Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam

On the opinion of St Thomas concerning predestination to glory considered in itself and apart.

« Although predestination, as considered completely, is the reason of transmission to the end of eternal life, and according to St Thomas, indeed according to Catholic doctrine, can presuppose no antecedent merits: yet from the very doctrine of St Thomas it is deduced that predestination to glory considered in itself and apart is from the consequent will of God, which presupposes supernatural merits foreseen as the reason of predestination to the glory of eternal life. »

This our thesis, like the preceding one, is in itself hermeneutical; yet it will contribute very much not only to the history of theology, but also to illuminating doctrine itself. Although, in defending the sense of St Thomas which we have indicated, we have most weighty authors, among whom I name Gregory of Valencia, in 1. q. 23. punct. 4. §. 5; Gamachaeum, a very distinguished theologian of old Sorbonne, in h. l. S. Th. c. 7; Peter de Comitibus Augustiniensem, de Praed. et Reprob. disp. 3. a. 8: we shall nevertheless take the manner and norm of our interpretation from nothing other than the writings of the Angelic Doctor himself. Following very nearly the same method as in drawing out the true sense of Augustine, we shall propose here first the clear doctrine of the author, on which our interpretation of the more obscure passages rests; then we shall examine singly those opinions of the Angelic Doctor from which a contrary doctrine could seem to follow.

I. The most clear doctrine, subject to no ambiguity, in the writings of the holy Doctor is this.

1. St Thomas never understood predestination simpliciter, as it is called, as predestination to glory considered in itself, but constantly as the predestination of all effects taken together, from the first grace to complete salvation; as he himself plainly declares. Taken in this complete sense, he considers predestination throughout question 23 of Part I, as is clear above all from the definition itself: « the plan (in the divine mind) for bringing the rational creature to the end of eternal life is called predestination » (a. 1; cf. a. 2). He expresses the same very clearly in explicit words: « predestination implies a relation to grace as cause to effect » (a. 2, ad 4); « predestination includes the will of conferring grace and glory » (a. 4); « under the order of predestination falls whatever promotes a man to salvation » (a. 8; cf. a. 3, ad 2, and all of a. 5). In the same way St Thomas treats of predestination considered in its completeness in De veritate q. 6; contr. gent. 1. III. c. 163; 1. dist. 40. et 41. In this sense of predestination, at any rate, St Thomas denies, and all Catholics deny, that there is any meritorious cause on our part.

But at 2., whenever the Angelic Doctor considers predestination to glory per se and in comparison with predestination to grace, he affirms each time that glory is predestined as a reward and crown consequent upon foreseen merits; and he not only sets forth this doctrine but also proves it by arguments in his commentary on Romans VIII, in the words which we have described at th. LVII. n. 4. A parallel passage is found in Eph. I. lect. 1. (p. 92. ed. de Rubeis). « It must be understood that effects are the reason of the divine will on the side of what is willed (understand this according to what has been said at pp. 572–575): namely, the prior effect is the reason of the later; but nevertheless when one comes to the first effect, no further reason can be assigned for that effect, except the divine will... Therefore in this way no reason whatever of predestination can be assigned on the side of the creature, but only on the side of God. For the effects of predestination are two, namely grace and glory. Of the effects which are ordered to glory, indeed a reason can be assigned on the side of what is willed, namely grace; for example, he crowned Peter because he had competed lawfully, and this because he was strengthened in grace: but for grace, which is the first effect, no reason can be assigned on the part of man which would be the reason of predestination, because this would be to posit that the principle of a good work is in man from himself and not through grace, which is the Pelagian heresy. »

Thus St Thomas says: a) by the very fact that the reason of some effect can be assigned in execution, the same can also be assigned in predestination. For from the fact that in execution Peter is crowned on account of his lawful contest, he proves also in predestination that one effect is the reason of another. Therefore, again, as we have shown (th.LVII.1.c.), St Thomas teaches that the order of predestination and of execution is the same with respect to the antecedence and subsequence of merit and reward; and accordingly, just as glory is given on account of merits acquired, so men are predestined on account of merits foreseen. b) If predestination is considered with respect to the individual effects, the Angelic Doctor teaches that a prior effect is the reason of a later one: grace is the reason of merit, merit the reason of reward; but of the first effect no reason can be given on the part of man. c) The only reason why no reason is given for the first effect is this: when predestination is viewed as a whole in its complex, together in respect of grace and glory, no reason on the part of man can be asserted, unless one says that grace is given on account of our natural merits (see th. LVIII.). Therefore, of predestination viewed as a whole in its complex there is no reason but the merciful will of God; the predestination to glory considered separately has a reason also on the side of what is willed, namely its reason is the supernatural merits foreseen.

