Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam

The interpretation of Rom. II concerning unbelievers and the rational knowledge of the natural law is vindicated.

« The consensus on the interpretation of the text Rom. II. 14. 15. is such that none of the holy Fathers and ancient theologians, not even those cited for the opposing opinion from the commentaries of Estius, has taught that the passage of the Apostle is to be understood not of the unbelieving Gentiles but of the faithful alone among the Gentiles; or has denied that the knowledge of the natural law described there is acquired by the light of reason, without the aid of revelation proposing the law itself. Nor do the arguments, which Estius sought to persuade us of from the context, carry greater weight: that the words of the Apostle are to be understood « of the faithful alone, whether they preceded the coming of Christ or followed it. » »

To define the state of the question, a threefold question must be distinguished. For it can be asked: (1°) whether the Gentiles not having the law, in this passage of Paul, are to be understood as the faithful alone among the Gentiles, in opposition to the Jews (as Jews and Greeks, circumcision and uncircumcision, etc., are frequently opposed); and not rather that they can be understood either as unbelievers alone, or indistinctly as both unbelievers and those faithful who, under the natural law, had been imbued with sufficient faith in God and in the Redeemer to come.

The second question is whether the Gentiles are said to do the things of the law naturally, by natural powers, or through the help of supernatural grace; and so whether the discussion concerns supernatural acts. Baius, and afterwards the Jansenists, who, denying the distinction between natural and supernatural virtues, affirmed that all acts of unbelievers are sins, therefore also taught that this text of the Apostle could not be understood except of the faithful alone and of acts of the faithful proceeding from grace; the other interpretation, of unbelieving Gentiles and of acts naturally honourable, they called Pelagian. Estius, a Catholic theologian, retained the explanation of his master Baius insofar as he affirmed and asserted that the passage of the Apostle is indeed to be understood « of the faithful alone, whether they preceded the coming of Christ or followed it, » and this because Paul speaks solely of the supernatural and meritorious observance of the law. Estius sought to confirm this his opinion by the authority of the Fathers and theologians, especially Augustine, then Prosper, Fulgentius, Ambrosiaster, Hugh, Lombard, Hervaeus, St Thomas, the Carthusian; and of the Greeks also, such as Origen, Chrysostom, Theophylact, Oecumenius. Then from the context of the passage itself he says that this commentary is « very probable and almost certain. » Estius did not, however, follow Baius in condemning the other interpretation, of unbelieving Gentiles and of acts ethically honourable by nature; for he confesses that « this exposition has nothing contrary to sound doctrine. » But certainly, if we trust Estius, the opinion seems rather weak on the authority of the Doctors: « some, among whom Cajetan, defend it, » he says.

The third question is whether the moral law is said by the Apostle to be made manifest to the Gentiles by the light of reason, without positive and extrinsic revelation of the law; or whether the opinion can be reconciled with the words of the Apostle which denies to human reason the power of knowing supersensible things, and in particular the moral order and moral obligation, otherwise than through faith from positive revelation of the law. In this sense no one, not even Estius himself, doubted until these more recent times that these powers are present in reason, and are shown by the testimony of the Apostle to be present, to know the natural law without its positive revelation¹. For Estius interprets the words of Paul « they are a law to themselves » to this sense: « they are for themselves in place of the law, while of their own accord and by their own judgment, without the external aid and impulse of a law commanding, they do good. » If, however, it should seem that there is a conflict between the opinion asserted by Estius, that in this passage the name of Gentiles designates the faithful alone, and yet that by the name of the law written in the hearts is to be understood the natural law known by the light of reason without revelation of that same law, we can leave to Estius the burden of answering; for we say that it is false that by the name of Gentiles the faithful alone are to be understood. But Estius does not answer this objection of contradiction, which he proposes as peculiar to the Pelagians, by denying, as more recent writers do, knowledge of the law without its proposal through revelation; rather he admits and reconciles both assertions. For all the faithful have, in addition to the natural law implanted in all, the law of Christ; and therefore these words of the Apostle, the Gentiles who do not have the law, cannot be understood of the faithful: « this argument, he says, may seem to have some weight as far as Christian Gentiles are concerned; but nothing pertains to those Gentiles who preceded the coming of Christ and yet believed that He would come. » That is, that they knew from revelation, at least implicitly, the Redeemer who was to come², it does not hinder that by the light of reason, without the revelation of the law, they could understand the natural law: that one should not steal, should not commit adultery, etc., which are examples set down by the Apostle himself.

