Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam

Arguments which are brought against the doctrine demonstrated so far are examined.

Arguments which are commonly put forward either to refute the doctrine of predestination to glory proved above, or to persuade the contrary opinion—that predestination to glory precedes foreseen merits—deduced from the testimonies of Scripture and the Fathers or from the order necessarily holding between means and end, are by no means to the point.

Since here we are dealing with a doctrine which is freely disputed in Catholic schools on both sides, it is rightly demanded that the arguments for the opinion we think true be considered not only in themselves and absolutely, but also comparatively with the arguments of the adverse party. Thus far, indeed, we have deduced the truth of our opinion from all the sources of theology; it remains, therefore, that we examine more carefully those things which are thought by some to weaken our proof and to favour the contrary opinion. This we shall endeavour fully to accomplish in the subsequent series of theses; in the present thesis, however, we shall first reject the direct attacks which the adversaries oppose to our arguments; then we shall show that the reasons by which they are wont to persuade predestination to glory before foreseen merits, considered in general, are of little efficacy.

I. As regards the direct attacks on our proof: 1°, the argument by far the chief, and by itself alone sufficient for demonstrating predestination to glory from the consequent will which foresees the merit of the supernatural, I say, the argument drawn from the antecedent will of God, that all men without exception be saved, cannot be refuted or attacked by any probable reason. For no attack can be mounted unless either by interpreting the antecedent will for the salvation of all men in a sense which we have demonstrated to be manifestly false (th. XLVII. sqq.), and whose assertion amounts to a denial of the saving will, such as we have shown is preached in Scripture and by the Fathers; or by asserting at once, in manifest contradiction, that the antecedent positive will does not comprehend innumerable men among those to be saved, and yet that the antecedent will is that all of them be among those to be saved. Concerning this matter we have said enough at th. LV.

2°. As for the remaining testimonies of Scripture and the Fathers adduced in the preceding thesis, Suarez and Gonet, together with the others, have one single answer: namely, that in all of them the discourse concerns not the order of predestination but the order of execution, in which latter they do concede that foreseen and predestined merits precede, as means to the end, the attainment of predestined glory¹. For they imagine, namely, in the divine mind² a twofold order of counsels: one they call the order of intention, by which God, as a wise provider, first wills the end, that is, the eternal beatitude of all who are to be saved; then the proximate means to the end, which are good works and merits; then the more remote means, which are the efficacious graces; and by this order they say that absolute predestination to eternal life was made before the foresight of merits. Predestination having now been made, they think that in our manner of understanding God proceeds, in his eternal counsel, to dispose its execution, where God wills first to apply the more remote means, then the proximate ones, and lastly wills the end; and so the order of execution, in the divine mind itself, is reversed when compared with the order of intention. Whence they say that all the testimonies of Scripture and the Fathers adduced are not to be understood of the order of intention, and therefore not of predestination, but of the other order, that of execution. By this art of interpretation, they thought, the clearest testimonies could be evaded.

a) But that double order in the divine mind, as these theologians conceive it, is fictitious, and was devised not to find the genuine sense of the holy Fathers but to escape the weight of their authority. In none of the testimonies of the Fathers that can be brought forward is there found any trace of this twofold order in the divine counsels; no one before these theologians, driven into a corner, ever thought of it. For what, I ask, is the order of efficacious intention in God and the order of execution? Intention in God is intellect and will together with a connotation of an object outwards. But if this very intention is efficacious, it is in God active execution, or an efficient act. Execution, however, passive, is not in God but in things. Therefore, while we conceive God as absolutely intending, or efficaciously willing, e.g., first the end, then the proximate means, lastly the more remote means, which are for the end and on account of the end: by this very intention active execution is wholly absolute; and without anything else being understood in the divine mind, by this very fact there will begin in time passive execution, that is, the existence of things. The order of this existence in time will certainly be inverted whenever, in intention, the absolute will for the end to be effected through means precedes; nor is it necessary, in God, after he has efficaciously willed the existence of the end and the existence of the means which are for the end and on account of the end, absurdly to imagine a new series of volitions by which, in inverted order, he again wills the existence of those same means for the end and the existence of the end. Certainly the Fathers did not distinguish predestining intention and active execution in the divine mind otherwise than according to the connotation of the term, as it is still future in itself or is now being effected in time (cf. th. LVII.).

b) Setting aside the other arguments, it is enough to read the testimonies of the Fathers, some of which we described above, to see that the hypothesis is absurd: namely, that those holy Doctors admitted predestination to glory to precede the foreseeing of merits, and said that only in execution (however one understands it) is the will of conferring glory consequent upon merits. For the Fathers deny that there is any predestination to eternal rewards except consequent upon the foreseeing of merits; see e.g. Ambrose and Theodoret, ll. cc. But if they had been of the opinion which the adversaries feign, they could in no way have denied that there is some predestination before the foreseeing of merits. Moreover, the Fathers in the same contexts affirm that predestination of reward is in the same way not before but after foreseen merits, just as reprobation, or predestination to punishment, is consequent upon foreseen sins. But not only in the order of execution but also in the order of predestination, punishment is predestined consequent upon foreseen sins. Therefore the Fathers thought the same about predestination of reward consequent upon foreseen merits. See e.g. Irenaeus and Fulgentius, ll. cc. In sum, if predestination to glory after foreseen merits is not expressed in the opinions of those Fathers, there are no words in any language by which it could be expressed.