3°. Although the first effect of predestination, that is, the first grace, cannot be the reason or meritorious cause on the part of man, namely why he receives it; nevertheless, according to the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor, it is by man's fault that he does not receive the effect of predestination; and accordingly, in all adult reprobates, that they are not predestined is their own fault. For God wills all men to be saved, and from this will he wills to give grace to all, so that they may be predestined and saved; but those who finally resist offered grace, all of these and only these are reprobate. Hence the distinction between the predestined and the reprobate is not made by the antecedent will, by which God wills all men to be predestined and saved, but by the consequent will, which foresees the good merit of those who cooperate with grace, and the evil merit of those who resist grace. Let St Thomas be heard. «Since a man cannot be directed to the last end except by the help of divine grace, without which no one can have those things which are necessary for tending to the last end, such as faith, hope, love, perseverance, it may seem to someone that it is not imputed to a man if he lacks the aforesaid, especially since he cannot merit the help of divine grace, nor be converted to God unless God converts him; for no one is blamed for what depends on another. But if this be granted, several inconveniences follow, which is manifest....... For the solution of this doubt it must be considered that although a man by a movement of free will (bare) can neither merit nor acquire divine grace; yet he can prevent himself from receiving it... For God, as far as in him lies, is ready to give grace to all; for he wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth, as it is said in 1 Tim. II. 4. But those alone are deprived of grace who put an impediment to grace in themselves; just as when the sun lights the world, it is imputed as a fault to one who closes his eyes, if from this some evil follows, although he cannot see unless he is anticipated by the light of the sun» S. Th. cont. gent. III. c.159. Cf. in Io. VI. 1. V. ed. de Rubeis T. III. p. 572. See th. LVIII. n. 4.

4. In plain words St Thomas declares that predestination includes the foresight of works, insofar as they dispose to sanctifying grace, and insofar as they merit heavenly glory; and therefore that predestination includes the consequent will. He asks, 1. dist. 41. q. 1. a. 3: « whether the foreknowledge of merits is a cause of predestination »? In his answer he first explains that the sense of the question is not whether the divine knowledge and will, considered in themselves, have a cause; but « whether the effect of the divine will, or what is willed, proceeds from some cause which God foreknew from eternity, which cause of what is willed is called a certain reason of the will on the side of the effect »? Then he proceeds to the solution of the difficulty. « Our operation is related differently to the twofold effect of predestination (grace and glory), because a meritorious work informed by grace is the meritorious cause of glory; but a good work preceding grace is not its meritorious cause, but only a certain disposition. Whence it is evident that predestination (the divine act in itself) has no cause, but has a reason on the side of the effect, according to which it is said to be rational and just. » In accordance with these things, the same passage, ad 5, says: « in the understanding of predestination is included the consequent will, which regards works, not as a cause of the will (as it is in itself), but as the meritorious cause of glory and as the preparation for grace » (above th. LVIII. n. 2). Therefore, just as St Thomas teaches without any doubt in many places that by the antecedent will God wills all men to be saved in view of foreseen works (cf. pp. 472. 473.), a doctrine which indeed cannot stand together with predestination to glory absolutely antecedent (th. LIX.), so he also declares expressly that predestination pertains to the consequent will, which regards works as the meritorious cause of glory. But lest the Angelic Doctor be said to have corrected himself in his later works, he teaches exactly the same in the Summa 1. q. 23. a. 5: « Nothing prevents some effect of predestination from being the cause and reason of another, the latter indeed of the former according to the reason of final cause, the former of the latter according to the reason of meritorious cause: as if we say that God preordained that he would give someone glory from merits, and that he preordained that he would give someone grace, so that he might merit glory. » Where you should notice the greatest difference, in that he speaks of the preordination of glory from merits, and of the preordination of grace, so that a man might merit glory; for he does not say that God preordained grace from an absolute intention of glory; but that glory was set before men so that they might merit it, and from this conditional intention God predestined grace for them.