Since, therefore, the first of the proposed questions, whether under the name of the Gentiles who do not have the law the faithful alone are to be understood in the text of Paul, or whether, if not the faithful alone, at least directly and principally the unbelievers are signified, is connected with two other, quite different, questions: the first, whether the Apostle's discourse concerns natural acts, ethically good, performed without the aid of grace; and so the false 25th proposition of Baius is demonstrated from the Apostle: « all the works of unbelievers are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices. » (Cf. propositions of Baius 27, 28, 29, 30, 37, 61, 62; of Quesnel 39, 40, 41; of the Pistoians n. 24, in the Bull Auctorem Fidei.) The other connected question is whether the manifestation of the natural law of which we speak is said by the Apostle to be through the light of reason, without positive extrinsic revelation of the law itself; and thus from the words of Paul is demonstrated some power of human reason to know the things of the law, without their needing to be made known by revelation. The anonymous Belgian writer mentioned above, who undertook to attack our doctrine, confusing these two questions, affirmed that all the Fathers and theologians cited by Estius interpret the words of Paul of the faithful alone, and contradict our interpretation of the Pauline text, by which we contend that the discourse of the Apostle is, if not solely, at least directly and principally, about unbelievers and about the rational knowledge of the natural law; for this opinion, he said, has as its only defenders « some, and among them Cajetan. »

Setting aside the question, which belongs to another place, of inward grace and how it is necessary for the observance of the natural law and for ethically good acts, we shall do two things. First, with regard to the interpretation of the Pauline text concerning unbelieving Gentiles and the rational knowledge of the law, we shall examine the doctrine of the Fathers and theologians, especially those to whom the opposing side appeals. We affirm, moreover, that among all of them there is none who has said that the words of Paul are to be understood of the faithful alone, nor any who has denied that they are to be understood of rational knowledge of the law without its proposal through revelation. Second, we shall then judge the value of the arguments which the adversaries draw from the context to confirm their opinion.

Although the matter is clear in itself, to guard against false interpretations we premise three things. Our discussion is now about the revelation of the law itself, not about a revelation which some have begun to assert to be necessary to men for acquiring the use of reason, unless perhaps they were to say that this is itself the revelation of the moral law. Next, in denying the necessity of this very revelation for the possibility of rational and natural knowledge, we understand the exclusion of not moral but physical necessity, which arises simply from the lack of powers of reason. Lastly, we treat universally of the rational knowledge of moral obligation, without now distinctly determining either its extent or its perfection. ( On these matters compare the Appendix to the Treatise on Tradition).

I. First, the proposition of Baius (22nd among the Baian propositions) was condemned by the Holy See, in which the innovator, against the Catholic theologians, said: « They agree with Pelagius, who understand the testimony of the Apostle, Rom. II, the Gentiles who do not have the law naturally do the things of the law, as referring to Gentiles who lack the grace of faith. » On this condemnation consult Ripalda (« Against the articles of Baius », T. III. of the work Operis de Ente supernaturali). Meanwhile two things follow from this censure: namely, that theologians were accustomed, in the dogmatic controversy, to understand the passage of the Apostle of unbelievers; and that the Apostolic See wished this interpretation to be kept safe and covered. Hence it is a prejudice that those « some interpreters, » as the adversaries call them, are many and weighty Doctors. Indeed, at the same time as Estius knew « only some, and among them Cajetan », who held that the Gentiles not having the law in Paul are to be understood as unbelievers, Stapleton (On original sin, book II, ch. 14, Opp. T. II. p. 66), successor of Baius in the Louvain chair and his most learned adversary, affirmed that this opinion is « the common opinion of all the other Doctors (except Augustine), especially of the Greeks, which Augustine himself does not disapprove. »

