Tractatus de divina traditione et Scriptura

What we have so far disputed concerning the magisterium and the ministry of preserving Tradition seems to require that we at least indicate more distinctly the principles concerning the subject and the object of the power of infallibly teaching and judging. For the fuller exposition and demonstration of this most weighty argument belongs to another treatise proper to it, on the Church and on the Roman Pontiff.

Principle I. Indefectibility in the truth of the faith which is one in catholicity, or infallibility in believing, has been divinely promised and conferred on the universal Church, which is « the house of God, the pillar and ground of the truth » 1. Tim. III. 15; « built upon a rock, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it » Matth. XVI. 18. Whatever therefore the universal Church believes with faith is established by the promise and institution of Christ to be infallibly true. Of this infallibility in believing, which is also called passive, the subject is the universal Church herself.

The Church is preserved by the Holy Spirit in the indefectible truth of the one faith through the authentic ministry and magisterium, through the pastors and doctors whom Christ gave for the building up of the body of Christ (Eph. IV. 11. 12.), to teach the Church of God with authority, to which there must answer as an effect, on the part of all the faithful, agreement and the « obedience of faith » (cf. th. IV. n. 2°.). Therefore to this magisterium instituted by Himself Christ promised and conferred infallibility in teaching ¹ all things which Christ Himself and the Holy Spirit had taught.

The subject therefore of this infallibility in teaching is all those, and they alone, to whom the right and duty of authentically teaching the universal Church has been divinely committed.

1°. Thus infallible is the teaching Church, i.e. the body of pastors and doctors in union, agreement, and subordination to the visible head of the Church; and this a) in the universal and consentient preaching of doctrine concerning faith or morals; b) in the solemn judgments or definitions of the same doctrine. For to the teaching Church thus constituted it was said: « All power is given to Me in heaven and on earth; going therefore teach all nations; baptizing them... teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and behold I am with you all days even to the consummation of the world » Matth. XXVIII. « And I will ask the Father, and He shall give you another Paraclete, that He may abide with you for ever, the Spirit of truth... He will teach you all things and bring to your minds all things whatsoever I have said to you » (ἀ εἴπον ὑμῖν) Io. XIV. 16. 26. See th. V. cf. Zaccaria Antifebron. dissert. II. c. 12.

For these promises do not pertain to the individual successors of the Apostles, since individuals do not succeed the Apostles in the office of authentically teaching the universal Church, which in the Apostles (with the sole exception of Peter, the head of the Church ever to abide in his successors) was not ordinary but extraordinary and personal to them; but the promises were made to the body of the apostolic succession in common, insofar as they are the teaching Church. But they are not the teaching Church except insofar as they remain united, consentient, and subordinate to the visible head of the whole Church.

Wherefore the efficient cause of the infallibility of the teaching Church, whether in its universal preaching or in its solemn definitions and judgments, is indeed the promised assistance of the Spirit of truth; but the condition without which the successors of the Apostles are not the teaching Church, and the formal cause by which they are constituted in the character of the teaching Church, to which the protection of Christ and the assistance of the Spirit of truth in teaching has been promised, is the visible head of the Church instituted by Christ and the union and agreement of the members with this head, just as in general the form of visible unity is the visible head of the Church itself. Hence it is that the ordinary office of infallibly teaching, i.e. to be propagated to successors, instituted in the Apostles, was declared by Christ the Lord in words which were never directed to individuals, but always to the whole college in union with Peter. Cf. th. V. VIII.

2°. By opposite reason the words of Christ by which the primacy, and the infallibility of the magisterium comprehended in the primacy, is promised and conferred to Peter, designate him alone, not only expressly distinguished from the rest, but also in relation to the rest, to be confirmed and fed by him. « Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jona... and I say to thee, that thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build My Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it » Matth. XVI. « Simon, Simon, behold Satan hath desired to have you... but I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not: and thou being once converted (ἐπιστρέψας) confirm thy brethren » Luc. XXII. « Jesus saith to Simon Peter: Simon son of John, lovest thou Me more than these?... He saith to him: feed My lambs... feed My sheep » Io. XXI.

Peter therefore received from Christ in an ordinary office, for himself and for each of his successors, the power and duty of feeding and teaching the universal Church in faith and morals, so that this very power conferred on Peter demands for each of his successors by divine institution the « obedience of faith » and the agreement of the whole Church; and consequently the infallibility of the whole Church in believing cannot stand, except insofar as to the head of the Church, the successor of Peter, together with such a right of exacting agreement in faith, there has at the same time been conferred infallibility in teaching; namely when he proposes doctrine concerning faith or morals by a definitive sentence binding the whole Church to the « obedience of faith. » The subject of infallibility, therefore, is the successor of Peter himself through the divine assistance promised to him considered in himself, insofar as he teaches the Church, and not under the condition of a concurrent judgment or agreement of the other pastors and doctors, who, over against the Pontiff thus teaching the Church, are the noblest part of the Church built upon this rock, so that the gates of hell shall not prevail against it, are brethren to be confirmed, are sheep to be fed; although there remains before the faithful the office of the pastors and doctors of authentically proposing, teaching and defending to them the very doctrine defined.

« It is a revealed dogma of faith that the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks ex cathedra, that is, when, discharging the office of Pastor and Doctor of all Christians, by his supreme apostolic authority he defines a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the universal Church, through the divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter, enjoys that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed His Church to be endowed in defining doctrine concerning faith or morals; and that therefore such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves, and not from the consent of the Church » (Definition of the Vatican Council, Constit. I. on the Church of Christ, ch. 4.).

Corollary 1. The subject of infallibility promised by Christ for the definitions of doctrine concerning faith or morals is not twofold adequately distinct; but it is both the visible head of the Church considered in itself, and this same visible head as composing and informing the body of the teaching Church, which itself thus constituted (the body with the head) is infallible through the assistance of the Spirit of truth. This inadequate distinction in the subject of infallibility is indicated by the Vatican definition itself described a little above. For there the infallibility of the Pontiff defining ex cathedra is compared with the infallibility of the defining Church ²; the former is declared directly and expressly by the Council, the latter is supposed as certain, and assumed as the term of comparison. If indeed the question be asked concerning the object, how far that infallibility of the Pontiff extends, as a general norm is established the infallibility of the defining Church: « the Roman Pontiff... enjoys that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed His Church to be endowed in defining doctrine concerning faith or morals. »

Corollary 2. Whatever is to be believed with Catholic faith or held with theological certainty concerning the extension in respect of the object of infallibility, if it be considered in the defining Church or in a general Council; that same is in the same way to be believed and held concerning infallibility, if it be considered in the Roman Pontiff speaking ex cathedra. From what has been said it is clear that this very thing has been defined by the Vatican Council.

Corollary 3. An antecedent agreement of the Church can indeed be an objective means by which the Pontiff arrives at knowledge of a doctrine as definable; but it is not of itself and from the nature of the case the sole and necessary means of knowledge; for doctrines concerning faith or morals can also be known as definable from other sources and means, and questions hitherto doubtful and controverted even within the bounds of the Church can be defined. In no way, however, is such an agreement of the Church or of the Bishops, whether antecedent or concomitant or subsequent, necessary by way of an authentic judgment concurrent with the judgment or definition of the Pontiff. The Gallican opinion demanding this agreement of the Church as necessary for the infallibility of the definitions of the Pontiff, so that the sole subject of infallibility would be the body of the teaching Church, namely the Pontiff with the Bishops, is already a heresy directly and explicitly condemned by the Vatican Council. A subsequent agreement of the whole Church is nevertheless always an effect of the definition of the Pontiff.

