Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam

Johannes Baptist Franzelin

Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam

Johannes Baptist Franzelin (1816–1886)

First published 1870

Johannes Baptist Franzelin's Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam treats the divine nature and attributes within nineteenth-century scholastic theology. The present digital edition follows the Rome 1870 print and includes the Latin text with an English translation. The title pages, approbations, errata, and indexes are omitted.


Prolegomenon: On the Object of Theology

§ I: Section I

Caput I: Chapter I

Thesis I: The doctrine on the rational knowledge of God belongs also to theology

Thesis II: Scripture declares that God is made manifest through the works of creation to human reason

Thesis III: The rational knowledge of the natural law, asserted by the Apostle for the Gentiles, includes and demonstrates a rational knowledge of God as supreme lawgiver

Thesis IV: The interpretation of Rom. II. 14. 15. concerning unbelievers and the rational knowledge of the natural law is vindicated

Thesis V: Scripture, in asserting a rational knowledge of God's existence from God's works, in no way presupposes the tradition of positive doctrine about God or faith as a necessary condition

Caput II: Chapter II

Thesis I: The Fathers agree that, by the light of reason and from God's manifestation in creatures, one can arrive at a first knowledge and at a more refined knowledge of God's existence

Thesis II: On the sense in which the Fathers call the notion of God innate to human nature

Caput III: Chapter III

Thesis I: On the manifestation in supernatural facts, insofar as through them God is intelligible to reason

Thesis II: On the existence of God as revealed and therefore to be believed by faith

§ II: Section II

Caput I: Chapter I

Thesis I: The constant teaching of the Fathers on our mediate and analogical knowledge of God

Thesis II: The agreement of St Augustine with the teaching of the other Fathers is demonstrated

Thesis III: On our knowledge of what God is, according to the threefold way of affirmation, negation and eminence

Thesis IV: On the multiplicity of notions by which we understand God

Caput II: Chapter II

Thesis I: The immediate vision of the divine essence is natural to no creature

Thesis II: The immediate vision of God as he is in himself is proposed and promised to us in revelation as our ultimate end

Thesis III: On the light of glory

Thesis IV: On the extensive scope of the beatific vision with respect to its principal object and its secondary objects

Thesis V: On the reason why God, though clearly seen, is nevertheless incomprehensible to the blessed

Thesis VI: The more difficult modes of speaking are explained by which the holy Fathers deny comprehension, but not intuitive vision, of the divine essence

The more difficult modes of speaking are explained, by which the holy Fathers deny comprehension, but not the intuitive vision, of the divine essence.

« From the time the Eunomian heresy arose, the holy Fathers have been wont to teach more insistently that not even the holy angels themselves can attain to the comprehension of God; yet even those who did not explain the immediate vision of God more distinctly are not to be judged to have denied it, unless perhaps for the state of this life, or as if it were a bodily vision. »

Gabriel Vasquez (disp. 37. cc. 2-4.), against the common interpretation of other theologians, held that St John Chrysostom above all, and then also very many other Fathers, both Greek and Latin, can be understood in no other sense than that they denied the intuitive vision of God to the holy angels and consequently to all the blessed in the homeland. That we may show this interpretation of Vasquez and of many more recent writers to be false, and explain the genuine sense of the holy Fathers in obscurer locutions of this kind, this is the aim of the present thesis.

Certain general principles, however, must be kept before our eyes. a) The present question is in itself hermeneutical and historical, not immediately dogmatic. For since in the Catholic Church there is some progress in the explanation of the revealed deposit, it could absolutely speaking have come about that in the fourth and fifth centuries the doctrine concerning the manner of heavenly beatitude was not yet sufficiently explained; in which stage of explanation, even within the bounds of the Church and among some very weighty doctors, there can be, without loss to faith, not only obscure and confused notions but also errors, which afterward, once the question has been sifted, are eliminated.

Yet b) here we are dealing with a doctrine in itself most weighty, which it matters most of all for all the faithful to know explicitly, a doctrine plainly set down in the Scriptures and preached by the ancient holy doctors with great agreement and clarity, as we demonstrated in thesis XV. In such dogmas, however, the dissent of very well-known doctors of great authority in the Church of God, such as Chrysostom, Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Epiphanius, both Cyrils, Ambrose and Jerome, named by Vasquez, can never be admitted unless it is evidently demonstrated. Their ambiguous and obscure locutions must therefore, on this hypothesis, necessarily be understood in that sense in which they agree with the other Fathers and with the dogma, which is certainly known at least from the subsequent centuries. These principles and their grounds we have demonstrated in their proper place in Tract. de Traditione, and more briefly in Tract. de Trinit., thesis X.

