Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam

On the private opinion of St Augustine concerning predestination to glory.

« No arguments are at hand suitable for persuading that St Augustine held and taught, at least in his own private opinion, that all who are to be saved are predestined to heavenly glory by the antecedent will of God, prior to the foreseeing of supernatural merits. »

Although from what has been demonstrated, the predestination which Augustine defends against the Pelagians and Semipelagians with the greatest zeal, and from the denial of which he affirms that it follows that grace is given according to our human and natural merits, is most certainly not predestination to glory considered in itself before foreseen supernatural merits; and although it is therefore not permitted, with the Jansenists, as impudently as foolishly, to reckon among the Semipelagian errors the opinion of the Catholic theologians and of the ancient Fathers that predestination to glory follows the foreseeing of the merits of grace: nevertheless it can be doubted, and it has been brought into controversy among Catholic doctors, what was the very opinion of Augustine about predestination to glory considered in the way we have said. For it may perhaps have come about that the holy Doctor, against the Pelagians and their remnants, defended as a revealed dogma of faith indeed the independence of predestination from natural merits, as has been demonstrated in the preceding thesis; yet at the same time, in vindicating this Catholic dogma, he used such a form of argument and such modes of speaking, from which it appears that he judged predestination itself to glory to precede the foreseeing of any merits whatsoever, even supernatural ones. On this hypothesis admitted, Augustine would have defended the Apostolic doctrine of gratuitous predestination and conferral of grace with a quite different authority and reason from that of the private opinion just described; and therefore nothing would be surprising in his having demanded profession of the Apostolic doctrine only from his adversaries, and never profession of that private opinion of his. Many theologians hold that in this matter Augustine dissents from the Greek and Latin Fathers, even those older than himself, if these are understood as we have shown they must be understood, and this is evident from their own words. Others of no less authority wholly maintain that predestination to glory, from the consequent will of God, consequent upon the foresight of the merits of grace, was never called into doubt by Augustine.

They prove this by arguments, among the rest, Peter de Comitibus, Ord. S. Augustini, de Praed. et Reprob. disp. 3. a. 4. sqq.; and, in reading the works of Augustine, the most practised Carolus Ioseph Tricassinus, Ord. Capuc., who, setting other questions aside, devoted all his talent and diligence to this one thing: to attain and explain the genuine opinion of Augustine on the doctrine of grace and predestination. There may also be read Vasquez, in 1. P. disp. 89. c. 6–8; Valencia, in 1. q. 23. punct. 4. §. 5; Stapleton, in Rom. IX. (Antidota Apostolica T. II.); Lessius, de Praed. sect. 2. et 4; Alticotius, Summa Aug. T. VI. a. 3. et 4; Kilber (Theol. Wirceb. T. II.). Cf. Maffei, Hist. theol. l. X.

I wonder why the theologians in this dispute have been unwilling to follow the same principles which have been ratified and fixed in other similar hermeneutical questions. If Augustine sometimes speaks more obscurely, then according to principles declared by us elsewhere (Tract. de Tradit.), it must be considered whether, given his purpose, the context, the state of the question and his own manner of speaking, and a comparison of various passages having been instituted, he cannot be reconciled with the common opinion of the preceding Fathers, whose doctrine he professes everywhere to follow; and therefore ambiguous expressions which admit a twofold sense would always have to be interpreted not against but in accordance with the doctrine of the other Fathers. If, however, the dissent were manifest, so that it could not be prudently reconciled, then indeed I would not hesitate, with Pighius, Catharinus, Osorius, Camerarius, Maldonatus (de Praedest. q. 4.)¹, Toletus in 1. q. 23. a. 5. conclus. 2°, and Petavius (l. X. coll. IX.), to depart respectfully from Augustine, since this could be nothing other than his private opinion, and, according to the whole character of the dispute, could have been proposed by that most holy author only as an opinion (cf. th. LXII.).

For the rest, leaving to others their own individual interpretations, it seems to me most clear on all sides that it was never in the mind of Augustine, any more than of the other Fathers, that there is any other reason of predestination to glory than with supernatural merits presupposed and foreseen. There are arguments of two kinds: positive, from testimonies proving our opinion, and negative, from the weakness of the reasons for the opposing opinion.