Corollary 4. According to the declaration of the Vatican Council itself the Pontiff is said to speak ex cathedra, « when, discharging the office of Pastor and Doctor of all Christians, by his supreme apostolic authority he defines a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the universal Church. » For the apostolic chair is nothing else than the supreme authentic magisterium, whose definitive doctrinal sentence obliges the universal Church to agreement. This intention of defining doctrine, or of teaching by a definitive sentence and with authority obliging the universal Church to agreement, must be manifested and knowable by clear signs. No determinate form, however, is essential, which the Pontiff must employ to manifest this will of his. For although there are certain solemn modes which of themselves express speaking ex cathedra, and which therefore the Pontiff never uses except when speaking ex cathedra, of which sort are dogmatic Bulls; yet this form is not essential and exclusive, so that without it the Pontiff, as pastor and doctor of all Christians, could not define a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the universal Church and condemn in the same way the errors opposed to it, and render this will of his manifest.

Corollary 5. In the very documents of Councils and Pontiffs in which it is most certainly the intention to issue definitions of doctrine, there can and usually do occur many things whose definition is not intended; such as things said by the way or incidentally, which they are wont to state indirectly, and for the most part also the arguments adduced in proof of the definitive sentence itself, etc. These, although they carry grave authority, are nevertheless not infallible definitions.

Likewise there can be and are documents of Pontiffs, not only private but wholly proceeding from the pastoral office, in which, concerning doctrine of faith or morals, the intention is to admonish, persuade, command, rebuke, or prohibit the propagation of some opinion or error, without intending to issue a definitive sentence by which the whole Church would be bound; and by that very fact there is no speaking ex cathedra. « For the Pontiffs often answer private questions of this or that Bishop, explaining their opinion on the matters proposed, not passing sentence by which they would wish the faithful to be obliged to believe » Melch. Canus l. VI. c. 8. ad 7. To this class are rightly referred e.g. the two letters of Honorius I. to Sergius of Constantinople ³. Among many others a most manifest example stands forth in the decree of Stephen I., concerning which we spoke in th. VIII. n. II. In a question which of itself was of faith, the command was indeed: « Let nothing be innovated, but what has been handed down. » But in no way can it be said that it was a definition ex cathedra; otherwise the Pontiff would not have retained in Catholic communion Cyprian and the other African and Eastern Bishops who persisted in the same error, nor would there have been need for the question to be brought to a clear settlement after the passion of Cyprian at last, concerning which Augustine often treats in excuse of Cyprian against the Donatists.

We do not deny that doubt can arise concerning certain documents of Pontiffs, whether they contain a speaking ex cathedra and a definition of doctrine; but this same thing sometimes happens also concerning documents of Councils, an example of which we have in the diverse opinions, which existed and among some still exist, concerning the Instruction for the Armenians issued in the Council of Florence, whether the things taught there expressly concerning the matter and form of the sacraments are dogmatic definitions or only instructions to be observed in practice. If ever doubts of this kind occur, the theologian rightly holds that « in judging this matter the judgment of wise men avails much, and (much more) the sense and agreement of the Church » Tanner de Fide q. 4. dub. 6. n. 262.

Let these things concerning the subject of infallibility suffice for our purpose; for the doctrine concerning the object of infallibility pertains more to our present treatment.

Principle II. The deposit of the Christian faith taken in the strict sense comprises all those things and those alone which have been revealed by God to the human race to be believed, done, and followed, explicitly or implicitly; or which have been manifested by Catholic revelation (in distinction from private divine revelations) for the eternal salvation of the human race.

Corollary 1. In the deposit of faith are contained both theoretical doctrines concerning mysteries and dogmas (among these also truths which, insofar as knowable by reason, are usually said to pertain to natural religion); and practical laws (and among these also the natural law written in the hearts of men using reason); and certain fundamental constitutions, such as the Church, its power, its form of government; and institutions of sanctification, consecration and divine worship (the sacraments, the sacrifice and many others): the revealed and supernatural order dogmatic, ethical, juridical (τὰ τῆς πολιτείας), liturgical.

Corollary 2. Only truths revealed by God, when they have been sufficiently proposed, can and must be believed with divine faith; because this is assent on account of the authority of God revealing.

Corollary 3. In the deposit of faith there can objectively be contained, and are contained, truths which were not always, or even now still are not, sufficiently proposed. Such truths, therefore, always indeed, from the time they were revealed, and for all the faithful, were the object of implicit faith, which extends to the whole deposit of revelation; before sufficient proposal, however, they were not, or are not, the object of explicit faith, whose obligation depends on that sufficient proposal itself. Although therefore after the Apostles there is no increase of Catholic revelation; there is nevertheless room for progress in the explication and proposal of revelation long since completed. Of this matter it will be said elsewhere.

Corollary 4. Whatever is contained in the deposit of revelation, all of it is to be believed and has been believed always, everywhere, by all the faithful, with at least implicit faith; yet not all of it has thus been believed or must necessarily be believed with explicit faith. Although therefore all those things which have been believed always, everywhere, by all with explicit divine faith must most certainly be reckoned revealed; yet it is absurd and contrary to the whole economy of faith to say that those alone are contained in the deposit of revelation (below, th. XXIV.).

Principle III. With revealed truths are connected, and referred to them, other truths not in themselves revealed, without which the deposit of revelation itself could not in its full plenitude be duly guarded, expounded, and defended.

Many things pertain of themselves to philosophy, to philology, to human experience, without whose infallible certainty neither could revealed truth itself be infallibly proposed and expounded, nor could it be understood what is to be believed: « unless we had rational souls, we could not believe. » Moreover facts in themselves nowise revealed are frequently so presupposed either to the very explication of revelation or to the errors opposed to it, that in certain circumstances revealed dogma cannot be guarded, defended against erroneous distortions, or applied without danger, unless the judgment concerning revealed dogma or the opposed error also embraces such facts in themselves unrevealed. Hither belong the facts usually called dogmatic, when the question concerns the genuine sense of human texts in determinate books, insofar as in that context they agree with or are opposed to the deposit of faith; the hagiographic facts of the true sanctity and eternal glory of deceased men who by solemn judgment are proposed to the universal Church to be honored with religious worship; then facts in themselves historical, e.g. the legitimate celebration of a determinate Council; moreover certain special dispositions of divine providence, and in general « matters pertaining to the general good of the Church » (Encyclical Quanta cura), e.g. if the question concerns the opportuneness or moral necessity of the political independence of the Supreme Pontiff and relations to kingdoms and nations in regard to the government of the Church.

Corollary 1. The deposit of faith is violated, as far as in it lies, not only by denial of revealed truth and by heresy; but it can also be assailed and exposed to dangers in the minds of the faithful through errors against truths in themselves unrevealed, yet connected with revealed ones and to that extent theological.

Corollary 2. Although the deposit of faith strictly taken comprises only revealed truths, nevertheless the deposit to be guarded in its whole amplitude with all its bulwarks and modes of application extends more widely: « O Timothy, keep the deposit, avoiding profane novelties of words » 1. Tim. VI. 20.

Principle IV. To whom Christ has committed the office of infallibly guarding the deposit and defending it against assailing errors, his infallible authority under the promised assistance of the Holy Spirit avails in the first place for guarding, proposing, and expounding the truths which in the strict sense constitute the deposit of faith itself, namely revealed truths, and consequently for warding off errors directly opposed to them or for condemning heresies. This infallibility pertains to the very revealed dogma fundamental to the Catholic faith; and hence its denial is not only heresy but also the root of all heresies.