II. In the texts cited, St Thomas speaks distinctly of predestination to glory considered per se and apart in comparison with predestination to grace, and he teaches most explicitly and clearly that the former follows upon the foreseen merits of grace. Nevertheless there are not lacking some passages in the writings of the holy Doctor which, if considered by themselves, may seem to conflict with this, unless his constant manner, in agreement with St Augustine, of considering predestination to grace, or predestination complete as to grace and glory together, is kept before the eyes. We shall first inquire into the true sense of those passages which Gonet (disp. II. §. 6.) adduces to demonstrate his opinion concerning predestination absolutely antecedent. Then we shall examine certain other heads of doctrine which occur in St Thomas and seem to oppose our interpretation.

1. The testimonies adduced by Gonet, if read in their context, present no difficulty whatever, although he himself affirms that in them St Thomas taught gratuitous predestination to glory so expressly, « that to doubt his mind is, as it were, to be blind in the middle of light. »

1st Testimony adduced by Gonet, from 1. q. 23. a. 5. ad 3., to which the rest are reduced, we shall explain a little more carefully. The words of St Thomas are: « why he chose these for glory and rejected those, has no reason except the divine will. » But if these words, as they are objected apart from the context, were taken of the will of God antecedently predestining to glory per se and apart from the predestination of grace and of merits; they would contain an intolerable doctrine, by which, with Calvin, it would be said that positive reprobation to eternal punishment, just as much as predestination to glory, has no reason on the side of the reprobate but arises from the antecedent will of God. I say that positive reprobation to punishment must be understood in St Thomas; for he declares this expressly in this very place: « God willed to represent his goodness in men, as regards some whom he reprobates, by way of justice by punishing. » This one thing alone is enough, so that, setting aside the context, we may most certainly conclude that the sense supposed in the objection cannot be the sense of this passage. In the context, however, this whole article 5 not only does not teach predestination to glory considered per se with no supernatural merits presupposed, but expressly teaches the contrary. He declares: a) « just as God has made us saved, so he has predestined us to be saved, » that is, in the same manner and order in which in execution salvation is not from our works, so the predestination of salvation is not from works. Hence b) « the effect of predestination can be considered in two ways: in one way in particular, and thus nothing prevents some effect of predestination from being the cause and reason of another.... as if we say that God predestined that he would give someone glory from merits... and grace so that he might merit glory. In another way the effect of predestination can be considered in common, and thus it is impossible that the whole effect of predestination should have some cause on our part; because whatever is in man ordering him to salvation is all comprehended under the effect of predestination, even the preparation for grace. » In this second way the Saint considers predestination here, as always elsewhere, in common with respect to all its effects, so as to exclude every merit lying outside predestined grace as its cause: namely the merits of the Origenists in the pre-existence of souls, the natural merits of the Pelagians, and the merits of the Semipelagians, which were feigned to merit grace conditionally, as future (above p. 456.). c) Just as St Thomas considers predestination in all the graces by which God brings man to eternal life, so in reprobation he considers two things on God's side: reprobation formally so called, namely the destination to eternal punishment, and the permission of sins, not indeed as a means ordained by God for bringing man to ruin, but insofar as God could absolutely bring it about that sins should not come to be¹; and if sins did not come to be, reprobation formally so called would not follow. « Just as predestination includes the will of conferring grace and glory, so reprobation includes the will of permitting someone to fall into fault, and of inflicting the penalty of damnation for the fault » ibid. a. 3. Reprobation is therefore wholly of the consequent will; for God, by the antecedent will, wills all men to be saved². Predestination presupposes the conditional antecedent will that all be saved; but it includes the absolute consequent will, by which God wills not only the preventing grace but the free effect of grace, namely good merit and perseverance in good, and on account of merit the crown of glory: « in the understanding of predestination is included the consequent will which regards works... as the meritorious cause of glory and as the preparation for grace » (the preparation for justifying grace, through free consent under actual grace) 1. dist. 41. q. 1. a. 3. ad 5; « predestination cannot be frustrated, because it is foreknown by God that this man will be saved by such a cause and in such an order » ib. a. 4; « predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of future things, and so, as God decreed the salvation of a certain man to be brought about through the prayers of others » etc. 3. q. 1. a. 3. ad 4; « predestination includes the consequent will, which regards in some way what is on our part; not indeed as inclining the divine will to will³, but as that to whose production the divine will orders grace (he predestines grace that we may work well, and that through good works we may merit glory), or even (in the predestination of further graces and of glory itself) as that which in some way disposes to grace and merits glory » verit. q. 6. a. 2. ad 2.

