Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam

The constant teaching of the Fathers on our mediate and analogical knowledge of God.

« Just as the chief error of the Eunomians in the fourth and fifth centuries was that they boasted that they themselves perfectly comprehended God's essence and what God is; yet by that very fact they supposed that the divine nature was understood through ideas not derived from elsewhere, and analogical, but immediate and proper, as it is in itself: so the defenders of the Catholic dogma, throughout this whole controversy, not only denied that God is comprehended by us, but also constantly maintained, for the explanation of the dogma, that the divine essence is not seen by us with a mental intuition in itself, but is known from the perfections of creatures already known, and therefore through analogical notions, as to what it is; and that this must be affirmed not only of purely rational knowledge, but also of the knowledge which we have drawn from revelation. »

I. As to the manner of knowing God, the summit of the Eunomian heresy was that they asserted that they themselves perfectly comprehended God and the divine essence. The Fathers and ecclesiastical writers who contended with those very men bear unanimous witness: Basil and Gregory of Nyssa in their books against Eunomius; Gregory Naz. or. 27. n. 3; Epiphanius haeres. 76. T. I. p. 989. 990; Jerome in Matth. XI. 27. T. VII. p. 74; Chrysostom in his homilies on the incomprehensible, e.g. hom. II. n. 3; Theodoret, haeretic. fabul. l. V. c. 3; Cyril of Alexandria, Thesaur. T. V. p. 200. « The man dared to say, says Chrysostom, l. c., that he knows God as God knows himself. » « Let Eunomius blush, who claims for himself such knowledge of the Father and the Son as they have of each other. But if from this he argues, and comforts his madness, because it follows (in the text of Matthew) and to whom the Son wishes to reveal, it is one thing to know by equality of nature, another by revelation » St Jerome, l. c. In this doctrine there is asserted at the same time a knowledge proper to God as he is in himself, and an immediate intuition, opposed to analogical knowledge through ideas derived from elsewhere, which is and is called abstractive. For if God is comprehended, as far as he is knowable, then assuredly he is known by a knowledge proper to him as he is in himself, and by no knowledge other than immediate, because the divine nature presents itself to the human mind as intelligible in itself and through itself; conversely, when this immediate intuition is denied, it follows of its own accord that God is known only through ideas derived from elsewhere and analogically, and not as he is in himself, and still less can he be comprehended ¹. It is no wonder, therefore, that the Anomoeans, in defending their heresy, even claimed for themselves in express words an immediate intuition of God. Epiphanius, l. c., so reports of Aëtius: « He, with his followers, has devised that God is known by himself above all mortals not according to faith, but by nature according to vision.... just as someone knows what is seen by the eyes and handled by the hands... thus this distinguished man says: I know God just as I know myself; indeed I do not so much know myself as I know God »².

This accusation of the Fathers and the description of the Eunomian error might seem, and indeed has seemed to some learned men, incredible (cf. Vasquez disp. 37. c. 2. n. 6.). But the Fathers, who disputed long and much with those heretics and certainly knew the whole nature of the error, clearly and often testify that the heretics claimed for themselves an intuition of the divine essence so perfect that God himself knows himself, and so comprehensive; yet the heretics are not on that account to be judged as having claimed for themselves the beatific vision, or, on the part of the object, a comprehension of the infinite essence, which is the divine essence as we Catholics hold and believe it to be. For the heretics erred about the very object of knowledge, namely the divine essence, I mean. The ultimate root of the Eunomians' error was in this: that they thought God to be that universal and abstract being, which is first conceived by us, and under whose aspect we understand whatever we understand³. The negative simplicity of this abstract being, since it is not placed in an infinity of perfection but in abstraction from every determinate perfection, the single most simple notion of τοῦ εἶναι remaining, namely in opposition to non esse; indeed we comprehend this being adequately, and far more perfectly than ourselves, as they used to say. Hence also the heretics, as we shall see below, asserted that all the names said of God (that being most simple by abstraction), for example essence, unbegotten, wisdom, justice, etc., are wholly synonymous; and the Fathers objected against them⁴ that what presented itself to their mind and thought was not God but something far different.

