Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam

On the infinite difference of divine being from universal being.

« They err without doubt who teach that the idea of being, under which we understand « whatever we conceive intellectually to be the idea of God; and so being, « which is the object of that idea, to be God, although known only directly and not yet reflexively. »

He who has understood the reason of being which God is, demonstrated in the preceding theses, and has at the same time attended to the reason of being which we apprehend in all things we conceive, will readily perceive that the certainty of the proposition we defend has already been demonstrated in what precedes, and that this thesis is in the manner of a corollary which spontaneously follows from what has gone before. For that which is comprehended in that most universal idea is not some singular being, determined in itself; but it is a most abstract note of reality, whether possible or actual (when it is called being), or of reality in act (when it is called esse in act), in which, beyond opposition to nothing and to non-being, there is no determination. Divine Esse, in the very simplest reason of essence, is from what has been demonstrated a singular Esse, determined by the highest determination, beyond which a more intense being cannot be. Whence it is plain that that being, under whose aspect we conceive all things, is not only not known by us under the formal aspect of divine essence as it is in itself, which our opponents indeed willingly grant; but also is not divine being, and in its whole reason is different from divine being.

Certainly the difference is greatest, first, in the very mode by which we conceive being in both ways. By the proper concept of being there is presented to us what is in created things, since from these we abstract it immediately; but then, from created things, by inferring, we arrive at thinking of Esse exemplare itself, the principle and fountain of all created and creatable esse¹. Therefore we do not have a positive proper concept of this Esse divine, because it is not presented to our cognition immediately in itself, but only from equivocal effects (of an order diverse from it), and from shadows and likenesses; by inferring (« by a touch of reasonings », see above p. 151.) we attain it. Hence the Fathers teach that if being, as it is presented to us by abstraction from created things through a proper concept, is considered, God must be conceived through negation and through ὑπεροχή, and it must be said that he is not being, and is above all beings (above th. XII. XXIII.).

2°. The difference is infinite in the intrinsic reason of being itself, from which that different mode of conceiving arises. That reason of being, which is first and under which our mind conceives all things, is most abstract, consisting indeed in a single note in opposition to non-being; and therefore it is intensively minimal, and so its universality or extension is greatest; for it is found in all things that are or can be thought, pertaining to their intrinsic formal reason: although in the actual esse of individuals there can exist only determinate being, concrete according to the proper reason of each and the diverse degrees of participation, from all of which determinations, by abstracting through the operation of our intellect, we conceive that very idea of universal being. On the contrary, being which God is, in his very reason of being, is the fullness of all absolute perfection; and therefore it is infinite intensively, and by this very reason of absolute being is determined to the esse of singularity, to which multiplication is intrinsically repugnant.

Thirdly, therefore, the simplicity of being in common is negative, by abstraction from all determinate perfections; and therefore that simplicity is not and cannot be in real existence, but only in the apprehension of the mind. The simplicity of divine being is positive, by the infinite intensity of perfection in the very reason of absolute being, and therefore necessarily is in real existence; while we attain it by the apprehension of our mind only most imperfectly and through negations. « They did not consider (Amalric of Bena and his followers) that what is common or universal cannot be without addition (in act), but is considered without addition... although the universal is also thought without addition, yet it is not without receptivity of addition... But divine Esse is without addition, not only in thought but also in the nature of things, and not only without addition but also without receptivity of addition. Whence from this very fact, that it does not receive addition nor can receive it, it may rather be concluded that God is not esse commune, but proper.... In this also their reasoning fails, that they did not attend to the fact that what is found in us as most simple (by abstraction) is not so much a complete thing as some aspect of a thing; whereas simplicity is attributed to God as to a thing perfectly subsisting » S. Thom. cont. Gent. l. I. c. 26. n. 6.

