Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam

Johannes Baptist Franzelin

Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam

Johannes Baptist Franzelin (1816–1886)

First published 1870

Johannes Baptist Franzelin's Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam treats the divine nature and attributes within nineteenth-century scholastic theology. The present digital edition follows the Rome 1870 print and includes the Latin text with an English translation. The title pages, approbations, errata, and indexes are omitted.


Prolegomenon: On the Object of Theology

§ I: Section I

Caput I: Chapter I

Thesis I: The doctrine on the rational knowledge of God belongs also to theology

Thesis II: Scripture declares that God is made manifest through the works of creation to human reason

Thesis III: The rational knowledge of the natural law, asserted by the Apostle for the Gentiles, includes and demonstrates a rational knowledge of God as supreme lawgiver

Thesis IV: The interpretation of Rom. II. 14. 15. concerning unbelievers and the rational knowledge of the natural law is vindicated

Thesis V: Scripture, in asserting a rational knowledge of God's existence from God's works, in no way presupposes the tradition of positive doctrine about God or faith as a necessary condition

Caput II: Chapter II

Thesis I: The Fathers agree that, by the light of reason and from God's manifestation in creatures, one can arrive at a first knowledge and at a more refined knowledge of God's existence

Thesis II: On the sense in which the Fathers call the notion of God innate to human nature

Caput III: Chapter III

Thesis I: On the manifestation in supernatural facts, insofar as through them God is intelligible to reason

Thesis II: On the existence of God as revealed and therefore to be believed by faith

§ II: Section II

Caput I: Chapter I

Thesis I: The constant teaching of the Fathers on our mediate and analogical knowledge of God

Thesis II: The agreement of St Augustine with the teaching of the other Fathers is demonstrated

Thesis III: On our knowledge of what God is, according to the threefold way of affirmation, negation and eminence

Thesis IV: On the multiplicity of notions by which we understand God

Caput II: Chapter II

Thesis I: The immediate vision of the divine essence is natural to no creature

Thesis II: The immediate vision of God as he is in himself is proposed and promised to us in revelation as our ultimate end

Thesis III: On the light of glory

Thesis IV: On the extensive scope of the beatific vision with respect to its principal object and its secondary objects

Thesis V: On the reason why God, though clearly seen, is nevertheless incomprehensible to the blessed

Thesis VI: The more difficult modes of speaking are explained by which the holy Fathers deny comprehension, but not intuitive vision, of the divine essence

§ III: Section III

Caput I: Chapter I

Thesis I: On the proper reason of the divine essence, insofar as we distinguish it from the attributes by consideration

Thesis II: On the distribution and order to be observed in treating the divine attributes

Caput II: Chapter II

Thesis I: The fullness of absolute perfection is expressed in Scripture by the name of God, 'He who is'

Thesis II: The meaning of the name 'He who is', and the absolute perfection of God, are declared by the holy Fathers

Thesis III: On the infinite difference between divine being and universal being

Caput III: Chapter III

Thesis I: The divine essence is one with the unity of singularity

Thesis II: On the most simple unity in the divine nature

Thesis III: From the teachings of revelation the divine simplicity is declared, and its proper reason, that God is pure act

Thesis IV: How God is truth itself

How God is truth itself.

From the demonstrated plenitude of absolute being it is further understood that God is truth itself, the supreme source and measure of all truth.

We are treating of the absolute properties or perfections of God, whose analogues in creatures are the transcendentals (being, one, true, good); therefore, after declaring the reason of divine being and of divine unity, it remains that we speak of truth and goodness.

The true and truth are spoken of in three ways: a) formally truth is the adequation of intellect with the thing understood; b) fundamentally the true is the thing itself to be understood, whether it is being insofar as it is intelligible, or being with a connotation of intellect, in which there is or can be conformity to the thing itself, or formal truth; c) morally truth is in signifying (see S. Th. de verit. q. 1. a. 1.). As regards this last notion, namely moral truth, veracity and truth can be distinguished. Insofar as a will and an act manifesting it correspond to formal truth perceived, that is, to true knowledge, this can be called veracity; but in the manifestation itself (e.g. by a spoken or written word), corresponding to formal truth, which manifestation has its origin in veracity, there is moral truth.

To this place the question of divine truth would properly belong only in the second sense; for if formal truth is considered, it would have to be treated in that part where the divine intellect and the knowledge of God are discussed, an order which St Thomas followed in both Summas. Yet on account of the intimate connection between fundamental truth and formal truth, we shall consider both aspects here together; and if anything about veracity needs elucidation, it will be more conveniently understood where we are about to speak of goodness, insofar as it is holiness. We consider divine truth both in itself and absolutely, and in comparison with analogous and participated truth.

