Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam

Predestination of grace, and predestination considered completely according to all its effects taken together, is not from the foreseeing of merit.¹

This thesis is deduced from what precedes, as a corollary; and, the Catholic doctrine of the gratuitous gift of grace being presupposed, it cannot be called into doubt, as is easily proved by declaring the sense of the statement.

1°. When it is denied that any merit of the whole of predestination is on the part of the predestined, it is said that for all the effects to which predestination refers, taken together, no merit can precede, from whose foreseeing the subsequent predestined gifts were, and on which therefore that whole series of gifts depends. For that merit would have to be outside the series of predestined effects; for if it were itself in this series, surely, since it cannot be the meritorious cause of itself, it would no longer be the meritorious cause of the whole series. But outside the series of predestined effects, as predestination is understood by Augustine and the other Fathers according to the doctrine of Scripture, as a preparation of supernatural gifts leading to salvation, there can be no supernatural merit whatever. Therefore it would have to be affirmed that merit is something acquired by natural powers, to which first supernatural grace is rendered. But this is the very error that Augustine first attacked in the Massilians, and that the Church afterwards often condemned in the definitions of the Council of Orange and the decrees of the Popes. For those erring men thought that free power of salvation would be denied to us, unless merit, which depends solely on our natural powers, could begin the way of salvation; therefore they attacked this account of predestination. And because in turn Augustine saw that, with this gratuitous predestination denied, grace such as is preached in the Scriptures would be denied, namely grace that is not the wage of natural works, therefore the holy Doctor insisted most diligently on this predestination. « For either, he says, predestination must be preached, as holy Scripture evidently speaks of it... or it must be confessed that the grace of God is given according to our merits, which savours of the Pelagians » de Don. persever. n. 41. For this reason he says he was compelled to the declaration of predestination. « For what compelled the passages of Scripture, by which predestination is commended, to be defended more copiously² and more clearly in this our labour, except that the Pelagians say that the grace of God is given according to our merits » ibid. n. 53; cf. n. 42. Finally he says that this gratuitous predestination pertains entirely to revealed faith, because its preaching is nothing other than the preaching of gratuitous grace. « I know that no one could dispute against that predestination which we defend according to the holy Scriptures, except by erring. Yet I think that the holy Cyprian and Ambrose.... ought to suffice for them, that they should believe and preach the gratuitous grace of God in all things, and in all things » ibid. n. 48.

2°. As predestination purely gratuitous is preached with respect to the first grace, so the reason of that gratuity extends to the whole series, insofar as every subsequent merit is founded on grace. « Whoever, therefore, have been distinguished from that original damnation by this largess of divine grace (considered as a complete distinction); there is no doubt that the gospel is procured for them to be heard, and when they hear they believe, and in faith which works through love they persevere to the end.... truly they also are elect by election, as has been said, of grace, not of their preceding merits, because grace is to them every merit » de Corrept. et grat. n. 13.