Since it would be long to copy out the opinions of all, I shall cite the passages that can be read, and take a few from them. Origen, On Romans, book II, nn. 7. 8. 9: « The Greek, that is the Gentile, if, when he does not have the law, he is a law to himself, showing the work of the law in his heart, and unmoved by natural reason, as we see some among the Gentiles either keep justice or preserve chastity.... Though he seem alien to eternal life, because he does not believe in Christ.... yet it seems that he cannot altogether lose the glory and honour and peace of good works....³ The natural law is common to all men. » Origen understands by this the law which « the Gentiles can perceive naturally. » Chrysostom, Homily XII, n. 3, to the people of Antioch: « What is the natural law? God formed conscience in us, and brought it about that we have the knowledge of good and of their opposites, drawn spontaneously from ourselves (αὐτοδίδακτον ἐποίησε τὴν γνῶσιν τῶν καλῶν κ. λ.). For we have no need to learn that fornication is evil and continence good, but from the beginning (ἀπ' ἀρχῆς) we know this. » The holy Doctor goes on: therefore God, when by positive revelation he prohibited what the natural law forbids, simply said thou shalt not kill, and did not add that this is evil; « for, he says, conscience, coming before, taught us this beforehand. » He confirms this from the words of Paul: when the Gentiles wish to excuse themselves, because they had no lawgiver, neither Moses, nor the prophets, nor the Apostle, nor the Evangelist, « Paul shows that they had the law which they had learned from themselves (αὐτοδίδακτον νόμον): for when the Gentiles who do not have the law naturally do the things of the law, they are a law to themselves. » In the same way, in Homily V on Romans, he interprets the same words of Paul: « Conscience and rational thought (λογισμός) suffice as law; by these, again, the Apostle shows that God made man sufficient (αὐταρκη) for choosing the truth and fleeing vice... He is condemned not by a positive law, which he does not know, but by natural reasonings alone. » Theodoret, Oecumenius and Theophylact follow Chrysostom in their own way. Theophylact comments on Romans II. 12–15: « The Greeks sinned without law, that is, without the instruction which is from the law.... they do the things of the law naturally, that is, persuaded by reasonings which are from nature (τοῖς ἐκ φύσεως λογισμοῖς)... not writing the letter but the works (what the law commands) engraved on their hearts, and having conscience and natural thoughts in place of law, as witness to what is good and honourable. » Cyril of Alexandria (against Julian, book III, T. VI. p. 108) repels the objection of the apostate Julian, that the God of the Christians once had no providence towards the Gentiles, with this same testimony of Paul: « For he also showed himself to be God of the Gentiles, through implanted laws (δια των εμφυτων νομων) most fully.... If he were God and Creator of the Jews only, and not of the Gentiles also, how would those who do not have the law be a law to themselves, arriving there by implanted guidances (εμφυτοις παιδαγωγιαις)? For nature by its own power (αὐτομάτως)⁴ is rich in the knowledge of every good (of natural good, indeed, and considered by the physical power of nature itself), this too having been obtained by the nods of the Creator. » We add St Basil, Homily IX on the Hexaemeron, nn. 3. 4, who, although he does not there explain this Apostolic text, nevertheless states most clearly the very matter now chiefly in question. For among a few lines he repeats four times that, as it is in our power to shun physical evil, so also to know moral good and evil, to approve the one and disapprove the other, is ready to us « from nature itself, not from teaching and instruction given by men; from the law of nature, which we need not learn; without discipline and doctrine (οὐκ ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἀνθρωπῶν, ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως. αὐτοδιδάκτῳ τῆς φύσεως νόμῳ. ἀδίδακτος ἐκκλησία τοῦ κακοῦ): just as no discipline teaches us to hate sickness, but of our own accord we turn away from what causes discomfort.

The Latins are in complete agreement with the Greeks. Tertullian adv. Marcion. l. V. c. 13. proves from Rom. II. that it is the same God who created nature, the God of the Old Testament who gave the law, and the God of the New Testament, whose is the gospel: « if God will judge the secrets of men, both of those who have sinned under the law and of those who are without law, because these also do not know the law, and by nature do the things of the law; certainly that God will judge, whose are both the law and nature itself, which is a likeness of law for those ignorant of the law. » The same author, de coron. milit. c. 6: « You have that common law of God in the public of the world, in the natural tablets, to which even the Apostle is wont to appeal... so that, when he says to the Romans that the nations by nature do the things of the law, he suggests both a natural law and a legal nature. » See⁵ and Hilary in Ps. 118. litt. 15. n. 11; Ambrose ep. 73. ad Iren. and l. de fuga saec. c. 3. n. 15, where from the text of the Apostle he declares the natural law to be « that which is not perceived by any reading, but is expressed in each person from a certain flowing fount of nature and drawn in by human minds; » and « first, he says, nature itself is the teacher of good work. » Gaudentius of Brescia (Serm. VIII. in Exod. p. 298. ed. Brix. 1738.), apart from the law of commandment « which God is known to have commanded before Moses by words alone, » and the law of the letter first given through Moses, distinguishes the law of nature from this same text of Paul. « The natural law is that, he says, by which the nations, not having the law of the letter, naturally do the things of the law, because the nature of the rational soul, so that it perceives its creator, so that it does not harm its neighbour, so that it does not do what it does not want to suffer, understands by a certain natural law; whence every man is inexcusable who either denies his author or does evil, which he does not fail to know through the law of nature to be evil.» St Jerome ad Algas. ep. 121. q. 8. T. I. p. 866; in Ez. XXIX. T. V. p. 353; in Matth. T. VII. p. 178. clearly understands in the place of Paul not only the faithful but all nations, and among these all men who have come to the use of reason. « This law, which is written in the heart, embraces all nations, and there is no man who does not know this law. » Only infancy is excepted, he says, and it must be understood in the way that Paul says in Rom. VII: « I indeed lived once without the law, but when the commandment came, sin revived. » There is no need to speak of Sedulius and Primasius on this passage. The former almost copies the commentary of Origen; the latter, he says, holds the nations to be inexcusable although they are without the (positive) law, « because every man in conscience blushes at sin and rejoices at a good deed. »

