Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam

The objects of knowledge of simple intelligence are all possible things; the secondary object of vision is chiefly all things existing independently of created liberty.

«¹The adequate object of knowledge of simple intelligence, and of what is absolutely necessary, is all possible things according to the formal reason of objective possibility; but to the secondary object of knowledge of vision, and of that which is necessary only on hypothesis, there pertain chiefly all those things which, God operating either immediately or through secondary causes, at some time really exist independently of the free acts of the created will.»

1. The statement of this proposition is required by the order of things rather than a special demonstration. For the reason why essences according to the state of possibility are called the adequate object of simple understanding, whereas contingent existences constitute not an adequate but only a partial and secondary object of vision, is manifest from theses XXXVIII. and XL.

Moreover, the truth of the former part, that all possible things, according to their natures not only specific but individual, according to all possible perfections, relations, orders, ends, actions, limits and imperfections, are perfectly comprehended by divine understanding, not by many distinct acts but by one substantial act, by which he comprehends himself²; this truth is demonstrated by all the arguments by which, in thesis XXXVII, we declared the manner in which God knows all things through his essence.

Just as, in considering the intensity of divine comprehension, by which God comprehends the primary object, namely the infinite essence, so here too, in contemplating the extension of the secondary object, our mind fails: «your knowledge is wonderful to me (above all my understanding), it is strengthened (it is high and unattainable, and so) I cannot attain it (by my understanding)»³⁴ Ps. CXXXVIII. (139.) 6. For we cannot fix the weak eyes of our mind upon infinite series, in each of which there is again an infinite variety of possibles; and so the multitude is not indeed of things actually existing, but of truths comprehended in act by one divine gaze, infinitely infinite.

Hence here there arises a question very troublesome to many, concerning infinite multitude. We cannot distinctly know singulars in any multitude except by distinct acts (attending distinctly to each, as Dionysius says). But taking the acts distinct, one after another, that is, by numbering, «the infinite cannot be traversed,» as Aristotle said; and therefore a number such as we conceive is repugnant to being infinite. For any multitude which we distinctly and definitely conceive is always a number, to which, however great it be, something is lacking; indeed an infinite multitude is lacking for the number to be infinite. When therefore we ask what the multitude is, e.g., of worlds and of orders, each of which is objectively possible, we cannot conceive it except in such a way that, for any determinate number, there is always another greater of these possibles, without the whole multitude ever being included. For this is the reason of the infinite as it is conceived by us, that «however much of it is taken, there is always something outside.» Hence we conceive distinctly only a finite number, with a confused signification of an infinite multitude, which as a whole is outside and above the number comprehended by us. But God distinctly comprehends each possible thing as it would be if it were produced, so that nothing is outside the multitude distinctly comprehended by him; otherwise ignorance, or what is nearly the same, a confused understanding, would have to be admitted in God, which is most absurd. Yet that whole multitude is plainly infinite, not certainly in the reason of perfection, as is evident, but in the reason of multitude.

For in the first place it is not a finite multitude; for there is no limit beyond which something else is not possible. Nor is it an indefinite or infinite multitude in power. For that which is infinite in power is either really something finite, having its ultimate term, to which another and another can always be added, as the multitude of really coexisting things is infinite in power; or it is something indefinite, which is conceived by the mind as confusedly greater than any determinate number, as mathematicians assume infinite quantities. But God conceives the many possibles singly, not in such a way that other and other things could be added to his concept; but he conceives all things plainly, beyond which and outside which nothing is possible: nor does he understand them confusedly as a multitude greater than any number which God himself might distinctly conceive; but rather he comprehends them all most distinctly, beyond which there is nothing that could be comprehended. Therefore, as «there is no number to his wisdom» Ps. CXLVI. 5; so of those things which he understands and comprehends singly, as they would be in themselves if they were produced, there is not a number but an extension and multitude that is infinite. «As for that other point which they make, that the knowledge of God cannot comprehend things that are infinite (and therefore the same times and the same vicissitudes of number recur always, lest there be infinite things, which not even God could comprehend), it remains for them to dare to say, and to plunge themselves into this profound whirlpool of impiety, that God does not know all numbers. For it is most certain that they are infinite..... The infinity of number, although there is no number of infinite numbers, is nevertheless not incomprehensible to him whose understanding has no number. Wherefore, if whatever is comprehended by knowledge is finished by the comprehension of the knower (that is, it is so comprehended that nothing is outside, nothing remains beyond to be comprehended); then indeed every infinity is also in some ineffable way finite to God» S. Aug. Civ. Dei XII. 18.

