Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam

On the proper reason of the divine essence, as we distinguish it by consideration from the attributes.

« Although the absolute divine perfections are not really distinct, nor can one of them be understood in the thing itself as prior to the others and the foundation of the rest; yet a distinction of reason, following from our imperfect manner of conceiving, is sufficient for us to distinguish the essence and the properties of the essence. This distinction being posited, we conclude that the essence is to be placed in this: that God is Being a se. »

I. Essence or what the Esse of a thing is (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι), the quiddity of the thing, as they say, can be considered in creatures in three ways: 1° if we understand all those things by which some individual thing is constituted in the nature of things, so that when they are posited it is, and with any one of them removed it would not be this thing. Considered in this way the individual essence in substances is called πρώτη οὐσία, first substance, which, if it is whole and wholly in itself, that is, neither made proper to another nor common to several distinct things among themselves, is a hypostasis. The essence under this consideration is therefore constituted of all that are in the individual thing, excepting the accidental things, which can be present and absent without the thing ceasing to be this thing. In this sense, if we speak of the essence of God, not only all the absolute perfections which we can conceive but also the relations constituting the persons pertain to the divine essence; not only as God is in himself, but also as he is conceived by us. But this sense of the name essence could not be used without confusion of things. For one thing is the consideration of the subject which is, and another of the perfection what it is. Hence although in God the most simple Esse is both the hypostasis which is and the absolute perfection what it is; nevertheless that distinction of reason with a foundation in the thing obtains between hypostasis and essence, so that the neglect of it, as the Fathers often warn, was the origin of nearly all the heresies concerning the mystery of the Holy Trinity (see Tract. de Trin. th. XXI. sqq.).

2°. In created things we understand essence as the complex of all those things which are necessarily common to the single subjects of the same order. This is essence abstracted, indeed, from individuals, and therefore precise with respect to accidental things and to the marks which individuate; but constituted by all the essential perfections which are in the individuals, and it is commonly called physical essence. By analogy to this we understand the essence of God as constituted by all the absolute perfections, and we oppose it, since there is no accident in God, to the internal relations and notions by which the persons are constituted and distinguished.

3°. Finally, in physical essence itself, where the discourse concerns created things, we distinguish those marks which are understood to comprehend all the rest in themselves, either formally but in confusion, or at least virtually; and this we call metaphysical essence. Metaphysical essence, therefore, a) contains the quiddity common to all and only the subjects of the same order; and so it sufficiently exhibits what the thing is in itself, and by this very fact distinguishes it from all others of a different order, in that it comprehends all the perfections of physical essence at least virtually. Hence b) in this same essence all the perfections of the thing have their principle, follow from it, and are understood to be inherent in it. c) Accordingly essence is that which is first understood in the thing, as being the source and principle of all that belongs to the thing. Concerning this metaphysical essence it is now asked whether any can be defined by us in God, and what it is.

It is clear that neither physical essence is to be distinguished from the personal properties, nor any metaphysical essence from the other perfections of God, if we were to conceive God as he is in himself¹. But indeed if we hold all the diverse reasons, under which we inadequately conceive the absolute and the relative, and in the absolutes again many perfections, to be identical, our judgement is no less erroneous than if we thought that the perfections exhibited under those reasons were really distinct in God. Therefore we judge from the truth of the thing that the reason under which we conceive that supreme thing as absolute, by which God is and which God is, abstracting from relatives, is a different reason; and again another reason, under which we conceive the Father formally as Father in relation and opposition to the Son. Accordingly we rightly distinguish that supreme thing as absolute, under the name nature and essence, from the personal properties, because truly that supreme thing is both absolute and relative; and since we cannot comprehend both in one adequate concept, we somehow adumbrate them by distinct and inadequate reasons.

In the same way we conceive the essence and the nature itself, most simple, under many inadequate notions of perfections (th. XIII.). But just as in creatures, from which we first derive the ideas of perfections, those are distinct, and depend upon one another and flow from one another up to the metaphysical essence, which is the principle of all: so also when we understand them in God, we do not indeed judge that one perfection really flows from another, since they are not really distinct; yet one inadequate reason, as it is conceived by us, presupposes another, and depends upon it as upon its principle. For although in God one thing is altogether simple, Being, and to be spirit, and to be wise, and to be willing, yet when we understand these through distinct concepts, we cannot conceive the will, either in itself or in its functions, except by presupposing the concept of intellect, nor the intellect except by presupposing the concept of spiritual substance, nor finally this or anything else without the concept of Being itself. Although therefore in God, on account of his infinite simplicity, we cannot indeed distinguish the metaphysical essence in the way in which it is understood in creatures; this nevertheless does not prevent that, according to our imperfect mode of understanding, among the many reasons by which we conceive in some measure what God is, there be assigned some one which stands in the place of essence. Moreover, just as the distinction of the perfections of God according to diverse reasons is necessary, so that the extension of our one concept through several concepts may in some measure make up for the defect of the intension of one concept; so the determination of what in God ought to be conceived, in the manner declared, as standing in the place of essence, will reconcile the unity with the multiplicity of reasons under which we think the perfections of God, and will render our knowledge deeper and better suited to the simplicity of its object.

