Tractatus de Deo uno secundum naturam

ON THE OBJECT OF THEOLOGY

On the material object of theology.

« Theology, in the broader sense of the word now received into common use, has as its subject-matter that about which it is occupied, and God is its principal object; its secondary object, however, is other truths insofar as they are considered in relation to God. But in the stricter sense, frequently used among the ancient Fathers, especially the Greeks, God, considered either according to his nature or according to the persons, is not only the first but, according to the etymology of the word, the sole object of theology. »

I. From the very etymology of the name, and by usage not only among the faithful but also among the Gentiles, theology in its established sense is the doctrine of God. It is clear, however, that the same term is used materially more broadly, to many other things besides God; yet this broader signification does not prevent God from being regarded as the subject (τὸ ὑποκείμενον) of the whole discipline, and as its object, not indeed the sole and adequate object, but the principal one, to which the rest are referred.

For, 1°, whatever is inquired into in theology besides God, his nature, his attributes and his internal processions, all these are works of God ad extra, either in the order of creation and nature, or in the order of sanctification and grace, or they follow from these works of God and take place within them. Their explanation and science, however, is not theological unless they are considered in relation to God, as to the supreme principle from which they come and from which they have their proper nature, and as to the ultimate end to which they tend; that is, by regarding either the due relation of conversion to God or the relation of aversion from him. Now in any science the principal object and subject of attribution is that to which all the other things treated in it are ordered, and under whose aspect they are considered. It is understood, therefore, why God is said to be the principal, but not the adequate, object of theology¹.

2°. Since we are treating of the theology of faith, which is wholly different from natural theology, as we shall soon see, it is nothing other than the scientific demonstration, explanation, defence and confirmation of (objective) faith: « for to this science (and to wisdom, which, as distinguished by Augustine, together with it constitute theology) is assigned that by which most wholesome faith is begotten, nourished, defended, and strengthened » Aug. Trinit. XIV. 1. Hence the relation of the objects to one another in theological science will be the same as that which holds among the (material) objects of faith². Now it is established that the principal object of faith, also the material one, to which the others are referred, is God; and this is gathered from the Scriptures themselves: Io. XIV. 4; XVII. 3; Coloss. II. 2; Hebr. XI. 6.

3°. Faith and the understanding of faith, which belong to wayfarers, stand as the beginning and preparation for the consummation and perfection in the theology of the blessed³; and each is a certain participation and, in its mode of knowing, a certain imitation of the science of God himself, which alone is theology infinitely perfect and adequate to its object 1.Cor. XIII. 10. 13; 1.Io. III. 2. Now God, comprehending his own essence as principal object, comprehends in it all other things that are true, as the secondary object of his science; and according to this pattern the blessed see the other things they see in the vision of God, by the morning vision (Aug. Civ. Dei XI. 7.). Just as, therefore, faith and the explanation of faith, that is, our theology, corresponds to the theology of the blessed as a beginning to its consummation, and to the infinite theology of God himself as a shadow to its archetype, so its principal object is God, to whom all other things are joined insofar as they are considered in relation to God.

The relation of our theology to the theology of the blessed and to that of God himself you have explained in S. Th. 1. q. 1. a. 3; in prolog. 1. sent. q. 2; in Boeth de Trinit. prooem. q. 2. a. 2. In the last of these places he says: « There are two kinds of science of divine things: one according to our mode, which takes its principles from sensible things in order to make the divine things known, and in this way the philosophers have handed down the science of divine things, calling first philosophy a divine science; the other according to the mode of the divine things themselves, so that the divine things are grasped in themselves; this, indeed, perfect in the state of the wayfarer, is impossible for us, but there comes to us in the state of the wayfarer a certain participation in that knowledge, and an assimilation to the divine knowledge⁴, insofar as through faith infused into us we cleave to the first truth itself for its own sake. And just as God, by the very fact that he knows himself, knows other things in his own way, that is, by a simple intuition, not by discursive reasoning; so we, by what we grasp through faith, cleaving to the first truth, come to the knowledge of other things according to our mode, namely by reasoning discursively from principles to conclusions... From this it is clear that this science is higher than that divine science which the philosophers handed down, since it proceeds from higher principles. »

II. It is agreed that among the Greek Fathers the name theology was used in its stricter sense, in keeping with the etymology of the word itself, and that by it alone the doctrine of God was indicated.