Among recent theologians and interpreters who teach that the Apostle is to be understood either solely, or at least also, of unbelievers and of the law made manifest by the light of reason without external revelation, I shall name some out of innumerable others, whom I have compared more carefully: besides Cajetan, whom alone Estius and the anonymous author cite, the Thomists Dominic Soto, De iustitia et iure, book I, q. 4, and his commentary on Romans, in h. l.; Catharinus in h. l.; Cardinal Gotti, De statu purae naturae, q. 11, dub. 2, §. 1, n. 5; De lege naturali, q. 3, dub. 1, §. 1, n. 2; the Scotists Andreas Vega, opusc. De iustificatione, ad finem; Claude Frassen, Scot. Academ. T. IV, De gratia, Tract. II, q. 3, p. 498; Bernardus a Piconio in h. l.; the Sorbonnists Duvallius, De legibus, q. 3, a. 1 and 4; Gamachaeus, in 1-2, q. 94; De lege naturali, c. 1 and 3; Grandin, De gratia, q. 1, c. 2, a. 1, sect. 1 and 2; Tournely, De gratia, q. 4, a. 1, concl. 1, part 2; Calmetus in h. l.; and then others: Toledo in h. l.; Bellarmine, De gratia et libero arbitrio, book V, c. 9; Suarez, who disputes this at length, De gratia, book I, c. 8, n. 20 ff.; Ripalda, in his very ample demonstration against the articles of Baius, T. III, De ente supernaturali, especially disp. XX, sect. 3; Cornelius a Lapide, Benedict Pererius, Tirinus in h. l.; the versions of Scripture with annotations, published with the approval of the Holy See: the Polish of Wujek, the Italian of Archbishop Martini, the German of Allioli; and the many Catholic interpreters of our own age, Kistemaker, Klee, Reithmaier, Adalbert Maier, Bisping, etc., in h. l.

I shall transcribe the words of Dominic Soto, theologian of Trent, because they are both excellent and contain certain theological principles necessary for rightly understanding the opinions of the Fathers. On Romans II. 14 he speaks thus: Paul treats of the Gentiles, « since they kept the law, which they bore carved in their minds by natural judgement alone, no less diligently than the Jews kept that which they had received expressed on tablets. He says, therefore, that when the Gentiles, who do not have the law —namely by hearing it from God, for which reason they were held lawless by the Jews—, naturally do the things of the law, you are not to understand by this the works of the law, whether judicial or ceremonial, which God had revealed peculiarly to that people above nature... but understand the precepts of the decalogue and the other moral precepts, with which nature itself has instituted and also obliged the whole human race. They, he says, who do these things naturally, are themselves a law to themselves, that is, they bear within themselves the law impressed; which law he had said long before (ch. I of this epistle) was revealed to them also by God through the things which have been made, so that the Jews might not be proud, that there should be no other law divinely revealed apart from their own; although he has also set forth these moral precepts more clearly to the Jews through the written law than to the Gentiles through the light of nature. But this assertion of Paul raises a difficulty, since it seems to favour the Pelagians, who teach that man can naturally fulfil the commands of the law. We can wipe away this difficulty by saying that Paul here asserts only this: that man can naturally fulfil the law as regards the substance of works which are morally good; but not as regards the intention of the one commanding, that they be meritorious before God. For this does not exceed their powers, as we have disputed in book I, De nat. et grat., where we also explained how the first parents, in integral nature, could naturally fulfil all the precepts as regards the substance of the work; but we, in fallen nature, not all but some, although both they and we can do none of them meritoriously without grace. And therefore he does not say here that the Gentiles naturally do all things, but certain things which are of the law. I indeed judge this exposition to be so far from reprehensible that, when understood, I consider it necessary. » Soto then brings forward a double interpretation of Augustine, of which we shall speak a little later, and a double interpretation of St Thomas likewise derived from Augustine: of these, one says that the Apostle's discourse is about the execution of the law, but that nature is understood as restored by grace; the other affirms that the comparison is only between the natural knowledge of the Gentiles and the knowledge of the Jews from revelation. « Namely, that the light of nature had given the same to the Gentiles of old that the law gave to the Jews, that is, for judging between right and wrong, although in the written law the precepts were more explicit than in the law of nature. » Finally Soto concludes that the exposition is to be preferred in which not only knowledge is compared with knowledge, but at the same time the execution of the law is treated: « yet in this sense, that they were able to do naturally the things of the law, that is, to do the precepts as regards the substance of the works; and therefore he did not say, they naturally fulfil the law; but, they naturally do the things of the law: which, if they had done, or were doing, God then came to their aid by special help, illuminating their minds with a higher light (the grace of faith), by which they could be received into friendship with God. »

