Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam

ON THE NEGATIVE DIVINE PROPERTIES IN RELATION TO TIME AND PLACE.

On the proper reason of divine eternity.

« From the perfection of the divine essence, divine eternity is understood as the whole, simultaneous and perfect possession of interminable life, to which successive duration, or intrinsic time, is absolutely repugnant. This notion of divine eternity is confirmed by the doctrine of the Scriptures. »

I. If eternity is conceived simply as duration¹ lacking beginning and end, or duration without term; the formal reason of eternity, such as is proper to God, is not sufficiently declared². For duration without term can be understood first of all as the duration of continuous motion, in which indeed there is no ultimate term of the whole duration, but each of the parts of which it consists is terminated. Although a duration consisting of parts without beginning or without a first term could not be, it could nevertheless be without an ultimate term, and thus there would be a continuous succession never to cease, by which time is constituted³. But how far this duration is from absolute perfection, no one fails to see. For in it what is actually present is always a minimum; for other things are no longer, and others are not yet; and therefore there is never a duration wholly simultaneous, as is easily evident to anyone in every motion and every continuous succession⁴.

Further, although the duration of substance is under discussion, it can be understood to be without term a) in such a way that, formally, the duration of substance as substance has no successions, and therefore there are no real parts of duration; but there are successions, and consequently successive parts, in the series of accidents and modifications of the substance. Thus, supposing a first term, the duration of substance can formally be, in itself, without a last term and wholly simultaneous; but according to its modifications there can be a series, without ever arriving at a last term; yet the single parts are not without a term, and so the whole is never, or cannot be, simultaneous. In this way the created spirit is eternal. b) A substance may be supposed in which there is no real succession either in itself or according to its modifications, and therefore no real parts of duration. This could indeed be a duration without a last term and wholly simultaneous: but if the substance is contingent, it will first of all have a first term; then it can have successions, and therefore terms for the single parts, and it can have a last term according to itself as a whole. For permanence does not belong to the intrinsic essence of a finite being; but just as its beginning is through creation, so the continuance of its existence is through the conservation of God, by whose ceasing its existence would cease. But as many indivisible moments as there are in a real continuous succession, so many times can conservation, and consequently existence, cease. Hence, although they are not real successive parts, they are nonetheless possible parts, which we can distinguish by reason ⁵. All these things, however, pertain to imperfections, which indeed can be absent from every contingent and finite existence, but are wholly repugnant to God, who is most pure, necessary and infinite act.

Hence the divine duration is to be understood from the very perfection of the divine essence. From what has been demonstrated, the divine Being is Being a se and necessary from its own intrinsic reason and essence: therefore it not only has no beginning and no end, no first and no last term; but it is as essential to it to be without term as it is essential to it to be Being a se; and a beginning or an end is as repugnant to it as it is repugnant that Being should not be necessary. Moreover, from what has been demonstrated, this divine Being is, by its intrinsic reason, the fullness of absolute being, and therefore in absolute act of all perfection without any power toward a further perfection. But in absolute and necessary act no succession can be; nothing that is not always in the same way; nothing of perfection can be conceived that is not yet or no longer; nothing therefore before or after, but the whole fullness is simultaneous and always is.

Insofar, therefore, as the divine Being is in the perfection of act, we can designate it by the name life; insofar as it is permanence, it can be called possession; insofar as it has no term, it will be the interminable possession of life; insofar as there is no succession in act, it is and is called wholly simultaneous; and insofar as it is pure act, in which succession is absolutely repugnant, it can be called perfect possession. This is absolute and perfect eternity, which Boethius rightly defines (de Consol. l.V. pros. 6.): « eternity is the interminable life's wholly simultaneous and perfect possession. »

It is clear from what has been said that the proper character of divine eternity, considered formally, is a perfection which by its intrinsic reason excludes the possibility of succession. This perfection is itself the very reason of the fullness of absolute being, or of most pure act. Hence it is also clear that eternity, in its fullest signification, is a negative perfection in the sense explained above in thesis XXI. Lastly, it is also clear that God is his own eternity.

II. That this eternity belongs to God as his proper absolute perfection needs no further demonstration, since no element is contained in its formal concept that has not been declared and vindicated above. Moreover, where, in the Scriptures, the eternity of God considered formally is treated, it is described in roughly this way.

1°. Where no creature yet existed, and therefore no time, this is called the beginning, that is, duration, which nothing precedes; and in this beginning God was ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν. Wherever thought is carried, it cannot conceive anything more first (if it is lawful to speak so) than a perpetual beginning; but in this beginning God already was ⁶, and therefore always was. Thus the eternity of God is declared at Io. I. 1. 2. coll. 3; cf. Gen. I. 1, although we judge that the beginning is not taken in exactly the same sense in these two passages. See Petav. Trin. l. II. c. 8. Cf. our Tractatus de Verbo Incarnato th. VIII.

2°. God is said to precede all time; for this is the most common way of expressing the eternity of God in the Scriptures, so that he is said to be « before the foundation of the world »; « before the earth (by synecdoche for the universe) was made »; « before Lucifer » etc. And from this there is either inferred or added an existence in which there is neither time nor any change.

