Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam

The predestination of adults to glory, considered in itself, belongs to the consequent will, which foresees supernatural merits.

« If the predestination of adults to glory is considered by itself and separately, it is gathered from the Scriptures, and it is persuaded by the explicit teaching of those Fathers who have written most clearly about this predestination to glory, that it ought to be attributed not to God's antecedent will, but to the consequent will that foresees the merits of grace. »

The truth stated in this thesis is already contained in what has been demonstrated so far, and by name in the fundamental principle which we demonstrated in thesis LVII. Nevertheless, on account of the gravity of the matter, and because the whole controversy about predestination is conveniently reduced to this form, namely to the question of the order between predestination to glory and between the foresight and predestination of supernatural merits, we shall prove by special arguments that predestination to glory does not precede but follows the foreseeing of the merits of grace.

I. In the Scriptures there are several heads of doctrine with which the antecedent predestination of all who are to be saved, prior to the foreseeing of the supernatural merits required in them for attaining salvation, seems not to be reconcilable. On the contrary, it follows from the same heads of doctrine that God did not will to confer eternal salvation, which he confers in time on account of supernatural merits, even from eternity by an absolute will, except from foreseen merits.

For, first, by the antecedent will, which precedes the foreseeing of merits, God, as the Scriptures teach, wills that all men be saved. But antecedent predestination and absolute will of salvation of all those who are actually saved, and without which no one is saved, cannot be reconciled with this will. For if antecedent predestination is posited, which refers to all and only those actually to be saved, there must necessarily be affirmed at the same time antecedent reprobation negative from eternal salvation, that is, the denial of predestination of all other men; which will of denying predestination God has — not from foreseen evil merits, but from his mere good pleasure — so constituted that, from this bare denial of predestination, before any supposition of sins, it is metaphysically repugnant for any of all those men to obtain salvation. But the antecedent will, that these others also should all be saved and none of them perish, such as the Scriptures, both taken in themselves and understood according to the interpretation of the Fathers, most explicitly teach to be in God, cannot consist with that antecedent will of the actually saved.

I ask, then, whether God, in that moment in which, before all foreseeing of merits, he predestined all his elect, truly willed that those not so predestined should also attain salvation under the condition, provided that they merit salvation by faithfully cooperating with grace? Did he will to confer on them graces truly sufficient, and did he will to confer these graces, so far as lies in him, by a true will, that they might cooperate and be saved? If it is said that he did not so will that they be saved under the condition and that none perish, then it is denied that God wills, by antecedent will, that all men be saved, as is preached in the Scriptures and by the Fathers. If, according to the doctrine of the Scriptures and the Fathers, this conditional will of salvation of all men is granted: surely those not included in the number of the antecedently predestined can enter. And God, so far as lies in him, wills that they enter the number of the saved; nor is it certain, in any way from the denial of that predestination, but only consequently upon the foreseeing of final sins, that they are not to be saved; nor can the heavenly city, with its foreseen completed predestination and its absolutely closed number of the saved, be understood except consequently upon the foreseeing of works. Therefore these very ones not included in antecedent predestination, in that antecedent moment all can be, and some of them, consequently upon the foreseeing of merits, will in fact be predestined to eternal life. For how, with no foreseeing of works yet supposed, is it established that out of so many thousands of thousands no one will cooperate, if all can cooperate, and if God wills that they cooperate with the grace to be given to all? Thus at last one would have to come to the opinion of Ambrose Catharinus¹ and of certain other theologians teaching that some are predestined to eternal life by antecedent, others by consequent will of God; against those theologians the argument drawn from the universality of the saving will certainly does not hold, nor do we now attack them.

But those with whom our dispute lies either expressly affirm, or are convinced by the very nature of their system necessarily to affirm, that the number of the saved is absolutely closed by antecedent predestination; and therefore they must affirm that God does not will that anyone else enter that number. But it is evidently repugnant to this will that God, in the same moment, should will that others also be in the number of the saved, provided they themselves do not fail; and that to this end he should give them the necessary graces with a sincere will, that they cooperate and enter that blessed number. I say it is repugnant; for by the very fact that the number of the saved is already determined and closed beforehand in each and every person, God does not will that anyone else enter that number. To say, therefore, that God, by antecedent will, by which he has already closed the number so that it is not to be increased, nevertheless wills that the same number be increased by all those whom he has not included in that number, is an evident contradiction. This argument alone suffices to demonstrate the thesis proposed, and it shines with such light that it can in no way be obscured, unless by a perverse interpretation of the saving will, as was done by Diego Alvarez and Gonet (disp. V. a. 2. n. 58.), or by mutually conflicting assertions, into which it has been shown above that Suarez fell. For the demonstration of the present thesis, therefore, the preceding theses, especially XLIX. L. LV. LVII., are to be kept before the eyes.