It is used, however, 1° so as to signify the doctrine of the one God according to his nature and of the divine attributes. In this sense Theodoretus asks in Gen. c. 1. interrog. 1, « why the sacred writer did not place theology before the creation of the universe. » He answers, however, that by the very fact that he taught God to be the creator of all things, he handed down « theology sufficient for that time⁵ ». Thus Dionysius and his interpreter Pachymeres distribute the doctrine of the divine attributes, as these are conceived and expressed by notions and names affirming or denying them, into theology by affirmations and theology by negations (Θεολογίαν καταφατικήν καὶ Θεολογίαν ἀποφατικήν) de theol. mystagog. c. 3.

2°. The Fathers also designate by name, with the same word theology, the doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity and of each of the persons in the Trinity. Hence Athanasius (orat. I. al. II. contr. Arian. n. 17.) reproaches the Arians that, from their teaching, it would follow that the Trinity had been made with the passage of time, and so the knowledge of theology would be constituted⁶ (2). Theophylactus in Matth. XXVIII. says that Christ handed down theology to us in the form of baptism. Whence among the Fathers Θεολογεῖν signifies to teach and to confess the divinity of one person in the Trinity. « The Word, says Athanasius (de Incarnat. cont. Arianos n. 19.), is predicated theologice in the Father, just as the Father is glorified theologice in the Son » (ὁ λόγος Θεολογούμενος ἐν πατρί, ὥς καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν υἱῷ Θεολογεῖται) cf. Gregor Nyss. contr. Eunom. or. VII. Opp. T. II. p. 215. Just as theology is said of the Father and of the Son, so it is said of the Holy Spirit in Greg. Naz. or. 23. (al. 13.) n. 12: τὸ πνεῦμα Θεολογούμενον. In this sense they often distinguish theology from oeconomia, a name under which they comprehend the assumption of human nature and the whole work of redemption, together with the faith and doctrine concerning this mystery. Thus Greg. Naz. orat. 45. (al. 42.) n. 4, after saying a few things about the one and triune God, excuses himself, since he had resolved « to speak not of theology but of oeconomia » (ὅτι μὴ Θεολογικὰ τὸ προκείμενον ἡμῖν ἀλλ᾽ οἰκονομικά); so too Photius, ep. 34, says it is equally heretical to teach in theology three essences or one person, and in oeconomia to think of one nature or two persons.

3°. Finally, especially where the divinity and humanity of Christ are discussed, theology and the doctrine of oeconomia are commonly distinguished by the Fathers. John, says Nazianz. or. 43. (al. 20.) n. 69, handed down theology, while the other Evangelists handed down oeconomia; and Severian of Gabala (inter Opp. Chrysostomi T. XII. p. 412. orat. de sigillis n. 5.) speaks in the same way: ὁ μὲν ἠστραψαν ἀκουσμάν, ὁ δὲ βροντᾷ τὴν Θεολογίαν. This was the reason why the name theologian was given from the most ancient times, as if it were properly his, to John, on account of the more illustrious celebration of the divinity of the incarnate Word above the other sacred writers; and likewise to Gregory Nazianzen, on account of his outstanding defence of the dogma of the Most Holy Trinity above the other Fathers.

Vide Petav. Proleg. c. 1. Cf. Card. de Aguirre Theologia S. Anselmi Tract. 1. disput. 2. sect. 1.

On the formal reason of the theology of faith.

« The formal reason under which the truth that is the object of the theology of faith is constituted is divine revelation, as the objective principle of knowledge, whether immediate or mediate, with rational deduction interposed. From the diversity, therefore, of the objective principle of knowledge, the theology of faith is understood to differ essentially, and in the kind of science, from what is commonly called natural theology. »

We have considered the subject, or principal material object, of theology. That object is to some extent the same in natural theology, in the theology of faith, in the theology of vision, and in the theology of infinite comprehension, though it is clear that these differ entirely in kind from one another; and as far as the last one goes, it can be called by the same name only analogically. There is no need for us to speak of the vision by which God comprehends himself, or by which the blessed behold him face to face. The essential difference between the theology of faith and natural theology is to be explained from the diverse formal reason of each; whence it is at the same time understood how the one is distinguished from the other, both in origin and in the extent of its object.