« In the beginning you, Lord, founded the earth, and the works of your hands are the heavens; they will perish, but you remain… they will be changed, but you are the same, and your years will not fail » Ps. CI. (102.) 25-28; LXXXIX. (90.)2; Ecclesi. XLII. 21.22.

Succession, and therefore failing, is essential to years and to time; therefore, by the very fact that the years of God are called an unchanging permanence in opposition to change and succession, years which are part of time are denied to him. « What are the years that do not fail, except those that stand? If therefore there the years stand, and the years themselves that stand are one year; and that one year that stands is one day… but that day always stands, and whatever you wish, you call that day: if you wish, they are years; if you wish, it is a day. Whatever you have thought, it nevertheless stands » Aug. in Ps. CXXI. n. 6.

3°. Hence it is shown that the permanence and successive duration of God are of a wholly different kind, such that nothing passes away in him and nothing comes to him; but it is a perpetual now. This is declared first in the comparison of time with the permanence of God, in expressions not metaphysical enough but still quite clear, where it is said that before God time is as very brief as it is very long, and conversely very long as very brief, like one day, or what in human estimation is nothing briefer, as « yesterday's day, which has passed » 2. Pet. III. 8; Ps. LXXXIX. (90.) 4; Ecclesi. XVIII. 8. Eternity is further declared in those places in which is, was and will be are indicated in God as one unchanging Being, and thus the differences of time are denied⁷. Cf. above thesis XXII. n. I.

4°. Most clearly the eternity of God is shown in Scripture, where its intrinsic reason is declared in the necessary and unchanging absolute Being itself. « I am » Exod. III. etc. « Before Abraham was made, I am » Io.VIII. 58. « I am the first and the last. » « I am Alpha and Omega. » We have treated these in the cited thesis XXII.

5°. Accordingly, in the absolute and most full sense the Scriptures use the name eternity, αἰών, τῶν αἰών αἰώνων, עוֹלָם וָעֶד. עוֹלָם⁸ when God is said to remain for eternity, God living for eternity, for ever and ever, unto ages of ages, swearing by himself: « I live, I for eternity Deut. XXXII. 40; Ps. IX. 8; XCI.9; Dan. IV. 31; Ecclesi. XVIII.1; Apoc. I.18; IV. 9.10; V. 14, and when it is said to God: from of old, from the age, you are Ps. XCII. (93.) 2.

It is not necessary to describe the opinions of the Fathers in a matter that is most manifest; please read Petav. 1. III. c. 3. 4; Thomassin. 1. V. c. 12. 13. See also the above thesis XXIII.

On the coexistence of temporal things with divine eternity.

« It follows from the proper reason of the unchanging eternity of God. » All things existing in some difference of time coexist, according to » its being actual to the whole divine eternity, although not from eternity; » but according to the knowability of this same actual being they lie open to the unchanging gaze of God from eternity. This proper notion of coexistence with eternity is demonstrated from the explicit testimonies of the holy Fathers. »

The question of the comprehension of all times, and of the things which happen in time, within the divine eternity was disputed quarrelsomely among some older theologians: some affirmed that all things which at some time exist in time are comprehended, according to their own real being, and have always been « in the measure of eternity », and that « according to their real being from eternity they have coexistence in eternity itself »¹; others on the contrary defended that all things existing in time coexist with divine eternity (or, what is wholly the same, with the substance of God, the necessary and unchanging being, in which no succession is possible) indeed according to their real being, when they actually exist; but because they do not actually exist from eternity, therefore this real being does not have coexistence in eternity from eternity: nevertheless the divine intuition is unchangeably directed from eternity to the threefold state of contingent things in time, namely that according to the different difference of time they are still future, are actually existing, are past. Provided that the genuine notion of divine eternity is held, which is nothing other than the necessary and unchanging divine Being itself, this matter is so self-evident in itself that it should never have been called into controversy. Nevertheless a distinct statement of the question is most useful for this end: that the reason may be rightly conceived by which the object of God's knowledge stands, which from eternity is directed to the very existence of a contingent thing in time and is called knowledge of vision; for from these notions depends the understanding of other grave questions, and especially the reconciliation of created liberty with the unchanging foreknowledge, or rather God's knowledge.

I. As is evident from the stated state of the question,a²³ of all things that are, will be, and have been, presence in the eternity of God can be understood in two ways: first, so that presence is the coexistence of things with eternity in their actual being; then, so that presence is understood as eternal in the idea, knowledge, and vision of God, for each state of the past, present and future, in whatever state things are at any time. From the very concept of eternity declared in the preceding thesis, n. I., the following are entirely manifest.

1°. Whatever begins to exist, and whatever exists with time and in time, necessarily coexists with the eternity or eternal duration of God, which is nothing other than the divine Esse itself, insofar as it abides wholly at once, immutably and interminably. A temporal thing, however, coexists with the eternal Esse or eternal duration of God, considered according to its existence in act, only for that time during which its temporal existence lasts; and a thing coexists either permanently or successively, according as it has in itself a duration either permanent or successive. Successive coexistence, indeed, is not as if there were a succession in the eternal duration itself; but⁴ insofar as succession is in the coexisting term, whose individual parts of duration coexist with eternal duration only for the time in which they actually are, in actual reality. Therefore, regarded in this actual reality, those things which are now coexist with the eternity of God; those which have passed and are no longer, coexisted then when they were, with the same immutable eternity; those which are not yet in act but are future, will coexist with the same eternity then, when they shall be. Not, however, do the past coexist with one part, the present with another, and the future again with another part of eternal duration, since divine eternity has no parts⁵. If therefore eternity is considered according to itself, and as it is permanent Esse, any temporal thing existing at some time coexists with the whole of eternity; but if the possible successive durations are considered, which could coexist with eternity greater and greater to infinity, and the actual duration of a temporal thing is compared with these possible durations, then this temporal duration is said to coexist not with the whole of eternity. This whole account of coexistence can be expressed by this formula: all temporal things coexist with the whole eternity of God, but not totally.

