Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam

God's knowledge, one in itself, can be distinguished in many ways according to its diverse objects.

« Although God's knowledge, one in itself, is the most simple substantial act; nevertheless from the diverse reason of the objects that lie under it, the cause is drawn for which it is rightly distinguished according to the solemn partitions: knowledge absolutely necessary and necessary only on hypothesis; knowledge of vision in knowing, and knowledge pertaining to effecting (speculative and practical); knowledge of approval and disapproval, the latter of which in the Scriptures is also called ignorance. »

God's knowledge in itself is the divine essence itself under the reason of infinite intellectual act; therefore it cannot be manifold in itself, but is one eternal act and a single most simple understanding (th. XXVII.). Moreover, the divine understanding is constituted in its whole perfection through the divine essence itself as its formal object; but all other objects are known through the essence known by itself, in one and the same most simple act, and they introduce into that substantial understanding no perfection or change. It is the same understanding by which God comprehends himself and his essence, and at once the understanding of all things, without any multiplication or distinction in the understanding itself (th. XXXVIII.).

Although the divine understanding is in itself so simple, beyond any multiplication of acts or forms, nevertheless its objects and their relations to it are not of one reason but of diverse reason. Hence, if we consider knowledge according to the terms which it connotes and which lie under it, there is not only a ground but also a necessity, in one and the same knowledge, for our inadequate concepts to distinguish several diverse reasons.

The objects of divine knowledge can be distributed in such a way that 1° knowledge comprehends either actual existences or the essences of things according to mere possibility. The former, taking its name from our sensible knowledge, by which only existing things can be seen, has been called knowledge of vision¹; the other, to distinguish it from the former, has kept the name of simple intelligence².

Moreover, things that never exist in act, or that at least are regarded in the order of reason prior to actual existence, can be considered again under a twofold reason: according to essence, I mean, in the state of mere possibility, insofar as they are the object of simple intelligence; and according to existence, which they do not have absolutely, but would infallibly have if some condition were fulfilled. In this second sense the object is neither known as really existing for some interval of time, which is evident in itself, nor is only the essence and the mere possibility of existence known. For it is indeed far different to know, e.g., sin as possible, and to know that a man snatched away by death would certainly have committed these or those sins had he lived longer; which is the example used by Gregory of Nyssa, St Augustine and other Fathers, of whom we shall speak later. Rightly, therefore, according to the diversity of objects, there is distinguished, besides the knowledge of vision and of simple intelligence, the knowledge of future things under a condition. This agrees with the knowledge of simple intelligence in that the object is not intuited as absolutely existing in act; it differs, however, in that it is related not only to necessary essence but to contingent existence, which would infallibly obtain under some condition. In the inverse order, it agrees in some measure with the knowledge of vision in that it is related to contingent existence, and not only to necessary essence; it differs, however, in that it does not intuit existence as absolutely future in act. This object is therefore middle between the object of vision and the object of simple intelligence, agreeing with each in some respect and differing in some respect. Hence theologians, as the sixteenth century wore on, called the knowledge of God considered under this reason middle knowledge, naming it by a name derived from the properties of the object; it is indeed, as is clear from what has been said, middle between the knowledge of vision and of simple intelligence. It can, however, easily be reckoned under the common heading with either simple intelligence or vision, according as under a different reason it agrees with one or the other; according to this counting together, it is no wonder that among the older theologians only a twofold member of the division is found. The thing itself, however, we shall show in its place was very well known among the ancients; for now we are disputing rather from hypothesis. If indeed the existence of a thing, namely the actual existence of a free act of the created will, which under some condition would infallibly be future, can be an object of infinite knowledge; under this hypothesis, which we shall demonstrate afterwards, we affirm that to the twofold member of the knowledge of vision and of simple intelligence there is rightly subjoined a third, the knowledge of future things under a condition, and this is not inappropriately called middle knowledge³. Moreover, we think the dispute about the name is of little or no moment, but about the thing itself it is of the greatest. Of the name, therefore, nothing more; of the thing we shall speak shortly, at more length.

