Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam

Johannes Baptist Franzelin

Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam

Johannes Baptist Franzelin (1816–1886)

First published 1870

Johannes Baptist Franzelin's Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam treats the divine nature and attributes within nineteenth-century scholastic theology. The present digital edition follows the Rome 1870 print and includes the Latin text with an English translation. The title pages, approbations, errata, and indexes are omitted.


Prolegomenon: On the Object of Theology

§ I: Section I

Caput I: Chapter I

Thesis I: The doctrine on the rational knowledge of God belongs also to theology

The doctrine of the rational knowledge of God belongs also to theology.

« Although the theology of faith presupposes the natural knowledge of the existence of God, just as the supernatural order of elevation generally presupposes the natural order to be elevated, it nevertheless belongs to theology to judge the value of human reason for that very natural knowledge of God, and of the mode of attaining this knowledge. »

I. From what we have said in the Prolegomenon concerning the material and formal object of theology, it is established that God is the principal, or indeed the sole and adequate, object of this sacred discipline, insofar as he has revealed himself through supernatural manifestations to human reason, illumined by the light of faith. This illumination does not create or produce reason itself, its natural power and the light of reason, but presupposes them and raises them to a higher order; whence also the supernatural manifestations by which he reveals himself to elevated reason presuppose natural manifestations, through which God presents himself to be known by the natural light of reason. The demonstration and explanation, therefore, of the existence and attributes of God, insofar as they are understood by reason from natural manifestations, belongs to philosophy; in the theology of faith, however, that more distinct natural knowledge is taken up in order to acquire a clearer understanding of those things concerning God that have been revealed by supernatural manifestations: and so theology makes use of what is known of God from the philosophical disciplines, not as principles proper to its own doctrine, but as aids « for the greater manifestation of those things that are handed down in this science, » as St Thomas says, 1. q.1. a. 5. ad 2. Yet because, where the existence of God is concerned, the theology of faith and philosophy, supernatural and natural manifestation, the light of faith and the light of reason, agree in material object although they differ in formal object, hence it is that many theologians too, following the holy Fathers, set up more extended demonstrations from the principles of natural reason concerning the existence of God, which is indeed the foundation of the whole theological science, « as from proper principles, not strictly, but ministerially, » as Cajetan says, ad 1. q. 2. a. 3. The holy Fathers, above all in their apologies against the Gentiles, are accustomed to regard this philosophical treatment as a kind of pedagogy leading to faith and to Christian knowledge; and theologians likewise declare it to be a preamble to theology itself. Lest we disturb the order of the disciplines that have been assigned to the various schools of this Academy, imitating the example of the weighty theologians, we shall leave the philosophical demonstration of the existence of God in its own proper seat, which it has in the metaphysics of sacred theology, προπαιδείας.

II. The arguments by which the existence of God is demonstrated in philosophy can be viewed in two ways: a) directly, insofar as reason, by its own power and innate light, knows from the existence of contingent beings, from their perfections connected with imperfection, from the nature of the rational creature and of all others whose existence is understood immediately, and therefore also from the essential dependence of the whole universe, its order and disposition toward an end, and from the absolute and ineluctable binding force of the moral law, that there cannot but exist a necessary being as the creative cause of effects, most wise, most perfect, just and holy provider and legislator, the principle and end of all things. This whole argumentation rests on the evident intrinsic connection of truths known by the light of reason, and therefore belongs to philosophy. The rational arguments can also be viewed as reflexively, when the question is asked what their value is: whether human reason in general has innate powers to know the existing God with certainty, or specifically whether human reason, by its natural light, can attain from the knowledge of creatures to the knowledge of the existence of God the creator, the true God, I mean, personal and altogether distinct and different from this universe. This reflexive consideration has its proper seat both in philosophy and in theology, but in a way corresponding to the different formal reason of each science. In philosophy indeed, through the direct demonstration itself, the reflexive question is also solved, since reason, knowing the object evidently, understands also reflexively that its knowledge is true. For true science does not exist « unless one knows that one knows; for science must be a perfect intellectual light, which manifests itself » (Suarez Metaphys. disp. I. sect. 4.). Yet the reflexive knowledge of the truth can be perfected and made more distinct by the analysis of the arguments.