In this is contained, and thence immediately follows, that the infallibility promised for guarding the deposit extends to the whole amplitude of guarding the deposit, i.e. to truths even in themselves unrevealed, insofar as they cohere with revealed ones and are required for their custody, proposal, explication, and defense. This extension of infallibility, with all theologians agreeing, is a truth theologically so certain that its denial would be a most grave error or, in the opinion of many, even heresy, although hitherto it has not been explicitly condemned as heresy. See Card. de Lugo de Fide disp. XX. n. 106-114; Bañez 2.2. q. 11. a. 2. concl. 2; Suarez de Fide disp. V. sect. 6. n. 4. 5. 8; sect. 8. n. 4.

Corollary 1. Not only of revealed truth but also of connected truth insofar as it is referred to revealed truth can an infallible definition be given by the infallible magisterium; and by the same reason not only can heresies be condemned, but even lesser censures can be inflicted by infallible authority under the assistance of the Spirit of truth. That therefore a doctrine is not defined as in itself revealed, or that errors are not individually condemned with the note of heresy, but are proscribed either with no determinate censure or with lesser censures or in globo with several censures: for these reasons considered in themselves it cannot without grave error be denied either the fact of a canonical definition or of a speaking ex cathedra, or consequently the infallibility of the definition itself.

Corollary 2. That the dogmatic Constitutions of the Council of Constance against the articles of Wycliffe and John Hus, with Martin V. confirming; of Leo X. against Luther (« Exsurge »); of Clement XI. against the Jansenists (« Unigenitus »), etc., where under diverse censures in globo propositions are condemned, and likewise the Constitution of Pius VI. against those of Pistoia (« Auctorem fidei »), where individually very many propositions are proscribed with lesser censures, are infallible definitions — no Catholic may deny. This corollary, itself certain from elsewhere, in turn demonstrates the truth of the principle laid down, because without it the consequent itself could not stand.

Corollary 3. The quality which is defined to belong to a proposition belongs to it infallibly in the sense and manner intended in the defining. Whence those who think e.g. that a proposition is called rash which is asserted against grave reasons and grave authority without sufficient foundation, also say that this quality, and not falsity of the proposition in itself, is defined in the censure of rashness. The same, that not falsity but another damnable quality of the proposition is defined, they equally affirm concerning the censures by which are branded propositions that are scandalous, evil-sounding, offensive to pious ears. See Card. de Lugo de Fide disp. XX. n. 114; Canus l. XII. c. 11. at the end. Certainly when the Council of Vienne « deemed the opinion (concerning the infusion of grace and the virtues in infants) to be chosen as more probable, » this in itself is not a definition of truth but only of greater probability (cf. de Lugo l. c. n. 115-129.).

Corollary 4. The infallibility of the Church and of the Roman Pontiff is believed with divine faith on account of the authority of God revealing; a sentence proposed as true, but not as revealed, through an infallible definition of the Church or of the Pontiff, is believed on account of the revealed authority of the one proposing. Whence this, which some call ecclesiastical faith, we may call mediate divine faith.

Principle V. If the Church is infallible in guarding the deposit of faith at least strictly taken, and consequently in declaring the true sense of revealed dogmas; by that very fact it is infallible in judging concerning the true sense, the intension and extension of its own authority and infallibility, or, what is the same, in judging concerning the conditions and the objects in which authority belongs to it by divine right and the assistance of the Spirit of truth has been promised to it. For this authority and infallibility is itself indeed a revealed dogma.

Corollary. It involves a contradiction to admit the infallibility of the Church in revealed dogmas, and at the same time to deny the authority of a definition supposed to actually exist, on the ground that the thing defined does not pertain to revealed dogmas. For if the Church or the Pontiff speaking ex cathedra actually defines a truth not in itself revealed, by that very act it also defines in exercise the extension of its infallibility to such truths. It therefore defines the force and true sense of a revealed dogma, of which sort certainly is the infallibility of the Church and of the Pontiff. But the adversary himself admits infallible authority for defining the true sense of revealed dogmas. Therefore, on the hypothesis of an existing definition, from his own principles he must admit the extension of infallibility also to truths not in themselves revealed; yet at the same time he denies it. Therefore the contradiction between principle and conclusion is manifest ⁴.

Principle VI. Just as it is certain, from the very principles of revelation as understood and declared by the Church, that to its infallible magisterium pertain truths, and to its infallible judgment are subjected errors, only in order to guard the deposit of the Christian religion, and to protect and promote it in the faithful; so it is equally certain that in most sciences as cultivated and to be cultivated by men from merely natural principles and from unrevealed sources — in philosophy above all, both theoretical and practical, in jurisprudence, in history, geology, ethnography — there are found truths which are at the same time revealed or connected with revealed ones. The reason is that revelation contains not only superrational truths, but many knowable also by reason and from natural sources; or in other words, that revelation and the natural disciplines have in many things a common (material) object. Likewise it is evident that in these disciplines, not indeed by right use but by abuse of reason and by ignorance ⁵ hypotheses can be set up as principles, and conclusions can be reached, which are opposed to the truths of revelation, whether rational in themselves or superrational, either simply or in some respect, and which consequently (since truth cannot contradict truth) contain errors knowable and damnable from revealed principles.

The magisterium of the Church therefore teaches such truths and can judge infallibly concerning such errors, not by teaching the human sciences from their own principles, but by judging from its own principles ⁶. Wherefore the infallible Church never judges, nor by force of the promised infallibility could the Holy Spirit ever permit it in defining to judge, whether concerning truths or concerning errors, except in order to guard the deposit and from the divinely enjoined office of custody of the deposit.

Corollary 1. Although philosophy and the other natural disciplines rest on their own proper principles, which are known, or insofar as they are known, not from revelation and from the authentic magisterium of the Church, but by reason and from natural sources; nevertheless the magisterium of the Church can and indeed must from the principles of revelation point out in advance the errors to be avoided which are opposed to the integrity and safety of the deposit to be guarded. Catholic cultivators of the sciences must therefore keep this norm before their eyes by prescription of reason, lest they fall into errors; by prescription of faith, lest they fall into errors contrary to the truths of faith.

Corollary 2. Those who profess themselves Catholics and therefore acknowledge the authentic magisterium of the Church, and nevertheless affirm that philosophy in the manner declared is not subject to this norm, that through it the progress of science is impeded, that the Church must leave it to philosophy to correct its own errors (Syllab. Pontific. prop. X. XI. XII. XIV.); these demand liberty to embrace errors through abuse of philosophy, and deny to the Church the right and duty of providing for the integrity and health of the doctrine of faith. See the Vatican Council, Constit. on Faith, ch. 4, can. 2.

