Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam

Johannes Baptist Franzelin

Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam

Johannes Baptist Franzelin (1816–1886)

First published 1870

Johannes Baptist Franzelin's Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam treats the divine nature and attributes within nineteenth-century scholastic theology. The present digital edition follows the Rome 1870 print and includes the Latin text with an English translation. The title pages, approbations, errata, and indexes are omitted.


Prolegomenon: On the Object of Theology

§ I: Section I

Caput I: Chapter I

Thesis I: The doctrine on the rational knowledge of God belongs also to theology

Thesis II: Scripture declares that God is made manifest through the works of creation to human reason

Thesis III: The rational knowledge of the natural law, asserted by the Apostle for the Gentiles, includes and demonstrates a rational knowledge of God as supreme lawgiver

Thesis IV: The interpretation of Rom. II. 14. 15. concerning unbelievers and the rational knowledge of the natural law is vindicated

Thesis V: Scripture, in asserting a rational knowledge of God's existence from God's works, in no way presupposes the tradition of positive doctrine about God or faith as a necessary condition

Caput II: Chapter II

Thesis I: The Fathers agree that, by the light of reason and from God's manifestation in creatures, one can arrive at a first knowledge and at a more refined knowledge of God's existence

Thesis II: On the sense in which the Fathers call the notion of God innate to human nature

Caput III: Chapter III

Thesis I: On the manifestation in supernatural facts, insofar as through them God is intelligible to reason

Thesis II: On the existence of God as revealed and therefore to be believed by faith

§ II: Section II

Caput I: Chapter I

Thesis I: The constant teaching of the Fathers on our mediate and analogical knowledge of God

Thesis II: The agreement of St Augustine with the teaching of the other Fathers is demonstrated

Thesis III: On our knowledge of what God is, according to the threefold way of affirmation, negation and eminence

Thesis IV: On the multiplicity of notions by which we understand God

Caput II: Chapter II

Thesis I: The immediate vision of the divine essence is natural to no creature

Thesis II: The immediate vision of God as he is in himself is proposed and promised to us in revelation as our ultimate end

Thesis III: On the light of glory

Thesis IV: On the extensive scope of the beatific vision with respect to its principal object and its secondary objects

Thesis V: On the reason why God, though clearly seen, is nevertheless incomprehensible to the blessed

Thesis VI: The more difficult modes of speaking are explained by which the holy Fathers deny comprehension, but not intuitive vision, of the divine essence

§ III: Section III

Caput I: Chapter I

Thesis I: On the proper reason of the divine essence, insofar as we distinguish it from the attributes by consideration

Thesis II: On the distribution and order to be observed in treating the divine attributes

Caput II: Chapter II

Thesis I: The fullness of absolute perfection is expressed in Scripture by the name of God, 'He who is'

Thesis II: The meaning of the name 'He who is', and the absolute perfection of God, are declared by the holy Fathers

Thesis III: On the infinite difference between divine being and universal being

Caput III: Chapter III

Thesis I: The divine essence is one with the unity of singularity

Thesis II: On the most simple unity in the divine nature

Thesis III: From the teachings of revelation the divine simplicity is declared, and its proper reason, that God is pure act

Thesis IV: How God is truth itself

Thesis V: How God is goodness itself

Thesis VI: How God is beauty itself

How God is beauty itself.

« Just as God is truth itself and goodness itself, so he is beauty itself, and therefore the exemplar and efficient cause of all derived beauty. »

