Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam

On the coexistence of temporal things with divine eternity.

« It follows from the proper reason of the unchanging eternity of God. » All things existing in some difference of time coexist, according to » its being actual to the whole divine eternity, although not from eternity; » but according to the knowability of this same actual being they lie open to the unchanging gaze of God from eternity. This proper notion of coexistence with eternity is demonstrated from the explicit testimonies of the holy Fathers. »

The question of the comprehension of all times, and of the things which happen in time, within the divine eternity was disputed quarrelsomely among some older theologians: some affirmed that all things which at some time exist in time are comprehended, according to their own real being, and have always been « in the measure of eternity », and that « according to their real being from eternity they have coexistence in eternity itself »¹; others on the contrary defended that all things existing in time coexist with divine eternity (or, what is wholly the same, with the substance of God, the necessary and unchanging being, in which no succession is possible) indeed according to their real being, when they actually exist; but because they do not actually exist from eternity, therefore this real being does not have coexistence in eternity from eternity: nevertheless the divine intuition is unchangeably directed from eternity to the threefold state of contingent things in time, namely that according to the different difference of time they are still future, are actually existing, are past. Provided that the genuine notion of divine eternity is held, which is nothing other than the necessary and unchanging divine Being itself, this matter is so self-evident in itself that it should never have been called into controversy. Nevertheless a distinct statement of the question is most useful for this end: that the reason may be rightly conceived by which the object of God's knowledge stands, which from eternity is directed to the very existence of a contingent thing in time and is called knowledge of vision; for from these notions depends the understanding of other grave questions, and especially the reconciliation of created liberty with the unchanging foreknowledge, or rather God's knowledge.

I. As is evident from the stated state of the question,a²³ of all things that are, will be, and have been, presence in the eternity of God can be understood in two ways: first, so that presence is the coexistence of things with eternity in their actual being; then, so that presence is understood as eternal in the idea, knowledge, and vision of God, for each state of the past, present and future, in whatever state things are at any time. From the very concept of eternity declared in the preceding thesis, n. I., the following are entirely manifest.

1°. Whatever begins to exist, and whatever exists with time and in time, necessarily coexists with the eternity or eternal duration of God, which is nothing other than the divine Esse itself, insofar as it abides wholly at once, immutably and interminably. A temporal thing, however, coexists with the eternal Esse or eternal duration of God, considered according to its existence in act, only for that time during which its temporal existence lasts; and a thing coexists either permanently or successively, according as it has in itself a duration either permanent or successive. Successive coexistence, indeed, is not as if there were a succession in the eternal duration itself; but⁴ insofar as succession is in the coexisting term, whose individual parts of duration coexist with eternal duration only for the time in which they actually are, in actual reality. Therefore, regarded in this actual reality, those things which are now coexist with the eternity of God; those which have passed and are no longer, coexisted then when they were, with the same immutable eternity; those which are not yet in act but are future, will coexist with the same eternity then, when they shall be. Not, however, do the past coexist with one part, the present with another, and the future again with another part of eternal duration, since divine eternity has no parts⁵. If therefore eternity is considered according to itself, and as it is permanent Esse, any temporal thing existing at some time coexists with the whole of eternity; but if the possible successive durations are considered, which could coexist with eternity greater and greater to infinity, and the actual duration of a temporal thing is compared with these possible durations, then this temporal duration is said to coexist not with the whole of eternity. This whole account of coexistence can be expressed by this formula: all temporal things coexist with the whole eternity of God, but not totally.

2°. If the created and temporal being is considered insofar as it lies under the knowledge and vision of God, that knowledge, precisely because it is eternal and free of all succession, is always in the same way, whether the created being is still in itself future, or now in act, or past. For each of its states, therefore, it is present from eternity and without change to the will, whether disposing or permitting, and to the divine knowledge, which intuits it from eternity and into eternity under one difference of time as future, under another as actually existing, under another as past. « Future things are not yet, and present things are now, and past things are no longer; but he comprehends all these things in one stable and everlasting presence. Nor does he know now otherwise, otherwise before, and otherwise afterwards, since his knowledge is not changed by the variation of the three times, present, past, or future, as ours is; with him there is no change nor shadow of turning » Augustin. Civ. Dei XI. 21. Accordingly, in respect of its knowability, created being is present not only to the whole of eternity, but also wholly. Therefore, as St Thomas says, cont. gent. 1. I. c. 66, « whatever is done through the whole course of time, the divine intellect intuits in its whole eternity, as present; nor, because it is done in a certain part of time, has it always been existing. » The reason and foundation of this eternal presence, however, is that from eternity it was true that such a created being exists at one determinate difference of time, is past at another, future at another; and all these differences the eternal knowledge of God intuits in the same way always. This matter will be dealt with further below, where we treat of God's knowledge.