Moreover c) one must consider the state of the question and of the controversy which those Fathers were handling, and accordingly the aim which they alone had in view. Nearly all the more obscure locutions occur in those places where the Fathers dispute solely against the doctrine of the Eunomians, who claimed for themselves a perfect knowledge of God, « as God knows himself, » and so claimed the comprehension of God (see above thesis X.). In this state of the question the Fathers dispute against the heretics in two ways. For they often consider only our mode of knowing God in this life; and then they declare that the very origin of our idea and notion of God is derived from the divine manifestations ad extra, and by this very fact deny, for our present mode of knowing, an immediate intuition of God, as was demonstrated in thesis X. Such places, however, have nothing to do with the present matter, and there is nothing obscure in them, except that testimonies which speak of our present knowledge through a mirror in an enigma are torn from their context and transferred to the knowledge which will be face to face. But no less frequently the Fathers have in view the exclusion of that blasphemous doctrine by which the Eunomians claimed for themselves a full and adequate knowledge, as God knows himself. This perfection the holy doctors deny not only for our knowledge but absolutely for every finite knowledge, even for heavenly and angelic vision, and they demonstrate that it belongs to the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit alone. Hence in this second manner of disputing the question was not about heavenly knowledge what sort it is, whether immediate or mediate; but, the immediate vision being supposed—which the adversaries not only did not deny but even called comprehensive—it had to be demonstrated what sort it is not; namely, that not even the angelic and supreme knowledge of a creature in the heavenly light can be so full and perfect as the heretics asserted their own human knowledge to be in this dim place. Just as, therefore, in this state of the question an explanation of the beatific vision is not to be expected from the Fathers, so the denial of perfect vision would be unjustly understood altogether as a denial of immediate vision. But no less clear is this: in this manner of disputing, while the Fathers are not concerned with intuitive vision and press solely and more vehemently the exclusion of perfect vision, there may occur locutions which, considered in themselves, seem to deny the intuitive vision itself, and which can be rightly explained only by considering the aim and a careful comparison of the passages. Nor do we say that before these questions were raised the notions of the beatific vision were equally clear and distinct among all the ancient Fathers, as they were afterward determined as the explanation of the dogma advanced; but we contend that the very matter of the intuitive vision of God is not denied by Chrysostom and by the many others who are accused.

With these matters established we must come to the particular explanations of the doctrine of these Fathers according to the threefold class indicated in the thesis; for some are to be judged to have excluded, not the immediate vision, but the comprehension of God for the heavenly homeland itself; others to have excluded sensible vision; and others to have denied both vision and comprehension of the divine essence only in the knowledge of this life.

1°. It is certain that the Fathers too, who most clearly declare, with no one contradicting, the intuitive vision in heaven, distinguished between intuitive vision and perfect vision; and while they teach the one, they deny the other. Thus Pope Gregory the Great, whose most open teaching we saw in thesis XV, nevertheless denies that in that very vision which is face to face, God can by a creature be seen perfectly. « In the height of reward God can be found by the species of contemplation (from 2. Cor. V. 7.), but nevertheless he cannot do so perfectly. For the angelic or the human mind, when it gazes at the unbounded light, by that very fact narrows itself, by which it is a creature; and indeed it is stretched above itself through advancement (seeing by supernatural light), but nevertheless, even when expanded, it does not suffice to comprehend its brilliance..... Whence it is further added (Iob XI. 8.): higher than heaven is... because the very elect spirits too do not perfectly penetrate the vision of so great a height » S. Gregor. Moral.1.X.n.13.14. « The angelic spirits themselves cannot contemplate fully the power of our Creator.... before whose power even those powers tremble in humility » ibid. 1. XXVI. n. 19. In much the same way, before Gregory, St Augustine compared the vision of God in his substance with the comprehension of the fullness of God. « The desire of the truly pious, by which they wish to see God and burn with eager longing, I think does not blaze toward that appearance to be beheld, in which he appears as he wills (in theophanies), which he is not; but toward that substance in which he is what he is... For this is promised to the saints in the other life.... Not that anyone at some time comprehends the fullness of God, not only with the eyes of the body, but even with the mind itself; for it is one thing to see, another to comprehend the whole by seeing » Aug. ep. 147. n. 20-21.

