Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam

The Fathers agree that from the manifestation of God in creatures it is possible, by the light of reason, to arrive at the first notion, and at the more refined knowledge, of the existence of God.

« The doctrine handed down in the Scriptures, that the existence of the true God is to be known by the light of reason implanted in us, the Fathers and Doctors of Christian antiquity cultivated with the greatest consensus; for from their documents it is plain that this is their common opinion: 1° that from this visible universe the manifestation of God shines forth to human reason; 2° that this manifestation and the implanted power of reason are so constituted that in the minds of all who have the free use of reason some confused knowledge of God arises, as it were of its own accord, from the very obvious consideration of the universe; 3° that, for cultivating this primitive knowledge so that it becomes fuller and more distinct, there is no lack, on the one hand, of objective traces of God in creatures, nor, on the other, of the subjective light of reason. »

I. As long as the doctrine about the manifestation of God through this visible universe is considered only in general, it is so constant among all the Fathers, and adorned with so many most eloquent disputations, that there can be no room for doubt. For they repeat and inculcate on every suitable occasion, from the Apologists Justin, Athenagoras and Tatian down to Pope Gregory the Great, John Damascene and Bernard, that the knowledge of God is universal among all nations, because the works of God, set before all, demonstrate to human reason that God, invisible in himself, exists; and thus in the works themselves a teaching and a certain instruction about God is contained, which all men understand. « Perhaps, says Clement of Alexandria, one ought not even to undertake a demonstration (of the existence of God), since the providence of God is manifest from the very aspect of all the works which are constructed with art and wisdom, and which in one way come to be in order and in another are manifested in order; and he who has given us being and life has also bestowed reason, wishing us to live reasonably and well. » After a longer disputation he adds: « the Parent and Creator of all things, all things from all things perceive by inborn power and without teaching (ἐμφύτως καὶ ἀδιδάκτως ἀντιλαμβάνεται)… all men, Greeks and barbarians¹ No race at all, whether of farmers, or of nomads, or of those who inhabit cities, can live which is not already preoccupied by the persuasion of a higher nature (μὴ προκατειλημμένον τῇ τοῦ κρείττονος πίστει). Therefore all peoples, to east and to west, to north and to south, have one and the same anticipation concerning him who established this rule, since his most universal operations have pervaded all things equally² Strom. V. p. 547. 612. The same things are demonstrated before Clement by Athenagoras (Legat. pro christ. n. 4. 5. 7.), and after him by Athanasius (orat. c. gentes n. 34. 35.); of whom the former says that the state of this world, its order, its perpetual harmony, its greatness, splendour, beauty and arrangement are all so many « pledges of the worship of God (ἐνέχυρα τῆς θεοσεβείας); for the invisible things are understood from the visible. » Athanasius, however, says: « created things, by their arrangement and order, as if in letters, indicate and proclaim their Lord and Creator… for since God, according to his own nature, is invisible and incomprehensible, therefore he arranged creation by his word in such a way that at least from the works he might be known by men; for often the artificer, even when he himself is not seen, is known from his works. Just as they also tell of the sculptor Phidias, that his works, from the mutual proportion and arrangement of the parts, presented Phidias, though absent, to those who beheld them: so one must understand from the arrangement of the world that God is its Creator and Maker. » Very similar things are repeated by Iustinus de Monarchia n. 1. coll. Apolog. II. n. 6; Tatianus cont. Graec. or. n. 4; Iren. l. II. c. 6. 9; III. c. 25; Theophilus Antioch. ad Autolyc. l. I. n. 1-7; Tertullian. cont. Marcion. l. I. cc. 10. 11; Apologet. c. 17; de testimonio anim. cc. 1. 2. 5; de anima cc. 2. 18. 20; Origines in Rom. I; cont. Celsum l. VII. n. 36; Minutius Felix in Octavio n. 18; Cyprianus de idolorum vanitate n. 5; Constitutiones Apost. l. VIII. c. 12; Basilius cont. Eunom. l. I. n. 14; epp. 234. et 235. ad Amphilochium; Gregor. Nazianz. or. 28. al. 34. n. 5-21; or. 34. al. 24. n. 10; Gregor. Nyss. de beatitudin. or. 6. T. I. p. 813. sqq.; contr. Eunom. l. XII. p. 320. seqq.; Chrysost. in Rom. hom. 3; ad popul. Antioch. hom. 9; in homiliis de Incomprehensibili; Hieronym. in Gal. c. I. et III. T. VII. pp. 391. 419. ed. Vallarsi; August. de Genes. ad litt. l. IV. n. 49; Serm. 141. al. 55. de verbis Domini; Cyrill. Alexandr. in Io. I. Opp. T. IV. p. 74-76; contr. Iulian. l. II. T. VI. P. II. p. 52; Gregor. M. Moral. l. XXVII. c. 5; Damasc. Fid. orthod. l. I. cc. 1. 3.