These things being supposed as clear and indubitable, St Thomas asks two things in the reply to 1. q. 23. a. 5. ad 3., from which words torn out of context are cited by Gonet: a) to what end God generally orders reprobation itself, by the consequent will to be sure, and with the failure of man to reach the end which God intends for all men by the antecedent will? He replies: just as God orders predestination to the manifestation of his goodness by way of mercy in sparing, so he orders reprobation to the manifestation of his goodness by way of justice in punishing. The difference, however, is that in predestination the absolute consequent will has the same object as the conditional antecedent will; in reprobation the absolute consequent will of damnation has an object other than the conditional antecedent will, which wills all men to be saved. He asks b) comparatively, what is the reason why God predestines this sinful man (considering predestination in its whole course from the first grace to glory), and reprobates another who is equally unworthy of grace; when he could reprobate the former by justice and predestine the latter by mercy. Here he replies according to the doctrine of the Apostle and the constant explanation of Augustine: not that there is no reason of reprobation (for that is most false); but that, since both are equally unworthy of grace and deserving of reprobation, antecedently to grace there is no reason on the part of men, but it lies in the sole will of God, merciful toward the one and just toward the other, that he is pleased to show mercy to one rather than to another, and to require from one rather than from another what is owed to him according to justice⁴. These things hold, and are said by St Thomas, in exactly the same way about execution and about predestination. This is the only sense of the words in the context which Gonet abuses. « God willed to represent his goodness in men, as to some whom he predestines (by the predestination of grace and glory), by way of mercy in sparing, and as to some whom he reprobates, by way of justice in punishing (sins being supposed). And this is the reason why God chooses some (by the election of grace to the crown of glory) and reprobates some (by the consequent will). And the Apostle assigns this cause in Rom. IX. 22, saying: willing to show wrath, that is, the vengeance of justice (therefore by the consequent will, on account of sin), and to make known his power, he endured, that is, permitted with much patience, the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction (to which they fitted themselves), so that he might show the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he prepared unto glory (through grace unto the glory both of holiness and of eternal blessedness); and 2 Tim. II. 20: in a great house there are vessels... some indeed unto honour, but some unto dishonour⁵. But why, comparatively, he chooses these for glory ⁶ and rejects those (while both are still considered antecedently to all grace, and both in sin equally unworthy of grace and deserving of reprobation), has no reason except the divine will; whence Augustine says (in Io. tract. XXVI. n. 2): why he draws this one and does not draw that one (behold drawing through grace, and that in the order of execution), do not judge, if you do not wish to err »⁷ St Thomas, 1. q. 23. a. 5. ad 3.

In these words, therefore, a) there is no question of predestination to glory considered per se, but of predestination complete in glory and in the honour of both grace and blessedness. b) There is question, just as of reprobation, so of predestination pertaining to the consequent will, « which regards that which is on our part, as that which in some way disposes to grace (of justification) and merits glory. » c) Considering sinners before grace, there is on their part no reason of predestination, although there is a reason of reprobation; and therefore, comparatively, why one is rather predestined and another reprobated, there is no reason in them (considered before grace), but in the sole merciful will of God toward the one and the just will toward the other. All these things certainly prove that the predestination of grace, like the gift itself, is wholly gratuitous; but they pertain nothing to the order between the predestination of grace and the predestination of glory, which the holy Doctor declares in the body of the article to be this: « that God has predestined to give someone glory from merits, and to give someone grace so that he might merit glory. » (so as to compare the merits by which glory is predestined).

The remaining objections raised by Gonet are to be dealt with briefly.

2nd Testimony: « That God wills to give someone grace and glory proceeds from sheer liberality » S. Th. verit. q. 6. a. 2. Reply: if it is taught here that glory considered apart is predestined with no supernatural merits foreseen, the sense will be that glory is not even given in execution as a reward and crown for supernatural merits, which would be the heresy of the Protestants. St Thomas teaches with Augustine, indeed with the Apostle Paul and with the whole Church, that grace is given freely, and that glory is given as grace for grace; and therefore grace and glory taken together are given from the pure liberality of God. See above p. 583. sq. and elsewhere passim.