I. The doctrine of Augustine, whenever it considers predestination to glory in itself and apart from the predestination of grace, becomes known from the following.

1°. It is a principle established with Augustine that gifts which are conferred by God in time on account of merits are in the same way predestined in eternity on account of foreseen merits. Augustine brought the gratuitous predestination of gifts into the dispute solely in order to show that their bestowal is equally gratuitous; he therefore judged predestination to be gratuitous in the same sense as bestowal. But it is certain by faith, and Augustine everywhere inculcates, that eternal life, as the crown of justice, is rendered to supernatural merits as grace for grace; therefore it is certain that in Augustine it is predestined in the same way (th. LVII.).

Moreover, it is established that the Massilians, and Augustine himself before his episcopate, held this order of bestowal and predestination: that the kingdom of heaven is conferred on merits; that merits are acquired through the grace of God; that grace is obtained through faith; and finally that faith is procured from the powers of nature and not through the grace of God. Hence, concerning predestination, they judged in exactly the same way: beyond controversy the kingdom is predestined on the basis of the merits of works, and these are predestined on the basis of the obtaining of faith; but faith, since it is not a supernatural gift of God but comes from the natural powers of free will, does not belong to divine predestination. Now indeed Augustine, as bishop and champion of Catholic doctrine against the Pelagians and Semipelagians, not only permits this order of predestination but holds it as most certain, provided the error about the beginning on the way of salvation is corrected, and faith itself and the beginning of faith are believed to be a gift of grace, which is given and predestined not for merits but gratuitously (See the demonstration in th. LVII. LVIII. LXII.).

2°. Augustine teaches in express words that, by the very fact that in execution the election to the recompense is made from merits, eternal election, or predestination to that same recompense, cannot in any way be understood except as made from the foreseeing of merits. Therefore he says that in those passages of Scripture where there is talk of an eternal election which is not from works (as Rom. IX. 11.), it must necessarily be understood as the election to those gifts which are also conferred in execution with no preceding merits; of which kind, certainly, eternal life is not for adults, but the calling to faith and other manifold graces are. See th. LVII. n. 3°.

Hence, as Chrysostom teaches, predestination is « neither from charity alone nor from our virtue, but from both; » and as Fulgentius says, « grace is prepared through mercy and the reward is predestined through justice » (above th. LIX.): so Augustine fully agrees in the same doctrine. « Those whom the Lord willed, these he chose; he chose, however, as the Apostle says (Rom. XI. 4.), both according to his grace and according to their justice » Aug. serm. 100. n. 3. As Epiphanius, Cyril, Ambrose, etc. explain that saying of Matt. XX. 23, « for whom it has been prepared by my Father, » of the preparation of the kingdom for labours, virtues and merits (above l. c.), so Augustine too interprets it in the same sense in Ps. 126. n. 5. « For others it has been prepared by my Father (the humble, not the proud)... and be you others, and it is prepared for you. » As other Fathers teach by common opinion that rewards are not predestined except in the foreknowledge of merits (above l. c.), so Augustine agrees in the same doctrine. « Because (the purpose of God) remains that he justifies believers, therefore he finds works which he now chooses for the kingdom of heaven..... Whence, what is said (Eph. I. 4.), because he chose us, God, before the foundation of the world, I do not see how it is said except with foreknowledge » ad Simplic. l. I. q. 2. n. 6.

3°. The same is proved from the manner in which Augustine judged the number of those predestined to glory: considered formally as a number, it is indeed antecedently determined; but which men are inserted into that blessed number, or, as it is commonly said, the number considered materially, depends on the foreseen merits of individuals. Hence he also teaches that the consummation of the present economy will come sooner or later by divine counsel, according as the cooperation of men has been more or less diligent in completing the predestined number of the Saints. Behold the most eloquent words of Augustine in that very book De Corrept. et grat., in which the adversaries seemed especially to have found predestination to glory before foreseen merits. « It is certain, he says, that the number of the elect is neither to be increased nor diminished, although John the Baptist also signifies, where he says: bring forth therefore fruit worthy of repentance... for God is able of these stones to raise up children to Abraham (Matth. III. 8.), so as to show that those are to be cut off if they bear no fruit, so that the number which was promised to Abraham may not fail; yet more openly in the Apocalypse (III. 11.) it is said: hold fast what you have, that no one take your crown. For if no other is to receive it unless this one shall have lost it; the number is certain ». De Corrept. et gr. n. 39. He explains the same sense more clearly in the little book De Bono viduitatis², written in the year 414, when the dispute against the Pelagians was already raging (cf. ib. n. 21.). He exhorts widows, n. 28: « Let not the complaint of vain men.... break you from this zeal, who say: how will the human race subsist if all are continent? As if this age were delayed³ for any other reason than that the predestined number of those Saints might be filled up; and with that filled quickly, the end of the age would certainly not be deferred. » Again in the book which he wrote already as bishop, De Bono coniug. n. 10: « Would that all wished this (to be continent), provided only in charity from a pure heart and a good conscience and unfeigned faith; the City of God would be completed much more quickly, and the end of the age would be hastened. »