Let Gregorius Naz. or. 28. al. 34. n. 5. 6. be heard in the name of all: « The nature of God is in itself unapprehensible and incomprehensible; I say not that it is, but what it is; for these differ greatly… For that God is, and is the creating and conserving cause of all things, both the eyes themselves and the natural law teach; the eyes indeed, while they turn their gaze upon visible things, beautifully composed and advancing, and, so to speak, moved and acting without motion; the natural law, while by reasoning through visible and ordered things it concludes to their author. For how else would this universe ever have stood and been established, unless God were creating and conserving all things? For no one, seeing a lyre most finely wrought and its harmony and craft, or hearing its harmonious sounds, will think in his mind of anything other than the maker of the lyre and the player of the lyre, and will be carried in thought to him, even if he does not know him by face; so also to us the efficient and moving and conserving cause of the things made is manifest, even though it is not comprehended by the mind. But he is too dull who does not advance thus far of his own accord, and who, following the natural demonstrations, does not at the same time grasp that God is not what we have conceived or formed in the mind by some image, or what reason has sketched »³. The same thing, in a brief sentence, Basil in Hexaem. hom. I. n. 6. and Cyrillus Alex. contr. Iulian. l. II. p. 73. have also set down, of whom the former calls this visible world « a school and gymnasium of rational souls for the knowledge of God, while through visible and sensible things it offers the mind a guidance to the understanding of invisible things, as the Apostle says: for his invisible things etc.»⁴ Cyril, to the question how the heavens declare the glory of God, answers: « splendid and outstanding works, though destitute of voice, nevertheless in some manner proclaim the knowledge of the artificer, which they reflect in themselves as it were in rays » ⁵.

That the manifestation of God to human reason is contained in this whole universe, so that God, existing, can be known from this existing universe of things, is the consensus of all Christian antiquity. Since, however, the question is not so much in general terms about the knowledge of God from creatures, whether there is any; but rather about the mode in which it stands: we proceed to consider this very mode more distinctly according to the teaching of the Fathers, although what the Fathers handed down about it can be understood without obscurity from the testimonies already cited.

II. We have seen in the preceding thesis that in the Scriptures themselves a double, as it were, degree of knowledge of God from the consideration of created things is distinguished: the first still obscure and confused, which in some way arises of its own accord and awakens the rational man to seek God by deliberate attention and reflective study, by which one arrives at the second degree, of knowledge now clearer and more distinct. We have this distinction explained more fully by the holy Fathers and Christian Doctors.

The Fathers teach with great agreement that, besides and before the knowledge of God, which is the fruit of scientific and philosophical meditation and demonstration, there is already present in all men who have not suppressed the light of reason some common knowledge. They describe this primitive knowledge of God, as an anticipation of the mind, with roughly these characteristics:

1° It arises of its own accord from the innate principles of the rational nature, and is not learned by teaching and discipline; but the rational man himself conceives it through himself. In express words it is said: « a conception and an innate judgment; a naturally implanted knowledge; a natural anticipation of the mind; that which a man conceives from an innate nature and without instruction; which is not learned by instruction, but which a man learns from himself; a reason congenital to all and the first law in us, leading us to God from visible creatures ⁶; a knowledge which nature itself suggests, as it were from common sense; a doctrine entrusted tacitly to a congenital nature and to innate conscience » etc. Iustin. Apol. II. n. 6; Clem. Alex. Strom. V. p. 612; Orig. in Rom. l. I. n. 16; Tertull. de anima c. 2; de testim. animae c. 5; Euseb. Praep. Ev. l. II. c. 9; Naz. or. 28. al. 34. n. 6.16; 34. al. 24. n. 10; Nyss. de beatitud. or. 5. T. I. p. 801; Cyrill. Alex. contr. Iulian. l. II. p. 52; Damasc. Fid. orthod. l. I. c. 13.