3rd Testimony: « The foreknowledge of merits, whether one's own or others', is not the cause of predestination » S. Th. verit. q. 6. a. 6. Reply: predestination, as a divine act in itself or as the divine essence, has no cause; by reason of the connoted effect, if predestination is taken in its completeness, as St Thomas is accustomed to take it and expressly declares in the same place, it has no reason on the part of the merits either of the predestined person himself or of others, because these very merits are effects of predestination considered complete and in the whole complex of its effects; but it has the divine goodness alone as its reason. Cf. th. LVIII.

4th Testimony: « It cannot be that merits following grace are the reason for showing mercy or for predestining, but only the will of God⁸, according to which he mercifully frees some » S. Th. in Rom. IX. lect. 3. (ed. de Rubeis T.VI. p.136.). Response: The reason of predestination to grace and of liberation from sin (whether it is considered separately or in connection with the predestination of all subsequent effects) cannot be called merits foreseen and future through grace « except according to the reason of final cause, » as St Thomas speaks, 1. q. 23. a. 5. ad 1. The assertion of such merits as meritorious cause, by which grace is predestined and given, belongs to the remnants of the Pelagians (see above p.456.). That the Angelic Doctor, l.c., speaks in this sense of the predestination of grace, is evident from the words themselves and from the context: « in another way it can be understood that someone may be called worthy of mercy not on account of any merits preceding grace, but on account of subsequent merits; as when we say that God gives someone grace and from eternity proposes to give it to him whom he foreknew would use it well (for donation and predestination, with respect to merit or gratuitous gift, in St Thomas always stand in the same way)... but it seems that this too cannot fittingly be said; for it is manifest that nothing can be posited as the reason of predestination, which is an effect of predestination... Moreover it is manifest, that every benefit of God which he confers on man for salvation is an effect of divine predestination. » Thus, with predestination considered in its entirety, the Angelic Doctor finally appends the words cited from Gonet. But what bearing has this doctrine, indubitable among all Catholics, on the order between the predestination to glory and the predestination to grace? Nothing at all, except insofar as the holy Doctor here too takes it as most certain. That everything which in execution is given for merits is in the same way also predestined from eternity on account of foreseen merits.

5th Testimony: « The Apostle sets forth the voluntary predestination of God (Eph. I. 11.), of which predestination the reason is not our merits but the mere will of God, on account of which he adds, according to his purpose » S. Th. in Eph. lect. IV. (T. VII. p. 98.). Reply: Arguments of this kind, which can certainly be piled up into infinity with ease, presuppose dull readers and readers wholly ignorant of the state of the question. Of what predestination does the Apostle speak in the text illustrated by St Thomas? Evidently of the calling to faith and grace, and of the predestination corresponding to this calling. The Angelic Doctor explains the calling in the order of execution, which precedes all merits, and the predestination corresponding to this calling, and therefore the predestination of the first grace, although in his own manner he understands the whole series of effects of predestination from the first grace to glory. That no antecedent merits are presupposed in predestination so considered, since none are presupposed in the order of execution, is a point which, as we have often said already, no Catholic denies. The words of St Thomas are these: « That part is divided into three: for first the Apostle sets forth the gratuitous calling; second, the voluntary predestination of God ... third, the end of both... He says therefore that this grace has abounded in us, and that in Christ all things have been restored ... not by our merits but by divine election ... But his grace depends on the divine will alone ... because God ... does not call through internal grace from anyone's merits. Then when he says: predestined according to the purpose of his will, he sets forth the voluntary predestination of God, of which it is said in Rom. VIII. 30: whom he predestined, these he also called. The reason of this predestination (that we be called, or which at least includes the first calling itself) is not our merits, but the mere will of God... Lastly he touches on the end of both, namely of predestination and of calling, that... through us who believe in Christ the glory of God may be praised ... The praise of the glory of God is when many are brought to the faith, just as the glory of a physician is when he brings many to health and cures them. » That the predestination to glory should be understood here in abstraction from the predestination to calling and to grace, and that it should be said to precede the merits of grace, is not only false but ridiculous. You have the order between the merits of grace and the predestination to glory considered apart most lucidly set forth by St Thomas in lecture I on this Epistle to the Ephesians (T. VII. p. 92.), the place which we described above.