4°. The most faithful interpreters of Augustine, St Prosper and St Fulgentius, say that it is false that, according to the mind of Augustine, predestination to eternal life is denied to anyone by the antecedent will of God, with the foreseeing of ruin and impenitence; and consequently they also teach that God « has predestined to the kingdom those whom he foreknew would return to him by the help of preventing mercy and would remain in him by the help of subsequent mercy. » See the testimonies above, th. LV. n. II. 4°; th. LIX.

II. The worth of the arguments by which the opposite opinion is attributed to Augustine is to be examined, and their inefficacy demonstrated.

1°. We shall set out the method of demonstration which must necessarily be used by whoever wishes to prove that Augustine teaches predestination not only of grace, or of grace and glory together, but of glory considered in itself, with no foreseen supernatural merits presupposed; for this alone is the true state of the question. Accordingly the adversaries will accomplish nothing unless they demonstrate: a) that in the testimonies brought forward from Augustine there is question not of the predestination of the grace of faith, of good works and of perseverance, but of the predestination of glory; b) that there is no discussion, taken as a whole, of the entire series of effects of predestination from first grace to glory; for that predestination taken as a whole depends on some merit, only the Semipelagians can affirm (th. LVII.); but they must demonstrate that between predestination to glory considered in itself and predestination of grace there is, according to the mind of Augustine, this order: that predestination to glory, antecedent and absolute, is the principle and norm of the predestination of merits and of graces. c) They must show that works supernatural in the Catholic sense are excluded by Augustine from predestination to glory, and not only works which are either natural in themselves or in their beginning depend on natural merit, such as the Semipelagians admitted. Yet these things must be demonstrated from the clear words of Augustine, because the holy Doctor, given the character of the controversy with the Pelagians and Semipelagians, always understands predestination as predestination of grace, or of grace and glory together; but he excludes works taken in the sense of the heretics, that is, those which depend, either immediately or mediately, on the natural powers of free will alone (th. LXII.). Hence a presumption never avails, but in each passage a demonstration is needed, if you wish to persuade that Augustine somewhere speaks of predestination to glory apart, and excludes from it the foreseeing of the merits of grace; for presumption always militates on the opposite side, by the very fact that the character of the whole controversy and the whole intention and contention of the holy Doctor regarded solely the gratuity of grace and the exclusion of natural merits. « Hear and understand: not from works is said (Eph. II. 9.) as though they were yours, existing from yourself for yourself, but as those in whom God has formed you, that is, has shaped and created... not that creation by which men were made, but that of which he spoke who was already a man: create in me a clean heart, O God... Thus, dearly beloved, if our good life is nothing other than the grace of God, then without doubt eternal life too, which is rendered to a good life, is the grace of God, and is itself also given gratuitously, because that to which it is given was given gratuitously. But he to whom it is given is grace only; while that which is given to him, since it is his reward, is grace for grace, as recompense for justice » de Grat. et lib. arbit. n. 20. Finally, d) it is not enough to set forth the doctrine of Augustine that, the predestination from first grace to the crown being supposed, the execution and the very bestowal of efficacious calling, justification, perseverance and eternal life follow infallibly in time. For who would deny this, except one who denied the infallibility of divine foreknowledge and predestination? Above all, it is not sufficient to have shown that according to Augustine all the predestined persevere infallibly; for those who do not persevere certainly were not predestined: « therefore they are not predestined, because they were foreknown to be such as would fall away by voluntary transgression » S. Prosper ad Obiect. III. Gallorum. But for something to be established, it must be shown that God wills, on account of an antecedent absolute predestination to glory, to give faith, good works and perseverance. Whoever could persuade that this is affirmed by Augustine would also have shown that he contradicts himself. For to the question why God gives the grace of faith to one and not to another, gives the gift of perseverance to one and not to another — when yet, considering his will in the scope of omnipotence, he could give to all, and considering the dignity of the recipients no merit precedes the first grace, and, with the gifts of grace set aside, all are unworthy — to this question, I say, Augustine never gives any answer other than that he does not know (cont. Iulian. l. IV. c. 8; de Corrept. et grat. c. 8; de Dono persev. cc. 9. 11. 13. etc.). But it is a manifest contradiction to teach that the cause why perseverance is given to one and not to another is the antecedent predestination to glory or the denial of it, and at the same time, whenever an opportunity offers, to assert that one knows not the cause why it is given or not given. Whoever holds this opinion of an absolute antecedent predestination to glory, from which the predestination and distribution of grace follows, ought to profess that he knows very well the cause which Augustine says he does not know; but that he does not know why God predestines this one antecedently to life and not that one, which Augustine, if predestination to glory is considered apart, never says he does not know, but rather has sufficiently declared that he knows very well. See above p. 559.560.