Therefore, 2° this knowledge of God is common to all, not only to the learned but also to the unlearned and to barbarians, because all have a rational soul and the works of God are constantly set before the consideration of all; and so this primitive and fundamental knowledge of God does not desert reason, even when a man, against reason, is trained to idolatry by public and private customs. See Clement of Alexandria in the place cited above: « the providence of God is manifest from the very aspect of all works… because God has imparted reason to us… whence there is no race of men which has not been preoccupied (προκατειλημμενον) by the persuasion of a higher nature… because the most universal operations of God have equally pervaded all things. » The same, Strom. V. p. 590: among all right-thinking men there was, he says, a natural manifestation of God, « who have not wholly cast off all shame before the truth » (ἃ καὶ μὴ τελέον ἀπηρυθριακοτες πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν). We have seen the opinion of Gregory Nazianzen in the passage above: « that God is, the eyes themselves and the natural law of reason teach…. But he is too dull who does not advance of his own accord, and, obedient to the natural manifestations… » In the same sense speaks St Augustine in Io. tract. 106. n. 4: « this is the power of true divinity, that it cannot be wholly and altogether hidden from a rational creature already using reason; for, with a few exceptions, in whom nature is too greatly depraved, the whole human race confesses God to be the author of this world. » Chrysostom hom. IX. n. 2. ad popul. Antioch.: « through things God willed to teach human nature. What then is "through things"? Through the creature itself…. both the Scythian and the barbarian, and the Indian and the Egyptian, and every man walking upon the earth, will hear this voice; for it falls into our mind not through the ears but through the eyes; and the sharing of visible things is the same and not different, as with languages… the creature utters a voice easy to understand both to barbarians and to Greeks and to all men universally. » Tertullian holds very similar things, cont. Marc. I. c. 10. Hence the same Tertullian calls upon the soul of the gentiles themselves as a witness of God, « not that which, formed by the schools, belches forth wisdom, but simple, rough, unpolished and untutored, such as those have who have only it… Nature the teacher, the soul the disciple: whatever the one has taught or the other has learned has been handed down by God, namely to the teacher of the teacher herself » Tertull. de testim. animae c. 2.5.

3° In the knowing subject they declare this power and innate impulse, both to know truth in general and, above all, to know God from the very nature of the rational soul, in which is the image of the substantial truth, the fount and norm of all truth. For just as all created things that are, and that are and live, are, according to the diverse degree of perfection communicated to them, a kind of analogous adumbration and participation of God the Creator, inasmuch as he is Essence (ἡ αὐτοουσια), the principle and exemplar of all being, both possible and real, and inasmuch as he is life itself (ἡ αὐτοζωη), the principle and exemplar of all life; so man through reason is a participation and image of God, even inasmuch as God is wisdom itself (ἡ αὐτοσοφια) ⁷, and so (speaking by appropriation according to the proper characters of the divine persons) the image of the hypostatic Wisdom, which is God the Word. According to this participation, the intellectual faculty itself, reason itself, is called by us the innate seminal word (λογος σπερματικος) ⁸, of which speak Justin Apol. II. n. 8. 13; Tertull. l. de anima c. 20; Basil. in regul. fusior. interrog. 2; Severian. Gabalit. de sigillis n. 2. (inter Opp. Chrysost. T. XII. p. 404); Cyrill. in Io. Opp. T. IV. p. 74. 75. 76. « The Word, Cyril says, enlightens every man coming into this world, not by teaching as angels or men do, but rather by creating (οὐ διδασκαλικως ἀλλα μαλλον δημιουργικως) for each of those who have been called into existence he plants the seed of wisdom or knowledge of God, and inserts a root of understanding, and so makes him a rational animal, rendering him a sharer in his own nature. » Origen (de Princip. l. I. c. 3. n. 8.) calls it « a participation of the Word; » Clemens Al. (cohort. ad gent. p. 45.) « a divine effluence (ἀπόρροιαν θείκην) instilled into all men simply, but especially into those free from learning, through which even the unwilling confess that God is one. » In this same sense of the image of God, Gregor. Naz. or. 28. al. 34. n. 17. says that mind and reason are « something divine and god-like » (θεῖον τοῦτο καὶ θεοειδές). In the rational nature itself, as it is the image of God, is founded the soul's propensity (συμπάθεια) and impulse to seek God in the consideration of the universe. So Athenagoras, Legat. pro Christian. n. 7: « that God is one, most men confess, even unwillingly, when they come to the principles of all things… The poets and philosophers, indeed, as in other matters so also in concluding this, have touched upon it, each impelled by his own soul, according to the kinship of the breath received from God, to seek, if they could find and understand the truth » ⁹.

III. Although from the consideration of this universe common to all ¹⁰ the knowledge of God as existing, as some personal, wise, good, provident being, on whom all other things depend as on a beginning and an end, is poured in as it were of its own accord, and in this sense even necessarily, « for this is the highest wrong, not to acknowledge him whom you cannot fail to know » (Tertull. Apol. c.17; Cyprian. de idol. van. p. 227.): nevertheless this primitive knowledge is very imperfect, and of such a kind that the Greeks properly call it προλῆψιν, « a knowledge received beforehand, namely needing unfolding » ¹¹. Of this notion, however, both the confirmation and the rational unfolding now belong to science, which is called first philosophy. For the more perfectly the essential dependence of this whole universe on its threefold order is known through a reflective meditation undertaken, the more evidently reason will understand the existence of a necessary cause; and the more distinctly the perfection of the same universe, « greatness and beauty » (Sap. XIII.), unity in multiplicity, and the wonderful subordination of the smallest and the greatest to their proximate ends, through intermediate ones, up to the highest, is perceived, the more brilliantly will reason attain the perfections of the necessarily existing cause. Not only a posteriori, but also in some way mediately a priori. For once the existence of a being from itself has been demonstrated a posteriori, from the very intrinsic reason of the necessary Being, and so as it were a priori, its infinite perfection can be understood ¹².

