Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam

The gifts of God have in predestination the order which they have in execution.

« Concerning the order in which the gifts of God succeed one another in preparation and in predestination, it can be laid down in general from the doctrine of the Fathers that the benefits of God stand in predestination in the same relation to foreseen merit as these same benefits, in their collation and in their very donation, stand to acquired merit: therefore those gifts of God which are conferred in time by sheer gratuity are in the same way predestined from eternity, independently of the foreseeing of any merit; but those which in execution are rewarded for preceding merits, these too are decreed in eternal predestination not without the presupposed foreseeing of those same merits.

Just as every operation ad extra is, so also predestination in God is the divine intellect itself and the divine will itself, with a connotation of the terms to which it is referred, that is, of the effects which are in the creature. When therefore it is asked whether there is, or what is, the meritorious cause of predestination, there cannot be question of a meritorious cause of the divine act in itself, which in reality is the very essence of God (cf. supra p. 306–311.); but the question is of merit quoad effectus, that is, with respect to the effects which are connoted under the name of predestination. But by the very fact that someone merits the effect connoted by predestination, he also merits that God should will this effect; or he merits not indeed the divine will, but that the divine will should be referred to such a good to be conferred upon him.¹ Thus Christ the Saviour, meriting grace for us, undoubtedly merited that God should will to confer grace upon us; and the foreseen merit of Christ is the meritorious cause that God willed to give us grace from eternity, which he confers in time, and so predestined grace for us. This is what St Thomas says, 1. q. 23. a. 5: « There was no one of such insane mind as to say that merits are the cause of predestination on the part of the predestining act; but the question is whether predestination has some cause on the part of the effect. And this is to ask whether God predestined (behold, a respect of the divine will) to give the effect of predestination (grace and glory) to someone on account of some merits. » With these things supposed, we demonstrate the thesis.

Without any doubt God, from eternity, prepared those gifts which he confers in time without any preceding merits to be conferred in this way, that is, from no foreseen merits. Whoever, therefore, would universally deny that grace is predestined by God gratuitously and without any foreseen merits of ours would by that very fact teach that grace is rendered to human merits, and so is not grace but wages. Hence it is clear why, and in what sense, Augustine, chiefly in the books de Praedest. SS. and de Dono persev., finally brought the controversy against the Pelagians and Semipelagians back to the question of gratuitous predestination.

But what we affirm in the thesis is not settled by this alone. For we say not only that from a gratuitous collation in time there is necessarily inferred a gratuitous preparation in eternity; but also, in the reverse order, we affirm that from gratuitous preparation, according to the doctrine of the Fathers, one rightly concludes to a gratuitous donation in time; and therefore also that all the benefits which in time are conferred upon antecedent merits were predestined from eternity on the basis of those same foreseen merits, so that God does not confer his gifts in time, whether from merits or wholly gratuitously, in any other order than that in which he predestined them from eternity. We shall establish this chiefly from the doctrine of Augustine himself, since opponents are usually moved almost only by it; the agreement of the other Fathers with this principle will be demonstrated below, where we shall treat of predestination to glory, and it is in itself so clear that it cannot be called into doubt.

1°. According to Augustine, the predestination of any gifts whatever, and their collation, or their very execution already under way, differ only as one act of the divine will considered in eternity with a connotation of the future work of grace, and the same act with a connotation of the same work of grace which is now being effected in the present. But it is evident that the same work lies under the divine will from eternity in no other order than when the work itself is now effected and begins to exist. Therefore Augustine, and whoever holds the same idea of predestination as Augustine sets forth in his books, necessarily holds that the order of predestination and of execution is not inverted but plainly one and the same.

The major premise of this argument is easily demonstrated from the very definitions of Augustine described in the preceding thesis. « Between grace, moreover, he says, and predestination there is only this difference: that predestination is the preparation of grace, whereas grace is already the donation itself... For the predestination of God which is in good is, as I have said, the preparation of grace; but grace is the effect of predestination itself. » Praedest. SS. n. 19. Augustine here distinguishes three things: the divine act with a connotation of the collation of grace as future; this is predestination. Next, the divine act with a connotation of collation in the present; this is donation, and the present beneficence, or the grace of God effecting inherent grace and the gift in the soul. Lastly, this very gift, which is the effect of predestination and of donation. Similar definitions occur throughout both books de Praedest. SS. and de Dono persev. Now, if according to Augustine predestination and donation itself differ only by the connotation of future and present in one and the same effect, then, surely, where the donation does not give the present effect except on account of merit, predestination too does not will the same effect except on account of foreseen merit; for predestination and donation are one effective will referred to one and the same effect, so that, according to the doctrine of Augustine, the distinction holds solely on the side of the time at which the effect exists; not on the side of the mode and order in which God wills the effect. This opinion of the holy Doctor was expressed by St Fulgentius, ad Monim. l. I. c. 7. « Both (the beginning and the progress of justice) God prepared by predestining them in that unchangeable will, in which he so disposed the future effect of renewing man, that his will cannot be new in the new work. »

