Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam

The Scriptures declare that God's manifestation through the works of creation is adapted to human reason.

« Supernatural revelation, recorded in the sacred Scriptures, clearly teaches that in this visible universe, according to its order, physical and historical, there is contained a natural manifestation of God, adapted to the innate light of human reason, so that for men who already use reason there is both the ability and, if other aids are lacking, the duty of knowing from it the true God, personal, distinct from this universe, to be honored with supreme worship by the rational creature. »

Among the testimonies of Scripture, of which not a few can be adduced to prove the thesis, those principal and solemn passages Rom. I. 18. sqq.; Sap. XIII.1–9; will almost alone suffice for us;

Rom. I.

« For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all the impiety and injustice of men who hold down the truth of God in injustice. 18. (Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools. And they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of corruptible man, and of birds and of four-footed beasts and of serpents, and did not approve οὐκ ἐδοκίμασαν to have God in knowledge) 23. 28. For that which is known of God is manifest in them; for God manifested to them. 19. For his invisible things are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood through the things that are made (τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου τοῖς ποιήμασι νοούμενα καθοράται), his eternal power also and divinity; so that they are inexcusable. For when they had known God, they did not glorify him as God, nor gave thanks; but became vain in their thoughts (ἐματαιώθησαν ἐν τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς αὐτῶν = μάταιοι φύσει), and their foolish heart was darkened. 20. 21.

Sap. XIII.

« Vain indeed are all men (μάταιοι μὲν γὰρ πάντες ἄνθρωποι φύσει), in whom there is no knowledge of God; and from the good things that are seen they were not able to understand him who is (τὸν ὄντα), nor by attending to his works did they recognize who was the artificer; but they thought the fire... or the sun and the moon, the rulers of the world, to be gods. 1. 2. If they were delighted by their beauty and thought them gods, let them know how much more beautiful than these is their lord, for he, the generator of beauty (τοῦ καλλους γενεσιαρχης), constituted all these things. Or if they were amazed at their power and works (δυναμιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν), let them understand from those things that he who made these is stronger than they. 3. 4.

For from the greatness of beauty and of creatures, the creator of these can be seen knowably (ἐκ γὰρ μεγέθους καλλονῆς κτισμάτων ἀναλόγως ὁ γενεσιουργὸς αὐτῶν θεωρεῖται). 5.

Again, nor should they be pardoned. For if they were able to know so much that they could judge the world (στοχάσασθαι τὸν αἰῶνα, to investigate the visible world), how did they not more easily find its lord? » 8. 9. as is read at Act. XIV. 16. 17; XVII. 26. 28. First we shall consider the manifestation and knowledge of God from creatures, as it is described in general in the passages cited; then we shall look at the twofold order, physical and historical, shown in the creatures that manifest him in the same place.

I. As to the knowability of God from creatures already known, this is the explicit doctrine of the Scriptures in the testimonies cited:

1° God is the object of natural knowledge for the human mind. For God is said, in his attributes, by which he is distinguished from this universe as its supreme author and Lord, from his work, to be knowable to men and easily knowable, without need of an inquiry inaccessible to a subtler and human talent, and knowable by the same natural faculty by which men judge of the properties of visible nature. Therefore God is an object of knowledge, and in human reason there are powers proportioned to attaining this knowledge. « What is known of God (τὸ γνωστὸν cognoscibile) is manifest in them. » This knowledge of God is continually explained by those things that are called « his invisible things, » namely invisible in themselves, which nevertheless are intelligible through something else; for « they are clearly seen, being understood. » Moreover, these are the attributes which are seen by the intellect and reason, by which God is understood to be the supreme divinity, « his eternal power and divinity » Rom. I. 19. 20. The sentence of the book of Wisdom is parallel to this doctrine of the Apostle. « Vain indeed are all men, in whom there is no knowledge of God; » or as it is in the Greek text: « vain by nature are all men, who have ignorance of God: » « and (who) could not understand him who is » (τὸν ὄντα): « for the creator can be seen knowably » (ἀναλόγως ὁ γενεσιουργὸς ἐθεωρεῖται): « if they were able to know so much that they could judge the world, how did they not more easily (gr. citius ταχιον) find its lord? » Sap. XIII. 1. 5. 9.

2°. Distinctly, in the same passages of Scripture, the mode of God's manifestation and of the rational knowledge that corresponds to it is described. The object cannot be known in act unless it manifests itself to the human mind, since this manifestation is nothing other than knowability in the second act with respect to the knower. But an object can become manifest either immediately through itself, or mediately through another object already known, which may be called the objective medium of knowledge.¹. Now indeed the Scriptures teach most clearly that God manifests himself to human reason; but he manifests himself through creatures in such a way that, from the known perfections of the visible universe, limited by imperfection, one arrives at the knowledge of God; not indeed that God is seen in creatures in himself and in his own substance, but that from the known effect, and from the perfection of the effect, reason understands the existence and, in some measure, the perfection of God the supreme cause. « What is known of God, says Paul, is manifest in them, » what is objectively knowable is also subjectively known; « for God manifested to them, » and made himself knowable in the second act. Then he adds the reason and mode of this knowability and manifestation: « for his invisible things from the creation of the world, through the things that are made, are clearly seen, being understood. »