Now indeed this same distinction is, among the Fathers whose sense we now seek, between vision simply and adequate vision; and it is only this second, adequate vision I say, which is excluded by them in the knowledge of the holy angels.

Chrysostom, whom we chiefly ask about, we have seen clearly teaching in thesis XV. that the blessed in heaven see God himself face to face; but where he refutes the comprehension asserted by the Eunomians, he no longer considers, in the knowledge itself of angels and blessed, what is perfect in it; but for his purpose he presses and describes what in that knowledge lacks absolute perfection. He does not simply deny to the angels the vision of God but a certain vision, which he calls ἀκριβῆς κατάληψις τῆς οὐσίας, ἀκριβῆς καὶ τετρανωμένη γνῶσις, γνῶσις μετὰ ἀκριβείας ἁπάσης, full comprehension of the essence, full and penetrating knowledge, knowledge in the whole fullness Chrys. de Incomprehens. hom. IV. n. 2. 3. 4; hom. V. n. 3. 4.

What, then, does this ἀκρίβεια mean for Chrysostom? The holy Father, in the very passage which Vasquez objects to, in Io. hom. XV. al. XIV. n. 2., openly declares this accurate or full knowledge in such a way that it is nothing other than the comprehension proper to God alone. He explains that saying of Matth. XI. 27: no one knows the Father except the Son. « What then? Do we all live in ignorance? Far from it. But no one knows as the Son does. Therefore, as many have seen him according to their capacity.... so no one knows his substance, what it is, except he who is begotten of him; for here he calls knowledge the full (accurate) vision and comprehension, and such as the Father has of the Son... Therefore...... he did not say: the Son who saw, related; but he put something more than to see, when he said: who is in the bosom of the Father..... For he who simply sees does not altogether have full (accurate) knowledge of the thing seen; but he who dwells in the bosom will never be ignorant of anything.... So question the contradicter (the Arian): does the Father know and see the Son.... with a certain accurate vision and knowledge? He will certainly confess this. From this, gather the accurate knowledge of the Son concerning the Father.

Two things here are most worthy of note for understanding the manner of speaking of Chrysostom in the doctrine of the vision of God. a) The full or accurate knowledge (ἀκριβῆς γνωσις) is that alone by which God knows himself; and so it is the comprehension of God in the strict sense; whence b) the knowledge which among Chrysostom is called full or accurate differs, by his own testimony, from vision simply so called. Therefore, according to the usage of speaking which Chrysostom kept, to the angels and the blessed full or accurate knowledge is indeed to be denied; nor yet on that account is the immediate vision of God denied to them.

In the same way Chrysostom, in other places where he disputes against the Eunomian comprehension, describes full and accurate knowledge as adequate comprehension, and distinguishes it from the vision of God.

At the very start of the sermons « on the incomprehensible nature of God », he declares that in the blessed there is perfect knowledge (γνωσιν τελειαν). For, he says, what the Apostle says (1. Cor. XIII. 8.): knowledge will be destroyed, « he speaks not of perfect knowledge but of knowledge which is in part, calling the destruction an advance to something better, so that when that which is in part is destroyed, it will no longer be in part but perfect knowledge... this destruction is therefore consummation and into greater increase » de Incomprehen. hom. I. n. 2. Moreover, in these homilies he explains the same difference, as in the homily cited on John, between the vision of God as he is, and full knowledge of God; and the latter he understands to be nothing other than the comprehension by which God alone comprehends himself. In those words of John I. 18. « No one has seen the Father except he who is from God; this one has seen the Father », he says it is declared immediately and clearly, and that the vision of the Father, as he is; is asserted of the Son; but it is not yet said by this very fact full knowledge, as the Father knows himself. He then proves this full knowledge from the explicit words of John X. 15: « as the Father knows me, and I know the Father » hom. V. n. 4. Hence he teaches that if ever the vision of God seems to be taken away even from the angels themselves, this ought to be understood of full knowledge hom. IV. n. 4; for this full knowledge (γνωσιν μετα ἀκριβειας) is a sign and demonstration of equality according to nature: hence only the Son and the Spirit thus know the Father hom. V. n. 3.