2°. In the Scriptures a) God promises and proposes eternal life to be attained by all indiscriminately, as a crown on condition that they have striven lawfully; as a prize on condition that they have run to the goal (1. Cor. IX. 24-27; 2. Tim. IV. 8; 1. Pet. V. 4; Apoc. II. 7. 26; III. 5.); as an inheritance, which is at the same time a reward promised only on condition that they suffer with Christ, that they may also be glorified together (Rom. VIII. 17; Matth. V. 12.); and these are proposed and promised by way of exhortation, so that all may strive, run, suffer, and so hasten to the crown, to the prize, to the glorification together, and not otherwise than under this condition laid up or destined from eternity². It is therefore clear that God has toward all men a conditional will of conferring eternal life, namely if they themselves render what is required of them; which will is not absolute, except insofar as the condition is supposed fulfilled.

Therefore b) election to eternal life is presented in the Scriptures as suspended and uncertain, until the condition of good works, without which there would be no election, is supposed to be fulfilled. For in truth it is uncertain as regards us, because our future free acts are still undetermined for us, and we can determine ourselves either way: to good through the grace of God, to evil through bare free will; and the Scriptures speak according to this indetermination (cf. as above p. 451. nota). But to God our election is indeed certain in the unchangeable foreknowledge, who sees future things as present, and to whom « future things are already made » (above thesis XXXII. XLIII. n. III). « Rather be eager to make your calling and election sure through good works » 2. Pet. I. 10. « Hold fast what you have, that no one may take your crown » Ap. III. 11. « Behold therefore... the goodness of God toward you, if you continue in his goodness; otherwise you also will be cut off; but they also, if they do not continue in unbelief, will be grafted in » Rom. XI. 22. 23. Cf. 1. Cor. IX. 27; Heb. cc. III. et IV; X. 35-39. Therefore again, election and predestination to eternal life are not absolute, but only consequent upon the foreseeing of final good works.

c) The final sentence of the judge of the predestined and the reprobate must be weighed more carefully. « Come.... possess the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world; for I was hungry, and you gave me to eat » etc. Matth. XXV. 34. sqq. In this sentence of the judge good works are clearly presented as the motive on account of which the elect are given « to possess prepared for them the kingdom from the foundation of the world, » and without which, as it is not to be possessed by them, so it would not have been prepared for them from eternity.

Adversaries are all here compelled to take refuge in an interpretation for which they can give no other reason than that they already hold the preparation of the kingdom to be before foreseen merits. They say, namely, that the meritorious cause subjoined in the judge's sentence, for I was hungry etc., refers only to the direct sentence, possess the kingdom; but it in no way pertains to what is added in the predicate, prepared from the foundation of the world. But first of all, if ever the words of Scripture are to be taken in their obvious sense, this certainly must necessarily be kept in the sentence of the judge. Those who recall the manner in which the punishment of fire can and must be proved from these same words will readily concede that it is not free from danger to neglect this fundamental rule. Now, when a double act related to the same object (here the conferral and the preparation of the kingdom) is enunciated in one complex sentence, and a reason is then subjoined to this sentence, it cannot be denied that in its obvious sense this reason is referred to each act to which it is subjoined. Especially it cannot be affirmed, without distorting the plain and obvious sense, that the subjoined reason pertains only to what is more remote in the context, and in no way to what is nearer and immediately preceding — as our adversaries, without any foundation, are compelled to interpret these words of Christ the judge in deference to their opinion: « possess the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world; for I was hungry, and you gave me to eat » etc. Our interpretation is confirmed by comparison with the other sentence of the judge upon the reprobate, v. 41, where the motive of damnation in execution is no less referred to the preparation of punishment, as all Catholics must confess: « depart from me into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels³; for I was hungry, and you gave me no food » etc. Finally, the thing itself shows that what is put forward as the motive of a prepared reward must be understood no less as the reason of absolute preparation than of retribution in the execution itself. When in execution the conferral of the reward is on account of merit, as on account of that motive for conferring it, the preparation of the reward in the antecedent intention, before the foreseeing of merit, cannot be other than conditional; but a reward absolutely prepared can only be consequent upon the foreseeing of merit. For certainly he who declares that he will confer the prepared reward, as judge by an act of justice, only on account of merit, by that very fact also declares that the antecedent preparation was conditional, if there was merit; but not absolute except consequently upon the supposition of merit. Thus the meritorious cause, once stated, is no less the reason and motive of absolute preparation than of conferral and just possession in such sentences: receive the crown prepared for you, because you have merited it by lawful contest; receive the prize prepared for you, because you have won the race.