Now indeed, in all the testimonies which have been brought forward, or can be brought forward, by the authors of an interpretation opposed to ours, Augustine treats of the predestination of grace, or of the whole series of predestined effects taken together from first grace to glory; and he always understands the gratuity of predestination to be altogether the same as that of the bestowal and execution itself, in opposition to the Pelagian error and especially the Semipelagian, and so to the exclusion of merits which are natural either in themselves or in their beginning.

2°. The arguments of certain theologians, judged from the principles declared so far, are seen at once to be beside the point, so there would be no need to speak of them. Thus Gonetus (disp. II. §. 5.), promising that he wishes « to inquire into the mind and doctrine of this holy Doctor more laboriously and to investigate more diligently, » offers one argument and three testimonies. The argument is this: the Massilians, as witnessed by Prosper and Hilary in their letters to Augustine, defended the opinion about predestination after foreseen merits, and disapproved Augustine's opinion about predestination. Augustine nevertheless inculcates his opposed doctrine against the Massilians in the books de Praed. SS. and de Dono persev. See the reply above, th. LXI. LXII. We shall speak shortly of the express testimonies usually adduced from Augustine; but those which Gonetus cites, namely the most efficacious, can be disposed of here at once. The first testimony, from l.⁴ de Corrept. et gr. c. 6: « We must understand the apostles to have been chosen through mercy, Judas through judgment; so he chose those to obtain his kingdom, and that one to shed his blood. » The second testimony, from l.⁵ de Grat. et lib. arbit. c. 9: « when the Apostle could have said: the wage of justice is eternal life, he preferred to say: but the grace of God is eternal life (Rom. VI. 23.), so that we might understand from this that God leads us to eternal life not for our merits, but through his mercy. » The matter is clear in itself, and if he had gone a little further in citing the words of Augustine, even a blind man would have seen that the question here is not so much of predestination as of execution, in which supernatural merits are affirmed and only natural merits denied; for St Augustine goes on: « is not a crown rendered for good works? But because he himself works the good works in the good... lest, by attributing to himself what they do well, they be lifted up from good works as if they were their own. » The third and last testimony Gonetus cites as from Augustine is from c. 28 of the « Soliloquies of the soul to God, » in which there is talk of the whole series of predestination, to which indeed no merits are presupposed. But it is not necessary to report the words, since the question for us is the opinion of Augustine, not that of the anonymous author who wrote these Soliloquies, certainly not earlier than the thirteenth century, after the chapter « Damnamus » of the Fourth Lateran Council (Later. IV.) was published in the year 1215. (cf. Soliloq. c. 32.)