Moreover, also hom. III. n. 3. 5., from which Vasquez presses the difficulty, it is not simply vision but the comprehension of God that is denied to the heavenly powers. Chrysostom explains the theophanies described in Is. VI and Ezech. I in such a way that, as for those prophetic visions in which the Seraphim and Cherubim covered their faces with their wings and dared not look even upon the condescension of God (συγκατάβασιν), that is, that form visible to the eyes of the body by which God adapted himself « to the mode of knowing » not now of angels (as Vasquez thinks) but of prophets, the holy Doctor judges it to be symbolically signified « that God is comprehensible to no created power » (καταληπτον), and that he cannot be seen « fully (μετα ἀκριβειας) » by any. Note, however, the manner in which Chrysostom explains the symbols. « Therefore the prophet says: the Seraphim stood around him, not indicating a place, but declaring by the nearness of place that those powers (by nature) are nearer to God than we are. For we do not know him, the incomprehensible (το ακαταληπτον), as those powers do, by as much as they are purer, wiser and keener-sighted than human nature. For just as the blind man does not know the inaccessible rays of the sun (το των ηλιακων ακτινων ἀπρόσιτον) as the one who sees does: so too we do not know God, the incomprehensible, as those do; for as great as the difference is between the blind man and the seeing man, so great is the difference between us and them..... Just as the wings declare their sublimity; and the throne, that God rests in them; and the eyes, their keenness; and the nearness of the throne and the perpetual hymns, their vigilance and freedom from sleep: so also their names signify their wisdom, and the others' purity. For what does Cherubim mean? complete knowledge (πεπληρωμένη γνῶσις); what does Seraphim mean? fiery mouths ... But if where complete knowledge is, they cannot fully see (ἰδεῖν μετὰ ἀκριβείας) even the condescension of God; where there is knowledge in part, as Paul says: we know in part, and through a glass and in a riddle; how great would be the madness of thinking those things known and plain to ourselves, which not even those can look upon? »

Chrysostom therefore concedes that the knowledge of the heavenly powers, if it is compared with our mediate knowledge through a mirror and in an enigma, is a vision of God that is incomprehensible; but if vision is taken for comprehension, in this way he denies that the incomprehensible can be seen by the angels themselves: as with bodily eyes we indeed see the sun, but do not comprehend it.

After these explanations of Chrysostom's sayings, whatever in most of the other Fathers might seem obscure in this matter has now been made clear. For Gregory Nazianzen, Basil, both Cyrils, Ambrose, Primasius, whose words may be read in Petavius (l. VII. c. 5. n. 6. sq.; c. 6. n. 7. sq.), say nothing other than that the angels themselves do not see God with that full vision by which God sees himself, or what comes to the same, by which the Son and the Holy Spirit alone see the Father. In this sense Augustine himself (ep. 147. nn. 20-22.) interpreted the words of Ambrose from the commentary on Luke (l. I. n. 25.). « And why do we speak of men, when we have read of the heavenly powers and potestates themselves: No one has ever seen God? And he added what is beyond the heavenly potestates: the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has declared him.... No one has ever seen God, because no one has looked upon, no one has comprehended with mind or eyes, that fullness of divinity which dwells in God; for has seen is to be referred to both. »

If there is any difficulty in Isidore of Seville (in Exod. cap. 42. T. V. p. 389.), it is of another kind and pertains nothing to the present place. « Although human nature, even after the resurrection, advances to angelic equality, and rises tirelessly to contemplate God, it does not prevail to see his essence fully, which not even angelic perfection attains to know in its whole or entirely..... For the Trinity alone is known to itself entirely, and the humanity assumed, which is the third person in the Trinity. » That which is said, that God is seen not fully, not in the whole or entirely, is the interpretation and best declaration of the doctrine of the Greek Fathers, who say that God is not seen μετα πασης ακριβειας. In the last clause, however, the editors of the works of Isidore, Grialius and then Arevalo, thought that the abstract humanitas suscepta should be taken for the concrete homo Christus, who is one of the three persons. In another place (sententiar. l. III. c. 3. T. VI. p. 120.) Isidore has the same words; but in the last clause there it is said more correctly: « the Trinity alone is known to itself entirely, and the humanity assumed by Christ, which (the person Christ) is the third (one of the three) person in the Trinity. »