Yet merit, which is acquired through grace and by grace, is certainly not denied to be true merit. Therefore, with the first supernatural grace already supposed, a man can obtain by congruous merit further and more abundant graces, which would not be granted without an antecedent impetration; and for that very reason they are predestined only under the foresight of the merit of impetration. When therefore predestination to grace is called gratuitous, this is to be understood for the same reason for which the conferring of grace is gratuitous. Grace, namely, is predestined from no foreseen merit of nature, and so the predestination of the first grace precedes every merit whatsoever; yet manifold graces can be, and are, predestined from foreseen supernatural merits, and the justification of adults is never predestined except from foreseen supernatural congruous dispositions. « Nor is the remission of sins itself without some merit, if faith obtains it. For there is no lack of merit in faith, by which that man said: God, be propitious to me, a sinner.... It remains, therefore, that we attribute to faith itself (and to the beginning of faith), whence all righteousness takes its beginning... not to the human free choice which these men extol, nor to any preceding merits... but that we confess it to be the gratuitous gift of God, if we think of true grace, that is, without merits... Wherefore let no one exalt himself even on the merit of his own prayer; for even if help is given to the one praying, to conquer desires and to love the eternal goods and God himself, it is faith that prays, which is given to one not praying... Hence eternal life itself, which indeed will be had in the end without end, and which is therefore rendered to preceding merits, yet because the very merits by which it is rendered are not prepared by us through our own sufficiency, but are wrought in us through grace, even eternal life itself is called grace (Rom. VI. 23.); for no other reason than that it is given gratis, and not therefore because it is not given to merits³, but because the merits themselves by which it is given are also given » August. ad Sixt.ep.194. n.9.10. « The good will of man precedes many gifts of God (by which it asks and wills to receive divine grace), but not all; and those which it does not precede, it itself is among them... For why are we admonished to pray for our enemies (unbelievers), who in any case are unwilling to live piously, unless that God may work in them even the willing (the beginning of good will); and likewise why are we admonished to ask, that we may receive, unless that by him may be done what we will (the further progress of grace), by whom it has been done that we will? » Enchir. c. 32. See also ep. 186. n. 10. ad Paulinum; in Io. tract. III. n. 9. etc.

Hence, according to the principles demonstrated in the preceding thesis, further graces, when in their execution they are conferred on account of supernatural merits, whether condign, congruous, or of impetration, must in the same way be judged to have been prepared and predestined only on the supposition of the foreseeing of these antecedent supernatural goods. Hence, as for example Augustine says: « this gift of God (of perseverance) can be merited by supplication; » so too he infers: « it is clear that God gives some things even to those not praying, such as the beginning of faith; others he has prepared only for those praying, such as perseverance to the end » (of adults) de Don. persev. n. 10. 39.

St Thomas has clearly set out this order of gratuitous predestination, which varies with the diversity of the gratuitous gifts. « Our operation stands in different relation to the twofold effect of predestination (grace and glory): for a meritorious work informed by (sanctifying) grace is the meritorious cause of glory; but a good (supernatural) work preceding (sanctifying) grace is not the meritorious cause of that grace, but only a certain disposition. Hence it is plain that predestination, as a divine act in itself, has no cause; but it has a reason on the part of the effect, according to which it is called rational and just... It is to be understood that predestination with respect to the ultimate effect has the character of distributive justice, namely with respect to glory: and therefore we can say that God gives glory to this one and not to that one, because this one has merited and that one has not; and likewise he wills that this one should have it and not that one, because this one is worthy and that one is not⁴. But with respect to the first effect, namely grace, has (predestination) the character of liberality rather than justice, because grace is given gratis and is not rendered for merits (namely not for condign merits, if the discussion is of the first sanctifying grace; for no merits at all, if it concerns the first actual grace).

Hence, on the part of the recipient, no cause can be assigned why he is worthy of grace; there is only a certain disposition (toward sanctifying grace)... In the understanding (therefore) of predestination the consequent will is included, which regards works⁵, not as a cause of the will (taken in itself), but as the meritorious cause of glory and as the preparation for grace » St Thomas, 1. dist. 41. a. 3.