Principle VII. The Holy Apostolic See, to which the custody of the deposit has been divinely committed, and the office and duty enjoined of feeding the universal Church unto the salvation of souls, can prescribe theological opinions, or insofar as they are connected with theological ones, to be followed, or proscribe them as not to be followed, not solely with the intention of infallibly deciding the truth by a definitive sentence, but also without it, from the necessity and intention, either simply or for determinate circumstances, of providing for the security ⁷ of Catholic doctrine (cf. Zaccaria Antifebronius vindicatus T. II. dissert. V. c. 2. n. 1.). In such declarations, although there is not infallible truth of doctrine, because by hypothesis there is no intention of deciding it; there is nevertheless infallible security. By security I mean both the objective security of the declared doctrine (either simply or for such circumstances), and the subjective, insofar as it is safe for all to embrace it, and it is not safe, nor can it be done without violation of due submission toward the divinely instituted magisterium, to refuse to embrace it. Whoever denied this distinction between the final definitive sentence of the Pontiff speaking ex cathedra and other doctrinal provisions and prohibitions would be compelled to reckon all edicts of the Holy See in any way pertaining to doctrine in one and the same class of definitions ex cathedra, which is proved manifestly false from ecclesiastical history, from the practice of the Holy See, and above all from the most careful declaration of definition ex cathedra issued by the Holy Vatican Council. But let the distinction between infallible truth and security of doctrine be diligently noted, for according to it as laid down in the principle are to be understood the things said in the deduced corollaries ⁸.

Corollary 1. The authority of the magisterium instituted by Christ in the Church, as regards the matter of which we now treat, must be considered twofold: a) as in its individual acts it is under the assistance of the Holy Spirit for the infallible definition of truth, or as it is the authority of infallibility; b) as extensively, as the same magisterium acts with the pastoral authority divinely committed to it, yet not with its whole intension (if it be lawful so to speak) nor by ultimately defining the truth, but as much as shall have seemed necessary or opportune and sufficient for the security of doctrine — which we may perhaps call the authority of doctrinal providence.

Corollary 2. The authority of infallibility cannot be communicated by the Pontiff to others as his ministers acting in his name. If therefore an infallible definition is said to have been issued through some sacred Roman Congregation, this manner of speaking is not proper; for in this hypothesis the Congregation stands only by way of counsellor, while the one defining is the Pontiff alone. There must therefore occur here those signs by which, as we said above, the intention of the Pontiff of defining ex cathedra must be rendered manifest.

The inferior authority of doctrinal providence, as we have called it, not indeed independent but with dependence on the Pontiff, is communicable and is communicated by the Pontiff himself with greater or lesser extension to certain sacred Congregations of Cardinals. Whence also the decisions of the sacred Congregations can rightly be called, and by ecclesiastical use are usually called, decrees of the Holy See.

From what has been said it is clear that every definition ex cathedra is indeed a definition of the Holy See, inasmuch as acting with the whole intension of the supreme magisterium it « defines a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the universal Church »; yet not every decree of the Holy See, though pertaining to doctrine, is a definition ex cathedra; finally, that a definition ex cathedra, which belongs to the Pontiff alone insofar as divine assistance has been promised to him in blessed Peter, can never in the proper and genuine sense be called a decision of a Pontifical Congregation.

That the Supreme Pontiff ratifies the sentences of the sacred Congregations and confirms them even with his supreme authority does not effect a definition ex cathedra, unless he makes the decree his own and issues it of himself with the necessary signs of the intention of defining doctrine to be held by the universal Church, so that the sentence is no longer that of the Congregation as judging but only by way of counselling. Only in this sense, especially after the declaration of the Vatican Council, can and must be admitted the doctrine of those theologians who, like Cardenas and Lacroix, also cited historically by Zaccaria (delle Proibizioni de' libri Append. §. 2. n. 6.), said that the doctrinal decrees of the sacred Congregations, if specially approved by the Pontiff, are definitions ex cathedra. But lest stress be laid on that expression, that the sentence of the Congregation has been confirmed with the supreme authority of the Pontiff, note that authority may be called supreme either by intension of exercise or in its substance; in this second way the Pontiff e.g. grants indulgences, privileges, dispensations, and decrees the beatifications of servants of God (short of the final definitive judgment) with supreme power, without its therefore always being the supreme intension in the exercise of this power. So therefore neither can there be a Pontifical confirmation of a doctrinal decree without its being from supreme authority, which namely is Pontifical; but it can be without the supreme intension of this authority and magisterium, which is found in definitions ex cathedra alone.

Corollary 3. It is false that the authority on account of which assent of the intellect can and sometimes must be rendered is only the authority of God revealing or of the Church or Pontiff infallibly defining; for there are manifold grades of religious assent. At present must be distinguished the assent of faith properly and immediately divine on account of the authority of God revealing; the assent of the faith which above we called mediate divine, on account of the authority infallibly defining doctrine as true though not as revealed; the religious assent on account of the authority of universal doctrinal providence in the sense which we declared a little above in the exposition of the principle.

Namely, in this assent which we call religious there is no question of doctrine to be held by force of the decree as infallibly true or to be rejected as infallibly false or branded by another censure of infallible authority; for this would be against the hypothesis. Nevertheless by force of the supreme and universal magisterium the authority is so sacred that to it, though not defining ex cathedra doctrine to be held by the universal Church, but without such a definition prescribing some doctrine to be followed or not to be followed, obedience is due. This obedience the adversaries do not indeed deny to be due, but they restrict it merely to the omission of external acts, and thus to reverential silence, « lest anyone teach some doctrine, nay even write on some matter or proffer his judgment »; but, they say, never except through a definition ex cathedra can be exacted « the submission of the mind, so that one lay aside his opinion and embrace the contrary with so firm a certainty as to profess by oath his adherence to it » (dissert. Traiectensis p. 134.). But if ever a sacred Congregation, where no definition ex cathedra as yet existed, demanded such submission of the mind, as in the case of Galileo, « the sacred Congregation of the Inquisition exceeded the limits of its power » (ibid. p. 133. citing D. Bouix de Papa T. II. p. 194.). We however judge that such judgments even short of a definition ex cathedra can be so framed as to demand obedience including submission of the mind, not indeed so that doctrine be believed infallibly true or false (as the adversary seems to have understood our opinion); but so that it be judged that the doctrine contained in such a judgment is safe, and is to be embraced with submission of the mind by us not indeed from the motive of divine faith (on account of the authority of God revealing or of the Church infallibly teaching), yet from the motive of sacred authority ⁹, whose undoubted office it is to provide for the health and security of doctrine — the safe doctrine to be embraced and the contrary to be rejected. For here there is no question of those decrees by which sometimes nothing but silence is enjoined (as e.g. we know was done by Paul V. in the doctrine concerning the aids of divine grace), but the discourse concerns decrees by which some doctrine is prescribed to be followed or not to be followed ¹⁰. These therefore are proposed to those whom they concern not only to be kept silent about, but, in the sense and to the extent in which it is prescribed, to be taught and defended — in which very thing submission of the mind is included. Since further in theological doctrine, which rests upon or coheres with the word of God, the proper locus and hence the proper and chief reason on account of which assent is rendered is not inwardly discerned truth but the authority proposing the truth, that sacred authority of doctrinal providence by force of its office is a most sufficient motive from which the pious will can, and if the form of the decree exacts it, must command the religious or theological consent of the intellect (cf. below in the Appendix on the relation of reason to faith, ch. II.). I think the opinion hitherto expounded rests on valid arguments.