2°. Not infrequently the Fathers call God invisible, insofar as he can in no way be seen by bodily eyes. This explanation is commonly rejected as inept in all those places where they call God invisible even to the angels; for those Fathers, at least, who acknowledged the angels to be pure spirits, could not think of bodily eyes in their case. But it must be noted that in this doctrine of the Fathers concerning the invisibility of God, the discourse is directly and of itself not about bodily eyes but about the spiritual and intelligible nature of God; and so it is said that God cannot be known either by men or by angels as a corporeal and sensible nature, without anything being determined about the manner in which angels know sensible things. Moreover, God is said hypothetically to be invisible to eyes not only human but also angelic, if he were; in that manner of speaking which the Apostle also used, Gal. I. 8. In this way Origen (de Princip. l. I. c. 1. n. 8.), to show that the nature of God is not corporeal but purely spiritual, says « that not even to the only-begotten is the nature of God visible, which by nature is invisible » He declares it thus: « it is one thing to see, another to know; to see is a thing of bodies, but to know and to be known belongs to an intellectual nature... whatever among corporeal natures is said to be seen and to see, this between the Father and the Son is said to be known and to know, by the power of knowledge and not by the frailty of visibility ».

In this sense Chrysostom, in Io. hom. XV. n. 1., cited above, teaches that the Son, just as the Father, was by nature invisible to the angels themselves before the incarnation, against the Arians, who attributed the theophanies of the Old Testament to the Son alone, because they thought him to be visible by his own nature and only the Father invisible. But the Son incarnate became visible not in the divine but in his human nature. « The manifestation was made through flesh, not according to the (divine) essence: for Paul shows that he (the Son) is invisible not only to men but also to the supernal powers. For when he had said: he was manifested in flesh; he added: he was seen by angels (1.Tim.III.16.). Therefore he was then seen by angels when he put on flesh; but before, they did not so see him (οὐχ εωρων αυτον ουτως), since even to them the essence was invisible. »

In this way, perhaps, Theodoret (dialog. de Incommut.), whose words I cited above at p. 186., can be understood to have taken vision for the vision of a sensible thing, when he said that the angels see not the divine essence but a certain glory of God (δοξαν τινα).

In this sense St Augustine (ep. 148. al. 111. nn. 7-8.) explained the words of St Jerome concerning the denial of bodily vision. He brings forward a threefold testimony of Jerome. The first reads thus: « the eye of man cannot see God as he is in his own nature; not only man, nor angels nor thrones nor powers nor dominions nor any name that is named; for a creature cannot look upon its Creator. » Augustine explains: « however much the eyes of our body may be changed for the better, they will be made equal to the eyes of angels (if there were any); but here Jerome said that the nature of the Creator is invisible to them and to the whole heavenly creation altogether. » For the second testimony of Jerome he cites from his commentary in Is. I.10.T.IV. p. 20: « a man cannot see the face of God, but angels, even of the least ones in the Church, always see the face of God... then we shall see face to face, when we have advanced from men to angels... although no creature sees the face of God according to the property of its nature, and then it is discerned by the mind, when it is believed to be invisible. » In the added commentary Augustine declares: « lest anyone believe that God is visible either to angels or to men, when we have become equal to angels, whether he is now or will be in future... (Jerome) signified sufficiently when he was seen by men through the eyes of the body as if he were himself corporeal, that he was not seen according to the property of his nature, in which he is then discerned by the mind, when he is believed to be invisible: to whom he is invisible, except by bodily sights even heavenly ones, as he said above of the angels and powers and dominions, how much more by earthly ones? » Lastly Augustine confirms his explanation by adducing the third testimony from the commentary in Is. VI. 1. T. IV. p. 90: « not only the divinity of the Father but not even of the Son or the Holy Spirit, since in the Trinity there is one nature, can the eyes of the flesh look upon; but the eyes of the mind, of which the Saviour himself says: blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God » .

In the same way, concerning the invisibility of God as regards bodily eyes, Augustine in this ep. 148. n. 6. explains the words of Ambrose from l. II. nn. 93. 94. on Luke. Nor are those words of Isidore in his Etymologies, l. VII. c. 1. n. 23., to be understood otherwise: « No one has ever seen God; for he is an invisible thing, and therefore is to be sought not with the eye but with the heart. » For, as Augustine says: « we cannot deny that the sons of God will see God, but as invisible things are seen..... but whence are invisible things seen, except by the eyes of the heart? » ep. 148. n. 1.

