Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam

The signification of the name, who is, and the absolute perfection of God, is declared by the holy Fathers.

• The doctrine which we have so far shown to be expressed in the Scriptures, the holy Fathers have illustrated in many ways; for from their sense and consensus: 1° by the very name of God « who is » Exod. III. 14., the eternal divine Being and its intrinsic necessity of existing ought to be held to be revealed; 2° this necessary being ought to be understood as Being absolute and Being simply, because all absolute perfection is comprehended in it; whence 3° the divine Being differs by an essential difference from the reason of being which can be, or be conceived, outside God. »

There is now no need to say anything about the most eloquent teaching of Philo (see Petav. l. I. c. 6. n. 5.) and of the later commentators of the Jewish people (see de Voisin, Theolog. Iud. l. I. c. 5., and elsewhere passim); for our purpose in this thesis is to confirm and illustrate, by the authority of Christian interpretation, the sense deduced in the preceding thesis from the sacred text and context of Exod. III. 14. 15.; VI. 3. The LXX interpreters above all expressed this sense in their version: ἐγω εἰμι ὁ ὠν... ὁ ὠν ἀπεσταλκε με. How great is the worth of that version, used by the Apostles themselves and handed down to the Churches as the genuine word of God, in a text eminently dogmatic and liable to no suspicion of corruption, is easily seen.

The Fathers and Doctors of the Church have defended the sense enunciated in the thesis in all its chapters, and illustrated it with ample commentary. Those who had read the Hebrew text hold this doctrine: Origen (de Princip. l. I. n. 6; hom. I. in l. Regnorum n. 12; in Rom. l. X. n. 8.); Jerome (in Eph. III. 14. T. VII. p. 600. ed. Vallarsii; ep. 15. alias 57. ad Damas. n. 4. etc.); Ephrem the Syrian (adversus scrutator. serm. 63. Opp. Syr. Lat. T. III. p. 123.). Others agreed, who had read the Greek and Latin version: Justin (cohort. ad gent. n. 25.); Clement of Alexandria (Paedagog. I. c. 8.); Gregory Nazianzen (or. 30. al. 36. n. 17.18; or. 38. n. 7; or. 45. al. 42. n. 3.); Cyril of Alexandria (dialog. de Trin. I. T. V. P. I. p. 392.); Damascene (de fid. orthod. l. I. c. 9.); Hilary (de Trin. I. n. 4-6.); Augustine (often, e.g. in Ps. 134. n. 4; Genes. ad litter. l. V. c. 16; de Trin. l. VI. c. 7.); and very many others, of whom some testimonies can be read in Petavius l. I. c. 6., and, from Petavius, in Card. de Aguirre, Theol. S. Anselmi T. I. disp. 24. sect. 2. We reduce their doctrine, as stated in the enunciation of the thesis, to three chapters.

I. They declare that Esse, a name which might seem to designate what is common and universal, belongs wholly and properly to God, because he alone necessarily is, and in his essence has the ground of existence. « God claims as his own proper name the common name of substance (existence), since all other things received their being by God's favour; God always is and has no principle from elsewhere, and he is his own origin and the cause of his own substance » S. Hieronym. in Eph. III. 14. It is clear enough in itself that he is not called origin in the proper sense, nor cause as efficient cause; but negatively, to exclude an origin from another and a cause distinct from himself, and positively, to indicate the ground of necessary existence from the very nature of that Esse, which can be called formal cause¹. Jerome expressed both of these again, in ep. 15. al. 57. ad Damasum. « One and alone is the nature of God that truly is, for what subsists has not from elsewhere, but is its own. » And so « he alone is, to whom what he is has been given by no one » Orig. hom. I. in l. Regn. n. 12. They say that this name qui est is most proper to God, « because he could not not have been, nor will ever be able not to be » Hilar. Trin. l. I. n. 5; Ambros. in Luc. l. X. c. 23. Hence at times they further say that the name ὁ ὢν embraces the three tenses, was, is and will be, Iustin. l. c.; Clemens Alex. l. c.; and therefore that God holds beginning, middle and end, Iustin. l. c.; Dionys. de div. nom. c. 5. §. 8. At other times, on the contrary, they teach that by the name ὁ ὢν the past and the future are excluded. « In the truth that remains, I find no past or future but only the present, and this incorruptibly » Aug. in Io. tract. 38. n. 8-10; Gregor. Naz. or. 38. n. 3²; Dionys. l. c. §. 4; Cassian. de Incarn. l. V. c. 8. Precisely by the fact that God is ὁ ὢν simply and a se, just as no beginning can be conceived in him, nor ever any end, so he is Esse persevering without any change or succession, or any possibility of succession; nothing therefore can have passed in him that is no longer; nothing can arrive that is not yet; and so nothing can be conceived as before and after, as past and future; but the whole is Esse unchangeably abiding, which we conceive as present, as a perpetual now: although it is not the present of time, which has relation to past and future; but it is a permanence eminent above every relation of time³. « For there is that which neither begins at a beginning nor ends at an end, where neither is there waiting for what will come, nor running over what ought to be recalled; but it is one, which always is » Gregor. M. Moral. l. XV. c. 20. But if the succession which is in things outside God be compared with the unchangeable permanence of him who is; the past, present and future coexist, the changeable with the unchangeable, the flowing with the permanent, for whatever difference of time by which the temporal thing exists; and thus the permanent Esse of God comprehends the past, present and future, which are differences in the coexisting creature, not in God who abides unchangeably.