II. The arguments by which the adversaries try to persuade themselves and others of their opinion—that predestination to glory precedes foreseen merits—are drawn, 1°, from testimonies of Scripture, chiefly from Rom. IX, and—what is truly astonishing—from Eph. I. 11. sq.; Matth. XXIV. 22. 24; Luc. XII. 32; Act. XIII. 48; and then from the doctrine of Augustine in the books against the Semipelagians, who deny that the beginning of faith and perseverance in faith are gifts of God, and that they are therefore predestined.

But indeed, a) neither from Scripture nor from any ancient Doctor do they bring forward, or can they bring forward, any opinion in which it is said that eternal life, considered in itself and apart, is predestined for all who are to be saved before foreseen works and supernatural merits. On the contrary, many of the Fathers teach clearly and expressly that the rewards of eternal life are predestined by God for those whose merits he foresaw, and are not predestined except with merits foreseen.

b) All the texts which the adversaries bring forward they consider torn from their contexts, with no account taken of the aim of the author and of the doctrine in other places. For if the aim and context of ch. IX of Romans are considered, then although many things in it seem difficult and obscure, two things are altogether evident. First, the discourse there is not about predestination to eternal life considered apart from predestination of grace, nor in any way about the order between the one and the other; but the discourse is about the gratuitous calling and the grace of faith and of adoption as sons and heirs of the New Testament. Then, directly there, the discourse is not about gratuitous predestination, but about the gratuitous conferring and bestowal to which predestination corresponds. Therefore, whoever would say that by those words, v. 11–13.³ indicate predestination to glory apart from regard to supernatural works, would of necessity have to affirm also the bestowal of glory without regard to supernatural merits, which is repugnant to Catholic dogma. Then the Fathers Origen, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Oecumenius, Theophylact, Jerome (ep. ad Hedib.), Ambrosiaster, etc., explain the whole of ch. IX of Romans in such a way as to exclude, by many and express arguments, the sense brought in by the adversaries.

In the other texts which are cited, plain inspection shows that there is no mention of predestination to glory considered apart from predestination to grace; and consequently there is also no trace of the doctrine of the adversaries about the order between predestination to glory and to grace. In Eph. I. 1-13 and in the parallel passages, the Apostle first speaks expressly of all the faithful, at least of all the just, from among Jews and Gentiles (vv. 12 and 13); moreover, he declares the term election and predestination to be not glory but grace and holiness: « he chose us that we should be (εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἡμᾶς⁴) holy and immaculate » etc. According to the adversaries' interpretation, therefore, we would have it revealed that at least all the just faithful at the apostolic time, and, considering the destination of Scripture for the Church of all ages, all the justified faithful without exception are predestined to glory. By this art of interpretation one would arrive, with Calvin, at denying all supernatural gifts to those who are not predestined to eternal glory, and at constituting the invisible Church from all and only the predestined.

c) As for Augustine, his whole discussion was concerning predestination of grace, or of grace and glory together, with human merits excluded as coming from the powers of nature. But whenever he has mentioned predestination to glory considered in itself, fully agreeing with the other Fathers he has signified that the reward of eternal life is also predestined in the same order in which it is given to the merits of grace (th. LVII.). But what is brought forward from the Scriptures and from the doctrine of St Augustine and also of St Thomas requires a fuller explanation, which we reserve for the following theses.

2°. Let there be considered the proofs which they repeat from the intrinsic reason of predestination itself.

a) The argument which the advocates of the adverse opinion consider the weightiest, and on which, if they are willing to tell the truth, they almost solely rely, is not drawn from Scripture and the Fathers but from the intrinsic natures of things; namely, from the order, as they themselves put it, of means to end. Indeed, this reason either proves that predestination to glory, with merits supposed and foreseen, not only has not been made but could not have been made by God; or, as it seems to us, it proves absolutely nothing. « The fundamental reason of our conclusion, Gonet says (disp. II. n. 26.), is drawn from St Thomas in the passages cited⁵, and it can be briefly put thus. He who wills in an orderly manner wills the end before the means to the end. But God wills in an orderly manner. Therefore he wills the end before the means to it. But glory is the end, and merits are the means leading to it. Therefore he wills glory before merits, and consequently election to glory cannot be from the foreseeing of merits. This reason is founded on this principle, which Aristotle hands down, namely that the end is willed first by the agent before the means to it. » To this his « fundamental » argument, no less unstable than the common and obvious one, a theologian applauds with a triumphal ode: « It is wonderful how much this argument torments the adversaries; so that, to free themselves from it, they turn on every side. »