I. The true, considered in things, is nothing other than being itself with a connotation of the intellect, which is conformed to it or can be conformed to it; or, in the words of St Thomas: « the truth which is in the thing itself is nothing other than an entity adequated to the intellect, or adequating the intellect to itself » (S.Th. de verit. q. 1. a. 4.). Truth in this sense is therefore the aptitude of being that the intellect may be conformed to it, which can be said in one word: the true is being itself under the aspect of knowability. Knowability, however, when the intellect is considered absolutely, extends as widely as the very reason of being; whence Augustine (Soliloq. l. II. c. 5.) simply defines: « that is seen to be true which is. » Therefore the greater the intensity of being, or the greater the perfection, the wider is the knowability of being, or the more intense is its truth: « where greatness itself is truth, whatever has more greatness must necessarily have more truth » Aug. de Trin. l.VIII. c. 1.

Now indeed: a) God, from what has been demonstrated, is the plenitude of all absolute Existence; he is perfection and greatness, not by bulk but by infinite power. b) God, from himself and necessarily, from the intrinsic reason of his essence, is this absolute perfection. c) Therefore the divine essence is not only infinitely intelligible, but has from the intrinsic reason of itself that it is actually infinitely understood and comprehended; because it is Existence, which as it is infinitely intelligible is also infinitely intellectual. For God is the plenitude of nobility in the whole reason and breadth of being; and the highest nobility of being which we can conceive is intellectuality, although in God it is more eminent than can be understood by us. The divine essence is therefore so intelligible that it cannot fail to be actually comprehended in accordance with its whole intelligibility; and it is the primary object of the divine intellection, so that God in his essence comprehends every truth by the same act by which he comprehends it, of which matter we shall speak in its place. Finally, d) an infinite entity, in its infinite intelligibility, is not only adequated to an infinite intellect, but is identically one thing comprehended and comprehension, understood and understanding. Just as therefore participated and dependent existence is true insofar as it is apt that the intellect be conformed to it, so absolute, infinite, and necessary Existence is substantial truth itself, insofar as from its intrinsic essence it is the understanding and comprehension of itself. « Truth is in the thing, says St Thomas 1. q. 16. a. 5, according as it has existence conformable to the intellect. This however is found most of all in God. For his Existence is not only conformed to his intellect, but is also itself his understanding. »

II. We shall understand in some measure the eminence of divine Existence by considering the reason in which truth stands to it in creatures. Truth which is, or can be conceived, apart from God is to be considered threefold: actual truth in existing things; purely ideal truth in possibles; formal truth in created intellects. Now indeed the source and measure of all this truth is divine truth: this is truth through itself and first truth; the other is participated truth, derived from the first truth.

For, first, things actually existing are true in relation to the divine intellect insofar as they correspond to the divine ideas; for the things themselves do not determine the divine intellect, but the divine intellect, comprehending the divine essence as imitable, which in conjunction with the divine will is called the practical intellect, is the cause for the things themselves, that they be, and be in this way, in which they correspond to the divine ideas : not that things are the measure of the divine intellect, but it is the measure of them. « Natural things, from which our intellect receives knowledge, says St Thomas, measure our intellect.... but they are measured by the divine intellect, in which all created things are, as all artificial things are in the intellect of the artificer. Thus the divine intellect is measuring and not measured; the thing is both measuring and measured; but our intellect is measured, not measuring natural things but only artificial ones. A natural thing therefore, constituted between two intellects, is called true according to its adequation to each: for according to its adequation to the divine intellect it is called true, insofar as it fulfils that for which it is ordered by the divine intellect... But according to its adequation to the human intellect a thing is called true insofar as it is by nature fitted to form a true estimation of itself » (S. Th. de verit. q. 1. a. 2.).

Hence also, the creature that acts freely according to the moral order corresponding to the divine ideas and good wills is called truth in Scripture; what acts against this order is called, and is, a lie. « It is not in vain said that every sin is a lie, because one sins only by that will which is contrary to truth, that is to God » Liber Sentent. ex Aug. sent. 150. Therefore, as « all the commandments of God are truth », « his law is truth », « all his ways are truth » Psal. CXVIII. (119.) 86. 142. 151. as norm and measure: so we are bidden « to walk in truth » and « to do truth. » On the contrary, the apostate angel « did not stand in truth, and truth is not in him » Io. VIII. 44; and those who « make a lie » are excluded from the heavenly Jerusalem, Apoc. XXI. 27; XXII. 15.

