a supernatural divine fact, which — whether and how it has occurred, i.e. as to existence and essence, as to intension and extension — is not to be conjectured a priori, but to be learned from God Himself, inasmuch as He has deigned to declare it to us either expressly in the handed-down doctrine of the Church, or has left it to us to deduce from handed-down doctrine. By that method of deciding a priori concerning such supernatural facts, should certain « speculative dogmas » happen, with D. Hirscher, to seem of no great moment for the kingdom of God, one will at length arrive at the Kantian figment that in the Scriptures only « moral precepts » are to be retained, while the rest is either to be disregarded or to be esteemed as the symbolic wrappings of moral precepts.

11. But to answer directly, the order of grace and of supernatural revelation does not destroy but elevates and consecrates the order of nature and of natural science; and each order, of nature and of grace, in the present state of elevation has as its end the glory of God in the faith, hope, and charity of the rational creature for this life, and in blessed glorification for the life to come. From this conjunction of each order it comes about that, just as natural elements are elevated to the supernatural state of the sacraments, and the « animal and earthly » will one day be transformed into the « spiritual and heavenly, » so too truths which of themselves are in the order of reason and natural science are elevated, according to the good pleasure of God the sanctifier, to the supernatural order of revelation and faith. And with this elevation through the word of God supposed, those truths touch a twofold order. Considered of themselves they are of the natural order and « profane, » and thus the object of reason and natural science; insofar as they are proposed by the word of God, under this formal aspect they already pertain to the supernatural order, are « religious truths, » and constitute the object of faith and theology. Although therefore even in the inspired books those things which of themselves are « matters of faith and morals pertaining to the edification of Christian doctrine » are rightly distinguished from others which of themselves and from their ingrained nature would not pertain to the religious order of the faith and morals of Christians; yet this distinction cannot be so understood, nor was it ever so understood in the Church, as if some things proposed in the Scriptures were held by the infallible word of God and others by the fallible word of man; but that some things there are of themselves and from their intimate rationale of the supernatural order and of the religious order, and these are called things revealed of themselves and for their own sake, i.e. because they are such truths; while others there are of themselves and from their proper character of the natural and rational order, which by theologians after St Thomas (2. 2. q. 1. a. 6. ad 1) are called things inspired or revealed incidentally, since they were indeed written with God inspiring and thus proposed through the word of God, yet not for their own sake but for the sake of others¹, with which they cohere historically or logically, of the sort which the distinguished author mentions on p. 98, and countless others. The former truths are revealed because they are religious; the latter are religious because and insofar as they are inspired for writing, and therefore revealed.

To the adversary's difficulty, then, the answer is plain. « The end proposed to God in revelation is uniquely the communication of religious truth; therefore He could not have willed to comprehend profane truths in revelation. » We answer. I distinguish the antecedent: the unique end is the communication of truth which of itself and by its nature is religious; I deny. Whoever assumed this as conceded for the principle of the demonstration would commit a begging of the question; for this very thing is to be demonstrated, that God willed to propose to men in His revelation no other truths except those religious of themselves and by their nature. The end is the communication of religious truth which is either such of itself or is elevated by inspiration itself to the religious order of revelation and faith; I concede.

12. I do not think it necessary to contend at length about the three other arguments added in the dissertation, drawn from the extension of the Church's infallibility to matters of faith and morals alone, from lost or corrupted texts of the Scriptures, and from certain sayings of the Fathers.

1°. If it were conceded that the infallibility of the Church extends only to those things which of themselves pertain to faith and morals, it would in no way follow that inspiration in the sacred writers was restricted to these alone. For the two charisms are wholly diverse, and therefore from the limits of one it could not be demonstrated that the limits of the other are the same. Just as from the fact that God instituted an infallible authority only for the conservation of truths revealed of themselves it would not follow that all these truths must necessarily be conserved in the Scriptures; so neither would it be consequent that in the Scriptures there are no inspired truths except those revealed of themselves. Moreover, these two are far different: that the magisterium of the Church is first and chiefly solicitous for guarding the integrity and sincerity of the deposit revealed of itself, which is most true; and that truths inspired in Scripture not for their own sake but for the sake of others do not pertain to the judgment of the Church — which, said thus absolutely and simply, no Catholic theologian will ever concede, since those truths by inspiration itself (as I said just above) are elevated to the order of religion and faith. The Church can indeed judge of these things infallibly, especially if there be need on account of others, namely for the custody of the deposit revealed of itself.

2°. From the fact that some sentence has not come down to us uncorrupted in the Scriptures, or at least that it is not established whether it has come down, it only follows that that sentence, as now read, does not pertain to the inspired Scriptures, or that it is doubtful whether it pertains to them; but it can in no way be concluded from this, as the adversary thought, that the sentence as first written was not inspired. Without note of temerity it can be affirmed — and great theologians have affirmed — that some whole books of inspired Scripture, of both the New and the Old Testament, have perished to us, without either their inspiration having therefore to be denied or divine providence being able to be accused.

3°. The doctors adduced on pp. 103–106 evidently say nothing pertaining to the present matter. You have a specimen in those things which, drawn chiefly from Sts Jerome and Augustine, we have refuted above as brought forward by the author in confirmation of his opinion.