Nevertheless, this is answered easily, without any strain on our part and without turning to one side, though with some retort. End and means are not of one kind only but of many. Someone can intend an end to be attained by means to be used by his own operation alone, without regard to the will or cooperation of another. In this way, if almighty and infinitely wise God wills an end, the absolute intention of the end is always conceived as prior in reason, and from it, consequently, the intention of the means⁶. Then someone can set an end before another to be attained through free meritorious cooperation⁷ (the help offered and given by himself being nonetheless presupposed), and to be given by himself in reward for merit. In this way, if the discussion concerns man, it is not only not necessary but even impossible that an absolute intention of the end should precede the supposition of merit. If God formally sets such an end before a free creature, to be attained as the reward of merits, it certainly appears more fitting to the order of things (whatever be the absolute possibility) that the reward not be set by absolute intention except with a free merit supposed; quite evidently such an absolute intention of reward is not necessary antecedently to the supposition and foreseeing of merit. Hence this argument drawn from the order of means to end either proves the contrary, if it proves anything, and can be turned back upon its authors; or it proves nothing at all. Indeed this retort is not to be declined. He who most orderly wills an end for another formally as a reward for free merits, does not will this end for him by absolute intention except with merits supposed. But God most orderly wills the end of eternal glory for adults formally as a reward for free merits (supernatural). Therefore God does not will the end of eternal glory for adults by absolute intention except with merits supposed (and therefore foreseen) (supernatural). Cf. Lessium sect. 5. n. 84. If the order we have supposed is denied to be necessary in itself in the divine intention, much more evidently the inverse order is not necessary, that God should first will the reward by absolute will and then the merits. But if this order is not necessary, then from that principle considered in itself, however common it be by the authority of Aristotle, nothing is proved, because it does not pertain to the matter. Hence, since from the nature of things God can at least as well predestine his elect to the reward of eternal life with merits supposed and foreseen as by an antecedent will before the foreseeing of merits, nothing remains but that we gather the divine intention from those things which he himself was pleased to make known to us about his merciful and saving will toward the human race. Now, from the word of God and from the works of God in the order of grace it is most certain that God, by his antecedent will, wills all men to be saved and no one to perish, and therefore offers and gives to all (so far as lies in him) the necessary help, so that all can be saved, with intention, command, threats and entreaties, that they may use these helps and be saved; and therefore he wills, by antecedent will, to refuse predestination to glory to no one, but only consequently upon foreseen evil merit. By this very fact it is evident that the distinction between the whole number of the predestined, and therefore of those actually to be saved, and the whole number of the reprobate and those to be damned, has not been made antecedently but consequently upon the foreseen good merits acquired through grace and the evil merits contracted by free will.

These things make clear the answer to the « fundamental reason » of the opinion we are opposing. They say: the intention of the end precedes the choice of the means, nor can there be an efficacious will for the means unless from an antecedent efficacious will for the end, since each person is moved to will the means by an efficacious will for the end. But the eternal glory of the blessed is the end which God intends; their merits are the means to the end. Therefore in God an efficacious will precedes, by which he wills eternal glory for all who are to be saved, and from this will there follows the will for merits. I reply: I distinguish the major premise: the intention of an end which someone proposes to attain for himself by necessary means—that is, independently of every other free will—precedes the choice of means: I concede M; the intention of an end which someone proposes to attain freely for another, as wage and reward, precedes the choice of the means by which he wishes to help the other to the free attainment of the end proposed to him: I subdistinguish: a conditional intention of the end precedes: I concede M; an absolute intention precedes: I deny M. Likewise, I distinguish the minor: eternal glory is an end which God intends to attain for himself by necessary means: I deny the minor; which God intends—that is, proposes to be attained and wills for another: I subdistinguish: which he wills for another as a reward to be freely attained by him, and therefore wills under a condition: I concede the minor; which he wills absolutely for another: again I subdistinguish: which he wills absolutely consequent upon the foreseeing of the condition fulfilled: I concede; which he wills absolutely antecedent to this foreseeing: I deny. To the addition « merits are means to the end, » the reply is: they are free means, which God commands men to use freely in order to attain the reward, and to which he helps by his graces: I concede; they are means which he himself employs independently of the free will of men: I deny. Let the examples set forth by St Paul and by Christ our Lord himself be recalled: how the president of the games sets a crown and a prize before those who contend and run, and how the householder sets a wage before the servants hired to tend the vineyard.

b) Another argument for the contrary opinion can be drawn from the special love of God toward his elect. No one can without error deny God's special love and providence toward the predestined, which is not common to those who are not to be saved. But this special love cannot be understood in predestination, except insofar as God, from an antecedent efficacious intention of eternal salvation, chooses for them efficacious graces, and through these merits and the gift of final perseverance. Indeed this is itself predestination to glory antecedently to foreseen merits.