2°. If the created and temporal being is considered insofar as it lies under the knowledge and vision of God, that knowledge, precisely because it is eternal and free of all succession, is always in the same way, whether the created being is still in itself future, or now in act, or past. For each of its states, therefore, it is present from eternity and without change to the will, whether disposing or permitting, and to the divine knowledge, which intuits it from eternity and into eternity under one difference of time as future, under another as actually existing, under another as past. « Future things are not yet, and present things are now, and past things are no longer; but he comprehends all these things in one stable and everlasting presence. Nor does he know now otherwise, otherwise before, and otherwise afterwards, since his knowledge is not changed by the variation of the three times, present, past, or future, as ours is; with him there is no change nor shadow of turning » Augustin. Civ. Dei XI. 21. Accordingly, in respect of its knowability, created being is present not only to the whole of eternity, but also wholly. Therefore, as St Thomas says, cont. gent. 1. I. c. 66, « whatever is done through the whole course of time, the divine intellect intuits in its whole eternity, as present; nor, because it is done in a certain part of time, has it always been existing. » The reason and foundation of this eternal presence, however, is that from eternity it was true that such a created being exists at one determinate difference of time, is past at another, future at another; and all these differences the eternal knowledge of God intuits in the same way always. This matter will be dealt with further below, where we treat of God's knowledge.

II. The truth of the notion declared so far, concerning the coexistence of temporal things with divine eternity, is confirmed by the explicit doctrine of the holy Fathers. For the Fathers, when they speak of the presence of all things in the eternity of God, constantly regard it in connexion with the will or permission and with knowledge, and under eternal knowledge. « Whatever is in things has never not been with God; and these things, although they began at their creation, are nevertheless not begun in relation to the knowledge or power of God. And the prophet bears witness to us, saying: God, who made all things that are to come⁶. For the things which are to come, although in that they are to be created, they will still come to be; yet to God, for whom there is nothing new or sudden (al. recens) in creating things, they are already done, since both the dispensation of times is that they be created, and already in the foreknowing efficacy of divine power they have been created..... All their preparation is coeternal with God » Hilarius de Trin. l. XII. n. 39. So too St Ambrose, de Fide ad Gratian. l. I. c. 15. al 7. « To God, things which are future are present, and to him to whom all things are foreknown, things to come are as things done, just as it is written: he who made the things that are to come. » St Augustine declares these things frequently. « Where and when he will act, the unchanging counsel is with him, in whose disposition times, whatever is future, are already made. For while moving temporal things, he is not moved temporally, nor does he know things to be done otherwise than as things done » Aug. Civ. Dei X. 12. He treats the matter most lucidly in l. II. ad Simplician. q. 2. n. 2, where he shows why in God knowledge rather than foreknowledge is to be said. « For if God's knowledge, he says, has the things themselves, they are not future to him but present, and so it can no longer be called foreknowledge but only knowledge. But if, just as in the order of temporal creatures, so with him the things which are future are not yet, but he anticipates them by knowing them; then he perceives them twice, in one way according to the foreknowledge of future things, and in another way according to present knowledge. Something therefore accedes temporally to God's knowledge, which is most absurd and most false. » If therefore foreknowledge and knowledge are said with regard to the knower himself, in that foreknowledge is in him differently while things are not yet in their own existence, and knowledge differently while they now exist: it must be denied that there is foreknowledge in God. For in him there is no succession from a more imperfect knowledge to a more perfect; but in the same way always all things are present to his eternal and unchanging knowledge in every state of theirs. If, however, the diverse state of things is considered, nothing hinders that the knowledge to which the state of things as yet future is subject be called foreknowledge, and the same, insofar as the state of things as now existing is subject to it, be called knowledge. But because the intuition of God is directed from eternity to both states, there is no succession in the divine knowledge but in the things known.

Many other Fathers, following St Augustine in this most true manner of considering God's knowledge, do the same: for example, Gregorius M., Moral. l. XX. n. 63. ed. Maur. « How, he says, is he foreknowing, since nothing is foreknown except what is future; and we know that for God nothing is future, before whose eyes no things are past, present things do not pass away, future things do not come; for everything that has been and will be for us is present to his sight, and whatever is present he can know rather than foreknow... And because he sees those things which are future to us, yet which are always at hand to him, he is called foreknowing; although he does not at all foresee what he sees as present. For also whatever things are, are seen in his eternity not because they are (now in act), but they are (by infallible consequence) because they are seen⁷.... For in him neither things past nor future can be found, but all changeable things endure unchangeably, and those which cannot exist together in themselves, all stand together to him at once. » So also Boethius (de Consol. l. V. pros. 6.) and St Anselm (de casu diaboli c. 21.) teach that knowledge rather than foreknowledge is in God, for the reason that « his infinite knowledge, embracing all the spaces of the past and of the future, considers them as though they were already being done, in simple cognition. » Whoever desires more, let him read Didacus Ruiz, de scientia Dei disp. 28. sect. 4. and disp. 25. sect. 4.