Finally, fourthly, just as being determined by the manifold degrees of created perfection is a certain imitation of the divine essence, so also the reason of common being, considered abstractly, has in the divine essence its own exemplar and is a certain shadow of it, the more remote, however, the more universal and the less intense its perfection. Therefore the reason of being in God and in all things outside God is wholly diverse; and accordingly being is predicated of God and of all things that can be conceived outside God not univocally (not according to the same reason of being), but analogically, insofar as the reason of being in created things is a shadow of divine being. « Being predicated of all things is not the nature of the uncreated, because what is predicated of all is the first of created things, as the philosopher says, and being is mixed with all things and is something existing among all. But created and uncreated being are diverse; and being which is something of all those things of which it is predicated, and mixed with all things, and being which is essentially none of all things and unmixed with all, must be diverse. And if it is asked how they differ as distinguishing, it must be said that divine essence differs from all in itself, and its simplicity and perfection do not permit it to be mixed with anything so that it is of its being » Albertus M. Summae P. I. Tract. VI. q. 29. m. 1. a. 2. ad 1. (Cf. supra th. XXIII. n. III.)

Therefore they are greatly mistaken who think that esse, under whose aspect we conceive whatever we conceive by the intellect, and whose idea is the first of all, is in reality God, and must therefore be recognized and affirmed reflexively as divine Esse. For they confuse the reason of being which is most abstract with the most concrete; the universal with the essentially singular; the indeterminate, and of the least intensity of perfection of all that can be conceived, with the supremely determined and with the infinite intensity of perfection; and finally, being which, formally as it is conceived to be universal, cannot exist outside the mind, but when it is determined to this or that singular being, multiplied, is identified with those very singulars: they confuse it with a being singularly existing by intrinsic necessity and wholly different in its reason from all things that can be conceived apart from it. They confuse, I say, absolute Esse and Being from itself not only with participated being but with that being in which the participation of all is conceived to be least.

This huge fallacy, by which simple being through abstraction is substituted for simple Being through absolute perfection, is not only the principle and, as it were, the summary of pantheism in all its most diverse forms, and not only was the foundation of the Eunomian theory of the simplicity of God and of the intuition by which we understand the divine essence; but from the same confusion, or from a little attentive consideration of the all-round diversity between universal being and divine being, which is essentially singular in itself, there have arisen the false doctrines of some learned Catholics concerning being, which they hold to be the object of our first intellectual idea and of our immediate intuition, and which they contend is objectively and really God, although not yet known distinctly and reflexively by us under the aspect of absolute essence. In this opinion there is also contained a false doctrine of created being, and further a false theory of creation, whether these consequences are explicitly drawn, as we know has been done by some, or are refrained from by them.

The propositions which the Supreme Congregation of the Holy Office pronounced on 18 Sept. 1861 « cannot safely be taught » all rest on this confusion of the being of our intuition with absolute being. Thus they were stated: « 1. Immediate knowledge of God, at least habitual, is essential to the human intellect, so that it can know nothing without it: since it is the intellectual light itself. 2. That Esse which is in all things, and without which we understand nothing, is divine Esse. 3. Universals, considered on the side of the thing, are not really distinguished from God. 4. Innate knowledge of God as simply being involves all knowledge in an eminent manner, so that through it we have implicitly known every being which is knowable under any respect. 5. All other ideas are nothing but modifications of the idea by which God is understood as simply being. 6. Created things are in God as a part in a whole, not indeed in a formal whole but in an infinite, most simple whole, which sets its parts, as it were, outside itself without any division or diminution of itself. 7. Creation can be explained thus: God, by that special act by which he understands and wills himself as distinct from a determinate creature (man, for example), produces the creature. » — « The most eminent and most reverend Lord Cardinals, having first heard the vote of the consultors, and having carefully weighed each and every one of the propositions set out above, answered the question proposed (whether they can safely be taught): Negative. »

Corollarium 1. Since a species consists in an essential perfection, which, being common to many individuals², constitutes those individuals as one nature and essentially different from all others; and a genus likewise consists in an essential perfection common to several species and distinguishing it from all others: hence being in common is outside every genus, because by reason of the least intensity of its perfection it distinguishes nothing from another, but is common to all; divine being is outside every genus, because by the infinite intensity of its perfection it is distinct in itself and different from all things that can be conceived apart from it, and has nothing in itself that could be common to any other.