2°. Both Augustine and the Massilians agree that God confers in time, without any preceding merit, those things which he predestined without any foreseen merit; and, conversely, that those things which he confers in time on account of any merit he predestined only with that merit foreseen. The Massilians taught that the beginning of faith is from our own powers, and agreed that the remaining virtues are afterwards given by God, faith obtaining them. From this doctrine Augustine chiefly concludes that even those very erring men, by the sole fact that they say the remaining virtues are gifts of God, concede that these virtues are predestined by God; nor does he require anything else from the adversaries than that they confess the beginning of faith also to be given by God, with no antecedent obtaining on the part of the unbelievers themselves; this admitted, he says, the entire doctrine of predestination is preached. Hence this evident argument arises: those adversaries contended that in execution some merit of faith from the powers of nature precedes, to which grace is repaid; whence they inferred, as if necessarily following, that in predestination too, in the same order, the foreseen merit of faith precedes, and the predestination of the other gifts, which are repaid to merits, follows. Yet Augustine agrees that it is rightly preached by them that the order of predestination of those following virtues is such, namely that they are predestined on account of the foreseen merit of faith, provided they also concede that the faith which obtains them is a gift of God. Therefore Augustine manifestly agrees that what is given in execution on account of merit, that the same thing is predestined from the same foreseen merit. Indeed, the doctrine of the Massilians, as Prosper and Hilary testify in their letters to Augustine, was this: « Those who are going to believe (by the powers of their nature), God foreknew before the foundation of the world, and predestined them to his kingdom, whom... he foresaw would depart with a good end. » « They contend that foreknowledge and predestination, or purpose, avail for this: that he foreknew, or predestined, or purposed to choose those who were going to believe. » Augustine, in the books de Praed. SS. and de Dono persev., by which he answers the difficulties of the Massilians, does nothing other than demonstrate that faith and perseverance in faith are equally a gift of God as the remaining virtues; so that, just as the adversaries cannot deny that these are predestined by God, faith obtaining them, so the predestination of faith itself, with no merit preceding, cannot be denied, nor that of perseverance, which we could merit by supplication. « Still, he says, those brothers are in a fog about the predestination of the saints.... But they have come to confess that men's wills are prevented by the grace of God, and agree that no one is able to begin or to complete any good work by himself. Retaining therefore those things, to which they have come, they distinguish themselves greatly from the error of the Pelagians » Praed. SS. n. 2. He concludes the whole book in these words: « they confess also that the beginning of faith, like continence, patience, justice, piety, and the rest, about which there is no contention with these, is a gift of God. » The difference, therefore, between the Catholic doctrine of Augustine and the error of the Massilians is this: that the latter contended that the remaining virtues and the kingdom of heaven itself are given by God with faith preceding, which is from the powers of nature, and therefore also that the graces and gifts are predestined from the natural foreknowledge of this faith; Augustine, on the contrary, taught that faith itself, by which they are obtained, is a gift of God, as is supernatural grace; and therefore he agreed that faith itself is predestined and given with no foreseen merits, and the rest with the preceding supernatural merit of faith, so that « there should be no contention about these things. »

In exactly the same way as Augustine declares what in the opinion of the Massilians is to be approved and what is to be disapproved, he also partly approves and partly retracts as erroneous his own opinion, which he held before taking up the episcopate. The opinion was this: « God predestines no one except him whom he foreknew would believe and would follow his calling, whom also he calls elect..... In those whom God has chosen, not works but faith begins the merit » Aug. Propos. in ep. Rom. n. 55. 62. He therefore thought, as the Massilians later did, that in execution faith precedes from the natural powers of free will, and that grace is repaid to this faith; and that this order itself was, without controversy, the order in predestination. Indeed he by no means disapproves the opinion of the identity of order in predestination and in execution, when he retracts his own doctrine (Retract. 1. I. c. 23. n. 3.); but he merely warns that it must be added that faith itself is a gift of God, and therefore predestined by God. « I said most truly, but that the merit of faith itself is also a gift of God, nor did I think it needed to be asked, nor did I say so.»

3°. Finally, Augustine declares in express words that the gifts of God are predestined in the same order in which they are conferred in execution itself. « It is agreed that God prepared some gifts to be given even to those not praying, as the beginning of faith, and others prepared only for those praying, such as perseverance to the end » de Dono persev. n. 39. Here you see that the preparation stands in the same relation as execution does; for, as he says in de Praed. SS. n. 12, « the first faith is given, from which the rest are obtained, which are properly called works. » Read ep. 194. al. 105. ad Sixtum n. 9. sqq. But concerning the gift of faith itself: « if there are some not yet called, he says, let us pray that they be called; for perhaps they are so predestined, that they may be granted by our prayers, and receive that same grace by which they will to be, and become elect » de Dono persev. n. 60.