II. The Fathers no less plainly declare the other head which we have indicated: that by the very fact that Esse is revealed as the proper name of God, the fullness of absolute perfection is shown. Gregory Nazianzen says that God ascribes to himself the name ὁ ὢν as his own, « because the whole Esse (ὅλον τὸ εἶναι) must be placed in him, from whom other things have that they are » or. 12. n. 12; « because Esse, and indeed the whole Esse, is essentially proper to God (τὸ δὲ ὂν ἴδιον ἐντως Θεοῦ καὶ ὅλον), and is neither bounded nor circumscribed by anything, whether before him or after him » or. 30. n. 18; because « he holds the whole Esse comprehended in himself, without beginning and without end, like a certain infinite and boundless sea of essence »⁴ or. 45. al. 42. n. 3; or. 38. n. 7. John Damascene, de fide orth. l. I. c. 9, set down this last opinion entire. Hence God « is not in some measure being, but simply and infinitely embraces the whole Esse in itself »⁵ Dionys. div. nom. c. 5. §. 4. Now just as esse contracted and bounded to one particular species is the perfection of one order but not of every order; and as esse bounded by some degree, beyond which it does not extend, is some limited and finite perfection: so he who is « Esse simpliciter » and « totum Esse » and « oceanus infinitus essentiae » is assuredly all absolute perfection. « God is indeed called many things: great, good, wise, blessed, true, and whatever else seems fittingly to be said; but his greatness is the same as his wisdom, for he is great not by bulk but by power; and his goodness is the same as his wisdom and greatness; and his truth is the same as all those; and there is not there to be blessed as something other than to be great and wise, or true or good, but all are Esse itself » S. August. de Trin. l. VI. c. 7. Plainly all those perfections, and any others we can conceive, are esse considered according to some aspect of nobility; Esse therefore simply is said by the Fathers to be every perfection according to every aspect of nobility⁶ and according to every degree; or rather, he has no degree beyond which he is not perfect. St Bernard says this very thing in that famous consideration of God (de Consider. l. V. c. 6.). « Who is (God)? Surely nothing better occurs than who is. He himself willed this to be answered of himself; he taught this when Moses said to the people: he who is has sent me to you: rightly indeed, for nothing is more fitting to eternity, which God is. If you say good, great, blessed, wise, or whatever such thing of God, it is restored in this word, which is Is. Indeed, to be him is to be all these. Even if you add a hundred such, you have not departed from Esse; if you say them, you have added nothing; if you do not say them, you have diminished nothing. Now if you have seen this so singular and so supreme Esse, do you not, in comparison with it, judge whatever is not this to be rather not-being than being? What again is God? Without whom nothing is. As nothing is without him, so neither can he be without himself. He is to himself, he is to all; and thereby in some way he alone is, who is of his own and of all Esse..... from whom all things are creabiliter, not seminaliter »⁷. Clearly God is understood as Esse of himself and of others in a very different way: his own Esse is formal, that of others is not formal, but as exemplar, efficient, conserving and final cause.