Examples of this more refined demonstration, and the most magnificent of them, you will find in almost all the holy Fathers cited above, especially in Athenagoras, Athanasius, Lactantius, Gregory Nazianzen, John Damascene. Cf. Petav. de Deo l. I. c. 1. 2.

Most of the Fathers, who wrote either against the gentiles or against the Eunomians, consider God chiefly under the aspect of efficient cause, and so, ascending from the created effect to God the Creator, they cultivated above all the cosmological argument, and what is customarily called the physico-theological argument. But the genius of St Augustine, accustomed to the most sublime meditations, although he too commends the way of knowing God first from visible creatures as proper to the human mind (Genes. ad litt. l. IV. c. 32. n. 49; Serm. 141. 241. etc.), yet where he seeks, for the refinement of understanding, what God is, he is accustomed rather, from the known metaphysical order, to raise himself up to God as exemplary cause: namely from the eternal and immutable truth of reasons, both in numbers and in the contemplation of the disciplines, from the ideas of wisdom, justice, and of the true and the good, from metaphysical laws, to which not only whatever is, but whatever can be, lies under and is governed by absolute necessity; he strives by the sight of the mind to behold truth, wisdom, and substantial goodness, which is both the foundation of the whole intelligible metaphysical order and its subsisting exemplar, and the cause of the rational light by which we understand what is true. Thus you may see St Augustine arguing in l. II. de libero arbitrio (per totum); Confess. l. VII. c. 17; de vera relig. n. 52. 2. sqq.; Soliloquior. l. I. c. 5. 8; de Ordine l. II. c. 16. etc. Cf. Lessius de perfect. divin. l. VI. c. 4. n. 39. sqq.

Scholion. Just as we see the doctrine of the Scriptures declared in the very ample explanations of the holy Fathers, so that no doubt seems possible about the genuine Catholic understanding, so the School Doctors, by common consent, have vindicated the same doctrine of Scripture and of the Fathers in their disputations, lest anything be wanting; for they hand down, as it were the head of doctrine, to which it would be wrong to be opposed, that the existence of God can be demonstrated with certainty by reason. Among the innumerable ones who may be consulted are St Thomas (who did not hesitate to call the opposed opinion manifestly false de verit. q. 10. a. 12., and an error cont. gent. I. c. 12.); Alex. Hal. 1. P. Summae q. 2. m. 2. aa. 1-4; m. 3. aa. 1. 2; Albert. M. Summa theol. q. 14. m. 1. usque ad q. 17. Opp. T. XVII; S. Bonav. 1. dist. 3. a. 1. q. 2. 3. Among the more recent ones consult Gillius de Deo Tract. VIII. c. 5. n. 7; Bellarm. de grat. et lib. arbitr. l. IV. c. 2; Molina, Valentia, Suarez, Vasquez in 1. P. de Deo; Franc. de Lugo disp. XIV. c. 2. etc.

Finally, as to the value of rational demonstration, let the judgments delivered on this matter be compared. By the Sorbonne faculty, by apostolic mandate, in 1348, among other theses of Nicholas of Autrecourt, the following also were condemned: « Likewise (he said) that no demonstration can be drawn from the existence of one thing to an effect, or from an effect to a cause, or conversely. » « Likewise that we do not evidently know that God is, understanding by God the most noble being » (Du Plessis d'Argentree Collectio Iudiciorum etc. T. I. p. 355.). The professor of Strasbourg, approved by his Bishop, Gregory XVI approving (apostolic letters, 20 Dec. 1834.), was ordered to subscribe (8 Sept. 1840.) to this thesis: « Reasoning can prove the existence of God with certainty. » Two propositions akin to these, at the command of the S. Congregation of the Index, 12 Dec. 1855, D. Bonetty undertook: Prop. 2.

« Reasoning can prove with certainty the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul, and human liberty. » Prop. 4. « The method used by D. Thomas, D. Bonaventura and the other Scholastics after them does not lead to rationalism, nor was it the cause why, in today's schools, philosophy should run into naturalism and pantheism. »