Formal reason⁷ of any object of knowledge is the proper mode by which the object is related to the knower as knowable. We may say that this mode is the form of knowability, by which the object of knowledge is made manifest and rendered knowable. Now for natural theology the object pertains to this extent, insofar as it is knowable by the intrinsic manifestation of truth as true, proportioned to the intellect knowing by its own innate powers. The object of the theology of faith, however, is rendered knowable by the light of revelation, through which it is made manifest either immediately in itself, or at least in its principles, from which it is deduced⁸. Therefore the reason of knowability of the object is essentially different in natural theology and in the theology of faith, at least in its principles, to which the individual theological truths are to be traced back. Now the diversity of sciences is produced by a diversity of the reason of knowability, even when they are concerned with the same material object⁹. Therefore the theology with which we are concerned differs essentially from purely rational theology.

Besides the difference between extrinsic manifestation and the objective principle of knowledge, the distinction and diversity of the intrinsic principle in the knowing mind must also be considered. Insofar as supernatural divine revelation makes manifest the object of the theology of faith, that object, so that it may be known in a way suited to it, is referred to the intellect informed by the intrinsic light of faith; and therefore it presupposes supernatural faith for its fitting knowledge. But the object of natural theology, which becomes known through natural manifestation, is in itself referred to the intellect equipped only with natural light. Thus the subjective principle of knowing in natural theology is, in itself, human reason by its natural light; in the theology of faith the subjective principle of knowing is indeed human reason, but instructed and aided by the intrinsic supernatural light of faith, so that theology may be consonant with its own proper object, as it ought to be. We shall speak of this matter again a little later.

Both the light of objective revelation and the light of subjective faith are commended by the holy Fathers as the necessary principle for theological knowledge, when they repeat and inculcate that faith must come first, so that the intellect may follow; and when theology is called by them « faith seeking understanding, » a phrase which they are accustomed to fit to the words of Scripture, Isai. VII. 9. (according to the LXX.): « unless you believe, you will not understand »¹⁰. In the same sense the Fathers say that divine things can be taught to us only by God himself,¹¹ and that the true gnosis, or theology, has as its objective principle nothing other than God revealing himself¹².

From the formal reason as declared it is clear that the origin of each theology is different; for the distinction of the formal reason rests on the very different origin of each. Both natural and Christian theology are indeed from God, but in different ways. The former is from God as author of nature, mediately through the works of creation, which are the objective manifestation of the Creator, and through the natural light of the intellect; for God poured out wisdom over all his works, and the Word, in the natural order too, enlightens every man coming into this world, so that « the world in the wisdom of God might know God through wisdom » (cf. 1. Cor. I. 21.), as the Fathers (especially the Apologists, Tatianus, Iustinus, Athenagoras, Clem. Alex., Origenes, Athanasius) often argue against the Gentiles. But the principles of the theology of faith are from God as immediate revealer, by a twofold supernatural speaking: by an external speaking, by which « God, who of old spoke in many parts and in many ways to the Fathers by the prophets, last of all in these days has spoken to us in the Son »; and then by an internal speaking, through the light of faith, by which we are teachable by God, are taught, enlightened, and anointed by the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit (Io. VI. 45; Matth. XVI. 17; 2. Tim. I. 10; 1. Io. II. 20). From the diversity of the formal reason and of the medium of knowing, and at the same time from the diverse origin, it is further understood how the theology of faith extends more widely than natural theology in respect of the knowable character of its object.

On the connection and distinction between theology and faith.

« Since the theology of faith is nothing other than the scientific explanation and confirmation of the doctrine of faith, there is clearly an intimate connection between theology and faith, and on the other hand a difference between theological knowledge, as it is called, both from purely rational knowledge and from the assent of faith. Nor, however, should it be denied, with some Scholastics, that theology is science in the proper sense of the name, on account of this intrinsic connection, by which theology rests on faith as on its foundation. »

I. From what has been said about revelation as the formal reason under which the truths of theology are considered, it might seem that theology is no different from faith itself; which, taken simply, is clearly false. Therefore, in order to understand more distinctly what the proper reason of theology is, we shall explain both its connection with faith and its distinction from faith.