13. As for the one argument remaining, drawn from the Vatican Council, I do not deny that my mind was moved; so manifestly false is the interpretation. In the dissertation the text of the Council is twisted into this sense: that a) revelation in the sacred books is to be understood only « of matters of faith and morals, » i.e. of those things which are revealed of themselves; and that b) revelation and inspiration were restricted by the Council to certain parts of the Bible, which alone contain revelation without error, and therefore (by reason, namely, of the matter contained) must be believed inspired. By an incredible confusion of things these are said to be contained in the words of the Council: « Those (books with all their parts) the Church holds as sacred and canonical, not because, composed by merely human industry, they were then approved by her authority; nor merely because they contain revelation without error; but because, written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, they have God as their author, and as such were handed down to the Church » sess. 3. ch. 2. These three propositions of the Council the author thinks so connected with each other that in the first indeed error is excluded (that the books were written in a merely human way and afterwards approved by the Church); while in the second, joined with the third, the extension of inspiration is determined, as if it were said: the books both contain revelation — in certain parts, namely — without error, and in these parts were written with God inspiring (pp. 102, 103). But the words of the Council, both considered in themselves and in view of the character of the twofold error that is rejected, are so clear and manifest that they altogether exclude the Professor's opinion concerning the restriction of the written word of God, and indeed suffice by themselves to refute it.

1°. The Council repeats the Tridentine definition that « the whole books with all their parts, as they are enumerated in the decree of the Council of Trent and are had in the old Latin Vulgate edition, are to be received as sacred and canonical. » Without evasion, therefore, all parts without any distinction of matter, which were first written in those books, are to be held as canonical and sacred. But because doubts about the genuineness of individual parts had sometimes been raised and could be raised, the Councils therefore establish the old Latin Vulgate edition as the norm. In all those things which truly constitute a part of a book in the sense of the Council, the books are to be held as sacred and canonical. But who ever doubted, or can doubt, that for example Gen. I. 2–25 evidently constitutes, and in God's Church was always believed to constitute, a part of the book of Genesis? The same chapter must therefore be held, by the definition of each Council, as sacred and canonical Scripture.

2°. After this definition, in the words cited by our author and described just above, the Council declares the sense in which those whole books with all their parts are to be held as sacred and canonical. a) The definition in itself, according to what it teaches affirmatively, declares the books to be sacred and canonical by reason of the supernatural mode in which they were written, « because, written with God inspiring, they have God as their author. » Whence this argument arises. From what was just now defined by the Council, all parts of the books are sacred and canonical. But they are sacred and canonical insofar as they were written with God inspiring. Therefore all parts of the books were written with God inspiring. b) Since the declaration given by the Council stands in opposition to the errors of our age, let us consider the same in view of those errors, according to what the Council excludes negatively. Not one, as our author on p. 103 thinks, but a twofold error is excluded: first, that the books with their parts are not sacred and canonical from what they ineptly called subsequent inspiration — that, written by merely human aid, they were afterwards approved by the authority of the Church; nor, second, are they sacred and canonical merely because they contain revelation without error.

That first error is not that of the Rationalists, who say that the books of Scripture universally were composed by merely human industry; for they acknowledge no approbation of the Church by which the books are constituted sacred. But it is the error of certain Catholic scholars who said that not the books universally, but only in certain parts and texts — « in the historical narratives of things subject to experience » — they were written by human industry, and afterwards approved by the authority of the Church. They spoke, therefore, of those very parts and texts of which our author asserts that men in writing were left to their own industry. While therefore the Council rejects this opinion, and opposes to it the affirmation that the books with all their parts are to be held as written with God inspiring, it most clearly asserts and teaches to be believed as written under divine inspiration those very parts in which those scholars, and now our author, say that the writers were left to their own industry.

If the other error — that the books, either universally (as Jahn and others said) or in certain parts, namely in certain poetic parts (as others said), are sacred only insofar as they « contain revelation without error » — if, I say, this error is considered together with the antithesis of the Council, that the books are sacred not on this ground alone but from inspiration, it is deduced that divine assistance for preventing errors does not suffice for the genuine notion of inspiration, by which all the books of Scripture with all their parts are to be held sacred. But these things I pass over, since we are not now undertaking a direct disceptation concerning the notion of inspiration. To the present matter pertains the fact that our adversary did not rightly understand the « revelation in the Scriptures » of which mention is made in the condemnation of that error. When the Council describes the error in these words, by the name « revelation contained in the Scriptures » it could not have understood only what is revealed of itself (as the adversary thinks); but it necessarily understood all things contained in the Scriptures, and by this very fact pertaining either of themselves or incidentally to the revelation proposed by the word of God — indeed it understood chiefly those things which pertain to revelation not of themselves (because they are such truths) but incidentally (because they were written), since those whose error is expressed asserted directly and chiefly concerning these latter things that the books are sacred only insofar as they contain revelation (the proposition of these things under divine assistance) without error.

Whether therefore you regard the general Tridentine definition repeated by the Vatican Council, that the whole books with all their parts are to be received as sacred and canonical; or you consider the condemnation of the twofold error and the declaration of the sense in which the books are to be held as sacred and canonical — not in this sense, namely, are they sacred and canonical, that the books, whether whole or in some of their parts, written by merely human industry, were afterwards approved by the authority of the Church; nor in this sense, that in the books, whether whole or in some of their parts, no other prerogative is had than the infallible truth of revelation — for this is indeed required in the Scriptures, but does not suffice; but the whole books with all their parts, of which as its subject the Council speaks, are sacred and canonical because, written with the Holy Spirit inspiring, they have God as their author: these things, I say, whether you regard them all together or singly, it is established that the new doctrine concerning parts of the sacred books written by merely human industry, and therefore not at all inspired, and hence at times even erroneous, is on every side and evidently excluded by the Vatican definition.

One thing therefore I ask and implore, that no opening be given to innovations against the certain doctrine in the Church; but how could this be avoided, unless what the most holy Vatican Council so solicitously counsels be kept continually before our eyes? « The Church herself does not forbid the disciplines (human) of this kind each in its own sphere to use its own principles and its own method; but, recognizing this just liberty, she sedulously takes care lest, in opposing divine doctrine, they take up errors into themselves, or, transgressing their proper bounds, occupy and disturb what belongs to faith. »