2°. The essences of things in the state of possibility, and the truth of essences, exist only because the divine essence is imitable in this way by beings and by analogous perfections and their mutual relations. This imitability, however, is natural to God, necessary, and independent of the free will; since in reality it is nothing other than the divine essence itself under the reason of the first and absolute Being, of absolute truth, and of the exemplar of every perfection. Whence the truth of essences in the state of possibility is absolutely necessary. But divine understanding necessarily comprehends every truth. Therefore knowledge of simple intelligence is absolutely necessary as regards the whole extent of its object. On the contrary, existence belongs necessarily to God alone; all other existence is contingent. Therefore the actual existence of all things which at some time are beside God is so much a truth that the denial of their existence could also have been absolutely true. Now, that they exist depends either on the free will of God operating through himself alone, or through the creature subject to him, or on the free will of God making or permitting, and at the same time on the free created will⁴. Whence the chief object of knowledge of vision is indeed absolutely necessary, namely the essence of God existing necessarily⁵: but the secondary object could also not be; if however it is, it necessarily lies under the divine intuition. Just as, therefore, knowledge of vision is absolutely necessary with respect to the existing divine essence, so with respect to all other things it is only necessary on the hypothesis that they really at some time exist.

To this last is referred also knowledge of future things under a condition, both in general and specifically that of the free acts of the creature, of which alone there is talk, where knowledge of this middle kind is in question. For that Titius, placed in certain circumstances, would sin and Caius would not sin, is so true that the opposite could also be true. But on the hypothesis of the truth, that Titius in those circumstances would sin and Caius would not sin — which hypothesis depends on their free will — God knows this truth necessarily; and if the opposite were true, God would again know this necessarily.

Therefore the same knowledge, which is distinguished with respect to the existence or non-existence of objects into the threefold member declared in n. 1°, when the necessity or contingency of these same objects is considered, is rightly divided into knowledge absolutely necessary and knowledge necessary only on hypothesis.

3° Knowledge of simple intelligence, understood in the sense declared, can be conceived as concerned with its object in two ways: either as simply the knowledge of objective truth, or insofar as it comprehends the natures, ends, goodness, order, relations, etc., of all things, formally insofar as things are apt to receive existence from God himself. In this second way knowledge is the reason of things to be effected, after the manner of art, and is not merely theoretical knowledge of essences and of truth; but it is the understanding of things to be done under the formal reason, insofar as they can be effected by God knowing them, and therefore the knowledge is practical.

It can, however, be regarded a) per se insofar as it comprehends all the reasons and modes of things to be produced: thus it is practical in the first act, yet it is not the cause of things in the second act; for otherwise the production of things would not be free but absolutely necessary, and all possibles would be actually produced. This was the error of Wycliffe, and in our age it is that of many sophists, who in a perverse sense call creatures thoughts of God. Indeed the holy Fathers also said: «God creates by thinking, and the thought (or rather the thing conceived by thought) becomes a work»⁶; but in a far different sense. For b) this same practical knowledge must be regarded insofar as it shines forth as art and as director to the free will commanding, so that for some difference of time things may actually be, whose natures and reasons divine art comprehends and sets forth in advance⁷. In this second way knowledge is practical in the second act (cf. above p. 315.). Thus, indeed, divine wisdom in the Scriptures is called «artificer of all things,» and God is said «to have made all things in wisdom» throughout. «Wisdom, says Dionysius (div. nom. c. 7. §. 3.), can be known from all things, since according to the divine oracle it is the maker of all things, and always fitting all together, and the cause of the indissoluble harmony and order of all things, and always connecting the ends of the former with the beginnings of the latter, and adorning the one agreement and harmony of the universe»⁸.

But knowledge of vision, taken in the sense declared above, does not indeed presuppose an existence already produced by a passing action, but it does presuppose the truth of existence for some difference of time, prior in reason. This knowledge of vision, therefore, is not referred to operating; but, the operation being supposed, it is the intuition of the existence of the work. The same is nearly to be said of middle knowledge, or of the intuition of an act which would exist if some condition were posited. This does not, however, prevent that both knowledge of vision and especially the knowledge of those things which would be under some condition may be mediately practical, not indeed after the manner of art but after the manner of providence. For although in God there is not one volition on account of another, since there is one most simple act by which he wills all things, whatever he wills; nevertheless the things which God wills are in mutual dependence, and he wills that one be on account of another. Whence the vision of the existence of one thing can, in our manner of conceiving, shine upon the divine counsels for willing another, and in that sense be a director in acting. That middle knowledge shines upon the divine providence especially in disposing rational creatures is easily understood.