II. From the very nature of the controversy as explained, it is easily understood that the Fathers could not refute the error of the heretics in its whole character without also teaching what is to be thought about the origin of the idea of God and about the immediate intuition of the divine nature. And indeed, while Catholic doctors refuted in many ways the principal error concerning the comprehension of God, from the Scriptures and from the analogy of faith, there is none of them who did not intend, in explaining the Catholic teaching, at the same time to uncover and utterly root out the root of the error, namely the doctrine of an immediate intuition of the divine essence and the opinion consequently following from it about the knowledge of God as he is in himself. In this controversy, which is wholly dogmatic, the Fathers may be considered first as Doctors of the Church, insofar as they both declare and cultivate the Catholic mind; and in this respect how great their authority is, with the added consent which can be shown to be unanimous, directly or indirectly, is established from the treatise on Tradition. Next, the proofs themselves can be considered, by which they demonstrate, from the analogy of faith and the natures of things, that the immediate intuition of the divine essence and knowledge of God as he is in himself must be denied, and that our ideas of God are drawn from the previously known perfections of creatures, and that therefore in this mortal life we can attain only to a mediate and analogical knowledge. Then indeed we shall understand from their teaching not only that it is so, but also why it is so; and at the same time it will appear how closely the teaching of the Scholastics, and especially of St Thomas, is connected with the declaration anticipated by the holy Fathers; from all of which both the constancy in teaching and the truth of the doctrine are wonderfully illustrated.

Accordingly, 1°, the Fathers examine the very concepts we have of God, and they teach as follows about them. All our concepts of God are of such a kind that they manifestly show their origin from creatures already known, and by that very fact do not present God as he is in himself. For either the concepts affirm some perfection, and this either in the concrete, as wise, just, etc., or in the abstract, as wisdom, justice, etc. Now all those former concepts, in the way in which we first form them in the mind, present a subject in which wisdom inheres as a form; the latter present a form which demands to be in a subject, from which it is abstracted by thought. But all these things are so only in created beings; God is not a subject under a perfecting form, nor is he an abstract form; but he is substantial wisdom, which is at the same time every other perfection in supreme simplicity. We attain this, that it is so, by reason and by faith; how it is, no proper concept presents to us. Or the concepts are negative, by which imperfection is denied of God. But God is not represented by these as he is in himself; rather there is presented the imperfection which is in the creature, and that is denied of God, because we understand that there is no imperfection in God; but we do not on that account have a proper concept of that perfection by which all imperfection is excluded. Although therefore we are taught by reason and faith that all perfections, and the very notion of being, are in God wholly otherwise and far more eminently than in creatures, our concepts nevertheless cannot represent anything but what is common to creatures and generic; for they do not present the divine perfections as they are in God, specifically, or rather individually and supereminently. Hence it readily appears that the concepts of the perfections which we affirm of God we first abstracted from creatures, since in the way in which we can conceive them distinctly they are not in God but in creatures. Hence it comes about that while we affirm perfections of God, we are at the same time obliged to deny that they are in God in this imperfect way; although we do not grasp the mode in which they are in him.

I say nothing here that is not expressed in so many words by the Fathers named at the beginning: let there be read, by way of example, Gregory Nazianzen, or. 28, al. 34, or 2nd theological oration. He first admonishes, at n. 6, that it is quite different to know that God is, and to know what he is: for, he says, a man is exceedingly foolish who does not understand from natural demonstrations from creatures that God is, and that God is not this (not so) as we can conceive or describe him in speech. Then, having proceeded to the inquiry into what God is, he shows at n. 7. 8. that he is incorporeal. « But however we say that he is incorporeal, that is not a presentation or comprehension of his essence, any more than that he is uncreated, without beginning, unchangeable and incorruptible, and whatever else is said of God, or about God » (καὶ ὅσα περὶ θεοῦ ἢ περὶ θεὸν εἶναι λέγεται); just as, to know the nature of anything, it is not enough to know that it is a body, or that it is created; « for it can be either a man, or an ox, or a horse. » The first cause, therefore, why we do not understand God as he is in himself is traced by Gregory from this: that our concepts of God are common, and do not represent the divine things according to their proper nature.

Yet these things are no less true of the knowledge of faith than of what is merely rational; for the Fathers manifestly speak of every mode of knowledge that we can reach in the present state. Indeed they expressly demonstrate that this same reason is why we do not understand God as he is in himself, even in the case of the knowledge of faith drawn from revelation. The Prophets and Apostles, says Gregory of Nyssa, against Eunomius XII, p. 319. 320, Tom. II, « by making God clear and known to men from the wonders which shine forth in his works, and by the names by which the variety of divine power is understood, lead them to knowledge of the divine nature, manifesting to men only the greatness of those things which are considered concerning God⁵, but as for the reason of the essence, since it could not be grasped, they left it unspoken, ineffable and unsearchable.... For if we have learned some names for the declaration of divine knowledge, all these have communion and analogy with names of this kind which designate a property of man..... All the words of the holy Scriptures devised for the glorification of God indicate something of those things which are made manifest concerning God, each containing its own proper meaning⁶, through which we are taught either that he is powerful, or incapable of defect, or not from any cause.... but the essence itself (as it is in itself), since it cannot be grasped by understanding and is ineffable in words, they left without curious inquiry. »