a) This doctrine the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX. embraced in most clear words in the letter written 21 December 1863 to the Archbishop of Munich, whose beginning is « Tuas libenter accepimus ». « We wish to persuade Ourselves that they (who were present at the literary congress of Munich) did not wish to restrict the obligation by which Catholic masters and writers are altogether bound to those things alone which are proposed by the infallible judgment of the Church to be believed by all as dogmas of faith. And We also persuade Ourselves that they did not wish to declare that that perfect adherence to revealed truths... can be obtained if only to the dogmas expressly defined by the Church faith and submission be applied. For even if it were a question of that subjection which is to be rendered by the act of divine faith, it would nevertheless not be to be limited to those things defined by the express decrees of oecumenical Councils or of the Roman Pontiffs, and of this Apostolic See; but to be extended also to those things handed down by the ordinary magisterium of the whole Church dispersed throughout the world as divinely revealed, and therefore by universal and constant consent retained by Catholic theologians as pertaining to faith. But since it is a question of that subjection by which in conscience all those Catholics are bound who devote themselves to the speculative sciences, to bring by their writings new benefits to the Church, therefore the men of that same congress must acknowledge that for Catholic scholars it is not enough to receive and venerate the aforesaid dogmas, but there is also need to submit themselves both to the decisions pertaining to doctrine issued by the Pontifical Congregations, and to those heads of doctrine retained by the common and constant consent of Catholics as theological truths and conclusions so certain that opinions adverse to those same heads of doctrine, although they cannot be called heretical, yet merit another theological censure. »

The author of the Utrecht dissertation (p. 136 ff.) thought this argument could be evaded by substituting for the words an unheard-of sense repugnant to the very context. The Pontiff, he says, first speaks of definitions of revealed dogmas; then, treating of the decisions issued by the Pontifical Congregations, he meant « only those decrees which, promulgated in his own name as his own definitions issued ex cathedra, every Catholic must venerate with absolute assent, » so that in the first part of the passage cited by us the discourse concerns definitions of dogmas ex cathedra under the censure of heresy against opposed errors; while in the second part, by « decisions issued by the Pontifical Congregations » are to be understood only definitions of the Pontiff speaking ex cathedra, but under other lesser censures. The disputer thinks this sense is further confirmed by the fact that in the Pontiff's letter the decisions issued by the Pontifical Congregations are joined with « those heads of doctrine retained by the common and constant consent of Catholics as theological truths, » in which (as our opponent testifies) « Suarez with others teaches that the consentient Church is infallible. » Thirdly, he holds that the sense which we take to be the most clear sense of the letter to the Archbishop of Munich is not genuine, because theologians on the one hand teach that submission of the mind cannot be exacted except through an infallible definition (p. 136), while on the other Cardinal Gotti altogether denies our very principle, as (p. 156) the adversary cites: « the decrees of the Congregations in matter of faith and morals, of themselves and as proceeding from the Congregation itself, are indeed to be much esteemed, but afford the theologian no firm argument, » yet « all are bound to obey in the external forum, notwithstanding any probability of opinions. »

But the doctrine of the Pontiff in the letter in question is altogether manifest. a) Who, pray, would take it into his mind that by the name « decisions issued by the Pontifical Congregations » are comprised no decisions issued by the Congregations themselves, but only definitions issued by the Pontiff himself ex cathedra? The decisions of the Congregations can indeed be called, and are often called, issued from the Holy See, from which into those sacred assemblies themselves is derived jurisdiction and participated magisterium (in the sense explained above), and whose organs and as it were members they are, assumed unto universal pastoral and doctrinal providence; the same, although they remain judgments issued by the Congregation and by no means by the Pontiff speaking ex cathedra, are also sometimes called decisions of the Pontiff, insofar as he ratifies and confirms them with his supreme authority; but it is certainly unheard of, in the style of the Curia (as they call it) and by the Pontiff himself, for a definition ex cathedra to be given the appellation of a decision issued by a Pontifical Congregation.

β) Let us inspect the context. The learned men had said in their congress held at Munich that « all Catholics in their learned dissertations must in conscience obey the dogmatic decrees of the infallible Catholic Church. » The Pontiff indeed praises this profession of the truth, « which necessarily arises from the obligation of Catholic faith »; but he declares partly in what sense it is to be understood, partly that it alone does not suffice. For first, « the obligation by which Catholic masters and writers are altogether bound is not restricted to those things alone proposed by the infallible judgment of the Church to be believed by all as dogmas of faith. » It is therefore necessary, but does not suffice, to adhere to those things proposed to be believed with Catholic faith immediately divine, whether by a formal or by an equipollent infallible judgment of the Church, as revealed dogmas. The Pontiff adds, secondly and in a distinct clause, that for that perfect adherence to revealed truths which is altogether necessary for attaining true progress of the sciences, neither does it suffice « if only to the dogmas expressly defined by the Church faith and submission be applied. » This second sentence of the Pontiff would not be distinct and altogether diverse a priori, as exhibited in the letter, if here dogmas defined by the Church were understood in the same sense as above dogmas of faith proposed by the judgment of the Church. In this second clause, therefore, there is question also of those dogmas which are not defined as in themselves revealed, of which sort are e.g. those against those of Pistoia and in many other Constitutions, defined not under the note of heresy but under lesser censures, to which, from the motive of the infallibility of the Church or Pontiff, faith is to be rendered mediate divine; and this very thing is sufficiently indicated by that phrase, « faith and submission be applied. »

If for the due cultivation of the sciences (for of this the Pontiff treats) it is not enough to keep before one's eyes both the dogmas of faith proposed by the judgment of the Church, whether formal (through definition) or equipollent (through consent), to be believed by all, and those dogmas to which faith and submission must be applied on account of an express definition of the Church, although they are not defined as in themselves revealed; what further remains to be rendered by Catholic men « who devote themselves to the speculative sciences »? This the Pontiff declares in the words from which, cited above, we drew our argument. « But since it is a question of that subjection (diverse from the act of faith whether immediately or mediately divine) by which in conscience all those Catholics are bound who devote themselves to the speculative sciences... they must acknowledge that for Catholic scholars it is not enough to receive and venerate the aforesaid dogmas of the Church (which are either proposed by the magisterium of the whole Church as divinely revealed, or have been defined, whether concerning faith or in a lower grade, by express decrees of oecumenical Councils or of the Roman Pontiffs); but there is also need to submit themselves both to the decisions pertaining to doctrine issued by the Pontifical Congregations, and to those heads of doctrine retained by the common and constant consent of Catholics as theological truths and conclusions so certain that opinions adverse to those same heads of doctrine, although they cannot be called heretical, yet merit another theological censure. » Clearly therefore the decisions issued by the Pontifical Congregations are distinguished from all those things defined by express decrees of the Roman Pontiffs. Consequently those are understood not to be definitions ex cathedra, and yet that to them (as the adversary p. 143 confesses) subjection through assent of the mind is due, the Pontiff declares. And indeed if the adversary's interpretation were admitted, then the Constitutions of the Council of Constance against Wycliffe (with Martin V. approving), of St Pius V. against Baius, of Innocent XI. against Molinos, of Innocent XII. in the case of Fénelon, of Clement XI. against Quesnel, of Pius VI. against those of Pistoia, and that very one afterwards issued by Pius IX. (Quanta cura) would either by no means or at least not wholly be comprehended among the « express decrees of oecumenical Councils or of the Roman Pontiffs »; but all those would in the letter to the Archbishop of Munich be called « decisions issued by the Pontifical Congregations » — than which, pray, what more absurd could be imagined?