Moreover, the beautiful is closely connected with the good. Thus God is, like truth itself and goodness itself, essential beauty itself. The beautiful is defined a posteriori from its effect by St Thomas, 1. q. 5. a. 4. ad 1: « those things are called beautiful which, being seen, please. » Hence the same Holy Doctor observes that the beautiful relates to the cognitive power, as the good to the appetite. Wherefore, in the definition given, if it is extended to the beautiful as widely as it reaches, the seeing is to be understood not only of the sensible but also, and above all, of the intellectual. In this way the definition comprehends under itself those things which agree not univocally but only analogically in the reason by which they are called beautiful. Therefore there ought not to be postulated one and the same reason of the beautiful, but only an analogous one in the diverse things which are and are called beautiful. The beautiful of the lowest reason can be called that which by itself and immediately delights the sense of sight and hearing alone, in which there is a greater analogy with the knowing faculty than in the other senses: as a beautiful colour and a beautiful sound are called. The beautiful is of a second and more perfect grade, which reaches the intellectual power, through sight and hearing or through the imagination, and delights it. It is easy to see that the beautiful in either of these senses cannot be formally except in sensible things, which are either sensible in themselves and in reality, or are presented as sensible.

But since that definition, drawn from the effect, does not declare what the beautiful is in itself, « for things are not beautiful because they delight, but they delight because they are beautiful » (cf. Aug. de vera relig. c. 32.): the intrinsic reason and essence of beauty remains to be inquired into. This is generally thought to consist in the unity of multiplicity: « things are beautiful because their parts are like one another, and are brought together by a certain joining into one fitting whole » Aug. de ver. relig. c. 32. n. 59. Therefore it must be said that many things are as it were matter, and unity itself is the form of beauty: « the form of all beauty is unity, » says the same St Augustine, ep. 18. al. 63. ad Coelestin. n. 2. Whence the greater and more distinct multiplicity, provided that the intensity of unity corresponds to it, the greater will be the beauty, whether it is a multiplicity simultaneous in space, as the beauty of a painting; or successive in time, as the beauty of music. But where unity and commensuration are lacking, the formal reason of beauty is wholly lacking. On the contrary, if unity were the greatest in utter simplicity, and the greatest virtual multiplicity, beauty would be greatest. This, however, cannot be in sensible things.

Hence there is another beauty, and that a higher and nobler one, in purely intelligible and intellectual things. For those things which are the object neither of the senses nor of the imagination, but which, seen by the sole intuition of the mind, delight it, are most beautiful with a beauty to which that other, sensible beauty is not of the same reason, but only analogous. Hence intelligible beauty is found even in the abstract truths themselves, which, seen in their wonderful connection, and thus in the unity and simplicity of principles and in the marvellous variety and harmony of their consequences, fill the rational mind with the purest delight. In really existing things, unity in multiplicity and beauty are to be perceived by the mind first of all in every life, whether vegetative or sensitive, from which life, as effects and messengers of intrinsic beauty, there proceed the most beautiful sensible phenomena, for example in flowers, in the eye, and universally in animal bodies. Hence it can be understood how much more noble is the beauty in the rational soul, and still more exalted in pure spirits, where there is the greatest unity and simplicity of a most noble substance, and wonderful variety of faculties, powers, and virtues. Finally, most sublime is the beauty of soul and spirit in supernatural elevation through sanctifying grace, through the habits and virtues divinely infused into it, and through the fellowship of the divine nature; which beauty is completed in consummation through beatific glory.

Indeed, that supreme unity which God is, is the exemplary and efficient cause, infinitely eminent, of all beauty, order, harmony, multiplicity and unity, whether in corporeal or in spiritual things, in natural and in supernatural things; so that all this beauty comprehended together in created things, and all the splendour of truth and goodness shining forth in all spiritual creatures, is nothing but a faint image and dim shadow of the beauty of God, who is « itself, according to itself and with itself, always existing uniformly beautiful, and eminently anticipating in itself the fountain-like beauty of all that is beautiful » Dionys. div.nom. c. 4. §. 7. For its essence, one and most simple, in this its simplicity first comprehends all the reasons of all perfections, which we can distinguish; it then comprehends, precisely as imitable outside itself, eminently all the reasons of all things, not only of existing but also of possible things; moreover it comprehends, by one infinite thought, which is its very substance, all the reasons of all truth in its own essence; and it comprehends, by one substantial volition, all the reasons of all good in that same essence. And all these things are in it one most simple intellectual Esse, so that the unity of perfection, to which all diversity is repugnant, by its infinite intensity equals and surpasses infinitely many distinct things, if a mind could conceive it. If furthermore we consider the most simple unity of the infinite essence together with the real and necessary distinction of the persons of Father, Son and Holy Spirit among themselves, in perfect identity with the essence, we can, by thinking, conceive in some measure, or rather, in this our darkness, surmise, how God is absolute beauty in himself, in whose comprehension and infinite love the divine blessedness itself consists, and by whose clear vision every created mind is rapt into love and is at once blessed.

