Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam

On the proper reason of divine eternity.

« From the perfection of the divine essence, divine eternity is understood as the whole, simultaneous and perfect possession of interminable life, to which successive duration, or intrinsic time, is absolutely repugnant. This notion of divine eternity is confirmed by the doctrine of the Scriptures. »

I. If eternity is conceived simply as duration¹ lacking beginning and end, or duration without term; the formal reason of eternity, such as is proper to God, is not sufficiently declared². For duration without term can be understood first of all as the duration of continuous motion, in which indeed there is no ultimate term of the whole duration, but each of the parts of which it consists is terminated. Although a duration consisting of parts without beginning or without a first term could not be, it could nevertheless be without an ultimate term, and thus there would be a continuous succession never to cease, by which time is constituted³. But how far this duration is from absolute perfection, no one fails to see. For in it what is actually present is always a minimum; for other things are no longer, and others are not yet; and therefore there is never a duration wholly simultaneous, as is easily evident to anyone in every motion and every continuous succession⁴.

Further, although the duration of substance is under discussion, it can be understood to be without term a) in such a way that, formally, the duration of substance as substance has no successions, and therefore there are no real parts of duration; but there are successions, and consequently successive parts, in the series of accidents and modifications of the substance. Thus, supposing a first term, the duration of substance can formally be, in itself, without a last term and wholly simultaneous; but according to its modifications there can be a series, without ever arriving at a last term; yet the single parts are not without a term, and so the whole is never, or cannot be, simultaneous. In this way the created spirit is eternal. b) A substance may be supposed in which there is no real succession either in itself or according to its modifications, and therefore no real parts of duration. This could indeed be a duration without a last term and wholly simultaneous: but if the substance is contingent, it will first of all have a first term; then it can have successions, and therefore terms for the single parts, and it can have a last term according to itself as a whole. For permanence does not belong to the intrinsic essence of a finite being; but just as its beginning is through creation, so the continuance of its existence is through the conservation of God, by whose ceasing its existence would cease. But as many indivisible moments as there are in a real continuous succession, so many times can conservation, and consequently existence, cease. Hence, although they are not real successive parts, they are nonetheless possible parts, which we can distinguish by reason ⁵. All these things, however, pertain to imperfections, which indeed can be absent from every contingent and finite existence, but are wholly repugnant to God, who is most pure, necessary and infinite act.

Hence the divine duration is to be understood from the very perfection of the divine essence. From what has been demonstrated, the divine Being is Being a se and necessary from its own intrinsic reason and essence: therefore it not only has no beginning and no end, no first and no last term; but it is as essential to it to be without term as it is essential to it to be Being a se; and a beginning or an end is as repugnant to it as it is repugnant that Being should not be necessary. Moreover, from what has been demonstrated, this divine Being is, by its intrinsic reason, the fullness of absolute being, and therefore in absolute act of all perfection without any power toward a further perfection. But in absolute and necessary act no succession can be; nothing that is not always in the same way; nothing of perfection can be conceived that is not yet or no longer; nothing therefore before or after, but the whole fullness is simultaneous and always is.

Insofar, therefore, as the divine Being is in the perfection of act, we can designate it by the name life; insofar as it is permanence, it can be called possession; insofar as it has no term, it will be the interminable possession of life; insofar as there is no succession in act, it is and is called wholly simultaneous; and insofar as it is pure act, in which succession is absolutely repugnant, it can be called perfect possession. This is absolute and perfect eternity, which Boethius rightly defines (de Consol. l.V. pros. 6.): « eternity is the interminable life's wholly simultaneous and perfect possession. »

It is clear from what has been said that the proper character of divine eternity, considered formally, is a perfection which by its intrinsic reason excludes the possibility of succession. This perfection is itself the very reason of the fullness of absolute being, or of most pure act. Hence it is also clear that eternity, in its fullest signification, is a negative perfection in the sense explained above in thesis XXI. Lastly, it is also clear that God is his own eternity.

II. That this eternity belongs to God as his proper absolute perfection needs no further demonstration, since no element is contained in its formal concept that has not been declared and vindicated above. Moreover, where, in the Scriptures, the eternity of God considered formally is treated, it is described in roughly this way.

1°. Where no creature yet existed, and therefore no time, this is called the beginning, that is, duration, which nothing precedes; and in this beginning God was ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν. Wherever thought is carried, it cannot conceive anything more first (if it is lawful to speak so) than a perpetual beginning; but in this beginning God already was ⁶, and therefore always was. Thus the eternity of God is declared at Io. I. 1. 2. coll. 3; cf. Gen. I. 1, although we judge that the beginning is not taken in exactly the same sense in these two passages. See Petav. Trin. l. II. c. 8. Cf. our Tractatus de Verbo Incarnato th. VIII.

2°. God is said to precede all time; for this is the most common way of expressing the eternity of God in the Scriptures, so that he is said to be « before the foundation of the world »; « before the earth (by synecdoche for the universe) was made »; « before Lucifer » etc. And from this there is either inferred or added an existence in which there is neither time nor any change.

« In the beginning you, Lord, founded the earth, and the works of your hands are the heavens; they will perish, but you remain… they will be changed, but you are the same, and your years will not fail » Ps. CI. (102.) 25-28; LXXXIX. (90.)2; Ecclesi. XLII. 21.22.

Succession, and therefore failing, is essential to years and to time; therefore, by the very fact that the years of God are called an unchanging permanence in opposition to change and succession, years which are part of time are denied to him. « What are the years that do not fail, except those that stand? If therefore there the years stand, and the years themselves that stand are one year; and that one year that stands is one day… but that day always stands, and whatever you wish, you call that day: if you wish, they are years; if you wish, it is a day. Whatever you have thought, it nevertheless stands » Aug. in Ps. CXXI. n. 6.

3°. Hence it is shown that the permanence and successive duration of God are of a wholly different kind, such that nothing passes away in him and nothing comes to him; but it is a perpetual now. This is declared first in the comparison of time with the permanence of God, in expressions not metaphysical enough but still quite clear, where it is said that before God time is as very brief as it is very long, and conversely very long as very brief, like one day, or what in human estimation is nothing briefer, as « yesterday's day, which has passed » 2. Pet. III. 8; Ps. LXXXIX. (90.) 4; Ecclesi. XVIII. 8. Eternity is further declared in those places in which is, was and will be are indicated in God as one unchanging Being, and thus the differences of time are denied⁷. Cf. above thesis XXII. n. I.

4°. Most clearly the eternity of God is shown in Scripture, where its intrinsic reason is declared in the necessary and unchanging absolute Being itself. « I am » Exod. III. etc. « Before Abraham was made, I am » Io.VIII. 58. « I am the first and the last. » « I am Alpha and Omega. » We have treated these in the cited thesis XXII.

5°. Accordingly, in the absolute and most full sense the Scriptures use the name eternity, αἰών, τῶν αἰών αἰώνων, עוֹלָם וָעֶד. עוֹלָם⁸ when God is said to remain for eternity, God living for eternity, for ever and ever, unto ages of ages, swearing by himself: « I live, I for eternity Deut. XXXII. 40; Ps. IX. 8; XCI.9; Dan. IV. 31; Ecclesi. XVIII.1; Apoc. I.18; IV. 9.10; V. 14, and when it is said to God: from of old, from the age, you are Ps. XCII. (93.) 2.

It is not necessary to describe the opinions of the Fathers in a matter that is most manifest; please read Petav. 1. III. c. 3. 4; Thomassin. 1. V. c. 12. 13. See also the above thesis XXIII.