Likewise St Bonaventure first distinguishes in predestination the substantial act itself, which is the divine essence, and the connoted effect to be conferred outside God. « When it is asked whether the eternal purpose or election in God has a motive reason, this is not understood with respect to the divine will or its act, which is God; but with respect to the ordering of the thing willed to his will. » Bonaventure puts the same distinction in other words, between the eternal act and the temporal connotatum. « Some name signifies purely eternal, as the name God; but some name signifies eternal by connoting the temporal.... as when one says: God preserves this thing; to preserve signifies the essence by connoting an effect in act; therefore it begins and ceases to preserve. » When therefore Bonaventure says that eternal does not fall under merit, it must be understood of what is purely eternal, that is, of the substantial act itself, and not of the act together with its connoted term or relation to what is outside. With these things premised, one understands the response of the Seraphic Doctor to the question « whether predestination or reprobation have a meritorious cause in us? » The response is this. « In predestination three things are understood: the first is the eternal purpose (substantial act), the second is temporal gratification (the prior term), and the third is eternal glory (the other term). Similarly in reprobation three things are understood, namely eternal hatred (substantial act), temporal hardening, and eternal damnation (the signified terms). As to the first and the last the same is to be judged; for the last, namely punishment and glory, simply fall under merit. The first, however, namely the purpose, precisely because it is eternal (namely insofar as it is purely eternal and the divine essence, abstraction made from the connoted terms; otherwise it would be absurd both generally and specifically with respect to eternal hatred), cannot have merit. But as to the middle, which is gratification and hardening, it is to be judged differently; for hardening simply falls under demerit or evil merit, but gratification neither simply under merit nor simply outside it. For there is merit of congruity, of worthiness, and of condignity. Merit of congruity is when the sinner (by the help of actual grace) does what is in him and for himself; merit of worthiness, when the just man acts for another; merit of condignity, when the just man acts for himself. Therefore it must be answered to the question whether predestination and reprobation fall under merit, that, speaking simply as to the principal signification (as to the divine act in itself), neither falls under merit; but as to the connoted term, reprobation falls under merit simply, predestination however in a certain respect » (simply and by condign merit as to glory, by congruous merit as to gratification or sanctifying grace, given however the actual grace, which the first cannot be except purely gratuitous) 1. dist. 41. q. 1. See also ibidem q. 2.

Thus it is clear that both St Thomas and St Bonaventure teach that all the gifts following the first grace are predestined for the same reason, from foreseen congruous or condign merits, just as they are conferred in time; and from the manner in which the gifts stand in the very conferring, they conclude to the order in which the same gifts are disposed in predestination.

3°. As regards meriting or obtaining predestination for another, it must first of all be certain and settled that the merits of Christ the Redeemer are the meritorious cause of all the effects of predestination, and therefore of the predestination of all the predestined men, Eph. I. 4-11; 2. Tim. I. 9. etc. Given this universal meritorious cause, some can obtain manifold graces for others, and contribute something toward obtaining them as instruments and co-workers of God. Graces, moreover, which are given on account of the impetration or the cooperation of others, are predestined in the same way. « If some are not yet called (so that they would follow), let us pray for them that they may be called. For perhaps they have been predestined in such a way that they are granted to our prayers, and receive the same grace by which they will and become elect » Aug. de Dono persev. n. 60.

Here, however, this can be considered in a twofold way. The first is that the series of effects of predestination be reckoned only in the graces and gifts intrinsic to the predestined man. In this way nothing hinders one man from obtaining for another the first effect of the whole series. So St Thomas seems to have spoken, 1. dist. 41. a. 4: « The effect of predestination has help in the way by which it also has its cause... as someone by praying for another merits for him (by impetration) the first grace, or also by persuading him to good; whence it is said, 1. Cor. III. 9: For we are God's co-workers... For if Stephen had not prayed for his persecutors, perhaps Paul would not have been saved; just as if someone did not perform meritorious works, he would not receive the crown which has been predestined for him. Nor, however, can predestination be frustrated, because it is foreknown by God that this one will be saved by such a cause and in such an order. » In the same way, to the objection drawn from the eternity of predestination, the Angelic Doctor replies: « predestination presupposes foreknowledge of future things; and therefore, just as God predestines the salvation of some man to be accomplished through the prayers of others, so also he predestined the work of the Incarnation for the remission of sin » 3. q. 1. a. 3. ad 4.

In another way predestination can be viewed more broadly: given the universal cause of the merits of Christ, all the graces ordained to his salvation, even those extrinsic to the predestined man, are reckoned into one series of predestination. Thus it is plain that even the prayers of Stephen, for example, lie under the predestination of Paul as an effect. St Thomas follows this way, 1. q. 23. a. 8; and de verit. q. 6. a. 6. But as Gregory of Valentia observes (on this passage, punct. 4, §. 1, « sexto certum est » etc.), the difference lies only in the manner of considering and speaking.