This is in substance the same opinion as that of all the other theologians whom I have named: they teach, without controversy, that the Gentiles in Paul are to be understood either solely, or at least directly and principally, as unbelievers; that the knowledge of the law, in opposition to positive revelation, is knowledge through the light of reason; and that the execution of the things of the law is either the observance of certain moral precepts through natural powers, or observance through the help of grace, which goes before faith and prepares for it. For it is not right to affirm that unbelievers, before the grace of faith, lack all the helps of grace for doing those things which are of the natural law; nay, without Semipelagian error it cannot be denied that under the help of supernatural grace those acts are performed which are a direct and positive preparation for receiving faith.⁶.

It remains that we examine the doctrine of Augustine and of certain other Doctors whom Estius cites, as though they had taught without controversy that the Gentiles who do not have the law are, in the text of the Apostle, the faithful alone; from which the anonymous author, in his usual way, then concludes that, according to the opinion of Augustine and the rest, the Apostle ascribes to the Gentiles no other knowledge of the natural law than that which comes from a presupposed revelation.

Augustine treats of this testimony of Paul, Rom. II. 14. 15, in two places against the Pelagians: On the spirit and the letter, ch. 26 ff., nn. 43–49; Against Julian, book IV, ch. 3, nn. 23–25. In both passages, under two different hypotheses, he says the words of Paul are to be understood in different ways. If it is granted to the Pelagians that Paul speaks of the observance of the law unto salvation and meritorious of eternal life, then the Gentiles can be none but the faithful, who do the things of the law, nature being reformed by grace. But if, he goes on, « they are not yet to be counted among those whom the grace of Christ justifies, but rather among those of the impious who do not yet truly worship the true God, yet whose certain deeds we rightly and deservedly praise, » then even so the dignity and necessity of His grace for every saving work will be established; because those works, although honest, nevertheless differ wholly from the supernatural works done through grace, are not on the way to salvation, and certainly are not meritorious of eternal life. Augustine readily concedes, moreover, that unbelievers in this way can both know and do some things of the law; and, no less than the other Fathers, he locates the principle of knowledge solely in rational nature. « However slight the works of the law naturally implanted, they would not be found in those who have not received the law, except from the remnants of the image of God, » and « they have the work of the law written in their hearts, that is, it is not wholly effaced, what was impressed there through the image of God when they were created. » That this image of God is the soul insofar as it is rational is established elsewhere, and Augustine declares it plainly in the same place: « the image of God... which impiety had not wholly abolished; for there remained surely that which the soul of man cannot be unless rational. »

Prosper (against the Collator, ch. 10, nn. 28–30, ed. Maur. in Appendix, T. X. Aug.) repeats the doctrine of his master Augustine in almost the same words. St Fulgentius, On the Incarnation and grace, ch. 25, nn. 48–54, indeed uses the former hypothesis of Augustine to refute the Pelagians: namely, that if the Gentiles keep the law so as to be justified, they cannot be unbelievers. But at the same time he teaches expressly, ib. nn. 50. 52. 54, that without the grace of faith the knowledge of the true God and of the moral law, and some observance of it, can exist; and this natural law, he says, God inscribed on hearts « by founding nature », that is, through the light of reason itself, since the soul of man cannot be other than rational. Of Ambrosiaster there is no need to say much; for his commentary, woven from various opinions, interprets the words of Paul now of unbelievers, « to whom it will profit nothing before God to abstain from contrary things unless they have received faith in God, » and of whom he says: « nature itself by its own judgment acknowledges its creator, not through law but through the reason of nature; for the work sees the workman in itself: » at the same time he applies the words of the Apostle also to Christian faithful.⁷.