Thus these are the things which the Fathers most clearly teach. a) Temporal things, if « considered in themselves, according to creation, in that which they are to be created, in the order of temporal creatures, » that is, are regarded in real existence, do not coexist with divine eternity except when they now exist in themselves. But indeed b) if times and the things which are in time are considered as they are subject to « God's knowledge, eyes, gaze, counsel, disposition, preparation, dispensation, power, foreknowing efficacy », so all times and whatever is made in time are, from eternity and always in the same way, all present together to the knowledge and power of God, and on the part of divine power and efficacy are already made, already created⁸, because their preparation is coeternal with God. Hence c) the object of the unchanging divine gaze, which is always in the same state, is from eternity the very real being of all those things which are made and are in time, although that being does not exist in itself from eternity; because God « does not perceive them according to the variety of the three times, not otherwise now and otherwise before, not in one way according to the foreknowledge of future things and in another according to present knowledge, but comprehends them all in one stable and everlasting presence. » Hence d) the being of things according to their knowability—that is, the fact that such things, such contingent or even free actions of creatures, exist at a certain difference of time—this knowable being of things is from eternity the (secondary) object and term of divine intuition; nor does it then first begin to be the object of divine intuition when its real existence begins. Wherefore actual existence in time is indeed the reason why it is true from eternity that such a thing exists in act at such a difference of time; and therefore the actual existence of a thing in time is the reason why the same thing is in the eternal state of knowability, even while the thing does not yet actually exist; and accordingly actual existence in time is a condition without which that existence would not be an object of eternal divine vision. Yet the cause or condition of divine intuition is not actual existence, in such a way that there is no intuition except when the thing itself actually exists. Therefore the presence of things according to knowable being in eternity precedes divine vision by reason; but divine vision precedes the actual existence of things not only by reason but by the whole eternity, as St Augustine says (Civ. Dei XII. 25.). The whole can be expressed in this formula: actual coexistence is not a necessary condition of eternal divine intuition; actual existence in time is the foundation of eternal knowability and of the relation to divine intuition; actual existence, according to the relation of knowability, is present to divine eternity to the whole and wholly.

Hence it is clear how there is no real contradiction between the many Fathers, to be cited in their place, who are accustomed to affirm, particularly about the free acts of creatures, that those acts are not so because they are seen by God; rather they are seen because they are; and between Pope Gregory the Great, whom we have heard teaching: « whatever things are, are not seen in his eternity because they are; but they are because they are seen. » For Gregory clearly speaks of actual coexistence⁹, of which it is most true from what has been said that things are not seen by God because they now are in act; but rather, from the fact that God sees things from eternity, it follows as an infallible and necessary consequence that things exist in act at the difference of time at which they exist, and as God sees them existing¹⁰. Other Fathers, however, consider the existence of things insofar as it is the foundation why things are knowable as existing; and in this sense the truth of existence at some difference of time is prior by reason to the intuition of it: and therefore things are not because they are seen; but because they at some time are, they are seen from eternity.

After all this, I think it is manifest that the saying « all things are present to divine eternity » cannot be admitted in the interpretation that the coexistence of things from eternity is meant. But the truth being supposed that things, when they are, coexist with eternity in the manner explained above, the whole dissent comes down to this: whether it must be said that the presence of things in eternity is nothing other than that things are known by God through eternal knowledge, in which there is no succession; or rather that it should be said thus: that very actual being, which begins in time according to its real existence, is subject from eternity to divine intuition according to its knowability. If those who speak in the first way also maintain that contingent things, and especially free acts, are not known by God from eternity as they are in themselves, but as God comprehends the whole efficacy of the cause, as has pleased some, then the difference between the former and the latter opinion would be real: but if it is conceded—as we shall demonstrate below—that the actual being itself, and therefore also the contingent and free act knowable in itself, is from eternity an object of divine intuition, because it has been true from eternity that this act exists at such a time, then the difference between the two opinions turns into a merely verbal one, and the whole dispute will be about the manner of speaking. It cannot, however, be denied that according to the manner of speaking the latter is far clearer and more distinct.

The divine immensity is the eminence of God above the relations of place and space.

« As eternity stands in relation to time, so divine immensity stands in relation to place and space. This, therefore, is to be understood not only as the omnipresence of God, but as the eminence of the absolute divine Being above every relation of place and space; just as eternity is eminent above all relations of time. According to this notion, the attribute of immensity is both understood from the absolute perfection of the divine essence and deduced from the direct doctrine of the Scriptures. »

I. Just as to any thing enduring in any way time, or a succession of things, can coexist, and therefore to the eternal, time without limit can coexist: so also to any existing thing another can coexist in that relation which we call presence; and therefore for him who in his mode of existing through presence is unlimited, other things can be present, or he himself can be present to others without limit. Whoever has such a mode of presence will rightly be called immense. Just as, therefore, the first and obvious notion of eternity seems to be conceived by comparison with coexisting time without limit; so the notion of immensity that first presents itself seems to be conceived as presence without limit of place and space.