4°. It should be noted that in the thesis, according to the doctrine of the Scriptures and the Fathers, the discussion concerns the meritorious cause, when we say that there is no cause of the whole predestination on the part of the predestined. Hence the difficulty drawn from this is excluded, namely that grace has no effect unless man cooperates freely. For this cooperation does not have the character of merit to which that grace is attributed, whose fruit is the cooperation itself.

Moreover, from this liberty of accepting grace in vain or not accepting it in vain, it does follow that it was in the free power of him who resisted accepted grace to cooperate with it and to obtain further graces, and by using them rightly to attain justification and to persevere in righteousness through grace; and so he would have been predestined. Conversely, it follows that he who persevered to the end could also, by resisting grace with his evil will, not have persevered, and so not have been predestined. But it does not follow that the effect of predestination lies in the power of a bare free will left to its natural powers, nor is it in any way in man's power to begin the way of salvation, since grace necessarily precedes every beginning which would come from us, and itself confers the very power of beginning the way of salvation. Hence the first effect of predestination in no way has the character on the part of the predestined man himself: for the first effect is not the consent itself, which indeed belongs to free will elevated by grace; but the first effect predestined by God is the prevenient grace itself, under which the future consent is foreseen.

« For although a man may ascribe to himself (not from natural powers, but to himself furnished already with the powers of grace) that he obeys the one calling him, no one can ascribe to himself that he has been called » Aug. Expos. inch. in Rom. n. 7. On the contrary, the reason and cause why grace, once granted and resisted by man, does not belong to the order of predestination, but to common providence only, lies in the free will of the man who resists. I have said that the reason lies in the free will of man why this grace, granted, does not belong to the order of predestination; yet it cannot be said that it depends on the free will of man that God should bestow another calling and prevenient grace, especially the first, which he foresees will be efficacious, if the man is unwilling to use the grace offered and given.

When therefore it is asked whether predestination lies in the free power of man, the sense can be twofold. The first, which the words themselves suggest and which theologians are accustomed to adopt, is this: whether it lies in the free power of man, left to his natural powers, to do something so that he may be predestined? which is the same as asking whether man can merit the first grace by the powers of free will? In this sense the Semipelagians answered affirmatively; all Catholics answer in the negative; indeed, Augustine located the whole weight of his disputation on predestination in this one point, namely in the necessity and the gratuity of grace. « Let them see that by this preaching of predestination that one most pernicious error alone is overthrown, by which it is said that the grace of God is given according to our merits » de Dono persev. n. 42.

The other sense, which the faithful for the most part understand by that question, is this: whether, given prevenient grace, it lies in the power of man to attain justification and to persevere in it to the end by cooperating with grace, and so to be predestined? In this sense, that it is in man's power to complete his predestination — not by natural powers but by a thing made ready through grace, and restored to liberty for supernatural operations — cannot be denied without contradicting the most certain principles in theology. St Peter admonishes, 2. Pet. I. 10: « Labour the more to make your calling and election sure (βεβαιαν firmam) » (which calling and election, namely, is already begun through the grace of faith). In the Council of Arausicanum II, can. 15, it is declared: « We believe also, according to the Catholic faith, that, grace having been received through baptism, all the baptized, with Christ helping and cooperating, can and ought to fulfil those things that pertain to salvation, if they are willing to labour faithfully. But that some are predestined by divine power to evil we not only do not believe, but also, if there are some who wish to believe so great an evil, we say to them, with all detestation, anathema. »

The Council of Trent, where it condemns the heresy teaching that the commandments of God are impossible to observe even for the just, adds the reason: « For God does not forsake those once justified by his grace, unless they first be forsaken by them; » and a little after, treating of the gift of perseverance: « God, unless they themselves fail that grace, as he began the good work, so will he complete it, working in them both to will and to accomplish » Sess. VI. cc. 11. 13. This second passage manifestly shows the false interpretation of those who explain that former saying, « God does not forsake, unless he is first forsaken, » with Gonet (de Reprob. disp. V. n. 54.), as though it only denied desertion by the withdrawal of habitual grace⁶. The teaching of St Augustine is brought back to the same sense. « All the less will they free themselves (from damnation) who are going to say: we have not received perseverance... since it can be said: man, in what you have heard and held, you would persevere, if you willed » de Correpl. et grat. n. 11.