With a wonderful design the Apostle joins subject and predicate, which, if taken simply, could be thought contradictory: the invisible things are visible, indeed even seen and perceived (τὰ ἀόρατα καθοράται); one or the other therefore needs explanation as to the sense in which it is to be taken. That the same verb ὁρᾶν should be taken equivocally, so that the subject speaks of sensible and the predicate of intellectual vision, is not probable. Just as the visibility of God cannot be other than intellectual, so the predicate of invisibility in the Scriptures must be taken not only for bodily eyes but for the eyes of the mind (e. g. 1. Tim. I. 17; Io. I. 18; VI. 46. etc.), unless the context should show otherwise. For that former invisibility, with respect to the senses, is too obvious in itself; nor would it be opposed in this sense, as happens in Scripture, invisibility for the present life to visibility for the future (cf. 1. Cor. XIII. 12.); for in this sense God is not now invisible and visible in the other life, but invisible absolutely in every state. So also in the place we are discussing, « the invisible things of God » are not only invisible to bodily eyes, but also invisible to the human intellect; yet they are said to be seen by human reason, so that the denial of immediate visibility is opposed to the affirmation of mediate visibility. For the Apostle adds an explanation of the mode in which God is seen, namely that he is not intelligible to human weakness from himself and his own substance, but is understood through the effects and works that have been understood² and his eternal power and divinity. Hence all men who hold down the truth of God in injustice are inexcusable, and the wrath of God is justly revealed and manifested from heaven against them, Rom. I. 18–20.

The disputation of the book of Wisdom differs from that of Paul in this, that there it is taught not only in general that a conclusion can and should be drawn from the existence of this universe to the existence of God, but also the principal elements of the argument are set forth. The proposition to be proved is this: « vain by nature ( they abuse their natural faculty ) are all men, who have ignorance of God. » The proof is taken from this, that the properties of this universe, immediately known, are such that human reason can and ought to conclude from it the existence of God and his eminent perfections. The terms from which reason proceeds are « the good things that are seen, » « the works to which they attend, » « their beauty and power » τὰ ὁρώμενα ἀγαθά, τὰ ἔργα, τούτων ἡ κάλλονη, ἡ δύναμις καὶ ἐνέργεια. The term to which reason arrives through analysis, unless it perverts its own nature, is joined as follows: to the good things that are seen corresponds to understand him who is (τὸν ὄντα); to attention to the works corresponds to recognize the artificer; to delight in their beauty or appearance corresponds knowledge, how much more beautiful than these is their lord; to admiration of their power and efficacy corresponds understanding drawn from them, that he who made these is stronger than they. The sacred writer concludes with a general proposition by which the logical connection between this visible universe and God the creator is declared: « for from the greatness of beauty and of creatures the creator of these can be seen knowably (ἀναλόγως) » (θεωρεῖται)³. From these things, lastly, he infers, similarly to Paul, that men who, captivated by the magnificence of the works of God, thought them to be gods, are inexcusable; because by the same faculty of reason by which they made this world the object and, as it were, the target of their inquiry, they could more easily find the lord of the universe from the consideration of the universe: « again, nor should these be pardoned; for if they were able to know so much that they could judge the world (στοχάσασθαι τὸν αἰῶνα), how did they not more easily find its lord » (πῶς ταχὺ οὐχ εὗρον)?

II. Scripture above all sets forth in this universe a twofold order, from the consideration of which human reason may know the existing God: physical and historical.

1°. That the whole physical order is a clear manifestation of God to the rational soul is sufficiently evident from what was said above. It is worth noting, however, the different way in which the Scriptures set forth the twofold logical element, both of which, if it is lawful to speak so, is necessary for the ascent of the mind from creatures to God. They presuppose, as a foundation, the evident imperfection of the creature, by which it is understood formally as a creature, and as a being from another. In this the sacred writer of the book of Wisdom declares the perversion of natural reason, in that men did not understand that « the good things that are seen » are μὴ ὄντα, so as to understand from them τὸν ὄντα; they did not understand the works formally as works, nor their deficient beauty and power, so as to gather from them the primal, exemplary and creative beauty and power (ὁ γὰρ τῶν καλλῶν γενεσιάρχης ἔκτισεν αὐτά). So also Paul teaches that « the creature of the world » is to be understood formally as a creature, that is, as that which has been made, and that in this formal understanding of the creature there is the logical principle from which human reason concludes and ascends to the invisible things of God: « his invisible things from the creature of the world (as from the term from which) through the things that are made (τοῖς ποιήμασι, i.e. under the formal reason of the thing effected), are clearly seen, being understood »⁴.

Another element is the perfection of creatures, by which, the more fully it is understood, the more clearly the perfections of the cause are known. « The heavens (by their magnificence) declare the glory of God, and the work of his hands (by their imperfection, by their lack of absolute perfection) the firmament proclaims »⁵ Ps. XVIII. (XIX.) 2.