Corollary 2. Those who ask whether there is more being with the creatures than God without the creatures speak more absurdly than one who would ask whether there is more art in the mind of Alighieri and the divine comedy computed together than if the art be considered in the mind of the poet by itself. For they do not notice, namely, that the name being, in relation to absolute being and participated being, is not univocal but analogous, and therefore those two cannot be counted together under one reason of being. Of absolute being there can be neither more nor less, since it is fullness, intrinsically and absolutely necessary; and therefore the essence and possibility of participated being is also absolutely necessary, which, however, apart from the divine essence itself, which is imitable outside it, is nothing of actual reality. But Esse actuale of a creature is contingent and not necessary, and therefore there can be more of it and less. Hence to the question whether there is more being after creation than before creation, the answer must be given by distinguishing: there is more being, if by this name you understand absolute being, I deny; there is more being, if you understand a being of a plainly different reason which can be conceived apart from the absolute, and which therefore admits with it not a numbering together but an analogical naming: I subdistinguish. There is more being, that is, more essences in the metaphysical order, I deny; more being, that is, more actual esse of participated being in the physical order, I grant.

It may be objected, however, against these things: being must be conceived by abstracting from absolute Esse and from participated esse; in this supreme abstraction there is comprehended under being, both divine being and participated being. Therefore it must certainly be asked whether (understanding being according to that abstract reason, and with no determination yet conceived to divine being or to participated being) there is more real being, or more esse in actu, after creation than before creation is supposed; and this must be affirmed, lest through a pantheistic error the reality of participated being, diverse from absolute being, be called into doubt.

Some things must be premised, for the explanation of this difficulty, about the analogical notion of being. The notion of being, already in that supreme abstraction where neither absolute nor participated being is distinctly named, is so constituted that it essentially requires application first to that which by intrinsic necessity is principally and in fullness is being, and secondarily to that which, by the very reason of its own entity, is only an imitation of absolute being, depends on it, and expresses a relation to it. Hence that notion of being is not abstract in such a way that one and the same reason of being is comprehended in two things (uncreated and created) which are distinguished from each other by other differences, as the reason of genus metaphysically is found the same in its subject species; but being is abstract in such a way that, although uncreated or created being is not expressed, nevertheless in the one the reason of being is plainly other than in the other. Therefore that notion of being is not generic but analogical; that is, fit to be applied to one principally, and to the others according to a diverse reason, with subordination and relation to that prior one: as, for example, art considered abstractly does not distinctly signify art in the mind of the artificer or art in the work, but can be applied to each according to a different reason (see Suarez Metaphys. disp. 28 sect. 3. n. 21.).

With these things laid down, the answer to the objected difficulty is easy. When it is asked whether after creation there is more being, it cannot be asked whether more being is contained in the abstract notion; just as one who asks whether after men have been created there is more humanity does not mean, if he is of sound mind, whether after creation more is contained in the abstract notion of humanity; for what is comprehended in an abstract notion can neither be increased nor diminished. The sense of the question, therefore, is whether, with creatures now existing, more things really exist in which the reason of real being, or esse itself in act, is verified, than the necessarily existing being alone. Therefore in this comparison the reason of being is already applied to diverse things, and divine being and participated being are conceived, which in the supreme reason of being itself differ wholly. Therefore the answer given above stands. For those which differ among themselves in the very reason of being cannot be numbered together; but it must be said that neither is there, nor can there be, more of divine being, which is Esse itself in absolute fullness; but there is more real participated being, or rather real participated being begins through creation and can increase, and can also be diminished by annihilation. Moreover this vindication of the diversity in the very reason of being between God and whatever can be conceived apart from God is necessary, and is the sole and sufficient exclusion of pantheism in every form.