γ) Against this clear text and context of the letter nothing is gained from the fact that the decisions issued by the Congregations are named together with the theological truths retained by Catholics with common consent, the denial of which would therefore merit some theological note. But mark well, I ask, that here in the Pontiff's letter there is in no way question of censures of doctrines already pronounced through the judgment of the Church, but only of religious adherence, by which Catholics retain those doctrines not as dogmas of faith but as theological truths with a consent so common and constant that (by the consentient judgment of theologians) they could not be denied without the note of error or rashness or other such notes. Now since the adversary affirms that Suarez teaches such a consent of Catholics to be infallible, it will be worth the labor to describe his doctrine. Concerning the infallibility in believing of the Church Suarez (de Fide disp. V. sect. 6.) teaches three things: first, that the Church cannot fail from faith through heresy; second, that neither can it err through ignorance « in those things which it believes as certain of faith »; third, in those things which it believes not as of faith, but in such a way that the contrary opinion would merit some censure, it is to be held that it does not err; concerning infallibility, however, in all these things it is not so certain; but according to the diverse grades by which doctrine touches faith more nearly or more remotely, it will be more or less certain that the Church does not err in these things ¹¹. Concerning the authority of the consent of theologians what we think will be indicated below, th. XVII.; meanwhile it is established that Suarez and very many doctors who judge such a consent of Catholics, although they do not acknowledge infallibility in it, nevertheless to suffice for the security of doctrine and for an argument of truth so grave that to oppose it without the note of rashness would not be lawful — that these doctors, I say, all held our principle, by which we affirm that for religious assent (distinct from assent of faith immediately or mediately divine) in theological matters an infallible authority is not required, but there suffices (as Suarez speaks) « in the human manner the highest authority »; for it is one thing to judge that an authority does not err in the proposed doctrine, and another that the authority is infallible. But as to the matter of which we now treat, from what has been said everyone sees how aptly there is joined in the letter to the Archbishop of Munich the obligation in conscience « that those who devote themselves to the speculative sciences submit themselves both to the decisions pertaining to doctrine issued by the Pontifical Congregations, and to those heads of doctrine retained by the common and constant consent of Catholics as theological truths. »

δ) These things cited from Suarez sufficiently show what is to be thought of the disputer's affirmation that all theologians whom he knows (as he says) conspire in the contrary opinion, namely that submission of the mind cannot rightly be demanded except by an infallible authority. He cites Bellarmine (de Eccles. l. III. c. 14. argum. 3.), Suarez (de Fide disp. V. sect. 6. n. 8; sect. 8. nn. 7. 8.), then recent men, D. Bouix, Murray, Knox, Weninger, him who under the assumed name Rudis wrote on the Petra Romana, and finally D. Ward, who he thinks contradicts himself in defending our principle. Distinguishing nothing, of course, between the assent of faith (whether immediately or mediately divine) and the religious assent answering to an authority specifically diverse, not only D. Ward but also Suarez and all those old theologians who follow the doctrine of Suarez just described will easily be accused of contradiction. But Bellarmine and Suarez and generally the old theologians, wherever from the obligation of assent they infer the infallibility of the obliging authority, speak of the assent of faith immediately or mediately divine. And indeed both the old and the more recent theologians Murray, Weninger, Rudis, Ward, when they treat either of those things which the whole Church believes of faith, or of definitions whether of Councils or of the Pontiff speaking ex cathedra, rightly argue that such assent as must be rendered by the whole Church to this doctrine of faith or to these definitions necessarily supposes the infallibility of the authority proposing and defining. Thus Bellarmine in the cited place first declares the state of the question: « The Church cannot err, that is, what all the faithful hold as of faith is necessarily true and of faith, and likewise what all Bishops teach as pertaining to faith is necessarily true and of faith. » Then he proves this truth with several arguments, the third of which runs thus. « We are obliged under pain of anathema to believe the Church in all things, as is clear from Matth. XVIII. 17; and all Councils pronounce anathema on those not assenting to the decrees of the Church. But it would be unjust to be obliged under so grave a penalty to assent to things uncertain and sometimes false. » He says, therefore, that to impose the obligation of believing of faith, so that the recalcitrant is to be held a heretic cut off from the Church, cannot without injustice be committed except to an infallible authority. But how, pray, do these things conflict with our opinion, for refuting which there is produced in the Utrecht pamphlet only the last clause of Bellarmine, with the whole text and context set aside?

A twofold fallacy of citation has also occurred in the text of Cardinal Gotti, who in the words as described in the dissertation seems to enunciate a principle directly repugnant to ours. Cited thus: « the decrees of the Congregations in matter of faith and morals, of themselves and as proceeding from the Congregation itself, are indeed to be much esteemed, but afford the theologian no firm argument. » « If the special confirmation of the Pontiff is lacking, all are bound to obey in the external forum, notwithstanding any probability of opinions. » But the most learned Cardinal merely asserts what all concede, that the decisions of the Congregations pertaining to doctrine do not have that firmness which is founded in infallibility; nor can articles of faith be constituted through them. Nor does the Cardinal say, as the sense is exhibited in the citation, that obedience is due only in the external forum; but he says: « all are bound to obey at least in the external forum. » The obedience, therefore, which Card. Gotti with all others denies and excludes as to be rendered to such decrees, is none other than the obedience of divine faith. And this doctrine not only does not conflict with our principle, but is admirably reconciled with it ¹² As to the two other cited men, I freely concede that the adversary rightly appeals for his cause perhaps to D. Knox, certainly to D. Bouix, whose doctrine in this chapter I cannot follow. For I cannot reconcile these two things which he asserts: a) that the Sacred Congregation of the Inquisition can « inflict theological notes, even that of heresy, as shall seem just » upon some opinion or doctrine; b) yet that no one « can rightly be compelled inwardly and from the heart to adhere to that judgment. » I say I cannot reconcile these, if the discourse concerns (as I have often said) adherence not of divine faith precisely by force of the judgment of the Congregation, but religious adherence of a lower order. Nor shall I concede to D. Bouix that in the case of Galileo the Sacred Congregation « exceeded the limits of its power. »]

But whatever you say of the opinions of these theologians, the genuine sense of the letter to the Archbishop of Munich is demonstrated from the very text and context; which I trust has already been sufficiently accomplished by us.

b) A not dissimilar demonstration is drawn from other letters of the Supreme Pontiff, 15 June 1857, to the Archbishop of Cologne, Card. Geissel, concerning the decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Index by which the books of Anton Günther had been proscribed. Decrees of this kind issued to proscribe doctrine do not become definitions ex cathedra by the fact that they are confirmed with the supreme authority of the Pontiff and ordered to be published ¹³, as is wont to be expressly noted in them. Nevertheless the Pontiff in the commemorated letter declares that the decree itself ought to have sufficed so that all Catholics not only held it persuasively that henceforth it is lawful for no one to defend and champion the doctrine handed down in those books; but also understood « that the doctrine contained in Günther's books cannot be held sincere » ¹⁴.

c) To these may be added, for confirming our principle, an argument drawn from the doctrine of Benedict XIV., acting indeed as a private theologian, but in a matter in which, by the confession of all with almost no exception, his authority is greater. Our principle, which we have long defended, is this: for obliging internal religious assent in a theological matter the infallibility of the proposing authority is not necessarily required. Now Benedict XIV. teaches these two things. α) In the beatification of servants of God the judgment of the Pontiff is not infallible, as his final judgment in the canonization of the blessed must be reckoned infallible (de Canonizat. SS. l. I. c. 42.). β) Nevertheless whoever asserted that in this or that formal beatification the Pontiff actually erred, and therefore that he is not blessed who was declared blessed, or that worship is not to be exhibited to him according to the Pontifical concession, « would be to be branded with the note of rashness or of a graver theological censure » (ibid. n. 10.). But in these two propositions of Benedict our very principle is contained. Moreover the same is the doctrine of very many theologians, and I think after Benedict XIV. it is common; therefore our principle, at least considered in itself, and prescinding from its application in special cases of ecclesiastical judgments pertaining to doctrine, is not against (as is said in the learned dissertation) but according to the common opinion of the doctors. In general Bellarmine (de R. Pontif. l. IV. c. 2.) testifies: « All Catholics agree among themselves that the Pontiff alone or with his particular Council, deciding something in a doubtful matter, whether he can err or not, is to be obediently heard. » Expressly concerning the decrees of the Congregations and of the Pontiff himself, though they are not definitions ex cathedra, the opinion which we have hitherto expounded is defended by Franc. Antonius Zaccaria ¹⁵, citing also the letters of Alexander VII., 7 Aug. 1660, to the Rector of the University of Louvain, most similar in this chapter to the letters of Pius IX. to the Archbishop of Munich which we described above (Zaccaria Storia delle proibizioni de' libri l. II. dissert. II. cc. 2. 3.).