Among the theologians who declare and prove that the objects which God knows by knowledge at least of simple intelligence are an infinite multitude in act, not indeed of things actually existing but of things actually known, consult S. Thomas 1. q. 14. a. 12. coll. 3. q. 10. a. 8; de verit. q. 2. a. 9; cont. gent. 1. c. 69; compend. theol, c. 133; 1. dist. 39. q. 1. a. 3; Alexander Hal. 1. P. q. 23. m. 3. a. 2; S. Bonav. 1. dist. 35. q. 5; dist. 39. a. 1. q. 3; Valentia in 1. P. q. 14. puncto 6; Vasquez in 1. P. disp. 63; Suarez in 3. P. disp. 26. sect. 4; Lessius de perfect. div. 1. VI. c. 2. n. 17; Franc. de Lugo ad 1. q. 14. a. 12; Ruiz de scient. Dei disp. 20; Sfortia Pallavicinus de Deo c. 33; de Fide, Spe et Char. cc. 18. 19; Ripalda (iunior) opusc. philosoph. XI. Indeed this doctrine is that of almost all the ancient theologians.

Most theologians, however, defend the same concerning the objects of knowledge of vision. And indeed, if rational creatures exist throughout all future eternity and their acts are multiplied without end, the arguments which demonstrate that the multitude of possible essences known in act is infinite also persuade that the multitude of actual existences, as they are under the eternal eye of God, is infinite without any last term⁵. For if of those acts, of each of which it is true that they will be, none is outside the actual divine intuition, the multitude of things actually known through knowledge of vision is infinite. For the multitude of the terms of all things to be future in eternity is of such a kind that no term is last, and so on the side of what is after, as they say, or formally of things future in eternity, there is no limit, but a multitude altogether infinite, not to be closed by any number. But none of all those acts is outside the actual divine intuition. Therefore the multitude of things actually known through knowledge of vision is infinite.

But note the greatest difference between these two propositions: «the multitude of things actually known is infinite» and «the multitude of things known for some future instant is actually infinite.» The first is most true from what has been said; the second, in the successive future things of which we speak, is absurd. What God actually sees, therefore, is an infinite multitude (κατηγορηματικῶς) under the eternal intuition of God; but he does not see a multitude which in itself at some time exists as actually infinite; rather he sees it in itself always only infinite in power (συγκατηγορηματικῶς), that is, existing so that it is always finite in itself and always increases, without ever reaching an ultimate term. If therefore knowledge of vision is considered with respect to the terms which for any future instant will be past, God does not see terms which are infinite, except by the infinity of power; but if knowledge is considered with respect to future terms, which all together lie under his vision, the multitude of things known is actually infinite, not by an actuality of existence which already is, but by the actuality of being known in the eternal intuition of God (cf. th. XXXII; see Vasquez disp. 63. c. 3. ad 3ᵗᵘᵐ).

It is one thing, then, to ask whether God sees infinite things, and another to ask whether the things God sees are infinite in act or in potency (categorematically or syncategorematically). To the former question the answer, from the foundations already laid, is affirmative: God sees infinite things. As to the other question, the dispute can be one about the name rather than about the thing, as Suarez rightly observes, 1. c.⁶. For if you consider the real existence of the terms in themselves, or the series constituted of past acts, the series, as I have said, is always only syncategorematically infinite. Suarez prefers this manner of speaking, as do Gabriel Biel and others who went before him. If you consider the terms as all together known by eternal vision, they are not a series in successive knowledge but are terms categorematically infinite, all together under one simple intuition of God. So most of the disciples of St Thomas, Valentia, Vasquez, Ruiz, Ripalda, Pallavicinus and very many others speak, and rightly so, since the question is not about the multitude of existing things but about the multitude of things known. « When we ask, says Vasquez 1. c. c. 2. n. 7, whether the multitude is actually infinite, we inquire about it as it is in the intellect of God, actually understood, to which no further addition can be made, since God can know nothing else outside the whole of it; therefore, since he knows all things in act, we say that the multitude known in act is infinite in the intellect of God, not in the nature of things. »