The clearest passage is in 1. I. ad Simplic. q. 2. n. 6, which opponents have often tried to evade, by one answer after another devised, but have never been able to obscure its light. « Election, however, does not precede justification, but justification election; for no one is chosen unless already distinguished from him who is rejected. » Certainly in execution election to the reward follows justification and merits, as is most certain by faith. Now hear, however, what the holy Doctor infers from this concerning the order of predestination. « Hence what has been said, that God chose us before the foundation of the world, I do not see how it is said except by foreknowledge. » That is, by the very fact that election to the reward in execution follows merits and on account of merits, election to the reward in eternal predestination can in no way be understood except consequently upon the foreknowledge of merits. Hence he further concludes that what is said at Rom. IX. 11: « not from works but from him who calls, so that according to the election the purpose of God might remain, » cannot be understood of election and predestination to the reward; but must necessarily be understood of election to grace, which in execution, and therefore also in predestination, precedes all merit. « But here, at Rom. IX. 11, when he says: not from works but from him who calls, etc., the Apostle wished to be understood not as an election of merits, which come after justification by grace, but by the liberality of the gifts of God. » Yet let the praises be recalled with which Augustine himself commends this work, written at the beginning of his episcopate, for its doctrine of predestination and grace: Praed. SS. c.4; Don. persev. c. 21; Retract. II. c. 1. Wherefore it is altogether surprising how Bellarmine could have been content with this answer: « St Augustine, when he wrote the books to Simplicianus, was still young, and had not found much in this most difficult question, which afterwards he investigated and discovered with greater diligence » (Bellarm. de Grat. et lib. arb. 1. II. c. 15.).

4°. They agree with Augustine, who have most profited from his doctrine. Thus St Fulgentius, ad Monim. 1. I. c. 8., after saying that grace is given gratuitously to the unworthy, by which the impious man is illumined to be justified, and that grace is given also to the worthy in the reward of eternal recompense, adds: « Moreover, God as he has always had these things in predestination, so he makes them through grace, as he had predestined. » Cf. ibid. c. 12. and de Veritat. praedest. 1. III. c. 5. St Thomas, to say nothing of others, has summed up this opinion about predestination in a few words, with the clarity that is his custom; it will therefore be worth our while to hear him. « Concerning the order of foreknowledge and predestination, some say that the foreknowledge of good and evil merits is the reason of predestination and reprobation, so that it is understood that God predestines some because he foreknows that they will act well and will believe in Christ.... And this indeed would be rightly said, if predestination regarded only eternal life, which is given to merits. But under predestination falls every saving benefit which is divinely prepared for man from eternity. Hence by the same reason he prepared for us from eternity all the benefits which he confers upon us in time². Hence to posit that some merit on our part is presupposed, whose foreknowledge is the reason of predestination, is nothing other than to posit that grace is given from our merits. » St Thomas, ad Rom. VIII. lect. 6. ed. de Rubeis T. VI. p. 123.

Many things are worthy of attention in this doctrine of Aquinas, which is repeated also in other places, about which discussion will recur elsewhere. a) He declares that predestination extends as far as the saving benefits conferred in time extend. b) It is most manifest from this passage that predestination is understood by St Thomas of all benefits, as they are regarded taken as a whole, and not the predestination of this or that benefit, e.g. of glory considered in itself, whenever he teaches that predestination has no relation to foreseen merits. For thus far, he says, it is necessary to acknowledge predestination as gratuitous, insofar as grace is to be believed gratuitous; and if moreover some merits were the reason of the whole effect of predestination, it would necessarily follow that such merits are outside and before the whole series of God's supernatural gifts and of the effects of predestination, and consequently are natural merits, which savours of the Pelagians. Cf. 1. q. 23. a. 5. If on the other hand c) one single effect of predestination is considered in itself, which is conferred in execution on account of merits, such as eternal glory; then « it is rationally said, » that predestination to this effect³ is from foreseen supernatural merits, by that very fact that in execution « it is given to merits.» *d)*The foundation of the whole of this doctrine with the Angelic Doctor is that « God, by the same reason, prepared for us from eternity all the benefits which he confers on us in time. » Because, namely, by the same reason by which he confers benefits in time, he prepared those from eternity; therefore it is rationally said that he predestined glory from foreseen merits, but first grace cannot be said to have been predestined from foreseen merits without falling into the Semipelagian error.

See the doctrine established in this thesis also in Vasquez, in 1. P. disp. 82. c. 5; disp. 89 c. 9; de Valentia, in 1. q. 23. disp. I. punct. 4. §. 1. 6; Lessium, de Praed. sect. 1. n. 4; sect. 2. n. 29; Philippum Gamachaeum, in 1. q. 23. c. 6. conclus. 2. prob. 3; Tricassin. de Praedest. p. 36. 81. 200. etc.