A few more theologians cited by the opponents must still be mentioned. As to the question whether the Gentiles who naturally do the things of the law are to be understood as faithful or as unbelievers, Lombard and St Thomas, in their commentary on this passage, propose both hypotheses of St Augustine. But as to the matter itself, with which we are chiefly concerned, namely the power of human reason to know the natural law, they leave no doubt at all. In the commentary itself, on the words of Paul they naturally do the things of the law, St Thomas explains: « namely, as regards the moral precepts, which are of the dictate of natural reason, in which is the image of God. » Moreover, the teaching of the Angelic Doctor is very well known, by which he supposes that the faculty of reason can attain some knowledge of the moral law, not only without the revelation of the natural law itself, which is our present concern, but even in an abnormal state outside human society. « If someone, he says, brought up in the woods or among brute animals, were to follow the guidance of natural reason in the pursuit of good and the avoidance of evil, it must most certainly be held that God would reveal to him, either by inward inspiration, the things necessary to be believed, or would direct to him some preacher of faith » De verit. q. 14, a. 11, ad 1; 3. dist. 25. q. 2. a. 1. sol. 1. ad 2.

The opinion of Hugh of St Cher is altogether the same⁸, as is that of Hervaeus (among the works of Anselm) and of Denis the Carthusian, to whom the adversaries also appealed. On that saying of Paul, they will perish without law, Hugh asks why the Gentiles, since they do not have the law, are not excused for transgressing the law? The answer comes down to this: the Gentiles, although they are destitute of revelation, nevertheless have the light of reason by which they can know the natural law. Hugh presses the same opinion further, namely that one who had been perpetually exiled from human society is not excused either: « because he had natural reason, and if he had done according to it what lay in him, the Lord would have bestowed grace »⁹. Hervaeus¹⁰ among many other things says that the natural law according to Paul is that which « natural reason has written in the heart of the Gentiles; » and the Carthusian: « they are a law to themselves, that is, their own reason is for them in place of law. »

From the testimonies adduced, I think it is clear that the holy Fathers, both Latin and Greek, and the most weighty theologians, with great agreement, have constantly interpreted the testimony of the Apostle in such a way that: (1°) the Gentiles who do not have the law are understood as unbelievers, universally destitute of revelation; or, if they are at the same time comprehended as imbued with faith in the future Redeemer, then certainly directly and in the first intention, if it is lawful so to speak, are understood those to whom the law was made manifest not by positive revelation but by the light of reason alone. (2°) It is clear that among all those cited by Estius there is none who taught, with a definite opinion, that under the name of Gentiles in Romans II. 14. 15. only the faithful are to be understood, and that unbelievers, too, cannot be understood. (3°) Among all those cited by Estius there is none who denied that from the testimony of the Apostle it can be demonstrated that human reason has the power of knowing the natural law without revelation; most of them, indeed, most plainly acknowledged and vindicated this opinion as one proposed by the Apostle.

Let judgment now be passed on the assertion of the anonymous Doctor, that only some few, together with Cajetan, have understood the Gentiles of the cited place of the Apostle to be unbelievers; and then on his accusation against our doctrine: « Among those few there is no one who expressly teaches that Gentiles, alien to the faith of Christ, can by themselves alone understand the obligation by which, absolutely and under every hypothesis¹¹, every rational creature, always and everywhere, of whatever kind, is bound; moreover, among those few I do not believe that even one will be found who in express words wholly excludes external instruction; these things the distinguished author has added of his own. » Thus that distinguished Doctor, in the work cited, p. 46.