Moreover, although we may correct the commonness of the concept, if it is permissible so to speak, by adding a negation, the Fathers say that it indeed follows that the concept is true, yet not so as to present God according to his proper nature, as he is in himself. Immediately after the passages above, Nazianzen adds: « It is not enough to say what he is not, but whoever wishes to investigate the nature of him who is (τοῦ ὄντος), must also say what he is; for he who only states what a thing is not does the same as one who, asked how much is twice five, should answer that it is not one nor two... yet he would not say that it is ten, nor would he bring the mind of the questioner to what he seeks. »

Further, by examination of the individual affirmative concepts, the same Nazianzen demonstrates at n. 13 their origin from creatures and their imperfection. Setting aside metaphorical names, such as when God is called fire, light, etc., and considering the perfections themselves, which are expressed by proper appellations, charity, wisdom, justice, understanding, Word, all these, says Gregory, we conceive not as they are in God; but « understanding indeed as it is in someone, and whose movements and thoughts are either silent or uttered by voice; word, what kind of word, unless either resting in us or poured forth? wisdom, justice, charity, what else than laudable habits and dispositions which inform us and change us? If, however, withdrawing from all these, we wish to see the divine as it is in itself, as far as it can be done, gathering some partial representation from these shadows, what is this effort? It will be from these and not these, or how are all these together, and each of them perfectly, that one thing which is simple by nature and which cannot be represented? » Vide Basil. contra Eunom. l. I. n. 13. 14; ep. 234. 235; Nyssen. contra Eunom l. XII. p. 320-331.

The whole demonstration of the origin of our ideas, and of the mediate knowledge alone of divine things, and of the analogy of our concepts consequently drawn from it, which everywhere recurs among the Fathers in the Eunomian controversy, is easily seen to be the perfect exemplar to which the doctrine of St Thomas and of the theologians of the Schools is expressed. Let there be read, for example, St Thomas, De potentia q. 7. a. 5: « It is clear that no effect equals the power of the first agent, which is God.... Therefore no form of any divine effect is in God in the same way as it is in the effect; nevertheless it must be there in some higher manner; and hence it is that all the forms which are distinct and diverse from one another in various effects are united in him as in one common power... and the perfections of created things are likened to God according to his one and simple essence. Our intellect, however, since it receives knowledge from created things, is informed by likenesses (analogical ideas) of the perfections found in creatures, such as wisdom, virtue, goodness and the like. Hence, just as created things are in some way, though deficiently, likened to God, so also our intellect is informed by the species of these perfections..... Hence it must be that those things which the intellect, informed by the species of these perfections, thinks or states about God, truly exist in God, who corresponds to each of the aforesaid species as that to which all the like things are like. But if such an intelligible species of our intellect equalled the divine essence in its likeness, it would comprehend it... Yet the aforesaid species does not perfectly liken the divine essence, as has been said; and therefore although such names as the intellect attributes to God from such conceptions signify that which is the divine substance, nevertheless they do not perfectly signify it according as it is, but according as it is understood by us »⁷. In this sense the Fathers say that we know not the essence but the things which are about it, not the first and simple nature, which remains within the veil, but that which is posterior (compare Exod. XXXIII. 23.) and descends to us; this is the majesty and magnificence, insofar as it is manifested in creatures; of this kind indeed are its notions which come after it, as the images of the sun in water show the sun to weak eyes. Naz.l.c.n.3.

2° To uproot the fiction of knowledge of the divine nature as it is in itself, so long as we live in this mortal body, the Fathers take up the examination and set forth a full theory of human knowledge. Indeed they establish, both in general and in particular in their disputations against the Eunomians, concerning our mode of knowing, the same principles for the most part which St Thomas and the other Scholastics afterwards developed.

Therefore the Fathers teach a) that our mode of knowing in the present life begins from sensible things, concerning which their teaching has been sufficiently stated above, in thesis VII, n. 1°. From this they not only infer that the existence of God is known by us from previously known effects, a matter which we treated in the same place; but they also thence demonstrate that, just as the idea of God is not immediate and intuitive, so the essence of God as it is in itself cannot be known by us: because effects and all created things are plainly of another kind (equivocal effects), and do not equal the power of their cause. « We say that the majesty and wisdom and goodness and providence of God are known by us... but his operations are various, while his essence is simple; we say that God is known by us from his operations, but we do not promise access to the essence itself » Basil, ep. 234. « God is in himself what he is, but he is called by those who invoke him not what he is, for his nature is ineffable, which is he who is; yet he has names from those things which we are sure he works in relation to us.... but the essence is prior to the operations, and we understand the operations through those things which are subject to the senses... and the human mind, as far as it grasps through the operations, so far it speaks » Nyssen, contra Eunom. XII. p. 329-331. « God is none of those things that are (οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων; that is, nothing of those things of which being is the immediate object of our concept), not as if he were not, but because he is above all things that are; if therefore our knowledge is of beings, what is above knowledge is also above essence, and conversely what is above essence will also be above knowledge » Damasc. Fid. orth. l. I. c. 4.