Hence St Paul explicitly calls the crown of eternal life the crown of righteousness, no less insofar as it is laid up or prepared than insofar as it is rendered in execution. He signifies, therefore, that the act of preparation or predestination of eternal life is an act of justice which presupposes merits, no less than the rendering and conferral of eternal life on account of merits is an act of justice; with only this difference, that the preparation is eternal and therefore consequent upon the merits lying before eternal foreknowledge not in time but in order, whereas the conferral takes place in time, and is consequent in its very existence upon the existence of the merits. « I have fought the good fight... henceforth is laid up for me the crown of righteousness (λοιπὸν ἀπόκειταί μοι ὁ τῆς δικαιοσύνης στέφανος⁴), which the Lord, the righteous judge, will render to me in that day » 2. Tim. IV. 7. 8.

From all these things we conclude that in the sentence of the judge (Matth. 1. c.) the causal proposition « for I was hungry » etc., by which merit is certainly stated as the motive for conferring the kingdom, coheres with the preceding clause: « possess (κληρονομήσατε) prepared for you the kingdom from the foundation of the world, » so that the cause is rendered no less of the eternal preparation than of the execution in time. The Scriptures therefore teach that eternal life, from the foundation of the world — that is, by the eternal counsel of God — is prepared and predestined consequently upon and on account of merits, which lie under the eternal foreknowledge of God, just as in time it is given and conferred on account of merits acquired.

The doctrine, therefore, which we defend is deduced from the Scriptures by the plain and obvious sense of the words and their context. If, however, there are things in the same Scriptures which at first sight seem to be opposed to this doctrine, they are in passages which we can admit to be obscure and difficult; but there is nothing clear and evident in them which states that eternal life, considered in itself, is predestined in the way the adversaries want. Moreover, when the scope and context of the passages are more carefully examined, it appears at least most clearly, however much obscurity may otherwise be supposed, that in them the discourse is not about predestination of eternal life before foreseen supernatural merits, but about predestination of grace, or of grace and glory together, before any human and natural merit; concerning this sense of the Scriptures there will be a place to speak elsewhere.

II. The interpretation and the most lucid teaching of the Fathers wholly demonstrate the sense which we gather from the Scriptures. One may confidently appeal to the Fathers, both Greek and Latin, who wrote on this matter at least up to the time of St Augustine. For by common consensus, both in affirming predestination to eternal life consequent upon foreseen merits, and in denying the same predestination before foreseen merits, they manifestly maintain and vindicate the opinion we defend, in all the passages, and they are many, where they speak not « briefly and in passing, » as sometimes concerning the necessity and gratuity of grace (cf. Aug. de Praed. SS. n. 27.), but clearly and explicitly concerning this predestination to glory considered by itself. That Augustine and his disciples treat predestination not in this sense, but rather defend predestination without any foreseen merits as the doctrine of the Scriptures « more laboriously and diligently », is most certain, and the more prudent of the adversaries themselves could not deny it.

The explicit opinions of many of the Fathers are recited by Lessius de Praedest. sect. 2; Petavius de Deo 1. IX. c. 3; c. 16. n. 1. 2; 1. X. c. 1; de Incarnat. 1. XIII. c. 1. 6; Tricassinus de Praedest. sect. 4. p. 10, sqq.; p. 71. sqq.; Carolus Du Plessis d'Argentree in Commentario historico de Praedest. et Reprobat. (is also found in Appendice T. III. Opp. Martini Grandin Paris 1710.); Claudius Frassen in Scoto Academico T. I, who in this chapter reduced the lengthy work of Tricassinus to a compendium. See also Maffei Hist. theol. l. X. §. 2. n. 2; Kilber (Theologia Wirceburg. T. II.) de Praedest. art. 3. etc.