3°. Finally, those Fathers are to be set aside who say nothing other than that God cannot be seen by mortals in this life. Among these is St Gregory of Nyssa in that place (or. VI. de beatitud. T. I. p. 813. seqq.), whom Vasquez (l. c. n. 11.) unjustly calls into suspicion; and to the same class belong Eucherius (l. Spiritual. formular. c. 1. n. 2. 15. Bibl. Max. PP. T. VI. p. 825.) and Dionysius, de coelest. hierarch. c. 4., whose words may be read in Petav. l. VII. c. 5. n. 7; c. 6. n. 8.

§ III: Section III

Caput I: Chapter I

Thesis I: On the proper reason of the divine essence, insofar as we distinguish it from the attributes by consideration

Thesis II: On the distribution and order to be observed in treating the divine attributes

Caput II: Chapter II

Thesis I: The fullness of absolute perfection is expressed in Scripture by the name of God, 'He who is'

Thesis II: The meaning of the name 'He who is', and the absolute perfection of God, are declared by the holy Fathers

Thesis III: On the infinite difference between divine being and universal being

Caput III: Chapter III

Thesis I: The divine essence is one with the unity of singularity

Thesis II: On the most simple unity in the divine nature

Thesis III: From the teachings of revelation the divine simplicity is declared, and its proper reason, that God is pure act

Thesis IV: How God is truth itself

Thesis V: How God is goodness itself

Thesis VI: How God is beauty itself

Caput IV: Chapter IV

Thesis I: On the proper reason of divine eternity

Thesis II: On the coexistence of temporal things with divine eternity

Thesis III: The divine immensity is God's eminence above the relations of place and space

Thesis IV: God is present to all creatures according to essence, presence and power

§ IV: Section IV

Caput I: Chapter I

Thesis I: God is spirit

Thesis II: The divine essence itself is an infinite, substantial understanding and comprehension

Thesis III: God, from his essence and from the infinity of his understanding, necessarily knows every truth

Thesis IV: The divine essence is the formal object of all truths; the other truths are the secondary object of God's knowledge

Thesis V: God knows all truths not only in the divine essence but also in themselves

Caput II: Chapter II

Thesis I: God's knowledge, one in itself, can be distinguished in many ways according to its various objects

Thesis II: The object of the knowledge of simple intelligence is all possibilities; the secondary object of the knowledge of vision is, first of all, all things existing independently of created liberty

Thesis III: God foresees all free acts of creatures

Thesis IV: On the proper objective reason of the foreknowledge of free acts

Thesis V: Human liberty is reconciled with infallible divine foreknowledge

Thesis VI: There is demonstrated in God a knowledge that is commonly called middle knowledge

Thesis VII: The objective truth of conditional future things is the proper object of middle knowledge

§ V: Section V

Caput I: Chapter I

Thesis I: On the antecedent and consequent will of God

Thesis II: On the distinctions of the saving will according to the teaching of St Augustine

Caput II: Chapter II

Thesis I: God's universal antecedent saving will is demonstrated from Scripture

Thesis II: The same universal saving will of God is demonstrated from the teaching of the Fathers

Thesis III: The teaching of St Augustine on the universality of the saving will is vindicated

Thesis IV: Under several interpretations of the text 1. Tim. II. 4., St Augustine never denied the universality of the antecedent saving will

Thesis V: By his antecedent will God wills the salvation of all, even of infants

Caput III: Chapter III

Thesis I: No positive reprobation is given that precedes the foresight of sin

Thesis II: No antecedent negative reprobation from eternal life is to be admitted

Thesis III: On the various senses in which predestination is taken in the manner of speaking of Scripture and the Fathers

Thesis IV: The gifts of God have in predestination the same order that they have in execution

Thesis V: The predestination of grace, and complete predestination considered according to all its effects taken together, is not from foreseen merit

Thesis VI: The predestination of adults to glory, considered in itself, is an act of the consequent will that follows foresight of supernatural merits

Thesis VII: The arguments brought against the doctrine demonstrated so far are examined

Thesis VIII: Neither the question of St Prosper in his letter to Augustine, n. 8, nor the reply of St Augustine can be understood of predestination to glory before or after foreseen merits, which are through truly gratuitous grace

Thesis IX: St Augustine, against the Pelagians and their remnants, never taught predestination to glory before foreseen supernatural merits, but taught a gratuitous predestination of grace to exclude natural merits

Thesis X: On the private opinion of St Augustine concerning predestination to glory

Thesis XI: On the opinion of St Thomas concerning predestination to glory considered in itself and apart

Thesis XII: The true sense of Rom. IX is declared

Thesis XIII: Other texts of Scripture, which are objected to by some, are explained

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