1°. Faith and theology can be considered in an objective sense as the whole complex of revealed truths cohering in mutual connection, so that one is comprehended in another and one depends on another and follows from it; that is, the system of revealed truths, or, if it is permissible so to speak, the whole of revealed truth as organic. In this objective sense faith and theology, strictly taken, signify the same thing, though not under the same aspect; for the name faith formally signifies the revealed truths and only materially the connection and organism of the truths, that is, it signifies revealed truths which are in mutual connection, but not under the formal aspect insofar as they are truths connected with one another; whereas the name theology formally designates the organism of revealed truth¹³. I have said that, under the name of theology in its stricter signification, the same thing is designated as under the name of objective faith; for although there are also theological truths which are not contained in objective revelation, these nevertheless belong to theology in a less strict sense, insofar as they are connected with the revealed truths. In this broader sense, and by reason of connection, nothing would prevent their also being said to belong to objective faith; but because faith, as we have said, does not designate the organism and connection of the truths as theology does, therefore such truths, not revealed yet cohering with revealed ones, are rightly said to belong to theology and not to objective faith; and so in this objective sense, of which we now speak, theology simply extends more widely than faith.

2°. Above all, and in the more proper signification, faith and theology, when their connection and difference are under discussion, are taken subjectively. In this sense faith is either a habit or an act of assent (the mind and will being strengthened by supernatural powers) to the revealed truth on account of the authority of God who reveals. Theology, as we said above, is γνωσις, the understanding and science of the truths of faith in a manner proportionate to the human mind illumined by faith. Hence theology presupposes faith as its foundation; it is built upon faith, as Clement of Alexandria aptly said, and it blossoms and unfolds from faith. This immanent procession of theology from faith can be declared more distinctly thus.

In faith (subjective, the sense in which we are speaking) a threefold act of the intellect can be distinguished: the knowledge that God, who is infallible, has spoken; the knowledge that God, who is infallible, has revealed these determinate truths in a determinate sense; and assent to the revealed truth on account of the infallible authority of God speaking, which is the formal act of faith itself.

a) That assent to the existence of revelation, which is presupposed to the formal act of faith, rests on knowledge at least confused, and suited to each person's capacity, of the motives of credibility and of the reasons which present the fact of revelation to the mind as knowable; but in order that this assent may correspond to the dignity of the object, so that it is supernatural and enters, as it should, as an element into the act of faith itself, it must be elicited by the powers of grace strengthening the intellect and the will; that is, the assent to the existence of revelation must be most firm from the light of faith itself. (See the analysis of the act of faith in the appendix to our Tract. de Trad. et Script. Cf. Card. de Lugo de Fide disp. V. sect. 3. et disp. XI.)

Now, since theology considered subjectively is, as has been said, the understanding and scientific explanation of objective faith, it is clear which part of theology, and how, can and ought to be « built » upon that fundamental knowledge of the motives of credibility which is either presupposed in or contained in the act of faith itself. For when the firmest Christian persuasion concerning the existence of revelation is explained and elucidated through a distinct comprehension of the motives of credibility, and so the understanding of the reasons by which the fact of divine revelation shines forth is enlarged extensively and intensively, that part of theology arises which is called apologetic. This, however, deserves the name of Christian theology only insofar as it rests and is founded on the primitive supernatural persuasion from the light of faith as its foundation; for if this connection with supernatural persuasion were lacking, it could be a philosophy preliminary to and a pedagogy for Christian theology, but it would not be Christian theology in the proper sense. From this principle, that apologetic theology, insofar as it is a Christian science, rests and is grounded on the primitive supernatural persuasion concerning the existence of revelation, you will infer why we said that the understanding of the motives of credibility is indeed enlarged intensively and extensively, yet it does not follow from this that the certitude and firmness of the Christian assent and of faith is increased through theological science considered in itself. Further, from these things it is clear how gravely Hermes and others erred, who held that a firm certitude concerning the existence and truth of Christian revelation cannot be had before a philosophical examination of the motives of credibility and of the reasons for truth; and therefore also that the persuasion of the faithful, nourished in the Catholic Church, concerning the credibility of their religion can and must be made subordinate to the consequences of a philosophical examination to be undertaken by them.

b) Further, in explicit faith there is necessarily contained a twofold knowledge in any believer: namely, that a certain series of truths is comprehended in the word of God; and, in addition, there is perceived, though obscurely and only by analogical reasons, a certain determinate sense of these truths and a certain connection of them with one another in the order of knowledge. Now, the explanation of that former Christian knowledge, and its scientific proof and defence from all the sources of revealed doctrine that are available, gives rise to what is customarily called positive theology, in very nearly the same way as we said that apologetic theology springs from the fundamental Christian persuasion concerning the existence of revelation. The connection of theology with supernatural faith in these very truths, however, is so close that, unless science rests on this faith, the whole of the studies would no longer be Christian theology (in the subjective sense, as it is here taken), but a certain archaeological, historical, critical and philological science, of the sort that can be made of any system of doctrine, even of a fictitious religion.