But for theology, under its formal reason, there will undoubtedly belong the judgment on the value of rational demonstration, and on the power of human reason to know God, who exists, from creatures by the light innate to it, if in the revealed word of God, which is the proper objective principle of knowing for theology, this power of reason is explicitly affirmed or denied; or certainly if the principles are contained in revelation from which what is to be affirmed or denied may be legitimately deduced. And yet, both in the written word of God and in the universal and constant interpretation of the same revealed word handed down by the Catholic Doctors of the Church, there are many things which show that God, the author of the rational light, has taught us, even by supernatural revelation, about the innate power and about the mode, by this natural power, of knowing him, whose knowledge is the ultimate, necessary and natural end of reason. For although it were true, as some more recent theologians have remarked, that in the Scriptures and in supernatural revelation generally the existence of the true God is not so much proved by arguments as its most full persuasion is already presupposed, this very presupposition would show above all that a knowledge and persuasion of the existing God is something, and is presupposed as antecedent to and independent of supernatural revelation. Moreover, that same revelation, especially where it rebukes ignorance or the denial of the true God, both indicates theoretically the mode by which men, with nature as their guide, could and should have come to know God; and practically and in exercise, Scripture itself in more than one place presents rational demonstrations of the existence of God, drawn from the fact of the existence of this universe, as legitimate and most sufficient; which the Fathers and Doctors of the Church, cultivating more diligently the sense of the Scriptures and the Catholic understanding derived from it, afterwards vindicated in full disputations. What has now been said somewhat confusedly will be made clearer in what follows; yet it is enough to conclude that there undoubtedly are at hand theological principles, from which a judgment can be made, if not on each of the philosophical arguments, certainly on the value of rational demonstration in general, and on the powers of human reason, innate to it, for knowing from creatures the existence of God the creator. It belongs therefore to theology, considered under its formal reason, though not to it alone, to examine and to test (ἐπιχρίσις) rational knowledge and its mode, when it is asked whether there is, and what is, a legitimate demonstration of the existence of God.

Thesis II: Scripture declares that God is made manifest through the works of creation to human reason

Thesis III: The rational knowledge of the natural law, asserted by the Apostle for the Gentiles, includes and demonstrates a rational knowledge of God as supreme lawgiver

Thesis IV: The interpretation of Rom. II. 14. 15. concerning unbelievers and the rational knowledge of the natural law is vindicated

Thesis V: Scripture, in asserting a rational knowledge of God's existence from God's works, in no way presupposes the tradition of positive doctrine about God or faith as a necessary condition

Caput II: Chapter II

Thesis I: The Fathers agree that, by the light of reason and from God's manifestation in creatures, one can arrive at a first knowledge and at a more refined knowledge of God's existence

Thesis II: On the sense in which the Fathers call the notion of God innate to human nature

Caput III: Chapter III

Thesis I: On the manifestation in supernatural facts, insofar as through them God is intelligible to reason

Thesis II: On the existence of God as revealed and therefore to be believed by faith

§ II: Section II

Caput I: Chapter I

Thesis I: The constant teaching of the Fathers on our mediate and analogical knowledge of God

Thesis II: The agreement of St Augustine with the teaching of the other Fathers is demonstrated

Thesis III: On our knowledge of what God is, according to the threefold way of affirmation, negation and eminence

Thesis IV: On the multiplicity of notions by which we understand God

Caput II: Chapter II

Thesis I: The immediate vision of the divine essence is natural to no creature

Thesis II: The immediate vision of God as he is in himself is proposed and promised to us in revelation as our ultimate end

Thesis III: On the light of glory

Thesis IV: On the extensive scope of the beatific vision with respect to its principal object and its secondary objects

Thesis V: On the reason why God, though clearly seen, is nevertheless incomprehensible to the blessed

Thesis VI: The more difficult modes of speaking are explained by which the holy Fathers deny comprehension, but not intuitive vision, of the divine essence