2. A twofold chapter of doctrine remains to be reconciled with the foregoing, namely the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor concerning the certainty of predestination, and concerning the order between love, election, and predestination.

a) St Thomas teaches, de verit. q. 6. a. 3, that in predestination two certainties must be considered: the certainty of foreknowledge, and the certainty, that is, the objective infallibility, of the order of predestination itself in itself. He explains this infallibility of the order in such a way that, although free will considered under each single grace may fail, the infallibility of the order of predestination arises from the multitude and variety of the graces succeeding one another. Whence this argument could be constructed. To all the predestined God selects an order of graces, to which infallibility of attaining salvation is intrinsic. But the selection of such an order of graces presupposes the antecedent absolute will of their salvation. Therefore the absolute will of the salvation of all who are to be saved, or predestination to glory, is prior, and from this will there follows the selection of the infallible order of graces.

We take the explanation of this doctrine 1. c. de verit. from St Thomas himself. He teaches elsewhere: « Divine providence with respect to the good itself, which comes through the attainment of grace and glory, together with foreknowledge of the outcome, is called predestination; divine providence with respect to the opposed evil, together with foreknowledge of the defect, is called reprobation. And because the good is subject to providence as caused and ordained, therefore it is said that predestination is the cause of grace and glory, to which it is ordained. But because evil is not subject to providence as intended or caused, but only as foreknown and ordained (by the consequent will), therefore reprobation is only foreknowledge of fault and not its cause; but of the punishment, by which the fault is ordered (the right order being preserved), it is both foreknowledge and cause » S. Th. 1. dist. 40. q. 4. a. 1.

a) Therefore, first, the difference must be understood between the order of the merciful election of one and the just reprobation of the other. In predestination, not only foreknowledge is to be considered, « as if it were said that God orders the predestined person to salvation just as any other, but with this, that he knows of the predestined person that he will not fail of salvation; for by saying so it would not be said that the predestined person differs from the non-predestined in respect of order, but only in respect of foreknowledge of the outcome: and thus foreknowledge would be the cause of predestination (even to grace), nor would predestination be by the election of the predestinating, which is contrary to the authority of Scripture and to the sayings of the Saints » de verit. 1. c. Clearly it is not enough to say: God foresees the outcome of salvation; but it is necessary to say that God works our salvation by the predestination of grace. God, on his side, indeed by the antecedent will destines every grace to this end, that it may have its effect; but if a man resists grace, that antecedent intention of God does not pass into the absolute will of the effect. But the graces under which he sees a man freely about to consent, these he predestines from the already absolute will of the effect, and through such graces orders the man to salvation. Even for one to whom grace is destined, under which through his own fault and against the antecedent will of God he is not going to consent and is not going to attain salvation, God could, according to the greatness of his omnipotence, destine another order of graces in which he would be saved; nevertheless he permits his failure. Conversely, for another to whom he predestines grace under which he sees him about to consent and attain salvation, he could, without « iniquity of the punisher », destine another order in which he sees that the man, through his own fault, would not cooperate and would not be saved, although he could and ought to cooperate and be saved. If therefore the order of graces pertaining to complete predestination, in which is contained the very effect, free consent, justification, merits, perseverance, and at length salvation, is compared with the order of graces lacking the effect (although this is through the fault of man, and not by God's will but only by his permission of failure of salvation), it is easily understood as the merciful « election of the predestinating » (Cf. supra p. 619. 620.).

3) Infallibility of order is then rightly distinguished from certainty of foreknowledge. For it is objective truth that a man, if such grace were given, would consent, although he could not consent; and that under grace, while it is actually given, he consents infallibly yet freely, is not brought about by God's knowledge, but is presupposed to knowledge as its object (above p. 409. sqq.). There is therefore in the predestined order of graces an objective infallibility, not indeed from the intrinsic nature and entity of the individual graces (for St Thomas there most plainly excludes this): but because, as regards the graces themselves which precede, it is objectively true that, if they were given, they would have their effect, and, while they are given, they will have it; and because, the whole series of predestination being already presupposed, it includes the very effect of a good work through grace, and perseverance in good, or, if a fall intervenes, return by penance and finally final perseverance. We think this is to be understood in the way St Thomas speaks of the infallibility of order from the multitude and variety of graces⁹. « Besides the certainty of foreknowledge (such as is also in that which « is not intended or caused by God but only foreknown »), the very order of predestination has infallible certainty, and yet the proximate cause of salvation is not ordered to it necessarily but contingently, namely free will (through grace and under grace). This can be considered in this way. For we find a compossible order with respect to another in two ways. In one way, insofar as one single cause produces its effect from the order of divine providence; in another way, when from the concurrence of many causes which are contingent and able to fail (such as graces here are) one effect is reached, each of which God orders to the attainment of the effect in place of that which fails, or lest another fail; as we see... the perpetuity of the species is preserved by divine providence so governing that not all fail when one fails; and in this way it is in predestination. For free will (under grace) can fail of salvation; yet in the one whom God predestines (where therefore the whole series of graces, predestined according to the objective infallibility declared a little before, is already presupposed), so many other aids are prepared (contained in the predestined series), that either he does not fall, or if he falls, that he rises again, such as exhortations and the suffrages of prayers, the gift of grace, and other things of this kind, by which God helps man toward salvation (in execution, which always corresponds to the order of predestination)¹⁰. If therefore we consider salvation with respect to the proximate cause, namely free will, it does not have certainty but contingency; but with respect to the first cause, which is predestination (which in the divine mind, with respect to the use of free will in the series of graces, is already presupposed and is complete), it has certainty.