2°. The metaphysical order itself, and the ideal order of purely possibles, and all truth in them, which properly speaking is not in itself but can be, depends on this: that the divine essence is imitable outside itself in these modes and according to these laws. The whole metaphysical order is therefore constituted by the necessary laws of essences, which laws are necessary because the divine essence requires them. Hence the divine essence itself, not by a free will but from its necessary perfection, is the source and measure of all truth also of the metaphysical order.

3°. Formal truth in created intellects is a certain participation in divine truth, either through the immediate intellectual conjunction with the very essence and substantial divine truth, as it is in the vision in the light of glory; or through a supernatural light of another order, derived from the first truth, which light is in every supernatural knowledge in diverse modes and degrees; or through the communication of the habit of knowledge and of ideas, as it is with the angels, and was the natural knowledge of the first man; or finally through the communication of the lowest of all, which in us is the intellectual light, from whose conjunction with truth in things there arises the conformity of the intellect with the thing, or formal truth. This light, moreover, is itself also a certain participation in the truth and wisdom of God, 'and, as the Fathers speak, the seminal word λογος σπερματικος, through which we are constituted the image of God (supra p. 96. 141. seqq.).

Finally, from participated formal truth is derived the truth in our signs and words.

It is therefore evident that every truth which is, and which can be conceived, apart from God depends on God insofar as he is truth through himself, as on its principle, exemplar and measure. God is therefore, in the same sense in which he is the first Esse, also the first absolute truth. See Lessius de divin. perfect. l. VI. c. 4.

Thesis V: How God is goodness itself

Thesis VI: How God is beauty itself

Caput IV: Chapter IV

Thesis I: On the proper reason of divine eternity

Thesis II: On the coexistence of temporal things with divine eternity

Thesis III: The divine immensity is God's eminence above the relations of place and space

Thesis IV: God is present to all creatures according to essence, presence and power

§ IV: Section IV

Caput I: Chapter I

Thesis I: God is spirit

Thesis II: The divine essence itself is an infinite, substantial understanding and comprehension

Thesis III: God, from his essence and from the infinity of his understanding, necessarily knows every truth

Thesis IV: The divine essence is the formal object of all truths; the other truths are the secondary object of God's knowledge

Thesis V: God knows all truths not only in the divine essence but also in themselves

Caput II: Chapter II

Thesis I: God's knowledge, one in itself, can be distinguished in many ways according to its various objects

Thesis II: The object of the knowledge of simple intelligence is all possibilities; the secondary object of the knowledge of vision is, first of all, all things existing independently of created liberty

Thesis III: God foresees all free acts of creatures

Thesis IV: On the proper objective reason of the foreknowledge of free acts

Thesis V: Human liberty is reconciled with infallible divine foreknowledge

Thesis VI: There is demonstrated in God a knowledge that is commonly called middle knowledge

Thesis VII: The objective truth of conditional future things is the proper object of middle knowledge

§ V: Section V

Caput I: Chapter I

Thesis I: On the antecedent and consequent will of God

Thesis II: On the distinctions of the saving will according to the teaching of St Augustine

Caput II: Chapter II

Thesis I: God's universal antecedent saving will is demonstrated from Scripture

Thesis II: The same universal saving will of God is demonstrated from the teaching of the Fathers

Thesis III: The teaching of St Augustine on the universality of the saving will is vindicated

Thesis IV: Under several interpretations of the text 1. Tim. II. 4., St Augustine never denied the universality of the antecedent saving will

Thesis V: By his antecedent will God wills the salvation of all, even of infants

Caput III: Chapter III

Thesis I: No positive reprobation is given that precedes the foresight of sin

Thesis II: No antecedent negative reprobation from eternal life is to be admitted

Thesis III: On the various senses in which predestination is taken in the manner of speaking of Scripture and the Fathers

Thesis IV: The gifts of God have in predestination the same order that they have in execution

Thesis V: The predestination of grace, and complete predestination considered according to all its effects taken together, is not from foreseen merit

Thesis VI: The predestination of adults to glory, considered in itself, is an act of the consequent will that follows foresight of supernatural merits

Thesis VII: The arguments brought against the doctrine demonstrated so far are examined

Thesis VIII: Neither the question of St Prosper in his letter to Augustine, n. 8, nor the reply of St Augustine can be understood of predestination to glory before or after foreseen merits, which are through truly gratuitous grace

Thesis IX: St Augustine, against the Pelagians and their remnants, never taught predestination to glory before foreseen supernatural merits, but taught a gratuitous predestination of grace to exclude natural merits

Thesis X: On the private opinion of St Augustine concerning predestination to glory

Thesis XI: On the opinion of St Thomas concerning predestination to glory considered in itself and apart

Thesis XII: The true sense of Rom. IX is declared

Thesis XIII: Other texts of Scripture, which are objected to by some, are explained

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