d) But if these things are so, does not the theological argument collapse by which the doctors commonly prove the infallibility of the Pontiff speaking ex cathedra? Could not « in such a way the pernicious system of Gallicanism, its head cut off, lift it up again? » Of this danger the Dutch dissertation gravely warns us; for because we distinguish between infallible definitions ex cathedra and other documents of the Holy See to which religious submission of the mind is due, although they cannot be reckoned definitions ex cathedra, « such distinctions (says the adversary pp. 155-156) are apt to render the infallible authority of the Pontiff void in the concrete, and to furnish occasion for denying in some particular decree the infallibility of the decision... And by what signs can it be established that the Pontiff pronounced a doctrinal sentence as the infallible Doctor of the Church, and not merely as a fallible governor, unless perhaps by the reception and sense of the Church? » ¹⁶

Things most like insults should not have been written by a theologian! No Catholic has ever denied, nor can deny, the necessity of distinguishing between definitions ex cathedra and other declarations, even doctrinal ones, whether of the Pontiffs themselves or of the Pontifical Congregations. Only the enemies of the Holy See and the impugners of infallibility have always attempted, and now the Neo-Protestants (Old Catholics) especially attempt, to eliminate this necessary distinction contained in the very decree of the Vatican definition. Whence it would follow that infallibility is effected and ruled not by divine assistance, as the Council declared, but as it were by habitual inspiration. Of this artifice of the enemies Maurus Cappellari (Gregory XVI) treats at length in his « Triumph of the Holy See » ch. 24, although he himself in all documents which ought not be held definitions ex cathedra calls the Pontiff a private doctor, not in the sense in which e.g. Innocent IV. or Benedict XIV. in their commentaries are private doctors, but only in opposition to the supreme intension of authority by which he defines doctrine to be held by the universal Church, or by which he speaks ex cathedra; and so in those documents he is a private doctor, i.e. not defining ex cathedra, in such a way that « to contradict him would be intolerable rashness » (ibid. n. 6.), whereas on the contrary it is altogether lawful without any rashness to contradict the private opinions of Pontiffs in their books no less than those of other doctors — a liberty which Benedict XIV. grants most fully to all (Preface, 2nd ed., de Synodo dioeces.). Since therefore the question concerns a distinction not between private lucubrations, in which the sacred authority of the Pontiff has no place, but between documents proceeding indeed from the office of the supreme magisterium, in which however the Pontiff does not propose with a final definitive sentence doctrine to be held by the universal Church, and such definitions as oblige the Church to the assent of faith immediately or mediately divine; therefore the most learned author of the « Triumph » so anxiously insists on the necessity of certain notes by which definitions ex cathedra may be discerned, lest by confounding the former with these latter documents « confusions and perturbations be introduced into the Church » ¹⁷.

And indeed Frederick Schulte, doctor of the Neo-Protestants, to defend heresy and impugn the dogma of the infallibility of the Pontiff, strains all his forces principally on this and constructs sophisms, to prove vain the distinction of definitions ex cathedra from other public documents and

This doctrine concerning the necessity of distinguishing definitions ex cathedra, and consequently concerning the necessity and certainty of the distinguishing notes, is clear of itself and common among Catholic theologians, at least when the question is which notes certainly suffice, although there is some diversity among them more in manner of speaking than in the thing itself when they declare which notes do not suffice. In this matter we do not follow the manner of Maurus Cappellari where he assigns (l. c. n. 5.) the notes of definition, internal and external; yet I think they hold good, provided a) the faith which the author says is exacted through definition from the universal Church be understood also as mediate divine, and β) in this sense too be taken what is there said concerning anathema and condemnation of the contrary heresy, or else, by sufficient judgment, « that whenever the Pope omits this formula, despite such omission he intends and wills to define as supreme hierarch and judge of the faith; » provided γ) the phrase addressed to the Church be understood not of the external accidental form of the document, but of the thing itself which the Pontiff sufficiently signifies to be defined by him as to be held by the universal Church. declarations of the Pontiffs, and so that all declarations which by force of his pastoral office have in any way been issued or are issued by the Pontiff must after the Vatican Council be held by Catholics to be infallible definitions ¹⁸. Since indeed Catholic truth stands in the middle between errors opposed to each other, as the Fathers often explain, heretics have always been accustomed to distort Catholic dogmas into the extreme sense of the opposite party; for in this way they see that the unskilled can be deceived and what the Catholic Church by no means teaches can easily be impugned as though Catholic dogma.

This distinction, therefore, of definitions whether of Pontiffs speaking ex cathedra or of oecumenical Councils from other documents of the Holy See, since no one can deny it without confusion of things — how, pray, does the adversary dare object the danger of Gallicanism from the fact that we affirm that to these latter declarations religious submission of the mind itself can be exacted, and how does he himself, to avert this danger, commend to us toward those same declarations only reverential silence? Gallicanism consisted in this, that they denied that the assent of divine faith is due to definitions ex cathedra, since they acknowledged no subject of infallibility but the universal Church alone, whether dispersed or represented in oecumenical Councils — which they understood apart from its informing head, the Roman Pontiff. But if some Gallicans, with assent of faith excluded, admitted a religious assent due to definitions ex cathedra; with so much more vehemence did they deny that to other documents which are not definitions, and expressly to doctrinal decrees of the Congregations, submission of the mind is due — yet they did not exclude reverential silence. Let the disputer see, then, to what his ill-omened distortions reduce.

Finally, as to the theological argument commonly adduced most effectively by the doctors, nay already comprehended in revealed doctrine itself, for demonstrating the infallibility of the Pontiff defining ex cathedra — it is not as the adversary imagines; but it is that by which above, p. 116, we demonstrated the infallibility of definitions from the Gospel testimonies. Suarez with the other theologians proposes the argument in this way. « It is Catholic truth that the Pontiff defining ex cathedra is a rule of faith which cannot err, when he authentically proposes something to the universal Church as to be believed of (immediately or mediately) divine faith... It can be proved in the first place from the testimonies just cited (Matth. XVI; Io. XXI.). For Christ gave to Peter and his successors the power of feeding the Church, above all in doctrine... and in a singular manner, through the power of jurisdiction, of interpreting or proposing truths to be believed, and under the obligation of believing them (with divine faith, namely, as he had already said, and as this word in theology is always understood of itself): therefore this power has necessarily annexed infallibility, and the assistance of the Holy Spirit lest it err. The consequence is proved, because this is necessary on account of the infallibility of the Church in believing; for if the Pontiff teaching in that manner could deceive it, it too could be deceived, nay would be compelled to error, because it would be bound to believe. »

But this argument, with the distinction made between definitions ex cathedra, to which is due the assent of faith immediately or mediately divine, and other decisions, to which religious assent is rendered (in the sense often explained), is not only not shaken, but rather presupposes and rests upon that very distinction of definitions from other authentic documents even of the Pontiffs. That this power of exacting from the whole Church assent to truth through an act of faith — which manner of teaching is and is called definition ex cathedra — is comprehended in the Gospel words so as easily to be deduced from them by analysis, Frederick Schulte, master of the Neo-Protestants, refused to understand; and therefore he said that the distinction of definitions ex cathedra from other public documents of the Pontiffs is nothing but a « scholastic figment » of the sixteenth century (Schulte l. c.).