III. From the teaching of the Fathers just described concerning the nature of divine being, it is now also established that the eminence of the same divine Esse and its transcendent diversity from all things that are outside God or can be conceived outside God are real. The Fathers repeat and inculcate this diversity explicitly, and with deliberate effort, very frequently.

The fullness of divine Esse cannot indeed be understood in an extensive sense, so that whatever is in any way something would be divine Esse. For God is being from himself, singular, existing necessarily from the intrinsic reason of his essence, in intensive fullness of perfection, so that he himself is every unlimited, independent perfection, which in one word we call absolute Esse. Hence no absolute perfection can be conceived that does not really exist, and nothing can really exist except God himself. From this, however, as we have already indicated above, it does not follow that limited, dependent, contingent realities created by the absolute Being, as by exemplar, final and efficient cause, are not possible or do not exist. Rather it follows, from the very reason of infinite reality, that such participations and imitations outside God are possible without end; and likewise it follows that limited, dependent perfections are in God not formally but eminently: namely, the limited, created or creatable perfection itself is not in God; but in God there is absolute perfection, inadequately imitable by many limited, dependent and created perfections. Plainly therefore the reason of divine Esse and of any being that is not infinite is otherwise.

In this sense, first, the Fathers teach that divine Esse rises above every essence and above every esse, if by these names is signified whatever is in this universe, or whatever can be conceived in any way apart from that one most simple perfection of absolute being. « The superessential infinity surpasses essences (ὑπερούσιος ἀόριστα al. ἀπειρία)... existing as none of those things that are, since he is the cause for all things that they be, but he himself is not (in respect of common being), inasmuch as he is placed beyond every essence » Dionys. de div. nom. c. 1. §. 1; Naz. or. 6. al. 12. n. 12; August. Genes. ad litt. l. V. c. 16; Damasc. Fid. orthod. l. I. c. 12. 14. The Fathers are to be understood in the same sense when they say: « divine Esse is joined with none of those things which are » Maxim. praefat. ad theol. mystagog.; Naz. or. 30. al. 36. n. 18; and when God is called « a nature proper to himself and in no way associated with these things of ours » Naz. ibid. n. 17. and « imparticipability (ἀμεθεξία), with which there is no communion of mixture with participants » Dionys. div. nom. c. 2. §. 5.

2°. The Fathers describe in many ways this singular and necessary supereminence of divine Esse, by added clarifications of the property of divine Esse in opposition to creatable or created esse. God alone is, naturally⁸ (by the intrinsic perfection of his nature): he alone is ὄντως; or essentially⁹ and singularly¹⁰: he is per se¹¹: he is simply, not in any measure¹²: the rest are what, and so far as, God willed them to be¹³: and so they are by participation in a particle of good¹⁴; and by this reason God is his own self (formally) and of all Esse (as cause)¹⁵.

Hence creatures are not nothing, they are not mere φαινόμενα; but they have esse of their own from God through creation, not of God through communication of their nature¹⁶. They are therefore: but because the reason of esse participati and of Esse a se is plainly different from what has been said, therefore esse is denied of God if it is regarded according to the mode in which we conceive being and esse from creatures. Conversely, however, God alone is said to be esse, and creatures non esse, when Esse principale is considered, and « Est, the purest, which has nothing of non esse », and « Esse totaliter, from which non-being wholly departs », as St Bonaventure and St Thomas speak (above). Accordingly « he is such that, in comparison with him, the things that were made are not. Not compared with him they are, for they are from him; but compared with him they are not, because true esse unchangeable esse is what he alone is » Aug. in Ps. 134. n. 4. For « there is one thing to be, another to be principally; one thing to be changeably, another unchangeably. For all these (created things) are, but they are not principally, because they do not subsist in themselves (by their own independent power); and unless they are held in the hand of the one who governs, they cannot be at all » Gregor. M. Moral. l. XVI. c. 6; XVIII. c. 17. St Augustine in many places, Origen in l. Regn. hom. 1. n. 12, Jerome in Eph. III. and ep. 25. ad Marcellam, and Dionysius and his interpreter Maximus, and others whose words may be read in Petav. l. I. c. 6. n. 6. sqq. and in Thomassinus l. III. c. 1. sqq., all hold teachings wholly like these.