These things having been set forth, the reply to the objection is clear. St Thomas here, as always elsewhere, considers predestination in the complex of grace and glory, and does not treat of the order of prior and posterior between the two benefits predestined. To the argument in form the reply is: God selects an order of graces to which infallibility is intrinsic. I distinguish the major, infallibility is intrinsic to the order of graces, insofar as the future effect of free consent through grace is regarded, and insofar as consent itself and the whole series of effects with perseverance are considered in complete predestination, I grant the major; infallibility is intrinsic from the very entity of preventing grace and without respect to free will, I deny the major. Then the minor is to be denied, both in itself, as is clear from what has been said at pp. 614–617, and according to the doctrine of St Thomas, who recognises no other order except that from the antecedent and conditional will of salvation grace is predestined, so that man may merit the crown; and from foreseen merits, by the consequent absolute will, the crown of eternal life itself is predestined.

b) A greater difficulty may seem to arise in reconciling those passages in which St Thomas compares love, election, and predestination with one another. For according to the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor, love, by which God efficaciously wills salvation for some as an end, and election, by which he wills salvation for these before others whom he reprobates, are said to be prior in the consideration of the mind to predestination, which is the reason of the order of graces toward the end of eternal life. Whence it seems to be taught that God wills salvation absolutely first as an end, and from this antecedent will wills graces and merits as means to the end. See 1. q. 23. a. 4; de verit. q. 6. a. 1; 1. dist. 41. q. 1. aa. 1. 2.

The genuine interpretation of these articles depends on determining the true sense in which St Thomas understood love and election. If election is understood as election to glory considered per se, and is said to be from the antecedent will; and predestination, on the other hand, is said to be the ordering of means to glory as to an end absolutely appointed, the sense would be that which our opponents want. But then, I ask, how does such an order not conflict with the doctrine, clearly set forth by the Angelic Doctor, as we have seen, of « predestination to glory from merits, » and of predestination from the « consequent will, which regards works as the meritorious cause of glory »? If on the contrary love and election, just as much as predestination, have for their object, according to St Thomas, the conferring of grace and glory; and if election, insofar as it is to glory, is attributed not to the antecedent but to the consequent saving will, then that whole comparison does not stand in the way of the doctrine of predestination to glory from foreseen merits, but rather confirms it.

Yet, c) election in those very articles is said by St Thomas expressly to be not only to glory, but to grace together with glory. « God gives certain goods to some which he does not give to others; and thus in the conferring of grace and glory election is considered » 1. q. 23. a. 4. ad1. « Divine election makes the difference of grace, as the (divine) disposition makes the difference of nature » 1. dist. 41. q. 1. a. 2. ad 2. In this way, then, the holy Doctor must be understood to speak of salvation begun through grace and consummated through glory, taken as a complex, when he says: « God wills their salvation, to which election and love pertain » 1. q. 23. a. 4. 0. Now love, that is, God's will of communicating good, is related to the same goods to which election pertains; therefore to grace and glory: for election adds over love only this, that God by love wills a good to someone without comparison with others, by election wills this good to some before others, as the Angelic Doctor explains in the same place.

