Tractatus de divina traditione et Scriptura

The notion of inspiration consisting in mere divine assistance is refuted, as is that which is called subsequent inspiration.

« It is false, what John Jahn and others have taught, that for the rationale of an inspired book it suffices, and that in actual fact the inspiration of Sacred Scripture consists in this alone, that God by His assistance averted the danger of erring and rendered men infallible in writing; and this is false, whether the truths thus written are said to have been already revealed before or not to have been revealed. With still less right have some called subsequent inspiration the divine testimony to the full veracity of a book written by merely human aid, and have thought it no wrong to deem some books of Sacred Scripture, especially in the narrations of deeds known to the writers by human means, to be inspired only subsequently in this way. »

I. The former of the two notions of inspiration which we refute was laid down absolutely, and with no distinction made among the books of Scripture whether prophetic or historical, by John Jahn. For thus does he define it. « We call divine assistance for the prevention of errors suggestion or inspiration, which appellation is consecrated by usage of speech, although it be not very fitting; for it expresses something positive, whereas the notion underlying it is negative. In this very point indeed does this divine safeguarding from errors differ from revelation, that it supplies the writer with no new knowledge, teaches him nothing; but only hinders the admixture of errors in what he already knows; whereas revelation furnishes doctrines, knowledge, and understanding of the divine counsels. This definition of inspiration and distinction from revelation is to be carefully noted; for frequently the one is confounded with the other, from which confusion great difficulties afterwards arise. » So he, in the Introduction to the divine books of the Old Testament, 2nd ed., vol. I, § 19.

Bonfrerius to a cursory reader might seem to be of the same opinion; in reality, however, his view differs much from that of Jahn, although even in the Bonfrerian explanation the genuine and integral notion of inspiration cannot be judged to be expressed, nor could it, especially after the Vatican definition, any longer be maintained. Bonfrerius distinguishes a threefold manner in which the Holy Spirit bears Himself toward the sacred writers, antecedently, concomitantly, and consequently. Of the so-called consequent inspiration we shall treat later; meanwhile Bonfrerius calls antecedent « when the Holy Spirit inspires, reveals, shows forth what is to be said or written, so that the writer adds nothing of his own wit, but writes only what has been inspired and revealed by the Holy Spirit. » This manner he refers to those parts of the books where the inspired matters are of themselves above the power of human understanding, neither known nor knowable to man naturally. Concomitantly he holds the Holy Spirit to have borne Himself with the holy writers in the historical books, in the part where deeds known to the writers from elsewhere are narrated: « thus (he says) the Gospels, thus the Acts of the Apostles, thus the books of Machabees, thus the other historical books written by prophets or others. » Now this second concomitant manner of Bronfrerius might seem to be altogether the same as that inspiration asserted by Jahn, yet it is not. Thus does he speak: « concomitantly does the Holy Spirit bear Himself when He bears Himself not after the manner of one dictating and inspiring (understand: supplying matters unknown), but after the manner of one who with his eye would direct another writing, lest he err in anything. For in this way can the Holy Spirit direct the hagiographer, so as to permit him to err or be deceived in nothing; since He foreknows what he is about to write, He so stands by him, that if He should see him about to err anywhere, He would come to his aid with His inspiration (with the suggestion of the unknown matter). » Further, in men writing under this concomitant action of the Holy Spirit « there is a certain determination from without, so that they cannot write things different from or contrary to what they write, since, as they write, the Holy Spirit does not suffer them to err, but ever stands by the writers ready in first act to inspire what is to be written, if left to themselves they would go astray; yet from within they are free, since in actual fact the Holy Spirit does not determine them, nor works anything in them antecedently, except where the divine operation is necessary for them » Praeloq. c. 8. sect. 1–4. See also Richard Simon, Hist. crit. N. T., pt. I, c. 23, 24; Calmet, dissert. de Inspirat., art. 2 (on 2 Pet. I. 21).