On external instruction in general, insofar as it pertains to the connatural unfolding of human reason, we have treated in another place (Append. Tract. de Trad.); nor does that question belong here, although we have seen St Thomas and Hugh assume, even for the abnormal state of one lacking all connatural instruction, a sufficient use of reason for some knowledge of moral good and evil. External instruction, without which, we say, on the testimony of the Apostle, no rational knowledge of the law and of moral obligation is attained, is the divine revelation of the law itself and the instruction concerning this revelation of the law. With this again premised, the opinions of the Fathers and theologians in the places cited above are to be compared with the assertion of the anonymous writer. He says: no one expressly teaches that Gentiles, alien to the faith of Christ, can by themselves alone understand the obligation of the moral law; not even one expressly excludes external instruction. The Fathers and theologians speak otherwise: «The knowledge of the law which we learn from ourselves (αὐτοδίδακτος γνώσις); the law which we have no need to learn; which conscience, anticipating positive revelation, teaches (προλαβὸν συνειδὸς); conscience and rational reflection take the place of the law; the Gentile is condemned not by the (positive) law, but by the reasonings of nature alone» (ἐκ τῶν τῆς φύσεως λογισμῶν μόνων) Chrysostom. «They come to knowledge of the law by the guidance implanted in them, by the proper power of nature» (αὐτοματῶς) Cyril. «Without the instruction which comes from the law; by the reasons which come from nature; natural thoughts take the place of the law» Theophylact. «The knowledge of moral good and evil is from nature itself, not from the teaching and instruction of men; from the law of nature, which there is no need to learn; apart from teaching» Basil. «A law which is perceived not by any reading, but is expressed in each man by the flowing spring of nature and is drawn in by human minds» Ambrose. « The guidance of natural reason in the desire for good and the flight from evil could follow even one reared in the woods, and so such a one is not excused » Hugh of St Cher and St Thomas. « Moral precepts are given, by which nature itself both instructed and also bound the whole human race; the law which the Gentiles bore written in the mind by the natural dictate alone; the law which is revealed by God through the things that have been made; God illumined the Gentiles in moral matters by the light of nature, and the Jews more clearly still through the written law; the light of nature gave the Gentiles the same thing the law gave the Jews, although with less clarity » Domingo de Soto. « The Gentiles naturally do the things that are of the law, that is, without any revealed and positive law » alius Conc. Trid. theologus Vega in Defens.Conc.Trid.l.XI.c.10. « Those (in Paul) are understood as men using natural reason alone, even though they do not have faith » Suarez l. c. n. 20; infideles, who destitute of external law have only the internal and natural law as their guide » Ripalda l. c. n. 33. etc.

What was put forward against our doctrine, or rather, as Stapleton and Suarez call it, and as it is plain from what has been said that it should be called, against the common interpretation of the Apostolic testimony, on the authority of an extrinsic source, I think has been sufficiently exposed. There remains a very brief examination of the things that are objected from the context of Paul itself; we can dispatch these in a few words, because the foundations by which the truth of our interpretation is demonstrated we have already laid down in the preceding thesis.

II. The arguments of Estius, which are said « to render it very probable and almost certain » that Paul, at Rom. II. 14. 15., speaks only of the faithful, come down to these. 1° Paul here commends the Gentiles for observance of the law; but this cannot be understood of unbelievers without producing a contradiction, for the Apostle often accuses unbelievers of their crimes, both in chapter I of this epistle and elsewhere. 2° The discourse here is about observance of the law such as is recalled in vv. 7. 10. 13. 26. 29; and that observance is full and meritorious of eternal life. 3° The Gentiles who do not have the law, and yet do the things of the law, must be understood in the same way as, in the verses cited, the Greek who works good, the uncircumcised who fulfils the law, and the Jew who is so in secret and circumcised in heart, whose praise is not from men but from God, are praised. 4° In the immediate context, just as accusing thoughts are referred to the guilt of eternal punishment, so defending thoughts on the day when God will judge are referred to the meritorious works of eternal life. But all these things belong only to the faithful. Therefore the Gentiles of vv. 14. 15. cannot be understood except as the faithful. The answer to these objections is ready, from the explanation of the context which we gave in the preceding thesis.

Ad 1ᵘᵐ: even if it were true that Paul here commends the Gentiles for observance of the law, no one will say that all, or the greater part of men among the Gentiles, or those who are supposed to be commended, are praised for the observance of the whole moral law; so, even with such a commendation admitted, the gravest crimes among the Gentiles, condemned by the Apostle in other places, are not thereby denied. But on examining the context not even this is true: the aim of Paul in these two verses, 14 and 15, is not to praise the Gentiles for observing the law; for his sole aim is to show that the Gentiles, because they do not have the revealed law, are not altogether lawless; but just as the Jews are to be judged according to the law, which they have manifested not only by the light of reason but also by the word of God, so he says that the Gentiles too have the law manifested by the light of reason, and are to be judged according to it. Now this manifestation of the law made to the Gentiles the Apostle shows by this argument: if at any time they do things which are commanded in the law, they do them understanding and perceiving their obligation; but since they cannot know this from revelation, inasmuch as it has not been made to them, but only from their rational nature (« for when the Gentiles who have no law do by nature (natura) the things of the law »), by that very observance of the law, however it occurs, they show formally, as of the law, the work of the law, while they do not have the law itself written on tablets, but have it written in their hearts, and they are a law to themselves by their rational nature; how this is to be understood we have explained above.