St Thomas explains this ground, as the principal one, in many places; e.g. in Boët. Trin. lect. II. q. 2. art. 3: « Our intellect, in the state of the wayfarer, cannot be borne immediately to the divine essence and to other separate essences, because it is immediately extended to phantasms, to which it is related as sight is to colour, as is said in De anima 3; and so the intellect can immediately conceive the quiddity of a sensible thing, but not of any intellectual thing... But there are certain invisible things whose quiddity and nature are perfectly expressed by the quiddities of known sensible things, and of such intelligibles we can know what they are, but mediately.... Sensible natures, when understood, do not sufficiently express the divine essence, nor even certain separate essences, since they are not naturally of one genus⁸ when speaking; and the quiddity and all names of this kind are said almost equivocally of sensibles and of those substances.... and so by the way of likeness those substances are not sufficiently known from these. Nor again by the way of causality, because the things which are found to be effected by those substances in these lower things are not effects equal to their powers, so that one could arrive at knowing what it is (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) of the cause. Hence concerning those immaterial substances, in the state of the wayfarer, we can in no way know what they are (by a proper concept, but only an analogical one), not only by the way of natural knowledge, but not even by the way of revelation, because the ray of divine revelation reaches us according to our mode, as Dionysius says⁹. For although we are raised through revelation to know something which otherwise would be unknown to us, yet not so that we should know in any other way than through sensibles... And so it remains that immaterial forms are not known to us by knowledge of what they are, but only by knowledge that they are, whether by natural reason from the effects of creatures or also from revelation, which is through likenesses taken from the senses. »

b) The Fathers, no less than the Scholastic theologians, declare this mode of our knowledge from the necessary and universal principle of all knowledge. Knowledge is not according to the mode of the known thing's being and perfection, but according to the mode of the knower, of whose vital act it is. Hence it comes about that those things which are inferior to us by nature we know in a nobler way than they are in themselves, material things intellectually; while those things which are superior to us by nature we know in a less perfect way than they are in themselves. Now we are a composite nature, not only because we consist of soul and body, but also because in the soul, considered in itself, there is potency and act, and therefore a perfection limited by imperfection; and knowledge itself is not a substance but an accident in the substance of the soul. Hence of all that we understand we form concepts according to the proportion and analogy of this our composite being; and therefore the infinite Being, which in supreme simplicity, without composition and without limitation, is every perfection absolutely, we cannot conceive by any notion as it is in itself.

In this sense the Fathers are accustomed to teach that the measure of the knowledge of God is in us; « for divine things are revealed (as Dionysius says, De div. nom. c. 1. §. 1.) according to the analogy of each mind, and the divine goodness, which is immeasurable, as it were accommodating itself to our mode of knowing, encloses the immeasurable in some measure » (ἐν μετρῳ τὴν ἀμετρίαν, ὡς ἀχωρητον). The complete theory which we have set forth can be read in Gregory of Nyssa, cont. Eunom. l. I. p. 98. (ed. Gretzer), and in Cyril of Alexandria, in Thesauro Opp. T. V. P. I. p. 264. 267. From the unlimited perfection of God in supreme simplicity, and from the composition which is in us, they conclude: « Since we cannot go beyond the measure given to us, we see God, who is incomprehensible, as in a mirror and in an enigma; for the nature of man cannot say anything greater about God than what belongs to its own nature: therefore we use our own modes, and make our own indications of greater things » (τὰ καθ' ἑαυτοὺς μειζόνων ὑποδείγματα ποιούμενοι). Among the Scholastics, besides St Thomas, 1. q. 12. a. 4, the one worth reading is Suarez, Metaphysics disp. XXX, sect. XI, n. 13, where he has those things which demonstrate that knowledge of the divine essence as it is in itself, and consequently the immediate intuition of God, is superior not only to the intellect of man but to that of any creature, as long as it is permitted only the natural powers and those proportioned to its nature. Of these things the discussion will return further below, where we shall treat of the beatific vision.