Setting these very trivial matters aside, we shall rather answer the double argument which is usually drawn from the doctrine of Augustine about the « damned mass, » and from his appeal to the gratuitous predestination of little children. As to this last, Augustine never brings in the example of little children in order to show the manner of predestination of adults to glory considered in itself. Whenever he uses this example, he treats directly of the gratuitous conferral of the grace of baptism and, through it, of the kingdom of heaven, with no preceding merits of the children; and from this he concludes to the gratuitous calling and conferral of grace for adults. He therefore speaks of the order of execution, where it is certain that eternal life is attributed to adults as the crown of justice for supernatural merits; and therefore the example of infants cannot hold, and Augustine adduces it only to declare the gratuity of grace, both in the conferral and, by that very fact, also in predestination. « For from the mouth of infants and sucklings God perfects his praise, so that what we see in these, whose deliverance no good merits of theirs precede, and in those whose condemnation only the original sin they share with all precedes, we should by no means hesitate to say that this happens also in adults; that is, not thinking that grace is given to anyone according to their merits, or that anyone is punished except for their merits » Don. persev. n. 25. Augustine speaks constantly to the same effect in ep. 186. n. 12; de pecc. merit. et remiss. l. I. n. 29. 30; contr. duas epp. Pelagian. l. II. n. 11. sqq.; contr. Iul. l. IV. n. 45; de Don. persev. n. 21. 27. 28.; Op. Imperfect. l. I. n. 38.

To the second argument it is enough to set forth the doctrine of Augustine on « discretion from the damned mass, » so that it may be understood that there the question is always treated in the same way, both as to the conferral and the predestination of grace, or of grace and glory together, and as to the whole series of graces taken together, from the first beginning to perseverance and glory. Mass, or sometimes damned lump (that is, the guilty of damnation), is what Augustine calls all who are infected by sin, whether original or personal (the name taken from Rom. IX. 21.). Hence it is repugnant that anyone be freed from this mass except by undue mercy; for he cannot be freed except through grace, which is the principle of all merit on the way of salvation. There is, moreover, a twofold discretion considered from that mass of damnation: one temporary, of those who again relapse into it by their sins; the other complete, of those who persevere to the end. « They had been called, and, following the one calling, were justified from the impious and renewed through the laver of regeneration.... These things are true: in accordance with all these things they were from us; yet in accordance with another certain discretion they were not from us; for if they had been from us, they would surely have remained with us » Don. persev. n. 21. Now I ask: what has this doctrine, most certain among all Catholics, that no one is delivered from the state of sin and the liability to damnation except by undue mercy and the grace of God, in common with predestination to glory before foreseen supernatural merits? And that, if the whole series of God's benefits in the predestined is considered, neither the beginning nor the progress and perseverance can, with the Pelagians and Semipelagians, be placed in human merits, since not a good but an evil merit precedes, and the subsequent merits themselves are gifts of God through grace? « For who discerns us from that mass of perdition and corruption, except he who came to seek and to save what was lost?... For who discerns you? Where if a man says: my faith, my will, my good work; the answer is given to him: for what have you that you have not received? And if you have received, why do you glory, as if you had not received? Indeed all this is so, not that man may not glory, but that he who glories may glory in the Lord.... Not because good works are frustrated, since God renders to each according to his works.... but because the works are from grace, not grace from works.... nor would faith itself be in us, unless God distributed to each the measure of faith » Aug. ep. 186. ad Paulin. n. 4; cf. ep. 196. n. 21. 22; Enchirid. c. 99. etc.

3°. We do not intend to examine each testimony which is usually or can be brought forward from Augustine. But so that from the principles set out so far⁶ the easiest method of grasping the true interpretation may be understood, it pleases us to make a trial, as an example, on the famous testimony from l.⁷ de Corrept. et gratia c. 7. n. 13, which is usually considered the clearest of all for the opposing side, and the most difficult in ours. « Whoever therefore are set apart from that original damnation by this largess of divine grace, there is no doubt that the gospel is procured for them to be heard, and when they hear they believe, and persevere to the end in faith which works through love; and if at any time they stray, they are corrected and amended; and some of them, even if they are not corrected by men, return to the way which they had left; and some, having received grace at whatever age, are taken away from the perils of this life by the swiftness of death. For God works all these things in them, who has made them vessels of mercy, who also chose them in his Son before the foundation of the world by the election of grace; but if it is by grace, it is no longer from works, otherwise grace is no longer grace. For they were not so called as not to be elect; on which account it is said: many are called, but few are chosen: but since they are called according to purpose, they indeed are also elect by the election, as has been said, of grace, not of their preceding merits, because grace is to them every merit. »