It is therefore evident that God's knowledge, considered universally under the reason by which it is referred to operation, is rightly divided into speculative and practical knowledge.

4°. Approval and disapproval properly pertain not to knowledge but to the will. Thus knowledge of approval is the knowledge of good things, which please the divine will; knowledge of disapproval is the knowledge of evils, which displease. «The knowledge of approval, says St Bonaventure (in 1. dist. 39. a. 1. q. 2.), connotes complacency of the will. By this, God does not know all things, since he knows neither evils nor evil persons, but only good things and good persons.» Whence it is evident that of God's speculative knowledge only some is knowledge of approval, but the knowledge which is practical after the manner of art is all of it, and in its whole extent is knowledge of approval.

Knowledge of approval therefore extends more widely in its whole extent than practical knowledge; nevertheless, because all practical knowledge is knowledge of approval, St Thomas (1. q. 14. a. 8.) simply says that practical knowledge has been customarily called knowledge of approval. For the works of the Lord can be nothing but good. «With you is your wisdom, which knows your works, which was present when you made the world, and knew what was pleasing in your eyes, and what was right in your commandments» Sap. IX. 9. Especially, however, God is said to know his friends, whom he both anticipates and follows with his graces; whence in most places where this knowledge is treated, knowledge, both of vision, practical after the manner of providential wisdom, and of simple intelligence, practical after the manner of efficacy, are joined together. «I know you by name, and you have found grace before me» Exod. XXXIII. 12; and in the reverse order: «you have found grace before me, and I know you by name» ib. v. 17. «The Lord knows the way of the just» Ps. I. 6. «The Lord knows the days of the unspotted» Ps. XXXVI. 18. «Before I formed you in the womb, I knew you» Ier. I. 5. «The eyes of the Lord are upon those who fear him» passim. Cf. Io. X. 14; 2. Tim. II. 19.

Speculative knowledge, insofar as it is of vision, and supposes the existence of good things, has approval conjoined with it simply. «God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good» Gen. I. Insofar as speculative knowledge is of simple intelligence or middle, approval coheres with it in a less proper sense, namely of what is only possibly good, or what would be good under some condition.

Moreover, speculative knowledge, whether of vision, or of simple intelligence, or middle, also refers to those things which are simply evil⁹; and this is knowledge of disapproval. But disapproval includes the negation contrary to knowledge of approval; therefore, since God is said in the Scriptures chiefly to know those whom he follows with his benefits and graces in effect, and whom he deigns to befriend, the contrary negation of this benevolent knowledge is in the same Scriptures often called ignorance. «I do not know you, whence you are» «I never knew you» Matth. VII. 23; Luc. XIII. 27. «Your eyes are too pure to see evil, and you cannot look upon iniquity» Habac. I. 13. Cf. Aug. ep. 169. ad Evod. n. 2; ep. 215. ad Valentin. n. 6; Fulgent. ad Trasimund. l. II. c. 8.

From what has been said, approval pertains both to practical and to speculative knowledge. Nevertheless the older Scholastics, distinguishing two members as mutually excluding one another, knowledge of simple acquaintance and knowledge of approval, took the former, of simple acquaintance, in a wider sense for speculative knowledge (both of vision and of simple intelligence), and the latter, of approval, on the contrary they took in a narrower sense for practical and effective knowledge alone, as we indicated a little before from St Thomas. Hence it appears that those theologians accomplish nothing who, on the authority of the old Masters, wish to persuade that knowledge of vision is practical and effective of those things which are subject to it. According to the common teaching of the older Scholastics, they say, knowledge of approval is practical and efficient. But knowledge of approval is knowledge of vision. Therefore knowledge of vision is practical and efficient. The answer is contained in the above declaration. Namely: I distinguish the major: every knowledge which is called knowledge of approval by more recent authors is, according to the teaching of the ancients, practical, I deny; in the narrower sense in which by the ancients knowledge of approval was opposed to speculative, I concede. Likewise: I distinguish the minor: knowledge of approval as it was understood by those ancients is of vision, I deny; if vision is taken according to the usage of speaking of somewhat more recent authors, as it is now commonly understood, thus some knowledge of approval, speculative however and not practical, is knowledge of vision, I concede.