From what has been established, against the opinion of certain more recent authors, we hold these things: a) God knows no indefinite. For this mode of knowing presupposes imperfection and ignorance. b) The infinite understanding of God cannot be compared with acts of knowing succeeding one another to infinity. For these, in actual existence, are always finite not only in perfection but also in number; from which it follows that through them one can never arrive at a multitude of things actually infinite. c) Because God intuits the whole infinite imitability of his essence, and by it knows distinctly, in one act, all possible imitations as each would be if produced, there is in the divine mind no evolution of the terms which he knows, nor can one be conceived, of which some more recent authors speak.

II. The second part, asserted in the thesis, is equally manifest from what we declared in the preceding chapter concerning the manner and perfection of divine knowledge considered in itself. And indeed, if by the divine will, whether efficacious or permissive, objects which are in themselves in the state of possibility actually exist for some difference of time; by that very fact, those things which in the prior sign lie under the divine understanding as possible, the same, in the posterior sign, lie under divine vision as existing. Therefore, in the perfect knowledge of all possibles, as they would be in themselves, there is comprehended in a certain way, as a part, if it is permitted to say so, the knowledge of existing things, as they are in themselves, which by that very fact is knowledge of vision (th. XL.).

In the Scriptures this perfection of divine vision, reaching to all things that at some time are, is proclaimed a) by general expressions. After St Job, in chapter XXVIII, has explained that wisdom is not like material treasure, which is hidden in the depths of the sea or in the bowels of the earth, he adds in vv. 23. sqq.: « God understands its way, and he knows its place; for he himself sees the ends of the world, and regards all things that are under heaven. » He adds a proof from the creation of all things, which is in the wisdom and through the wisdom of God. « He who made the weight for the winds and weighed the waters by measure. When he set the law for the rains and a way for the sounding storms; then he saw it and recounted it, and prepared and searched it out. » That is, he comprehends all wisdom in himself, and through it comprehends all works, and the whole reason of wisdom poured out over them, and manifested through them, and shining in them. b) Especially his knowledge, before which nothing is small so as to lie hidden from him, and nothing great so as to surpass him, is declared to pertain to each singular thing. « He who numbers the multitude of the stars and calls them all by name (by intimate knowledge of each)… and of his wisdom there is no number » Ps. CXLVI. 4. 5; Is. XL.26. Entirely parallel to the cited passage from the book of Job is another, Eccli. I. 1. sqq., with an explicit enumeration of those things which in Job are called « the ends of the world and all that is under heaven. » The description of Ecclesiasticus runs thus: « All wisdom is from the Lord God, and with him it has been always and is before eternity. Who has numbered the sand of the sea (graece of the seas) and the drops of rain and the days of eternity? Who has measured the height of heaven and the breadth of the earth and the depth of the abyss?... One is the most high creator, almighty... he himself created her in the Holy Spirit and saw her and numbered and measured her⁷. And he poured her out over all his works. » Thus also God is said to know « the birds of heaven, and to feed the young of ravens, and to guard the sparrows, and to clothe the lilies and the grass of the field, and to have the hairs of the head numbered » not only by speculative but chiefly by practical knowledge of his wonderful providence: Ps. XLIX. 11; CXLVI. 9; Iob XXXVIII. 41; Matth. VI. 26. sq.; X. 29. 30; Luc. XII. 24. sq.

On the preaching of the holy Fathers in a matter that is manifest, there is no need to say more. In Irenaeus, 1. II. c. 26. al. 45., there is a long exposition concerning the numbers of the smallest things that exist — of the hairs of the head, of sparrows, of sand, of the pebbles of the earth, of the waves of the sea — the reasons, particular ends, and order of each of which, he says, men seek in vain; but that Christians agree and confess that « nothing of all these things which have been made, and which are done and will be done, escapes the knowledge of God; but by his providence each of them receives and has received its own habit and order and number and quantity, and nothing at all is made or is to be made in vain, nor as it happens (in Greek ὡς τυχὸν, in Latin fortuito), but with great fitness and with a sublime consciousness; and that there is a wonderful reason which can both discern things of this kind and state their proper causes. » See the Fathers as cited in Petav. 1. IV. c. 3; Ruiz disp. IX.