Now, according to the rules described above, the sense of this testimony is to be examined, which, as I said, seems to favour the adversaries more clearly than the rest. First of all, in the whole context the glory considered in itself and apart is never considered; whence also there is no mention of any order between the predestination to glory and the predestination of grace (cf. rules a. b.). But the whole series of predestination is considered in the eternal foreknowledge and preparation of God: « who have been distinguished by the largess of grace; » « he chose them before the foundation of the world. » Further, just as the effects are foreknown and prepared from eternity⁸, so they infallibly follow in temporal execution: « there is no doubt that the gospel is procured to be heard by them, etc. » (cf. rule d.). What is the order in that distinction, taken as a whole through the largess of grace — whether God predestines antecedently to the crown and consequently to merits, or rather in the inverse order — Augustine in the words cited does not declare; but if this is sought from his principles found elsewhere, it appears what is to be said, from the things demonstrated at the beginning of this thesis, and it appears most clearly from what follows in this very passage which we are interpreting. For to the question why some who have lived well for a while are not elect, he does not answer: because election to glory was made by antecedent will, and therefore he does not know this; but he answers that they are not among the elect for this reason, that « God knew they would not have perseverance, and foreknew that they would fall. » To the opposite question, why God did not give them perseverance, when by absolutely willing it he could indeed have done so, he does not answer that he did not antecedently predestine them to life; but if this, he says, is asked of me, « I answer that I do not know » (cf. rule d.). Moreover, this election, considered fully, that is from election to first grace up to election to perseverance and glory, indeed has no antecedent works, which could be only natural; for supernatural works, as is expressly declared, are themselves within the series of predestined effects: « by the election of grace not of their own preceding merits, because grace is to them every merit. » But this exclusion of natural works, on which predestination and bestowal would depend at least initially, is the principal aim of this whole passage (cf. rule c.). In the same plain way, the principles laid down can and ought to be applied to solve the difficulties which are usually raised from other texts of St Augustine (See Tricassinus, in the work on Predestination).

How difficult it is to demonstrate that the doctrine of predestination to glory before the foreseen merits of grace is according to the opinions of Augustine, the great Petavius is an example. Through several chapters continuously he wove and unwove this web, in book IX, de Deo, c. 6 sqq. Already at the very beginning of c. 6, n. 1, he does not sufficiently distinguish these two things: first, that God predestines glory to certain men, namely to all who are to be saved, by an antecedent will which foresees merits, and by which predestination posited he at length predestines to the same merits and efficacious graces; second, that God « was led on account of merits to decree glory with no merits leading him. » The former, about which alone there can be dispute among Catholics, Petavius in no way demonstrated to be according to the opinion of Augustine; the latter no one would deny except absurdly⁹. For who would imagine that God was led, to decree the conferral of glory on account of merits, by certain other merits of those who are to be saved? It could only be said that God, led by the merits of Christ the Redeemer, decreed glory on account of the merits of those to be saved; but of that merit of Christ there is no question here. Suarez (l. I. c. 8. n. 26.) and others are not immune from this confusion of two different questions, as if this — that God, led by no merits, decreed glory as the recompense of our merits — were already predestination before foreseen merits. Indeed the contrary is plainly to be inferred; for he who, moved by no merits but by his own mere good pleasure, wills to give the crown under the condition of a lawful contest, by that very fact does not absolutely predestine the crown except on the supposition of a lawful contest. Moreover Petavius, as one repentant of the fact from chapter 12 onward, himself concedes and maintains that Augustine designates not glory considered in itself but grace together with glory as the term of predestination, where he denies that it was made from any merits of those predestined. And at last he plainly confesses: « we think it more true, according to the opinion of Augustine, that God decreed glory not precisely and absolutely, but as a reward, and depending on merits which he foreknew would certainly be future, and ordained with them » l. IX. c. 15. n. 1. But that Augustine, when the whole series of predestined effects is considered, very often taught against the Pelagians and Semipelagians that this depends on no merit, no one among us doubts; but from this it follows that the holy Doctor judged that glory considered in itself was predestined by antecedent will foreseeing merits, we deny; and Petavius himself at last seems to deny this, when he concedes that he agrees less with Augustine, « who think that glory is decreed by God absolutely, that is, connected and woven with no series of merits » l. c.