1°. Let us consider immensity under this concept, whether it is a perfection and belongs to the absolutely perfect God. The presence of spirits (for we may now rightly suppose that the spirit is God) is not in the same way as the natural and empirical presence of bodies. Those which have parts outside parts, or which are extended, can naturally be present to other extended things only in such a way that the relation of presence differs for each of the parts, and part corresponds to part and whole to whole in that space which is formed by the extension itself. Spirits, on the contrary, are wholly present (for they have no parts) and can exhibit their presence to several things at once, and so even to extended things and spaces, in such a way that the whole spirit is in the whole and whole in each of the parts. This power of presence is without doubt some perfection in a spirit, and greater the more widely the power of presenting itself extends. In a finite spirit, however, this power cannot be unlimited, but necessarily has its limits; nor perhaps is it always in act as to its whole efficacy, but can be only partly in power (cf. Suarez Metaphys. disp. 51. sect. 4. n. 32. sqq.). All limitations of this kind, however, are wholly repugnant to an infinite spirit¹.

Therefore: a) God, an infinitely perfect spiritual substance, cannot exist without being able to be present to other existing things, whatever things are supposed to exist. b) In God, an infinite spirit and pure act, a power of presence cannot be conceived as partly in act and partly in power; but it is always wholly in act, insofar as it is something real in God, since in reality it is nothing other than the existing intellectual substance absolutely perfect, which, whatever it is, is in act (cf. above p. 302.)². c) The power of presence cannot in God be restricted to certain limits, beyond which God would not be present in act; but it is an absolute power to which every limitation is repugnant; or God, formally as present substance, is absolute power and perfection without limit, even in the aspect of presence. Therefore, without doubt, immensity under this concept—that God is intrinsically determined to intimate presence in all existing things without limit—is a perfection included in the absolute perfection of God.

Let it be well noted, in order to guard against ambiguity, that presence can be said in two ways: a) as it connotes a creature really coexisting. In this way omnipresence is an attribute relative ad extra, and by reason of its contingent term is necessary only on hypothesis; but on the hypothesis of an existing creature, relative omnipresence necessarily follows from the absolute perfection of being (cf. above pp. 357. 258. 311.). We, however, are now treating not of the relative but of the absolute attribute. Thus b) presence can be understood as it is absolute perfection³ in God. In this way it is the absolute divine Esse itself, unlimited in presence, which we declare through the co-signification of a coexistence of creatures possible only indefinitely. Concerned therefore with this presence, or better absolute adsentia (cf. Suarez Metaphys. disp. 30. sect. 7. n. 35.), we say it is the divine immensity, by which God so exists that no creature is possible, no possible place, no possible space, to which God, if those created things were to exist wherever and of whatever magnitude, would not be intimately present without any of its own⁴ change. Cf. Anselm. Monolog. c. 23.

In this notion of the immensity of God which⁵ we have just given, we might perhaps rest content, without asking further what it is. In truth, however, everyone readily perceives that this notion is most imperfect. For the explanation is almost wholly drawn from the relation of reason to possible creatures or, what comes to the same, to possible places and spaces (which they call imaginary space); but the ground of this relation, which alone is properly the absolute attribute of immensity, remains most obscure. Indeed there is a danger that (as St Augustine relates happened to himself while still a young man, Confess. VII. 5.) we conceive immensity from this explanation as a certain infinite extension and diffusion; just as the error is easy by which eternity is conceived as an infinite time and infinite succession, while it is explained through the relation of reason to possible time (or imaginary time, as they say). This error of judgment may indeed be avoided by adding the negation that immensity is not by way of diffusion, just as eternity is not by way of succession; yet we must endeavour, if it can be done, to form a somewhat more polished concept of immensity, from which we may understand the very reason why it neither is nor can be after the manner of diffusion and extension.

2°. When we think of objective truth in the metaphysical order, or what is the same, when we think of the absolutely necessary laws by which whatever is or can be is subject and governed, we readily understand that these truths or laws are ontologically prior and independent of all relations of place and space; on the contrary, place and space are subject to those laws and governed by them⁶. Since therefore this independence from such relations is immediately evident to us, we judge the question absurd, whether it is true here or there, or whether it is also true beyond the limits and spaces of this universe, for example that the same thing cannot at once be and not be, or that equal things added to equal things make equal sums, and so on. Clearly, necessary and essential truths, considered in themselves, are exempt from all relations of place; and their own reason stands fast, even where there is no place, no space, nothing that is called here or there. If, however, there is some place and some space, the reason of truth will certainly hold there too, not as though truth moved to a place, or were in a place circumscriptively or definitively; but rather the reason of truth is everywhere the same, because in itself it is independent of all local limits. Now who does not see that it is equally absurd to call into question whether that which is truth itself, and the root and foundation of all truth, is here or there? Truth itself (ἡ αὐτοαλήθεια) is ontologically prior to everything that is said to be here or there: every place, every position, every space depends on it, not only in its reality, if it has any, but in its very possibility; and therefore it is above all and beyond all such relations. « And I looked at other things, and saw that they owe it to you that they are, and that in you all finite things are; yet not as in a place, but because you hold all things by the hand of truth » S. Aug. Confess. VII. n. 21. Hence if there is no place and no space and no creature, truth itself is in itself: « before all things God was alone; he himself was to himself both world and place and all things » Tertullian. cont. Prax. c. 5. But when place and space and any creature whatever is thought of, it cannot be conceived in the mind as existing somewhere, nor can it exist somewhere without truth itself, God, being there also: not as though God, truth, by some change were existing in another way than before, or began to be where previously he was not; but the change has been made in the created thing, in place or in space, which previously were not. Before, there was no here and there; but once they are, they can be only in God and with God. Thus God is nowhere locally (by position, circumscription, or limitation to some where outside of which he would not be); but he is everywhere, as belongs to truth and wisdom and is necessary from their intrinsic reason. « You have grasped little if it has been revealed to you of him (God) that he is nowhere, who is not excluded by any place. But in that sublime and incomprehensible manner of his, as all things are in him, so he is in all things » S. Bernard. Consid. V. c. 6.