The difference, then, of this opinion from the other of Jahn is chiefly twofold, in that a) Bonfrerius does not extend mere assistance for the prevention of errors to all the books and texts of Scripture; in that b) everywhere in all books and passages he admits, joined with that assistance, a positive inspiration in first act, which, as often as is necessary, passes into second act and suggests to the writer the very matters and sentences to be written; from which three notions—assistance for avoiding errors, suggestion of what is to be written ready in first act, suggestion of what is to be written in second act where necessity requires—consists and is completed the integral notion of that concomitant manner; not therefore is this, as with Jahn, a merely negative notion.¹ Which things although they be so, we judge nevertheless that this opinion too of Bonfrerius, and his explanation of concomitant inspiration, is without doubt false. For although inspiration properly so called in first act is said to be everywhere ready at hand to the writer, yet in actual fact many things would stand written in the sacred books which in second act would not be properly inspired, but written by human powers alone, albeit under the infallible assistance of God. Whence it agrees in part with the opinion of Jahn, and so will be refuted together with it. Now the opinion of Jahn is refuted by altogether all the arguments by which we have proved theses II and III.

1°. Jahn himself confesses that by the name inspiration a positive act is signified; whence he says this name is less fit for expressing the negative notion laid down by him. But the name is biblical, employed by the Apostles; its positive notion is manifestly deduced from the doctrine of Christ, the prophets, and the Apostles, as it is exhibited both in the Scriptures of the Old Testament and in the evangelical and apostolic writings; it has been declared in the universal preaching of the Church; expressed in the creeds and in the definitions of Councils (th. II, III). Therefore from the very revealed doctrine which we have demonstrated above, the Scriptures are inspired in the proper and positive sense, and not in an improper and merely negative signification.

2°. From what has been demonstrated, inspiration is such an action of God upon men, and the books of Scripture are so the work of inspired men, that God must be believed to be the author of the books. But if divine assistance only hindered errors, while for the rest men wrote the books by their own wit, God is not the author of the books.

3°. If that were the notion of inspiration, and if the Scriptures were inspired only in that sense, the ecumenical Councils and the Supreme Pontiff could write books, or at least documents of definitions, by inspiration, and the charism of inspiration would consequently be ordinary. In actual fact, too, there would exist inspired documents besides the Scriptures. But all these things are utterly false.

It is evident of itself that this notion of inspiration remains false, whether it be a question of passages of Scripture containing doctrine already revealed apart from the act of inspiration to the writers themselves or to others, or the discourse be of books and passages whose doctrine and sentences were not elsewhere revealed. For if revealed doctrine be consigned to writing by a man of his own wit, with the assistance of God only forestalling error, God will not on that account be the author of the book, albeit infallibly containing revealed doctrine, as is plain in the canons and definitions of Councils, in which revealed doctrine is infallibly contained, yet God is not the author of the writing itself in that proper sense in which God must be believed to be the author of inspired Scripture (th. II, III).

4°. With that concept of inspiration of Jahn supposed, many things would be contained explicitly in the Scriptures which yet would not be the word of God, nor explicitly revealed by God. For if St. Luke, for example (and the same holds of the other historical narrations and moral doctrines of the Bible), in the Acts narrated the deeds of Paul and others only insofar as he knew them by humanly acquired knowledge, and God only hindered error, those facts in themselves are not manifested by God but by man alone, although from the divine assistance it be infallibly certain that the facts happened as they are narrated by the man. Since therefore this assistance is supposed to be revealed, the truth of the facts narrated may be deemed implicitly revealed in the revelation of the divine assistance; yet the facts will not be revealed explicitly and in themselves. He, then, who should deny those facts would sin against faith, because he would deny the word of God revealing the assistance, and in the assistance the infallible veracity of the narration, but he would not deny the word of God explicitly revealing the facts themselves in themselves, because no such word would exist. Whence the divine revelation would bear itself toward such facts and the moral doctrines of Sacred Scripture in nearly the same way as e.g. revelation bears itself toward dogmatic facts defined by the Church with infallible veracity. But all these things are utterly false and absurd. Therefore false is that concept of inspiration from which these things follow.