II. Although the theologians agree that essence can, and for the benefit of knowledge ought to, be distinguished in God from the properties in the manner explained, there is not one opinion of all as to the concept in which its proper reason is to be placed. As is clear from what has been said above, the concept of essence ought to exhibit marks which both distinguish the thing from all others of a different order, and are understood as first constituting the thing, so that from these, as from prior things, the rest that inhere may be deduced, and which are not themselves consequent upon any prior things. Essence therefore is always the supreme perfection (not having one prior to it) among all those which constitute a thing in a certain order of beings and distinguish it from all others. In created things, therefore, essence can never be constituted by the reason of being, because although that is the supreme perfection, it is not proper to one order nor distinguishing from others, nor are all the determinate perfections which inhere in the thing comprehended in it as in a principle; but it is necessary that essence be being contracted to a determinate perfection. But if in something the very reason of being were distinct and different from all things which are not it, and if it were the reason of being simply, so that it would be understood not as an indeterminate concept of being arrived at by abstraction, but as determinate being in the fullness of perfection; then indeed this reason of being would be both the supreme perfection, and distinct from all others, and the principle containing all perfections, which, being determinate, could be distinguished in it not in reality but only in reason: and accordingly this very reason of being would be, before the other perfections, metaphysical essence. But this very reason of being is in God, insofar as he is being not by participation but Absolute Being; a negation of participated being and an affirmation of Absolute Being are expressed together in this, when it is said being from itself. Therefore the divine essence is rightly reckoned before the other perfections of God.

Let the very great difference between being by participation and being from itself be carefully noted, I beg. In creatures, the lower and more determinate things are always more perfect, and at least virtually include within themselves the perfections of the higher grades. « Living things surpass beings, sentient things surpass living things, rational things surpass sentient things, and pure spirits themselves surpass rational (sentient) things » Dionys. de div. nom. c. 5. §. 3. For since the being of creatures is not simply but determined to a certain grade, therefore being is found in them at a higher or lower grade, according as they more nearly or more remotely imitate and shadow forth the divine Being. The more restricted grade rational therefore includes the more universal grade of life, and this in turn the higher grade of being, but not the reverse. But being from itself is not restricted to any grade, but is Being simply, and therefore of all nobility and of all perfection. Hence when being from itself is said with no determination added, there is understood absolute perfection in every line of being, if it is lawful so to speak. Whence by the added determination life from itself is not signified as a nobler grade, but there is expressed a perfection of a determinate order already comprehended in Being from itself, which is the perfection of every order; and further, if life is defined as intellectual, this very intellectuality from itself was already comprehended in life from itself, and both ultimately in Being from itself. Hence in being from itself the more universal and less determinate grade comprehends the lower grades, which we conceive as determined to certain reasons; the contrary holds in being by participation.

St Thomas has most clearly summed up all this doctrine, 1. 2. q. 2. a. 5. ad 2. « Being simply taken, according as it includes in itself every perfection of being, excels life and all the perfections that follow. Thus Being itself has in itself beforehand all the good things that follow, and in this way Dionysius speaks (de div. nom. c. 5.). But if one considers being itself, as it is participated in this or that thing, which do not take in the whole perfection of being, but have being imperfect, as is the being of any creature; so it is manifest that being itself with a superadded perfection is more eminent. » Cf. 1. q. 13. a. 11.

From all these things it appears that those theologians have not sufficiently considered the reason of being from itself, who thought that the metaphysical essence of God is to be constituted not in Being from itself, but in a grade of intellectuality or in an intelligent act; for Being from itself is prior to these grades, by which they are themselves comprehended, and from which they are deduced as from a prior. Being from itself therefore is not any lower grade whatever, but is what in God we understand as the first and as the supreme root of all perfections. Nevertheless the grade of intellectuality in creatures is a fuller expression of the divine Being than the higher and more general grade of life, and here again the imitation is nearer than the most universal grade of being, because, as has been said, in participated being the fullness of the more contracted grades stands to the higher grades in the inverse order to that in Being from itself. Therefore the teaching declared by St Thomas, 1. q. 93. a. 3, that in intellectual beings alone is found the image and the likeness as specific, while in the other, higher grades of life and being there exists only the vestige of God, does not conflict with our statement that the divine essence is to be constituted in Being from itself, because the one divine Being is the exemplar shadowed forth through participated being, through participated life and intellectuality; but being participated together with the perfection of intellectuality expresses it more nearly than being without an addition.

From what has been said it can also be declared why this predication being from itself is not, in the proper sense, a definition of God, nor can any other definition be given of the kind that logicians understand, consisting of the genus that is nearest and the last differentia. « All the contrary and diverse things that are in the world, says St Thomas, de potent. q. 3. a. 6, are found to communicate in some one thing, either in the nature of the species, or in the nature of the genus, or at least in the reason of being. » That is to say, all created things are in some way composed of what is common to many and of what is proper to themselves (cf. Ecclesi. XLII.25.). Hence the essence of all created things consists of a grade of reality which is common to the order immediately above, and of another, proper grade which determines to an order distinct from all others; and accordingly the definition, which is a statement explaining what a thing is, consists of the designation of the nearest genus and the last differentia². But such a definition of God, not only as God is in himself but also as he is conceived by us, cannot be given; because in God nothing, not even the supreme reason of being, is something common which, with a perfection added, is determined to the proper reason of God; but that supreme reason of Being is by itself most proper and altogether different from every reason of being which we can conceive apart from God; nor can any distinct perfection be added to it by which it would be determined, because that Being itself is every perfection³. Nevertheless, since the name being is analogous, that is, since being said principally of God can also signify what is outside God, of a reason altogether diverse indeed, yet assimilated and subordinated to the divine being⁴; therefore we can apply this name to signify only the divine being, through the added from itself, which we understand as a last differentia of diversity from participated being. Whence this determination of the analogous name to its principal signification, by an added differentia as it were last, has a certain likeness to a definition. Moreover, the perfections which are confusedly comprehended in the concept of being from itself we can explain more distinctly, and so describe God in some measure.