In general this truth is most fully attested in the Christian consensus. Hence there can be no difficulty, except perhaps a hermeneutical one, in the passage of St Jerome (in Habac. I. 14. T. VI. p. 604. ed. Vallarsi). « It is absurd, he says, to draw the majesty of God down to this, that he should know moment by moment how many gnats are born or die; what is the multitude of bedbugs and gnats and flies on the earth, how many fish swim in the water, and which of the smaller must yield as prey to the greater. Let us not be such foolish flatterers of God, that, while we bring down his power even to the lowest things, we become insulting to ourselves, saying that the providence of rational and irrational things is the same. » The holy Doctor does not treat primarily of speculative knowledge of vision but of practical knowledge of providence. Next, he does not treat of providence simply, but of a special providence pertaining only to rational creatures, which alone can be the object of paternal care and love, since the other irrational creatures, just as they are created, so also are governed by providence for the sake of rational creatures as their proximate end. Therefore St Jerome said more and wished less to be understood, as St Bonaventure says in another matter of a certain opinion of St Augustine (Breviloq. P. 3. c. 5.). Moreover, that the doctrine found in the Gospel and in all the Scriptures and in the Christian profession, so to speak elementary, should not be called in question by the holy Doctor, much less rejected as « absurd », ought to be held firmly in itself, and it is demonstrated from other passages of his. Let there be compared, for example, the clear and polemical disputation of the holy Doctor in Ier. XXXII.26. T. IV. p. 1090. « God, said the prophet, is believed to have made all flesh, both rational and brute animals. For there are some who confess the providence of the creator only as far as rational things, while they assert that brute things perish or live by chance accidents. And the prophetic word declares that nothing escapes the providence and knowledge of God, because some things are created for their own sake, and others for the use of men »⁸.

Scholion. In the question about the infinite multitude of the objects of God's knowledge, which we discussed in the first part of the thesis, many thorny difficulties occur. But almost all of these arise from our transferring, scarcely noticing it, our finite and limited manner of conceiving to the infinite understanding of God. About each of these the cited authors may be consulted; but the following general principles should be kept before one's eyes for their solution. a) What is without any ultimate limit, and thus infinite according to one reason and in one line, can be finite according to another reason (S. Th. 3. q. 10. a. 3. ad 2.). From this you will understand that the acts of rational creatures do not cease to be infinite in multitude into the future (on the side of what is after), however many preceding acts (on the side of what is before) you subtract⁹. b) What is simultaneous in knowledge is not therefore able also to be simultaneous in real existence. For the nature of a thing can be repugnant to coexistence, without being repugnant to the simultaneous knowledge of a mind, especially an eternal and infinite one. From the fact that today and tomorrow are known together, it does not follow that they can coexist. Whence you will gather that from the knowledge of God of infinite things together with the omnipotence of God it is not rightly inferred that God can produce infinite things actually existing, although there is none of the infinite known things which he could not produce singly. The reason in those things which are by nature successive is evident; in others, which are not successive in themselves, the reason is that the intrinsic nature of created actual existence requires that it be « in measure and number and weight, » limited, namely, in intensity as well as in extension¹⁰. Therefore God does not know infinite things as producible together, but as producible in such a way that, when actually existing, they are always in weight and number, bounded by determinate and finite limits. This is what Pallavicino says, l. c.: « God does not know infinite possibles as one collection; but he knows infinitely many single possible collections » (an infinite multitude of possible orders and systems). c) From the fact that created quantities and perfections are possible greater and greater to infinity, it does not follow that some one created quantity or perfection is possible as infinite, because in those possibles and perfections and quantities, by the very fact that they are infinitely possible, there is no last one, and one exceeds another only by a finite proportion. Therefore also from the fact that God knows all possible perfections and quantities, infinite in multitude, it does not follow that some infinite one is known. Cf. Ruiz de Scient. Dei disp. 20. sect. 4. n. 3. sqq.

Moreover, if we speak of perfection, in which alone it is possible — nay, not merely possible but necessary — infinity properly so called differs from the finite not by degree but by the whole intrinsic reason of being. Whence, just as it is repugnant that from any quantity or quality, e.g. of stones, a spirit should arise; so it is repugnant that from finite things ever an infinite should arise.