II. In the second part of the thesis we treat of a certain singular opinion which, once proposed by a very few theologians in Belgium as a possible hypothesis, has in our age begun to be revived as a thesis concerning the notion of inspiration actually obtaining in certain books of Scripture. Bonfrerius, l.c., sect. 7, describes a third manner in which the Holy Spirit could bear Himself in the writing of books. « Consequently the Holy Spirit could bear Himself, he says, if something had been written by some writer with the human spirit, without the aid, direction, assistance of the Holy Spirit, yet afterwards the Holy Spirit should testify that all things written therein are true; for it is certain that then this whole writing would be the word of God, and would have the same infallible truth as have the rest which were written by the inspiration or direction of the same Holy Spirit. »

That a book thus approved by the Holy Spirit would be Sacred Scripture he undertakes to persuade by a twofold argument. For a) a decree written by another of his own wit, which the king approves, becomes the word of the king. b) A sentence uttered by a man the Holy Spirit « can render Sacred Scripture and the word of God by proving it and asserting it to be true; and so He has in fact done » in approving a certain sentence of the profane poets Aratus, Acts XVII. 28, and Epimenides, Tit. I. 12, and Menander, 1 Cor. XV. 33 (see St. Jerome, ep. 70, n. 2, to Magnus).

Therefore « in like manner an entire history or any book, although at first written with a profane spirit, the Holy Spirit could render Sacred Scripture by asserting that all things contained in that book are true. »

Bonfrerius declares expressly, however, that he does not wish this hypothesis of his applied to any whatsoever book of Sacred Scripture which we now have. « In this third way, he says, although I do not think the Holy Spirit has ever acted in those books of Sacred Scripture which we have, yet absolutely nothing forbids His acting so, or even His having perhaps acted so sometime in some of those books which we have said were Sacred Scripture and yet afterwards perished, » since namely, in the Scripture which we have, they seem by the very citation of and appeal to them to have been approved as veracious.

Thus too, as a hypothetical doctrine and one of possibility, the thesis was proposed before Bonfrerius by Lessius and Hamelius.² « if some pious and salutary work composed by human industry from a divine instinct,³ approved by the public testimony of the Holy Spirit as most true in all its parts, such a work would have an authority equally infallible as (has) Sacred Scripture, and would rightly be called Sacred Scripture and the word of God. For of the same authority is a letter dictated by the king and (another) subscribed by him; which manner, although in fact I think it is not found in any book of the canonical Scripture, yet is not impossible » (Hist. Congreg. de Auxil. of Livinus de Meyer, bk. I, c. 9, Venetian ed. 1742, p. 24).

But in these our times the opinion concerning subsequent approbation, by which some book becomes Sacred Scripture, has been proposed in a far worse form by certain learned men, who have deemed that there stand in fact in our canon of the Scriptures several books or texts of books which, written by merely human aid, were nevertheless afterwards added to the sacred Scriptures by the authority and approbation of the Church. Nay, appealing to Bonfrerius, they call this approbation subsequent inspiration, and say that a book thus approved becomes inspired, which manner of speaking, most inconvenient and indeed inept, neither Bonfrerius nor any other before these times employed. They propose, then, and make their own in the first place the distinction of antecedent and concomitant inspiration; then they proceed thus. « It may also be that a writing originally composed by merely ordinary human powers was at length elevated to the dignity of the word of God, and by this very fact became inspired, in that it was inserted into the canon.⁴ In this hypothesis a writing would have become the word of God in the way in which a passage written by Cicero becomes my word when I employ it in some oration or letter to express my concept: this is subsequent inspiration. Which of these three species of inspiration is to be referred to this or that book, to this or that verse, can scarcely be defined in detail; we can only say that those places in which it is expressed: thus saith the Lord, or something similar, belong more probably to the first (antecedent) species, while the historical narrations of things subject to experience may belong to the later (subsequent) one. The poetical books seem to be reckoned chiefly to the second (concomitant) » (Historia revelationis biblicae by D. Daniel Haneberg, 1850, p. 774).