St Irenaeus, l. IV. cc. 39. 40. (al. c. 76.), first, against the Gnostic fiction of a twofold or threefold nature of men — some good, some evil, some intermediate — teaches that man becomes good through the grace of God, with which he himself cooperates freely, and becomes evil by resisting the grace of God. « If you are a work of God, await the hand of your craftsman... offer him your heart soft and pliable, and keep the form in which the craftsman formed you.... But if, hardened, you reject his art and become ungrateful toward him... you have lost both his art and your life... Therefore the art of God is not lacking... but he who does not obtain it is the cause of his own imperfection... nor will God compel him who is unwilling to hold his art. » Now by these two orders of men not only will different dwellings be assigned in the judgment according to the diversity of merits, but God also, in his foreknowledge of the good and the evil, predestined those dwellings. For Irenaeus continues at once: « But God, foreknowing all things, has prepared fitting dwellings for both, » namely of light or of darkness.

I shall say nothing of Origen, since perhaps his authority is held in contempt on this question. Moreover, he evidently agrees with the other Fathers in many places as to predestination to later graces and to glory (concerning predestination to the first grace he speaks scarcely more difficultly than some other Fathers, and it can be explained in a Catholic sense). See, for example, the commentary on Rom. I., both as it is in the translation of Rufinus and as those who copied it into the Philocalia (c. 25) described it. Gregory Nazianzen and Basil, who therefore themselves also by their own authority uphold the same doctrine (Opp. Origenis ed. de la Rue T. IV. p. 462. 463.).

Epiphanius, Haeres. LXIX. n. 58., explains with the other Fathers in this sense Matth. XX. 23: « It is not mine to give you; but if you labour, it will be prepared for you by my Father. » Cyril of Alexandria (Thesaur. T. V. P. I. p. 243.) interprets this passage of Matthew by the same opinion even more clearly. « It is not mine to give you; not because he could not confer it, but because the rewards must correspond in proportion to the labours of those who contend. » He then compares God with the presiding official of the games, who proposes prizes to all who will be victors, and concludes: « thus the Saviour judged it unfair to confer promptly the highest honour on those who ask... for it is more fitting that it be granted to those for whom the foreknowledge of the Father has prepared this on account of the excellence of their virtues. »

Chrysostom discusses this eternal predestination according to foreseen merits frequently and explicitly, so as to leave no room for doubt. Among other things he explains thus the sentence of the judge, Matth. XXV. 34: « Possess as your own inheritance, as paternal and yours, owed to you from of old; for before you existed, these things were prepared for you and predisposed, because I foreknew that you would be such » Homil. 79. al. 80. n. 2. in Matth. He teaches the same thing on purpose and most clearly in other places. « In charity he predestined us: not from labours and right actions does this come about, but from (God's) charity, neither from charity alone but also from our virtue; for if from charity alone, all would have to be saved⁵. But if again from our virtue alone, his coming and all things administered through him (the economy of grace) would have been in vain. But neither from charity alone nor from our virtue, but from both » in Ephes. hom. I. n. 2. See also in Rom. hom. XV. XVI. etc. The other Greek Fathers agree with Chrysostom: Theodoret, Oecumenius, Theophylact. This is the commentary of Theodoret on Rom. VIII. 29. 30: « For whom he foreknew and predestined... He did not predestine simply; but, since he had foreknown, he predestined... Whose purpose⁶⁷ he foreknew, these he predestined from the beginning, and those predestined he also called. » Among the Latins the first to be heard is St Hilary, In Ps. 64. n. 5: « Many are called, but few are chosen... Thus election is not a thing of indiscriminate judgment, but a discrimination made by a choice of merit. Blessed therefore is the one whom God has chosen, blessed on account of this, because he is worthy of election. But we ought to know for what this blessed one was chosen, namely for what follows: he shall dwell in your tabernacles. »

Ambrose (de fide, l. V. n. 83.) explains the words of Christ, Matt. XX. 23, in the same way as Epiphanius and Cyril: « For whom it is prepared: that (Christ) might show that the Father also is not wont to confer rewards on account of petitions, but on account of merits… Whence the Apostle also says: whom he foreknew and predestined (Rom. VIII. 29.); for he did not predestine before he foreknew, but those whose merits he foreknew, their rewards he predestined. »

On this other passage, Rom. VIII. 29, the author of the commentary on the Epistles of Paul, which is printed among the works of St Ambrose along with several other Fathers, expressed the same opinion. «Those whom he foreknew would be devoted to him, these he chose to lay hold of the promised rewards.»