II. The truth of the notion declared so far, concerning the coexistence of temporal things with divine eternity, is confirmed by the explicit doctrine of the holy Fathers. For the Fathers, when they speak of the presence of all things in the eternity of God, constantly regard it in connexion with the will or permission and with knowledge, and under eternal knowledge. « Whatever is in things has never not been with God; and these things, although they began at their creation, are nevertheless not begun in relation to the knowledge or power of God. And the prophet bears witness to us, saying: God, who made all things that are to come⁶. For the things which are to come, although in that they are to be created, they will still come to be; yet to God, for whom there is nothing new or sudden (al. recens) in creating things, they are already done, since both the dispensation of times is that they be created, and already in the foreknowing efficacy of divine power they have been created..... All their preparation is coeternal with God » Hilarius de Trin. l. XII. n. 39. So too St Ambrose, de Fide ad Gratian. l. I. c. 15. al 7. « To God, things which are future are present, and to him to whom all things are foreknown, things to come are as things done, just as it is written: he who made the things that are to come. » St Augustine declares these things frequently. « Where and when he will act, the unchanging counsel is with him, in whose disposition times, whatever is future, are already made. For while moving temporal things, he is not moved temporally, nor does he know things to be done otherwise than as things done » Aug. Civ. Dei X. 12. He treats the matter most lucidly in l. II. ad Simplician. q. 2. n. 2, where he shows why in God knowledge rather than foreknowledge is to be said. « For if God's knowledge, he says, has the things themselves, they are not future to him but present, and so it can no longer be called foreknowledge but only knowledge. But if, just as in the order of temporal creatures, so with him the things which are future are not yet, but he anticipates them by knowing them; then he perceives them twice, in one way according to the foreknowledge of future things, and in another way according to present knowledge. Something therefore accedes temporally to God's knowledge, which is most absurd and most false. » If therefore foreknowledge and knowledge are said with regard to the knower himself, in that foreknowledge is in him differently while things are not yet in their own existence, and knowledge differently while they now exist: it must be denied that there is foreknowledge in God. For in him there is no succession from a more imperfect knowledge to a more perfect; but in the same way always all things are present to his eternal and unchanging knowledge in every state of theirs. If, however, the diverse state of things is considered, nothing hinders that the knowledge to which the state of things as yet future is subject be called foreknowledge, and the same, insofar as the state of things as now existing is subject to it, be called knowledge. But because the intuition of God is directed from eternity to both states, there is no succession in the divine knowledge but in the things known.

Many other Fathers, following St Augustine in this most true manner of considering God's knowledge, do the same: for example, Gregorius M., Moral. l. XX. n. 63. ed. Maur. « How, he says, is he foreknowing, since nothing is foreknown except what is future; and we know that for God nothing is future, before whose eyes no things are past, present things do not pass away, future things do not come; for everything that has been and will be for us is present to his sight, and whatever is present he can know rather than foreknow... And because he sees those things which are future to us, yet which are always at hand to him, he is called foreknowing; although he does not at all foresee what he sees as present. For also whatever things are, are seen in his eternity not because they are (now in act), but they are (by infallible consequence) because they are seen⁷.... For in him neither things past nor future can be found, but all changeable things endure unchangeably, and those which cannot exist together in themselves, all stand together to him at once. » So also Boethius (de Consol. l. V. pros. 6.) and St Anselm (de casu diaboli c. 21.) teach that knowledge rather than foreknowledge is in God, for the reason that « his infinite knowledge, embracing all the spaces of the past and of the future, considers them as though they were already being done, in simple cognition. » Whoever desires more, let him read Didacus Ruiz, de scientia Dei disp. 28. sect. 4. and disp. 25. sect. 4.