« Let us understand by the right hand (Ps. 120. 5.) the power that God has given you, so that, if you will, by God's gift you may be at the right hand. For all the wicked will be at the left, and all the sons of good will be at the right, to whom it will be said: come, blessed of my Father..... But that you may be at the right hand, you have received the power, of which John says: he gave them power to become sons of God. Whence have you received this power? By believing, he says, in his name. If therefore you believe, the power itself has been given you, that you may be among the sons of God; but to be among the sons of God, this is to belong at the right hand.... But what avails the very power that man has received, unless the Lord protect?... He, therefore, who does not allow us to be tempted above what we can bear (1 Cor. X. 13.), although we are already faithful, God protects us » Id. in Ps. 120. n. 11. « Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated... Esau are all the carnal, Jacob all the spiritual; the lesser are the elect, the greater are those rejected. Does he wish to be chosen? Let him become the lesser » Id. in Ps. 136. n. 18; cf. in Ps. 46. n. 6.

The saying which is at times ascribed to Augustine, although it does not occur in these words in him, has a basis in such sayings: « if you are not predestined, make yourself predestined. » Many theologians are wont to censure it, because they think it can have no other sense than either this: if you have not yet received grace, do something by your own powers by which you may receive grace; or this other: if you are not going to cooperate with grace, nevertheless cooperate. The former certainly cannot be said; the other, they say, is absurd. But Catholics who use that saying attribute to it no other sense than this: through the grace of God, which is not lacking to you, do those things, foreseen by which you will be predestined. If you are a sinner, return to justice; if you are just, remain in holiness and do not sin any more. In accord with this sense there follows that sentence from the explicit teaching of St Prosper, in his replies to the Capitula « calumniantium Gallorum », to the Excerpta Genuensium, and to the Obiectiones Vincentianas: « They did not have the necessity of perishing because they were not predestined; but they are not predestined because they were foreknown as going to be such through voluntary prevarication... For they were not abandoned by God so that they would abandon God; but they abandoned, and were abandoned, and by their own will were changed from good to evil: and on this account... they were not predestined by him who foreknew them such » ad cap. III. Gall. Likewise: « because they were foreknown as going to fall, they were not predestined; but they would have been predestined, if they were going to return and remain in holiness » ad Obiect. Vincent. XII.

Potest ergo dici: he who is reprobate in the foreknowledge of God can cooperate with grace in such a way that God's will to confer grace on him would be predestination; and by that very fact, in the foreknowledge of God, he would not be reprobate but predestined. Likewise, he who is predestined in the foreknowledge of God can finally sin in such a way that God's will to confer grace on him would not be predestination; and so in the foreknowledge of God he would no longer be predestined but reprobate. In other words: the predestined man, not indeed in the composite sense, but nevertheless in the divided sense, can be damned; and the division depends on free will, by which he can finally sin: the reprobate, not indeed in the composite sense, but in the divided sense, can be saved; and the division depends not on free will according to its natural powers, but on one instructed and elevated by the helps of grace. This, however, does not signify a power of changing predestination or reprobation: but it signifies a power, through the help of grace, of doing that, given which reprobation would never have been; and a power of committing the sin, given which predestination would never have been completed. Yet once predestination has been completed, consequently upon the foreseen free acts of grace, or conversely once reprobation has been supposed, consequently upon the foreseen final sin, predestination and damnation certainly cannot be joined together, nor conversely reprobation and salvation; but this impossibility is not antecedent but consequent, inasmuch as we cannot at the same time cooperate and not cooperate, sin finally and not sin. St Thomas objects to himself: « since the effect of predestination is fulfilled by the motions of free will, which are meritorious works, » it seems that predestination has no certainty. » In his reply, supposing as certain that the effect is fulfilled by the motions of free will, he declares the ground of certainty: « a contingent future, that the motion of free will, although it is not determined in its cause, is nevertheless determined in its being, insofar as it is actual (that is, a second free act is something determined in itself); and so it is subject to the certainty of foreknowledge » 1. dist. 40. q. 3. ad 4. Likewise: « this predestined one can be considered either as in himself or as related to divine knowledge: and so in one way (as in himself) it is attributed to him that he can be damned; in another way not » (namely as, with all his supposed acts, he is subject to divine knowledge) Quodlib. XII. a. 3. ad 2. (See above thesis XLIV.).