If the theological argument is constituted in this principle: that every act of authority exacting not only reverential silence and external obedience but internal assent (without distinction of grade and quality) must necessarily be infallible; this is certainly rejected by us, but we deny it to be a theological argument, i.e. contained explicitly or implicitly in revelation, or deducible from revealed truths, or at least founded in the consent of the old theologians. If that principle be admitted, how, pray — e.g. the edict of Stephen I., « let nothing be innovated, but what has been handed down, » those very many things which theologians deny to be definitions strictly so called, both in the acts of Councils and in the Constitutions of Pontiffs, and which nevertheless, « without intolerable rashness » (as Maurus Cappellari speaks), the same theologians agree it was or is not lawful to contradict or to hold the contrary — how, I say, will all such documents still be distinguished from definitions ex cathedra, and not altogether, after the Schultean assertion, be confounded with them? But such « confusions and perturbations in the Church » I myself, with that same most blessed author of the « Triumph, » think are above all to be guarded against.

Corollary 4. The authority of universal ecclesiastical and doctrinal providence of itself primarily resides in the sole pastor of the whole Church and in no other singular person. Yet just as to individual Bishops it was said, « feed the flock of God which is among you, » so to them without doubt in the flocks subjected to them belongs, also as regards the pastures of sound doctrine, the authority of particular providence, in subordination and union with the supreme and universal pastor, the Roman Pontiff. From the necessity of this subordination and unity in doctrine it comes that their authority refers only to preaching and defending doctrine already proposed either by explicit definition or by the consent of the Church or through decisions of universal providence, and not to deciding of themselves controversies among Catholics. For the same reason, since the authority of the Bishop, even as regards its own proper object, is not supreme, the supreme magisterium of the Holy See is always at hand, whenever against the doctrine of one or of several Bishops suspicion should deservedly arise. Cf. Antifebron. dissert. II. c. 12.

Nay, in the internal forum and in regard to the direction of the spiritual life, sacred authority, i.e. by force of the sacred office instituted by Christ, and not only scientific authority, belongs in its own manner also to directors of souls, so that the faithful in doubtful matters touching conscience can and sometimes (where no other safe way lies open) are bound to conform their practical judgment to the authority of the ministers of God (cf. St Alphonsus l. I. nn. 12. 13.). Namely, the whole Church and its individual parts Jesus Christ the head disposes and rules in internal and external life, but not without His visible vicars through all orders from the highest to the lowest, so that the principle of spiritual authority and obedience with diverse grades, forms and modes pervades the whole body and all members.

In general the evangelical counsel of obedience, not only of the will but also of the intellect, most clearly demonstrates that the infallibility of the one commanding is not a necessary condition for the subjection and obedience of the intellect to be able to be rendered ¹⁹. Nay, from the common doctrine of the Saints, which Suarez describes at length (de Religione T. IV. tract. IX. l. IV. c. 15. cf. T. III. l. X. c. 8. n. 2.) and St Alphonsus in compendium (l. IV. n. 47.), « a subject doubting whether the thing commanded be lawful or not is bound to lay aside the doubt, and thus can and must obey. » For Sts. Bernard, Bonaventure, Ignatius, the Blesseds Humbert of the Order of Preachers, Denis the Carthusian and the rest with one consent teach: « whatever man commands in God's stead, which yet is not certain to displease God, is to be received as though God commanded it » (St Bonaventure Specul. disciplin. P. I. c. 4.). But all these things would be utterly false unless in such doubts the subject were bound to submit his intellect, not indeed in speculative opinion but in the practical judgment concerning the honesty of his action, to authority, though it be infallible neither speculatively nor practically. This doctrine of the Saints, therefore, which St Alphonsus calls common and certain, if it be true, it is false that the intellect cannot or must never submit itself to a superior authority unless infallible.

Corollary 5. The authority of infallibility and the supreme magisterium of the Pontiff defining ex cathedra had altogether nothing ever to do with the case of Galileo Galilei and with the abjuration of opinion enjoined on him. For not only did no shadow of a Pontifical definition intervene there, but in the whole decree of the Cardinals of the Holy Office, and in the formula of abjuration, not even the name of the Pontiff is ever found pronounced either directly or indirectly. The documents described in John Baptist Riccioli's Almagestum Novum, P. II. l. IX. sect. 4. c. 40. pp. 496 ff. can be read. Yet in that state of the question, with the matter not yet sifted, since the truth of the astronomical system, by no means yet proved, afforded no foundation for interpreting the places of Scripture in other than the obvious sense, and since even men most learned for that age in physics and astronomy, as Tycho Brahe, Alexander Tassonus, Christophorus Scheiner, Antonius Delphinus, Justus Lipsius (see Riccioli l. c. p. 495.), judged Galileo's opinion contrary to the Scriptures, it pertained altogether to the authority of ecclesiastical providence to take care lest the interpretation of Scripture suffer harm through conjectures and hypotheses then seen by most as by no means likely ²⁰. No examination of doctrine was instituted for its definition for the universal Church ²¹, of which no one thought; but a criminal process was held in 1633, according to which for those circumstances nothing else could be judged than what is in the final judgment.

In the same opinion in Galileo's time were at Rome other theologians and astronomers, as Fr. Scheiner, Fr. Riccardi Master of the Apostolic Palace (Nelli in the life of Galileo T. II. p. 449). From the letters of Mario Guiducci, disciple of Galileo, dated 6 and 13 Sept. 1624, Nelli l. c. reports this. « In this meantime he (Galileo) had news that the Jesuit Fr. Orazio Grassi, his antagonist (Professor of astronomy in this Roman College), had said that whenever a demonstration should be found proving the motion of the earth, Sacred Scripture would have to be interpreted otherwise than has been done in the places where it speaks of the stability of the earth and the motion of the heavens, and this from the opinion of Cardinal Bellarmine. » This exposition of doctrine, worthy of the genius and piety of Bellarmine and Fabri, admirably shows both the genuine sense and the equity of the sacred tribunal and the reason by which Galileo not only could but had to acquiesce in the sentence, so that there is no need with D. Bouix and with the Utrecht writer to opine that « the Holy Inquisition exceeded the limits of its power, » and that fictitious eppur si muove, above all in the manner in which without certain author the rumor spread, seems to have been invented not to the praise but to the disgrace of a wise man. The sentence runs. « Lest that grave and pernicious error and transgression of thine ²² remain altogether unpunished, and thou become more cautious in future and be an example to others to abstain from such offences, we decree that by public edict the book of the Dialogues of Galileo Galilei be prohibited, but thee we condemn to the formal prison of this Holy Office for a time to be limited at our discretion, and by title of salutary penance we prescribe that for the coming three years thou recite once a week the seven penitential psalms, reserving to ourselves the power of moderating, changing, or wholly or partly removing the aforesaid punishments and penances » ²³. See the Revue des sciences ecclesiastiques 2ª. serie T. III. pp. 105 ff.; 217 ff.