Moreover, that a somewhat confused understanding of the existence of God may be drawn from creatures, there is not even need of a distinct, subtle and philosophical inquiry into the perfections of creatures; a common and obvious consideration suffices, as the Scriptures teach us, Sap. XIII. Yet concerning the distinction between the first confused and spontaneous knowledge of God and the more refined knowledge that follows, which is indicated in the Scriptures themselves, we shall speak presently.

In the Scriptures we hold that, when it is asked of the first cause of this universe whether it is, there is set before human reason the imperfection and limitation of creatures to be considered; but when it is asked about the existing cause, what it is, we see set forth the beauty, order and magnificence of creatures. The two considerations, joined together, constitute the whole demonstration of the existence of God: « for from the greatness of beauty and of creatures (formally as creatures) the creator of these can be seen knowably » l. c. v. 5.

2°. St Paul declares history, both at Lystra, Act. XIV. 16. 17, and at Athens, Act. XVII. 26. 28., as a testimony of God to all nations, from which they could and should have known him. The Apostle distinguishes a) the secondary causes of the physical order, whose actions and effects are directed by God the provider toward the preservation and benefit of men, under which aspect the historical argument is closely connected with the cosmological one; b) he distinguishes the history of peoples, which by divine providence is so directed, and to this end, that the nations, in the sum of the whole history, may know the divine providence besides the human element. « God indeed in past generations allowed all nations to walk in their own ways; yet he did not leave himself not without witness (ἀμαρτύρων). » This testimony God is said to have given to all nations, « doing good from heaven, giving rains… filling our hearts with food and joy. » Likewise God 'determined the appointed seasons (through physical causes)⁶ and the bounds of their habitation » (through providence in the history of peoples); cf. Deut. XXXII. 8; Eccles. XVII. 15. This twofold providence he arranged for « the human race over the whole face of the earth, » « that they should seek God, if perhaps they might grope for him and find him » (εἰ ἄρα γε ψηλαφήσειαν αὐτὸν καὶ εὕροιεν). Lastly, c) the Apostle distinguishes the continual benefits of God and his providence in the direction of individual men: « he is not far from each one of us; for in him we live, and move, and have our being. » By these very words, and by this description of providence, Paul confirms and declares that these are the relations of human nature to God, and that dependence on God by which, in men who have attained the use of reason, first a dim and confused notion of the supreme divinity arises, as it were spontaneously and necessarily; so that then, this preconception being presupposed, they seek God and a more explicit knowledge of God, through which they can grope for him and find him from the consideration of benefits both common and particular.

That first spontaneously arising and obscure knowledge, which the Fathers not without reason call « implanted in nature », in a sense to be explained by us below, and from which, as from a spontaneous preconception, there arises the impulse of the rational soul to seek more diligently the author of the world and of itself and to refine the idea, the holy Apostle indicates very clearly and distinguishes from the more refined knowledge. For he teaches that the divine works are ordained to this end, and that from these very works there follows by itself an impulse for men to seek God; in this impulse there is already necessarily contained some confused and primordial knowledge of God: « God made from one every race of men to dwell upon the whole face of the earth, appointing the appointed seasons and the bounds of their habitation, that they should seek God. » In this search man can and must cultivate the primitive concept; but he can also, by his own fault, apply this same primitive idea of God to objects that are not God, and so pervert it. Therefore it does not necessarily follow, from the fact that a man seeks God in whatever way, that he will grope for him and find him: « if perhaps they may grope for him and find him » Act. XVII. 27. The very same distinction between the first spontaneous but confused knowledge of God arising from the consideration of creatures, and the more distinct knowledge of the true God, is set forth in Sap. XIII. 6. sq. « And these perhaps err, seeking God and wishing to find him. For while they are conversant with his works, they inquire; and they are persuaded that the things that are seen are good. Again, nor should these be pardoned; for if they were able to know so much that they could judge the world, how did they not more easily find its Lord? »

Hence it is clear how the idea of some existing divinity is common to all nations and, as it were, indestructible, while the perversion of the sincere notion of God extends so widely. It is also clear why the Fathers Tertullian, Minucius Felix, Cyprian and Arnobius appealed, for the existence of God, to the testimony of « the simple soul, from the street, not educated in schools, but such as nature has formed; » for « many things are suggested by nature, as it were from the common sense with which God has deigned to endow the soul. Philosophy, having laid hold of this, has puffed it up (by abuse) to the glory of its own art » Tertull. de anima c. 2.

III. The faculty, and if other aids are lacking the duty, of understanding the existence and perfections of God from creatures is such that men, taught by this natural manifestation and natural testimony, who do not worship God are « inexcusable » ἀναπολόγητοι Rom. I. 20; so that for them, even if they seek God, if however they do not grope for him and find him, « pardon should not be granted » and they are οὐδὲ συγγνωστοί; they are « unhappy, and their hope is among the dead; » they are « all vain by nature » Sap. XIII. 1. 8. 10. Moreover, that this God is to be known in the natural manifestations « from the creature of the world, from those things that have been made, » that he is the same true and living God who has also revealed himself by supernatural manifestations, is most clearly evident from all the passages; for indeed in the Scripture passages cited there is no reprehension of anything other than ignorance of the true God.