§ III: Section III

Caput I: Chapter I

Thesis I: On the proper reason of the divine essence, insofar as we distinguish it from the attributes by consideration

Thesis II: On the distribution and order to be observed in treating the divine attributes

Caput II: Chapter II

Thesis I: The fullness of absolute perfection is expressed in Scripture by the name of God, 'He who is'

Thesis II: The meaning of the name 'He who is', and the absolute perfection of God, are declared by the holy Fathers

Thesis III: On the infinite difference between divine being and universal being

Caput III: Chapter III

Thesis I: The divine essence is one with the unity of singularity

Thesis II: On the most simple unity in the divine nature

Thesis III: From the teachings of revelation the divine simplicity is declared, and its proper reason, that God is pure act

Thesis IV: How God is truth itself

Thesis V: How God is goodness itself

Thesis VI: How God is beauty itself

Caput IV: Chapter IV

Thesis I: On the proper reason of divine eternity

Thesis II: On the coexistence of temporal things with divine eternity

Thesis III: The divine immensity is God's eminence above the relations of place and space

Thesis IV: God is present to all creatures according to essence, presence and power

§ IV: Section IV

Caput I: Chapter I

Thesis I: God is spirit

Thesis II: The divine essence itself is an infinite, substantial understanding and comprehension

Thesis III: God, from his essence and from the infinity of his understanding, necessarily knows every truth

Thesis IV: The divine essence is the formal object of all truths; the other truths are the secondary object of God's knowledge

Thesis V: God knows all truths not only in the divine essence but also in themselves

Caput II: Chapter II

Thesis I: God's knowledge, one in itself, can be distinguished in many ways according to its various objects

Thesis II: The object of the knowledge of simple intelligence is all possibilities; the secondary object of the knowledge of vision is, first of all, all things existing independently of created liberty

Thesis III: God foresees all free acts of creatures

Thesis IV: On the proper objective reason of the foreknowledge of free acts

Thesis V: Human liberty is reconciled with infallible divine foreknowledge

Thesis VI: There is demonstrated in God a knowledge that is commonly called middle knowledge

Thesis VII: The objective truth of conditional future things is the proper object of middle knowledge

§ V: Section V

Caput I: Chapter I

Thesis I: On the antecedent and consequent will of God

Thesis II: On the distinctions of the saving will according to the teaching of St Augustine

Caput II: Chapter II

Thesis I: God's universal antecedent saving will is demonstrated from Scripture

Thesis II: The same universal saving will of God is demonstrated from the teaching of the Fathers

Thesis III: The teaching of St Augustine on the universality of the saving will is vindicated

Thesis IV: Under several interpretations of the text 1. Tim. II. 4., St Augustine never denied the universality of the antecedent saving will

Thesis V: By his antecedent will God wills the salvation of all, even of infants

Caput III: Chapter III

Thesis I: No positive reprobation is given that precedes the foresight of sin

Thesis II: No antecedent negative reprobation from eternal life is to be admitted

Thesis III: On the various senses in which predestination is taken in the manner of speaking of Scripture and the Fathers

Thesis IV: The gifts of God have in predestination the same order that they have in execution

Thesis V: The predestination of grace, and complete predestination considered according to all its effects taken together, is not from foreseen merit

Thesis VI: The predestination of adults to glory, considered in itself, is an act of the consequent will that follows foresight of supernatural merits

Thesis VII: The arguments brought against the doctrine demonstrated so far are examined

Thesis VIII: Neither the question of St Prosper in his letter to Augustine, n. 8, nor the reply of St Augustine can be understood of predestination to glory before or after foreseen merits, which are through truly gratuitous grace

Thesis IX: St Augustine, against the Pelagians and their remnants, never taught predestination to glory before foreseen supernatural merits, but taught a gratuitous predestination of grace to exclude natural merits

Thesis X: On the private opinion of St Augustine concerning predestination to glory

Thesis XI: On the opinion of St Thomas concerning predestination to glory considered in itself and apart

Thesis XII: The true sense of Rom. IX is declared

Thesis XIII: Other texts of Scripture, which are objected to by some, are explained

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