c) Finally, by a more distinct explanation and enlargement of the fundamental knowledge of the sense of the truths to be believed, insofar as it depends on comparison with rational ideas and truths, and of a certain mutual connection of the truths, which we mentioned last, speculative theology — or, as it is customarily called to distinguish it from positive theology, scholastic theology — is constituted. How this depends on faith, presupposes faith and rests upon it is understood from the very notion, and will be made clearer from the explanation of what is called theological assent in a specific sense.

II. In the second part of the thesis we treat of the distinction between theological knowledge and the assent of faith. To declare this distinction we shall consider theology first as positive, then as speculative.

1°. The discourse may therefore concern theology insofar as it proves and declares truths immediately from its own proper source, that is, from the word of God, which is contained in Scripture and in tradition or ecclesiastical preaching, as this manifests itself in many ways in the doctrine of the Councils, of the Roman Pontiffs, of the holy Fathers and Pastors of the Church, in the Liturgies, in practical use, in the agreement of theologians, and in the sense and consensus of the Christian people. In this proof the aim is always to show that some truth is contained in the word of God in a determinate sense, either with certainty or at least probably, and at the same time to show how the truth is proposed in the word of God. The mode of proof, however, can generally be fourfold.

a) The proof may be such that it shows a truth contained in a determinate sense in the word of God with that certainty that it is sufficiently proposed to the faithful in common, as a revealed truth; and this can happen only from a demonstrated or authentic definition, or from a sufficient universal consent. Thus, for example, a theological demonstration of the Most Holy Trinity is drawn from Matth. XXVIII. 19; of original sin from Rom. V. 12. sq.; of the real presence of the body and blood of the Lord under the species of bread and wine from Matth. XXVI. 26. 28. (with the parallel passages) etc. The same holds for the proof of all the truths of faith, whether from Scripture or from tradition or from both together, whenever the proof can appeal either to an authentic definition of faith or to the consensus of the Church. In this case the assent to the truth itself must be no other than the assent of faith; theological science, insofar as it is distinguished from faith, can pertain only to a more distinct knowledge of the mode in which the truth is contained in the word of God, and of its being shown to be contained in the word of God, and is defended against contradictors.

b) It can often happen that, although it is established from elsewhere that a truth is revealed, the particular place from which the proof is drawn supplies only a more or less probable argument, because the sense of the place, taken as it is, cannot be fully demonstrated either by intrinsic or by extrinsic reasons, at least not so that the truth appears, from that place considered in itself, as sufficiently proposed to all. Thus it is established by the faith sufficiently proposed in ecclesiastical preaching that matrimony is a sacrament of the New Law properly so called; the special proof, however, for example from Eph. V. 22–32., is not so framed that the truth could be shown to be sufficiently proposed to all by the force of that text of Paul. In this kind of proof the assent to the truth is twofold: first, it is the assent of faith, if the proposition is considered as contained in the word of God in its broad sense; then, along with the assent of faith to the truth itself, there is joined a theological assent of a lower order, by which, by the force of the reasons adduced, one holds that this truth is revealed in this determinate testimony of the Apostle. It is evident that this assent rests on a double foundation: one is the assent of faith, by which we believe that the teaching of the Apostle is the infallible word of God; the other is merely a theological persuasion of a lower order, that in this place of the Apostle the reason of a sacrament properly so called is enunciated. Whence also the judgment that in this place of the Apostle Christian matrimony is revealed as a sacrament of the New Law properly so called is not a judgment of faith, nor a judgment purely rational, but a sentence somewhat mixed, made up of the judgment of faith, that the word of the Apostle is the infallible word of God, and of the hermeneutical and theological judgment, that in the present section of the apostolic epistle the true reason of a sacrament is enunciated. This is called, according to the diverse degree of certitude or probability, theological sentence, theological opinion, to distinguish it from the sentence and assent both of faith and of the purely rational.