How certain this matter was to St Jerome beyond all controversy, one will understand even by reading his reply alone to question 10 of Hedibia, letter 120, where the holy Doctor, explaining the difficult texts from Rom. IX, declares that everything the Apostle says about the election between Jacob and Esau, and about the vessels of mercy and of contumely, is to be understood of election by preceding causes on the part of men, in election just as in execution. « He does not save irrationally and without the truth of judgment, but by preceding causes, because some did not receive the Son of God, while others (aided by grace) were willing of their own accord to receive him… From this it is shown that not nations are chosen, but the wills of men. »

As for Augustine's own disciples, the things to be recalled first are those we adduced above from St Prosper, th. LV. n. II. 4°. Most eloquently St Fulgentius distinguishes the gratuitous predestination of grace from the predestination to glory, which, considered in itself, proceeds from the merits of grace and is therefore according to justice. « To this predestination belong both the gratuitous justification of the Redeemer and the just recompense of the judge; to this predestination belongs the mercy which Paul obtained, that he might be faithful; and the crown of justice which the Lord, the just judge, will render to him on that day, and not to Paul only, but to all who love his coming… to whom, by mercy he prepared the gratuitous gift of justification, so by justice he prepared the eternal⁸ reward of justification » de Veritat. Praedestin. c. 5. He expresses the preparation of the reward through justice in the same way in another place, I. I. c. 24, to Monimus: « Therefore God, about to show what he had foreseen was to be repaid and what was to be given⁹, predestined to punishment those whom he foreknew would depart by the vice of an evil will; and he predestined to the kingdom those whom he foreknew would return by the aid of prevenient mercy, and who would remain in him by the aid of subsequent mercy. » See Alticotium, Summa Augustiniana T. VI. quaest. 2. a. 4. n. 12. sqq.

You will find the theologians who defend the opinion demonstrated so far—not indeed all of them, but a long enough series, drawn from various schools—in Card. Toletum, in 1. q. 23. a. 5. conclus. 2; in Vasquez, 1. P. disp. 89. c. 2; in Lessium, de Praedest. sect. 2. n. 8; after them in Peter of the Counts of the Order of St Augustine, de Praedestin. et Reprobat. disp. III. a. 9; and in Cardinal Sfondrati at the end of his work: « The Knot of Predestination Untied. » To these, many others could be added from the older authors and very many from the more recent, so that the demands of those who seek the authority of the Schools are fully satisfied. The more learned and prudent among the adversaries themselves, who most fiercely defend predestination before foreseen merits, having gathered reasons from every side, are nonetheless compelled to admit that our opinion is « truly probable » (see Suarez, Opusc. de Auxil. 1. III. c. 16. n. 8.).

To take a specimen of the opinion of the Scholastics, let Toledo be heard, l. c. After he has, to prove predestination to glory « on account of foreseen good (merits) » (a rather unfortunate selection, I confess)¹⁰ brought forward the testimonies of the Fathers, he proceeds to examine the opinions of the older Scholastics. « You will say: the Scholastics all adhere to Augustine.¹¹ Attend, for the love of God, lest you be deceived. St Thomas and Scotus¹² and Durandus are of this opinion; the common opinion is against it, as many do not notice. First of all, this opinion (predestination after foreseen merits) is that of Alexander of Hales, I. q. 28; of Albert the Great; of Henry, in Summ. q. 4. a. 9; q. 5. a. 5; quodlibet 4. q. 18; and of Bonaventure, 1. dist. 41. q. 2., who says that predestination is on account of works, although it is uncertain to men on account of which works our God does this. The same Gabriel, d. 41. q. 1., who holds that some predestination is by the will of God alone, as of the Blessed Virgin and the Apostles, and of others on account of good works. The same Ockham with the school of the Nominalists; the same Thomas Argentinas, d. 41. q. 1. See for yourself whether these do not make a common opinion with the others, whom I had no leisure to see. In their name I shall recite the words of Albert, who speaks thus (1. dist. 40. a. 11; cf. Summ. P. I. Tract. XVI. q. 63. m.2.): There are two things in predestination: the foreknowledge of those to be saved, and the will to save so many. This will of God regards something in our work, since he wills that as many be saved as will use well the grace to be given by him, and no more; and if more were to use that grace well, then from eternity he would have willed more. Thus Albert. » It has pleased me to recite these very words of Toledo, whose warning—that no one should think the opinion defended by him and by us was less frequent among the older theologians—was perhaps more necessary as the sixteenth century was declining; but for some it will not be useless even in our own age.