Caput IV: Chapter IV

Thesis I: On the proper reason of divine eternity

Thesis II: On the coexistence of temporal things with divine eternity

Thesis III: The divine immensity is God's eminence above the relations of place and space

Thesis IV: God is present to all creatures according to essence, presence and power

§ IV: Section IV

Caput I: Chapter I

Thesis I: God is spirit

Thesis II: The divine essence itself is an infinite, substantial understanding and comprehension

Thesis III: God, from his essence and from the infinity of his understanding, necessarily knows every truth

Thesis IV: The divine essence is the formal object of all truths; the other truths are the secondary object of God's knowledge

Thesis V: God knows all truths not only in the divine essence but also in themselves

Caput II: Chapter II

Thesis I: God's knowledge, one in itself, can be distinguished in many ways according to its various objects

Thesis II: The object of the knowledge of simple intelligence is all possibilities; the secondary object of the knowledge of vision is, first of all, all things existing independently of created liberty

Thesis III: God foresees all free acts of creatures

Thesis IV: On the proper objective reason of the foreknowledge of free acts

Thesis V: Human liberty is reconciled with infallible divine foreknowledge

Thesis VI: There is demonstrated in God a knowledge that is commonly called middle knowledge

Thesis VII: The objective truth of conditional future things is the proper object of middle knowledge

§ V: Section V

Caput I: Chapter I

Thesis I: On the antecedent and consequent will of God

Thesis II: On the distinctions of the saving will according to the teaching of St Augustine

Caput II: Chapter II

Thesis I: God's universal antecedent saving will is demonstrated from Scripture

Thesis II: The same universal saving will of God is demonstrated from the teaching of the Fathers

Thesis III: The teaching of St Augustine on the universality of the saving will is vindicated

Thesis IV: Under several interpretations of the text 1. Tim. II. 4., St Augustine never denied the universality of the antecedent saving will

Thesis V: By his antecedent will God wills the salvation of all, even of infants

Caput III: Chapter III

Thesis I: No positive reprobation is given that precedes the foresight of sin

Thesis II: No antecedent negative reprobation from eternal life is to be admitted

Thesis III: On the various senses in which predestination is taken in the manner of speaking of Scripture and the Fathers

Thesis IV: The gifts of God have in predestination the same order that they have in execution

Thesis V: The predestination of grace, and complete predestination considered according to all its effects taken together, is not from foreseen merit

Thesis VI: The predestination of adults to glory, considered in itself, is an act of the consequent will that follows foresight of supernatural merits

Thesis VII: The arguments brought against the doctrine demonstrated so far are examined

Thesis VIII: Neither the question of St Prosper in his letter to Augustine, n. 8, nor the reply of St Augustine can be understood of predestination to glory before or after foreseen merits, which are through truly gratuitous grace

Thesis IX: St Augustine, against the Pelagians and their remnants, never taught predestination to glory before foreseen supernatural merits, but taught a gratuitous predestination of grace to exclude natural merits

Thesis X: On the private opinion of St Augustine concerning predestination to glory

Thesis XI: On the opinion of St Thomas concerning predestination to glory considered in itself and apart

Thesis XII: The true sense of Rom. IX is declared

Thesis XIII: Other texts of Scripture, which are objected to by some, are explained

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