Thus these are the things which the Fathers most clearly teach. a) Temporal things, if « considered in themselves, according to creation, in that which they are to be created, in the order of temporal creatures, » that is, are regarded in real existence, do not coexist with divine eternity except when they now exist in themselves. But indeed b) if times and the things which are in time are considered as they are subject to « God's knowledge, eyes, gaze, counsel, disposition, preparation, dispensation, power, foreknowing efficacy », so all times and whatever is made in time are, from eternity and always in the same way, all present together to the knowledge and power of God, and on the part of divine power and efficacy are already made, already created⁸, because their preparation is coeternal with God. Hence c) the object of the unchanging divine gaze, which is always in the same state, is from eternity the very real being of all those things which are made and are in time, although that being does not exist in itself from eternity; because God « does not perceive them according to the variety of the three times, not otherwise now and otherwise before, not in one way according to the foreknowledge of future things and in another according to present knowledge, but comprehends them all in one stable and everlasting presence. » Hence d) the being of things according to their knowability—that is, the fact that such things, such contingent or even free actions of creatures, exist at a certain difference of time—this knowable being of things is from eternity the (secondary) object and term of divine intuition; nor does it then first begin to be the object of divine intuition when its real existence begins. Wherefore actual existence in time is indeed the reason why it is true from eternity that such a thing exists in act at such a difference of time; and therefore the actual existence of a thing in time is the reason why the same thing is in the eternal state of knowability, even while the thing does not yet actually exist; and accordingly actual existence in time is a condition without which that existence would not be an object of eternal divine vision. Yet the cause or condition of divine intuition is not actual existence, in such a way that there is no intuition except when the thing itself actually exists. Therefore the presence of things according to knowable being in eternity precedes divine vision by reason; but divine vision precedes the actual existence of things not only by reason but by the whole eternity, as St Augustine says (Civ. Dei XII. 25.). The whole can be expressed in this formula: actual coexistence is not a necessary condition of eternal divine intuition; actual existence in time is the foundation of eternal knowability and of the relation to divine intuition; actual existence, according to the relation of knowability, is present to divine eternity to the whole and wholly.

Hence it is clear how there is no real contradiction between the many Fathers, to be cited in their place, who are accustomed to affirm, particularly about the free acts of creatures, that those acts are not so because they are seen by God; rather they are seen because they are; and between Pope Gregory the Great, whom we have heard teaching: « whatever things are, are not seen in his eternity because they are; but they are because they are seen. » For Gregory clearly speaks of actual coexistence⁹, of which it is most true from what has been said that things are not seen by God because they now are in act; but rather, from the fact that God sees things from eternity, it follows as an infallible and necessary consequence that things exist in act at the difference of time at which they exist, and as God sees them existing¹⁰. Other Fathers, however, consider the existence of things insofar as it is the foundation why things are knowable as existing; and in this sense the truth of existence at some difference of time is prior by reason to the intuition of it: and therefore things are not because they are seen; but because they at some time are, they are seen from eternity.

After all this, I think it is manifest that the saying « all things are present to divine eternity » cannot be admitted in the interpretation that the coexistence of things from eternity is meant. But the truth being supposed that things, when they are, coexist with eternity in the manner explained above, the whole dissent comes down to this: whether it must be said that the presence of things in eternity is nothing other than that things are known by God through eternal knowledge, in which there is no succession; or rather that it should be said thus: that very actual being, which begins in time according to its real existence, is subject from eternity to divine intuition according to its knowability. If those who speak in the first way also maintain that contingent things, and especially free acts, are not known by God from eternity as they are in themselves, but as God comprehends the whole efficacy of the cause, as has pleased some, then the difference between the former and the latter opinion would be real: but if it is conceded—as we shall demonstrate below—that the actual being itself, and therefore also the contingent and free act knowable in itself, is from eternity an object of divine intuition, because it has been true from eternity that this act exists at such a time, then the difference between the two opinions turns into a merely verbal one, and the whole dispute will be about the manner of speaking. It cannot, however, be denied that according to the manner of speaking the latter is far clearer and more distinct.