Since all those things whose existence we perceive we behold under the categories of space and time (που και ποτε), and the presence of created spirits themselves is restricted within certain limits and to an intelligible place, as St John Damascene says (Fid. orthodox. II. 17.), a great difficulty arises for us in conceiving an existence free from all these relations. Yet for overcoming this difficulty no more apt means, and no reason more proper to the thing itself, seems possible to devise than—as St Augustine learned by long meditations—to think of God as he is, Truth and Wisdom. « Therefore let us not suppose, as though by spatial magnitude, that God is diffused through all things, but rather as he is, great wisdom » Augst. ep. 187. ad Dardan. c. 4. n. 11. « For is truth nothing, since it is diffused neither through finite nor through infinite spaces of places? And you cried out from afar: rather, indeed: I am who am » Id. Confess. VII. c. 10. Cf. contr. epistol. Manichaei cc. 15-19.

II. According to this reason, with the concept of immensity now established, the truth of this immensity follows from the infinite perfection of God itself, not only because the very power of presenting oneself is simply a perfection, and so unlimited presence necessarily belongs to God without limitation and in act, as was said above; but also immediately from the formal reason that God is the absolute Being itself, absolute truth and wisdom and substantial power.

1°. It is therefore evidently absurd to conceive, even in thought, the absolute Being itself, absolute truth and wisdom, as subject to any relations of place and space, such that it could be within determinate limits beyond which Being, truth, wisdom and power would no longer be. Absolute truth and wisdom and active power, absolute virtue and ἐνέργεια, by the very fact that it is, is exempt from all local limitations, and it can nowhere be something defined by place beyond which it is not; but it is everywhere, as above and beyond all place; and place, and space, and any creature whatever, if it is, is in that absolute virtue, nor can it be conceived as absent from it anywhere.

Hence it is clear, a), that it was an absurd and most wretched play of the imagination when some ancient heretics, and more recently Augustine Steuchus Eugubinus, and the Calvinian Vorstius (see Petav. l. III. c. 7.) taught that God is everywhere not by essence but only by power and operation. Did truth itself, wisdom itself, absolute power itself seem to them to be some mathematical point, from which operations are to be imagined as issuing like rays from the sun? It follows, b), from the doctrine set forth, that absolute power cannot be conceived as operating anywhere where its own essence and substance is not. This theorem follows necessarily from the fact that it is repugnant to the intrinsic nature of him who is absolute power itself, that he should be absent anywhere and so subject to the limitations of place or space; without any need to appeal to that saying, which is often used as a kind of principle: « there is no action at a distance. » For this principle, taken universally with regard to action, is at least not evident, and is denied or called into doubt by several weighty theologians, with Scotus, Gabriele Biel, Valentia, Vasquez, Franc. de Lugo, etc. Thus divine action at a distance is not given, nor can it be conceived, because nothing is, or can be conceived, distant from God, as we have proved; we do not, however, press the inference by which many, according to the axiom stated, deduce immensity from the fact that God operates, or can operate, everywhere.

2°. That the immensity of God, and omnipresence intimately bound up with it, are contained in the doctrine of the Catholic faith is manifest from universal ecclesiastical preaching. The doctrine of the Fathers not only comprehends the dogma itself, but also distinctly embraces the explanation of the dogma which we have proposed a little above, so that from them we may understand not only whether the divine immensity is, but also what it is, as far as this is granted in our present darkness. So that we may not be too long, let the declarations of the Fathers be read in Petavium, l. III. c. 7-10., from which each will see the proof of our thesis confirmed; which, since it is nothing other than a commentary on the doctrine of the Fathers, we have taken pains to make.