All these things, especially after the definition published in the ecumenical Vatican Council, can in no way be maintained. The definition runs thus. « Those (entire books with all their parts, as they are enumerated in the decree of the Tridentine Council and are contained in the old Latin Vulgate edition) the Church holds for sacred and canonical, not therefore because, composed by merely human industry, they were afterwards approved by her authority; nor therefore only because they contain revelation without error; but therefore because, written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, they have God for author, and as such have been handed down to the Church herself » (Constitut. Dei Filius, c. 2). As is plain, a) a twofold error is by this declaration of the Council directly excluded: that some books of Scripture were written by merely human industry, yet afterwards approved by the Church and inserted into the canons of the Scriptures, and on this account held sacred and canonical; or that some books of Scripture are divine books only by reason of their matter and not by reason of the writing itself. b) It is positively taught that the books of Scripture are sacred by reason of the very writing under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, so as to have God for author. Yet the individual marks by which divine inspiration may be discerned, and what is required for God to be the author of the books, are not explained by the Council itself. Hence c) by theologically demonstrating the notion of inspiration and its distinction from divine assistance, and by declaring what is required, or at least what does not suffice, for God to be the author of the books, there is inferred from this definition of the Council, by theological conclusion, the falsity of that opinion too which asserts that mere divine assistance, by which God stood by the writers safeguarding them from all error, suffices for the rationale of Sacred Scripture such as the Church now has, and that in fact in some sacred books or parts of books no inspiration distinct from this assistance took place. d) Of the merely hypothetical opinion, as Bonfrerius explained it, the Council does not speak. In truth, if it is only said that a humanly written book, whose veracity in each and every point God had afterwards revealed by public revelation, could be called Sacred Scripture and would have divine authority, the dispute may be about words, provided there be acknowledged the diversity of such a book from the divinely inspired Scripture which the Church has received and has.

As regards the inward fallacy of that wrongly so called subsequent inspiration, that we may disentangle the confusion of matters, we distinguish these three: a book is inspired, a book is Sacred Scripture, a book contains the word of God; finally we shall inquire how it is not absolutely repugnant that some humanly written book become a divinely written or inspired writing.

1°. Inspiration is a divine supernatural action upon the man writing, from which the book written by the inspired man is and is called terminatively inspired. But a divine approbation and declaration that in some book written by merely human aid there is nothing not true is not an action of God upon the writer; nor does it come about through this declaration that the past act of writing ceases to be merely human, and that a book long since composed by merely human aid begins to be written divinely. Therefore such approbation is not and cannot be inspiration, nor can such a book be inspired.

2°. The name Scripture and Sacred Scripture is, from biblical and Christian usage, a proper name designating nothing else, no other sacred monument, but the books and parts of books which were written under divine inspiration. Therefore, since a subsequent divine approbation and declaration of veracity cannot render a book inspired and homogeneous in origin with the books of Scripture, neither can it effect that it pertain to Sacred Scripture properly so called. If sacred scripture be taken in a more common and generic signification, the divine revelation of the veracity and holiness of doctrine does indeed effect that such a writing already be sacred, just as the definitions of Councils or of the Roman Pontiffs, on account of the infallible veracity concerning which it is established from divine revelation, can be called sacred writings.

3°. From such an attestation of the veracity of a book, made by God Himself through catholic revelation, it would indeed follow that the things contained in a book of human origin would be divinely revealed truths, and consequently the word of God to be believed. For as truths naturally known by men in general, so too truths naturally known and written by some man, God could propose to be believed by supernatural revelation, and He would effect this by the very fact that through public revelation He attested the veracity of the book. But not on that account would that humanly written book be an inspired book or Sacred Scripture of the proper name, although it could be called a divine book by reason of the matter and the truths which it contains (cf. th. II). Of such a subsequent catholic revelation of God have spoken those certain Belgian theologians of whom we have spoken. But since they saw that the books which we have in the canon have been handed down, simply and all in one manner, as books of God the author, while of any other diverse subsequent revelation as regards any of them there is no vestige, they therefore wisely protested that they wished that hypothetical theory of theirs applied to no canonical book at all. But what Sixtus of Siena and certain more recent men have said concerning reception into the canon by the authority of the Church, by which a book written by merely human industry could become Sacred Scripture, nay that in fact some books or parts of books by this insertion into the canon became Scripture inspired with subsequent inspiration, is far different. For such a reception of a human book into the canon a) by the infallible Church cannot take place, because it would be a false testimony concerning the inspiration of a book which is not inspired. b) An infallible definition of the Church concerning the truth of all things contained in some human book is indeed not repugnant; but through it not only would the book not become inspired Scripture, but neither would it be effected that the truths contained in that book would be divinely revealed truths. For such a definition would bear itself in the same way as a definition in dogmatic facts; that is, it would be established concerning the truth of all things written in the book, not through the immediate revelation of God but through the revealed infallibility of the testifying Church or Pontiff; therefore they would have to be believed with faith not immediately but mediately divine (cf. above, p. 124).