This argument gives occasion to guard against a false interpretation of our doctrine. The special love of God toward the predestined⁸, which is not common to the reprobate, can be understood in several ways. First, the greater and lesser love of God is not properly said of the act in itself as more or less intense, since the act is the divine substance itself under the aspect of love, which is infinite in itself; but greater and lesser love is said by reason of the connoted term, that is, by reason of the goods that God wills, and of the manner in which he wills to confer them on creatures. This being laid down, we distinguish antecedent love and consequent love.

Now consequent love, that is, love as it is regarded completely in relation to the actual conferring of grace, merits and glory, which foresees merits and thus extends to the whole series of effects of predestination, is undoubtedly altogether special toward the predestined and not common to the reprobate. From the universal and conditional will of salvation God decrees and distributes graces, without which salvation cannot be obtained; therefore the special love is to be considered, in how it stands toward the predestined in the conferring of graces. We say that consequent love, that is, as all the gifts actually conferred are regarded, is special toward the predestined. For if a grace which has its effect is always morally a greater benefit than another grace which (through the fault of man) remains ineffective, how much more special a benefit must be reckoned the graces connected with final perseverance itself? This perseverance is in itself a gratuitous gift, insofar as it can be merited or obtained not by condign merit but only by suppliant congruous merit, and is absolutely gratuitous in the first grace, from which its obtaining can begin. Therefore, to the predestined, to whom alone and to all of whom this great gift is given, it is given from grace, yet not without regard to their free cooperation (if we speak of adults) under grace and through grace; to those to whom it is not given, the cause is not in the antecedent will of God but in themselves.

Chiefly the adversaries demand a declaration of special antecedent love. Antecedent love, as it is referred to glory considered in itself, is the will to confer glory not absolutely but under the condition of merits. That this is universal, and not particular toward the predestined such that other reprobates would be excluded from it, we have sufficiently demonstrated. Nevertheless we concede and affirm that God, antecedently and also by will, wills for some, before others, by a special love, a higher degree of glory (provided they did not fail in the graces to be given to them). Yet this greater antecedent love and the wider conditional will is not equal toward all who are predestined by the consequent divine will; nor through it is any distinction yet made between the predestined and the non-predestined. Such special love toward some, however, is inferred from singular gifts, by which they are anticipated from infancy or later without any merit and are led in marvellous ways to a sublime holiness, to which others cannot attain (See Lessium sect. 5. n. 96; sect. 6. n. 150. 151.).

When, however, the question is about special antecedent love of God toward all the predestined, first we deny that the reason and norm of the distribution of graces is the antecedent absolute predestination to glory; for if this were supposed, it would follow that for the non-predestined, on account of an antecedent negative reprobation, graces which will not have effect would be chosen deliberately, and by that very fact the most certain doctrine of the universality of the antecedent saving will could no longer be defended. Nevertheless, in the distribution of graces we maintain a special love and antecedent providence toward the predestined. God decrees from eternity and confers in time all his graces with an antecedent will and with an « intense desire, » that the good work to which grace is ordered be done freely by man. But while God, knowing that man, if such grace were given, would resist it by his own fault, nevertheless wills to give this grace and not another that would have effect—which indeed, according to the extent of his omnipotence, would not be lacking to him—that antecedent divine will for a good work remains ineffective through the fault of man, and the will of permitting resistance succeeds. On the other hand, while God confers grace with knowledge going before that man, if that grace were given, would cooperate, the antecedent will passes into an absolute intention of the good work. Therefore, in the conferring of grace which he sees will be efficacious if it were given, the love toward man is greater and special, consequent upon the knowledge of conditionals, but antecedent to the existence of the good work and to the knowledge of vision. If now you look at the whole series of efficacious graces up to final perseverance, by which predestination is completed, and at the same time consider that God could have conferred other graces, and in another order, which he knew would be ineffective through man's fault: you will easily understand how special is God's love and providence, even antecedent (with knowledge of conditionals going before), toward all his elect. On the other hand, that God's providence in the graces which he actually confers on the reprobate does not have the character of predestination and of this special love, this happens through their own fault, although indeed another order of graces and providence would not be lacking to the Omnipotent, in which they too would consent and come to justification and persevere, and so would have been predestined. But questions are not to be raised about possible orders; rather divine providence must be considered according to the present order, in which « the predestination of God is for many a cause of standing, for no one a cause of falling. »