As for the Scriptures, in them divine immensity is described, accommodated to our manner of understanding, very much in the way that eternity is removed from the limitations of time, by opposition to the limits of place and space. a) As eternity is expressed by saying that God is at every time and before all time; so immensity is explained through God's presence in every place and space, the totality of which is commonly called « heaven and earth, » together with the declaration that God is contained by no spaces. « Since he is the Lord of heaven and earth, he does not dwell in temples made with hands…. Yet he is not far from each one of us; for in him we live, and move, and are » Act. XVII. 24. 27. 28. « Do not I fill heaven and earth? » Ier. XXIII. 24. « Is it to be thought that God truly dwells upon the earth? For if heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain you, how much less this house which I have built? » 3. Reg. VIII. 27 ; 2. Paral. VI. 1. « He is higher than heaven, and what will you do? deeper than hell, and whence will you know? longer is his measure than the earth, and broader than the sea » Iob XI. 8. Likewise b) as eternity is expressed by saying that in God all time, past, present and future, is one, and therefore difference and succession of time is denied; so immensity is declared by the fact that before the divine presence the far and the near are one in space, and consequently before it there is no difference of places and spaces. « Am I a God at hand, says the Lord, and not a God afar off? If a man hide himself in secret places, shall I not see him? » Ier. XXIII. 23. « If I ascend into heaven, you are there; if I go down into hell, you are present. If I should dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, for even there your hand shall lead me » Ps. CXXXVIII. 8. « God is in heaven above, and on earth beneath » Ios. II. 11. Finally c) as eternity is expressed by saying that divine duration has neither beginning nor end; so immensity is shown by the fact that divine presence has no term. « O Israel, how great is the house of the Lord, and vast (ἐπιμηκης) the place of his possession. He is great and has no end, high and immeasurable » (μεγας καὶ οὐχ ἔχει τελευτὴν, ὑψηλὸς καὶ ἀμέτρητος) Baruch III. 25.

God is present to all creatures according to essence, presence and power.

« The divine immensity with the co-signification of existing creatures » is omnipresence; in which the Doctors rightly distinguish three things: that God is intimately present to all creatures by essence, and in many different ways besides by presence and power. »

To complete the doctrine set out in the preceding thesis, here we consider the absolute attribute of immensity according to its relation of reason to what is outside God, or according to the coexistence of things which are in place and space, or which are said to exist in whatever way.

Concerning the coexistence of every place and every space and every creature¹ with God, and in the intimate presence of God, no further difficulty can remain once the divine immensity has been explained in its absolute aspect. For by the very fact that creatures actually exist, God, by reason of his immensity, is necessarily intimately present to them; nor is omnipresence in God, according to its formal concept, anything other than immensity itself with the co-signification of the coexisting creature. The theologians and ascetics, however, are accustomed, with the Master, 1. dist. 37., and with St Thomas, 1. q. 8. a. 3., to distinguish a threefold reason by which God is in all creatures: by essence, presence, and power.

What is principally considered in this distinction is this: that it is declared that God is in all things not merely by some operation—which was the most serious error of some—but that the divine nature and substance itself is everywhere; and then that it is explicitly taught that this existence of God in all things is not as if idle and inert, but is the most active presence of the first cause of all being and of all good. Moreover, not all theologians explain in the same way which distinct reasons and relations they wish to be signified by these names. St Thomas himself explains the matter somewhat differently in his commentary on 1. dist. 37. q. 1. a. 2, and differently in the Summa 1. q. 8. a. 3. The ambiguity is almost wholly in the explanation of what it means to be in all things by presence, as distinguished from the mode of existing in all things by essence and power. The Angelic Doctor explains in the Summa 1. c.: « he is by presence in all things, insofar as all things are bare and open to his eyes; » but in the commentary, 1. c.: « according to this, he says, that he operates in a thing, it is said to be in the thing by presence…. and because the operation does not abandon the divine power from which it proceeds, therefore he is said to be in the thing by power, and because power is the essence itself, it follows that he is in the thing also by essence. »

Thus, insofar as God is considered to be in all things by essence, abstracting from God's operation in the creature, from the manner in which he manifests himself, from the gifts he confers, from the special way by which he elevates the creature and joins it to himself, but considering only the existence of the essence in itself, God is everywhere necessarily and in the same way. With this existence in all things by essence there is the connexion that he is in all things by power, insofar as all things in their whole being, in every perfection, in every act, depend on the conservation and action of God, which moreover is really the divine essence itself, intimately present. Likewise, from his existence in all things by essence it follows that he is in all things by presence: generally indeed as overseer and as « an eye brighter than the sun », holding creatures intimately present to himself, both all and each; but specially God is said to be somewhere and to be in creatures by singular presence, where, the veil being as it were removed, he shows himself present by singular manifestations, by singular gifts both transient and especially permanent, by a singular elevation and conjunction of the creature with himself, especially of the rational creature, to whom he gives himself as it were, and in a special way unites himself as the object of faith, hope, charity, vision and beatific enjoyment.