For the rest, those certain theologians who have spoken of a subsequent revelation of God through which a human book could become Sacred Scripture seem to have been deceived by a confusion of the divinity of a book by reason of the matter which it contains and by reason of the writing. That is, they confound the comprehension of the word of God and the divine origin or inspiration of the writing itself. Because they see that by a subsequent divine revelation it can be effected that what is contained in a veracious humanly written book already be the word of God, they conclude that the book itself is inspired and is Sacred Scripture, which yet in no way follows.

Hence too you will answer the proof which they bring from the similitude of a royal diploma. If a royal minister wrote a document of his own wit, with the king neither supplying the sentiments nor moving the will of the minister, by no approbation would the king become the author of the written work. By the approbation of the king, however, the laws written in that document would become royal laws, because law obtains its formal rationale and force of law not from the jurisconsults who conceived and wrote it in mind, but from the manifestation of the royal will and from the approbation made by the king. In this sense too the codes of laws are attributed to princes, e.g. Justinian, Theodosius, etc., not because they are said to be the authors of the books, but because the contents in the codes have the force of law from the authority and will of the princes.

For the signification is not the same when author of a book is said, and when Theodosian code or diploma of the king or testament of the testator is named; by the former locution is signified from whose mind the very complex of sentences emanated and was written; by the latter appellations there is said of itself only from whom the code, diploma, testament has authority and binding force.

4°. Since the adversaries appeal to certain sentences of the pagans which they say were made Sacred Scripture by subsequent approbation of veracity, and to the similitude that one man can render another's, e.g. Cicero's, sentences his own, for the declaration of this matter it must be inquired how a document long ago written by human means can become inspired. From what has been said it is already established that an inspired book, and Sacred Scripture of the proper name, cannot be except from a supernatural action of God upon man for writing, from which the book exists inspired in its origin. Therefore a) no subsequent approbation can render a book inspired. b) Nor does the adoption of a profane sentence made by an inspired author render it in itself inspired, although the report and application or narration of that sentence spoken by a profane man be inspired. Thus e.g. the report of the discourses of the friends of Job, nay even of the sentences of impious men « who said, thinking within themselves not rightly... let us crown ourselves with roses » etc., Wis. II, the narration of the saying by the man born blind: « God does not hear sinners » Jn. IX. 31, the application of the verses of Aratus and Epimenides, Acts XVII. 28; Tit. I. 12, is without doubt inspired; but not on that account have those sentences in themselves, or as they stand in the books of the poets, become inspired truth. Nevertheless c) it would not be repugnant that some true sentence, though humanly written, become inspired. For as preceding natural knowledge of a truth is no reason why God cannot inspire it for writing, so too preceding natural writing is no reason which of itself would impede the inspiration of the same truth for writing it divinely; and then, indeed, neither would it be repugnant that, for expressing the same inspired sentence, the same words be employed which the profane author used. Thus it is not repugnant that the inspired author of 2 Mach. should have conceived the compendium of the history of Jason of Cyrene, inspired to him for writing, in the very words of Jason himself, whom we suppose to have been a non-inspired author. Hence too we concede that it is not absolutely repugnant that there be inspired matters and sentences, all of which already stood written humanly in some book true throughout. If then all those matters and inspired sentences were expressed in the same words which the non-inspired author had used, in this hypothesis the same concept or the same entire book would have been written twice in a very different manner, once humanly and again divinely. This, however, although from the very notion of inspiration not in itself repugnant, yet if it be a question of an entire book, seems almost trifling, nor sufficiently reconcilable with the divine majesty and wisdom.