That saying, therefore: « if you are not predestined, make yourself predestined, » has some sense not discordant from sound doctrine; it is nonetheless ambiguous and therefore in need of explanation. Cf. de Valentia in 1. q. 23. punct. 4. §. 8; Lessium de Praed. sect. 6. n. 154. sqq.; Maeratium disp. 38. ad finem.

A corollary following from all that has been said, of the highest importance not only for theoretical doctrine but much more for practical life. In the order of execution we can indeed by our own evil will fall away from the good will of God, and so the sins are ours; but we can neither will nor accomplish anything saving except through grace offered and given to the unworthy by the sole mercy of God, who works in us so that we both will freely and accomplish the good on the way of salvation. « Men make their own will, not God's, when they do what displeases God; but when they so act as to do what they will, that they serve the divine will, although they act willingly (freely) in what they do, it is nonetheless his will, by whom what they will is prepared and commanded » Conc.

Araus. can. 23. Now indeed, just as among all Catholics these principles are certain and settled in the order of execution: so also in the order of predestination, in exactly the same way, that someone is not predestined and by that very fact reprobate, is the fault of man; that someone is predestined, whether to a saving work or completely to the whole series of gifts up to eternal life, is the grace of God, who, with no preceding evil merits but with preceding good merits⁷, predestines in his foreknowledge both first grace and subsequent graces, which he foresees will be joined with their effect in the free operation of man; and in these graces the great gift of perseverance; and eternal life itself, as grace for grace⁸: «and so the predestination of God is a cause of standing for many (all the predestined); it is a cause of falling for no one » S. Prosper ad Obiect. Vincent. XII.

Just as in the order of execution the difficulty arises, « that when free will is defended, the grace of God seems to be denied; but when the grace of God is asserted, free will is thought to be taken away » (Aug. de grat. Christi c. 47.), so in exactly the same way there is the same reason between predestination and foreseen free merit. Therefore, just as in the order of execution the whole saving good and no evil is to be referred to the grace of God — not, however, in such a way that either God's antecedent will to give all men truly sufficient grace, or man's liberty, is taken away — so in exactly the same way in the order of predestination the whole saving good and no evil must be referred to the predestination of God — not, however, in such a way that God's antecedent will to save all men, or man's liberty to attain salvation through the grace of God, is denied or twisted into an alien sense. Those who defend predestination absolute before all foreseeing of works on the part of the created will keep before their eyes almost only the former truth, and they defend it indeed laudably; but they can very hardly reconcile the other with that former one. Both points pertain to the very foundations of Christian doctrine and life: namely, on the one hand, our total dependence in the way of salvation on the grace and mercy of God; on the other, the universality of the antecedent will that all men be saved, and the universality of the redemption and restoration of all men to the possibility of salvation. The holy Fathers reconcile the one truth with the other; but it is not right to defend the one in such a way that the other is denied or called into question.

ARTICLE III.

On predestination to glory considered by itself and separately.