Hence it is manifest that God is everywhere present by essence, yet not everywhere in the same way present by power and presence. Thus in Scripture God is said to be present in a special way with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, with Moses, Joshua, Gideon, David, Solomon, etc. « I will be with you and bless you; » « fear not, for I am with you » Gen. XXVI. 3. 24; XXXI. 3. 38; Exod. III. 12; Deut. XXXI. 23;. Ios. I. 5. sqq.; Iud. VI. 16; 2. Reg. VII. 3. 9; 3. Reg. XI. 38. Likewise where God manifested himself in singular visions to Jacob, Gen. XXVIII. 17; to Moses, Exod. III. 5, the place is called « the house of God and the gate of heaven, » « holy ground. » In the tabernacle and in the temple God is said to dwell, because he willed that place to be consecrated to himself, so that in it he might manifest himself in a special way both by sensible signs and by hearing prayers, and so that there he might be acknowledged in a special way as present, and worship might be offered to him as present. « Let your eyes be open toward this house day and night, toward the house of which you said, My name shall be there… that you may hear the supplication of your servant and of your people Israel, whatever they shall pray in this place » 3. Reg. VIII. 29. 30. etc. From these things it is also clear how God is in a special way in phenomena and appearances, by which he supernaturally manifests his presence, of which kind there are many in the Old Testament, and in the New the form of a dove over Christ when baptized, tongues of fire over the Apostles, etc. He is said to come to rational souls, to dwell and abide in them when they are sanctified: both because he, present to them intimately by essence, perpetually pours into them and in them conserves and increases the precious gifts of grace and the charisms, by which they are constituted in supernatural likeness to him in adoptive sonship; and because, so sanctified, he presents himself immediately to them as the object of faith, hope and charity. The souls themselves abide in God as the object of paternal knowledge and love, so that he may confer eternal life upon them; and God abides in them as the object of filial knowledge and love, so that a mutual friendship intervenes between them and God. Further, from what has been said there is explained the special presence of God the Holy Spirit, revealing in the prophets and Apostles, assisting and governing in the Church: « The Paraclete with you forever; » « behold I am with you all days » Io. XIV. 16; Matth. XXVIII. 20. In heaven, however, God present manifests himself with unveiled face in all the angels and saints, presenting himself to be seen, loved and enjoyed, as he is, in the fullness of his essence, truth, goodness and beauty, which by one name is called the glory of God. « For though it is not doubted that he is everywhere, says St Bernard (on Ps. Qui habitat, serm. 1. n. 4.), yet he is in heaven in such a way that in comparison with him he seems hardly to be on earth at all. Hence also when we pray we say: Our Father, who art in heaven. For just as the soul, though it is whole in the whole body, is nevertheless more excellently and singularly in the head, in which are all the senses…. wherefore, as regards the manner in which it is in the head, the other members seem in a certain way not so much to dwell in it as to be governed by it: so if we consider that presence in which the blessed angels enjoy him, we seem to have scarcely any protection and name of God at all. « Now the most intimate and sublime presence of all is that of the Word in the human nature of Christ through the hypostatic union, where the Son of God makes the created and visible nature his own, and so, according to the assumed nature, the divine person himself becomes visible: « that which we have heard, that which we have seen with our eyes, that which we have looked upon and our hands have handled of the Word of life: and the life was manifested and we have seen » etc. 1. Io. I. 1. 2.

Hence from all these things it is understood how God, though necessarily present everywhere, is said to approach, come to the creature, or withdraw from it and leave it, and how the second and third persons are understood to be sent to the creature. These things, namely, cannot be understood of presence simply according to essence; but they are understood by reason of this, that God, according to presence and special operation, in the manner declared, begins or ceases to be in the creature; and from this change of either presence or absence, as is clear from what has been often repeated, there arises not in God but in the creature. « Nor is he absent where he is far away; for where he is not present by grace, he is present by vengeance; he touches all things, yet he does not touch all things equally…. and since he is never unlike himself, he touches unlike things in unlike ways » Pope Gregory the Great, in Ezech. l. I. hom. 8. n. 16.

Corollary to the preceding theses. If we compare space and time, which are commonly called imaginary, with the attributes of immensity and eternity of God, it is easily understood that, since both of these are nothing real outside the concept of the mind, the former can be confused with the immensity of God, and the latter with the eternity of God, only absurdly. We form the concept of imaginary space while negatively we abstract from the existence of bodies, or rather from the real existence of every creature, which is limited in the mode of presence, and positively we understand the possibility of bodies and of extension, or of creatures existing, extended without end. But just as God, on account of the absolute perfection of his presence, is subject to no limits of place and of real space; so also he is subject to no limits of this kind, which are merely possible. Therefore, just as God, on account of the eminence of his presence, is nowhere in real space definitively or circumscriptively, but everywhere by simple existence; so, on account of the same exemption from all limiting relations of place, his presence, even in places that are possible, which we can conceive without end, is nowhere and everywhere, although there he is present to no thing, because there no thing exists.

Similarly we form the concept of imaginary time, negatively abstracting from all successions that exist in reality, and positively conceiving continuous successions possible without end. Yet we can conceive none which, if it were to exist in reality, would not necessarily be coexisting with the same eternal and immutable divine duration, with which the real successions of times, which now are, coexist.

From these things it is further understood that the judgement must be corrected, if anyone perhaps imagines God to himself as ever greater and greater, toward the indefinite, whether in immensity or in duration. For immensity is the most simple absolute perfection in the order of presence, always the same, by which God is exempt from every local limitation; and eternity is the most simple absolute permanence, without any possible succession, always the same. But spaces and places, in which the immense God is present, and successions and times which coexist with the eternal God, can be multiplied into the indefinite, without ever arriving at a last term. According to these possible successions, the particles of time before and after, prior and posterior, greater and lesser duration must be explained when they are transferred to that place where there was no time but only divine eternity: as when it is said that the world could have been created sooner or later, and it is asked, « why then rather than before it was made? Just as it can be asked why here rather than where it is, and not elsewhere. » See Augustine's disputation in Civ. Dei XI. 5, whose conclusion is: « if they say that the thoughts of men are empty, by which they imagine infinite places, since there is no place beyond the world, it is answered to them that in this way men vainly think of the past times of God's leisure, since there is no time before the world. »²