d) From the express doctrine of St Thomas, election, especially as it is included in election to glory, pertains to the consequent will of God, not to the antecedent; for by the antecedent will (before any foresight of consent or dissent, of good or evil merit), according to St Thomas, God does not elect some before others, but wills all to be saved. To this objection: « election implies a certain discrimination, but God wills all men to be saved; therefore predestination is without election, » the Angelic Doctor replies, 1. q. 23. a. 4. ad 3: « it must be said that God wills all to be saved antecedently, which is not to will simply (so that it would be the effect itself), but in a certain respect (conditionally), not, however, consequently, which is to will simply. » He therefore affirms: God by the antecedent will wills all to be saved, which is not yet election; and he wills some to be saved before others by the consequent will, which itself is election. Again: « if election is taken as it is in the purpose of God himself, so it is eternal, because from eternity he willed to separate the good from the evil unto glory » 1. dist. 41. q. 1. a. 2. Indeed, if election to glory, formally considered, presupposes a distinction between the good and the evil, it pertains to the consequent will (cf. Augustin. supra p. 579.)¹¹

Since these things are so, these three, love, election, predestination, in St Thomas are not distinguished from one another by the fact that one belongs to the antecedent will and another to the consequent; but they are alike all of the consequent will, and they are not distinguished by reason of the terms to which they are referred (cf. Suarez de Praed. 1. I. c. 11). For the term of all three, complete, is the whole series of God's benefits from the first grace, joined with its effect, to complete salvation; and the term considered incompletely is either grace or glory. The distinction lies only in the formal concept: love is formally the will of communicating those supernatural benefits; election is the same will with an added notion, that this communication is referred to one before another; predestination is love itself and election, with the added formal notion of ordering to the end with the infallible certainty of its outcome. Whence it is clear how, according to the doctrine of St Thomas in the same places, love in its formal concept is prior by reason to election, and election by reason to predestination. For the concept of predestination includes election and love, and adds a certain note to them; just as election includes love with a certain added note. But lest we be deceived by this notion of prior and posterior, it must be retained that those three stand in this order when they are referred to the same term, that is, when all three are considered either before the whole series of benefits as a complex, or before grace, or before glory. For if election, for example, were considered before glory only, and predestination before grace, then indeed predestination would precede election.

The declaration of St Bonaventure, in 1. dist. 40. a. 3. q. 2. ad 2., can be compared regarding the concept and mutual relation of purpose, election and predestination. « It is to be noted that in God purpose, predestination and election are the same in reality; yet they differ in the manner of understanding... Purpose signifies a firm conception of the will, predestination with the conception signifies a pre-ordination, and election a certain discernment. According to this, therefore, it is evident that purpose is prior in the manner of understanding, and then election (and then predestination); because it must be understood that something is separated from evil or from malice before it is directed to the end, and so the diversity and the order are evident. »

These things having been laid down, the answer to the argument drawn from this doctrine of St Thomas, which can be framed in the following way, is clear. According to St Thomas, 1. q. 23. a. 4. and the other places cited, election precedes predestination. But election according to St Thomas is the absolute will of the end, by which God wills eternal salvation for some before others; predestination is the reason of the order to that end, which order is through efficacious graces and merits. Therefore, according to St Thomas, the absolute will of eternal salvation, or election to glory considered per se, precedes the ordering to the end, and accordingly also the foreseeing of graces and merits, which are the means to the end. The answer: I distinguish the major, election, if it is understood as the absolute will of glory considered per se and apart, according to St Thomas precedes predestination; if predestination is understood as predestination considered incompletely as to grace and merits, I deny the major. Election considered completely as an absolute consequent will, by which God wills the supernatural benefits of grace together with glory for some before others, precedes predestination of the same benefits; I subdistinguish the major, the notion of election is prior, because it is less full or fixed, containing fewer notes, I concede the major; it precedes as an act with respect to its own term, distinct in reason, from which it is understood that predestination follows as an act with respect to another term, distinct in reason, I deny the major. Moreover, as to what is said: election is the absolute will of eternal salvation and predestination is the will of graces and merits, I distinguish the minor, election, adequately considered according to St Thomas, is the will of glory apart, and predestination is of grace and merits, so that the whole series of supernatural benefits is not included in election, I deny the minor. Election and predestination can be considered inadequately in that manner in which it is said, I subdistinguish the minor, and then election is never taught by St Thomas to precede predestination, I deny the minor; and then election to glory, by the clear doctrine of St Thomas taught in other places, ought to be called consequent upon the predestination of graces and merits, I concede the minor.