To the second and third: we deny that the opposition between those who have the law and the Gentiles who, not having the law, by nature do the things of the law, has the same sense as that other opposition, between Jews and Greeks, circumcision and uncircumcision. For this latter opposition, in the books of the New Testament, is drawn solely from difference of people and origin, not from difference of religion, so that even all Christians are divided into Jews and Greeks; that is, into those who are Jews by race and those who are descended from another people (see the distinguished P. Patrizi, in Evangel. l. I. c. 1. n. 68.). But that other opposition no longer regards only a difference of people; it is expressly placed in a difference of religion: some have the divine revelation of the law, while others have, for the manifestation of the law, only rational nature, and so they are a law to themselves. Hence also the fact that those Gentiles who do not have the law are sometimes, and in some (ὅταν ποιῇ), said « to do by nature the things of the law » differs greatly from the working of good, for which glory, honour and peace are promised to Jew and Greek, and from the keeping and fulfilment of the law, for which praise is given, not by men but by God, to the uncircumcised (that is, those not circumcised in the flesh) and to those circumcised in heart and in spirit: vv. 7. 10. 26. 27. 29. The same distinction holds between « Gentiles, if at any time they naturally do the things of the law », and those of whom v. 13 says: « the doers of the law will be justified », if justification (as seems more probable) is to be taken in the positive sense of supernatural justice, and not only negatively of naturally just acts, which therefore do not deserve punishment. For in this verse, where « the doers of the law who will be justified » are named, the discourse concerns not those who do not have the law but expressly the hearers of the law, and therefore those who have the law revealed. But the clause at vv. 14. 15., where the discourse is of the Gentiles who do not have the law, coheres with the words of v. 12: « whoever have sinned without law will perish without law »; for this very point, how they will perish without law, is declared in vv. 14–16, namely that although they are without revealed law, they are not simply without law.

From these things it is now plain also what the answer is to the fourth objection. For it is false that the Apostle presents thoughts defending men on the day of judgment in such a way as to show them worthy of eternal life. Accusing and defending thoughts are in the present life, while reason and conscience present some actions as evil and absolutely forbidden, others as good and commanded. When, therefore, a man acts against or in accordance with this dictate of conscience, the judgment of conscience (the prior judgment) will hold on the day of judgment, so that the righteous judge is about to condemn or approve those actions which conscience has beforehand condemned or approved as morally evil or good. It does not follow from this, however, that as he will judge the gravely evil worthy of eternal damnation, so he will judge the good, in whatever way, worthy of eternal life. « But if those who naturally do the things of the law are not yet to be counted among those whom the grace of Christ justifies, but rather among those of whom, even among impious men who do not truly worship the true God, certain deeds we read of, or know of, or hear of, which, according to the rule of justice, we not only cannot blame but rightly and deservedly praise... what will accusing thoughts profit them on the day when the Lord shall judge the secrets of hearts, except perhaps that they be punished more gently?... nor will it be idle in the judgment of God that one sinned more or less than another in that very damnable impiety » S. Aug. de spiritu et litt. n. 48. Cf. S. Hieronym. in Ezech. XXIX. T. V. p. 353; Origen. in Rom. l. II. n. 7.

Therefore, as much by the authority of the common interpretation in which the Fathers and theologians agree as by the examination of the context which we carried out in the preceding thesis, it remains certain that the Apostle sets forth the light of reason itself as the principle by which the obligation of the natural law is known, without any positive revelation of the law being presupposed, either as the sole manifestation of the natural law or as a condition without which reason could not arrive at its knowledge.

I confess that this whole thesis may seem a sort of παρεργον (a by-work). For it could have been drawn from the treatise on grace, that this rational knowledge of the law was declared certain by the Apostle; but we did not wish to allow the very foundation on which the ethical argument rests, proposed in the Scriptures for the rational power of knowing the existence of God — namely the rational knowledge of the law and of moral obligation — to be handed down by anyone of however obscure a name as « the opinion of some few only, » to which, it is said, the greater part of the Fathers and theologians, and the very context of the Apostle, are opposed.