c) It can sometimes happen that, although the truth whose theological demonstration is sought has not yet been sufficiently proposed in the Catholic faith, nevertheless to those who are able to perceive the force of the arguments it is certain, from a careful examination whether of Scripture or of tradition, that this truth is contained in the revealed word of God. This being posited, the arguments which demonstrate the truth contained in revelation are, for such persons, sufficient; the application and proposal of revelation is enough to elicit the assent of divine faith. In those, however, who thus perceive the arguments, the assent of faith and theological knowledge do not differ in any other way than that which we indicated first (under letter a). Thus nothing prevents the truth of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin from having been believed by some with divine faith even before the definition of the dogma, though not yet with Catholic faith (that is, not yet as a dogma proposed to all as binding on faith) (see St Alphonsus Liguori Theol. Moral. l. VII. c. 2. n. 262. and the authors cited there). It should be noted, however, that these very things which we have here said in the third place are rejected by many theologians; and above all we must take care not rashly to extend this doctrine to opinions or sentences in which theologians freely go off in all directions and there is no moral consensus in the Church of God.

d) Finally, quite often the deduction of some sentence from the word of God does not exceed the limits of probability; it then constitutes a theological sentence or opinion in the manner which we mentioned in the second place; this is sufficiently evident in itself.

As long as positive theology is considered in this way, insofar as it either demonstrates the truths of faith from the word of God, written or handed down, by the aids and hermeneutical principles, or renders them probable as truths contained in the word of God, it was not without reason that Aureolus said that the articles of faith are not the principles but the conclusions of theology. It is also clear from what has been said in what sense it is true, as Aureolus likewise maintains, that a truth is not demonstrated in theology in order to beget assent, but for its greater declaration: « the theological habit, he says, is not adhesive but only declarative » (in 1. Sent. prolog. a. 3. pag. 13. sqq.).

2°. Yet, these things being so, the ancient Doctors, properly speaking, have before their eyes speculative theology when they take up the question of the distinction between the assent of faith and theological assent. It must be observed, namely, that, as in all sciences, so also in theology, as we said above, there is a mutual connection of the truths, and a dependence of one on another, at least as regards our knowledge and in the logical order. Truths from which others depend, at least in the order of our knowledge, and which are understood by us, are and are called principles. Of principles, insofar as they are known not from other prior things but from themselves, the understanding is said by the ancients not properly to be science; for science is certain knowledge from causes, or more generally from principles; whence science is of conclusions. In theology the truths from which others are known, at least in part (that is, if not both, at least one proposition from the premises), are assumed not by the light of understood reason but by faith believed. And so what in other sciences is the understanding of principles, in theology is faith; and the principles most proper to theology are the truths of faith¹⁴. The conclusions, however, deduced from the principles of faith are themselves also truths of faith, or at least connected with the truths of faith. The question therefore arises, how the knowledge or assent to such conclusions, which is properly called theological assent, differs on the one hand from the assent of faith, and on the other from purely rational assent.

a) What is stated in the conclusion is already implicitly contained in the premises, either in both taken together, or in one alone, so that the other is assumed only to manifest the comprehension of the conclusion in that former one. Whence, when it is established that both premises are a revealed truth, or when one premise, revealed, already implicitly contains what is stated in the conclusion, and the other, though not revealed, evidently manifests this comprehension of the conclusion in the revealed premise, without doubt the truth which is stated in such a conclusion is revealed. An example of a theological conclusion in the form first mentioned would be the following, against the Arians. From the double revealed truth that God is one, and that the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, there evidently follows the conclusion that that by which the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are God, namely the divine nature and all absolute perfection, is one in number in three distinct persons; this very truth, therefore, is already contained as revealed in each of those premises. An example of a conclusion in the other form can be brought forward against the Monothelites. The revealed proposition that Christ, besides the divine nature, has a perfect human nature, through which he is a true man, already contains the other truth, that Christ, besides the divine will, has also a rational will and human volitions. When therefore the other proposition is assumed to complete the argument: Christ is a true man; but to man a rational faculty of will is essential; therefore Christ has a human will: that assumed proposition only manifests the comprehension of this conclusion in the revealed proposition.

This being posited, the truth of the consequent drawn from the revealed premises can be considered in two ways: either formally as revealed by God, and then to the proposition there corresponds the assent of faith on account of the authority of God revealing; or it can be considered formally as a truth understood from the truth of the premises and from legitimate consequence and deduction, and then to the proposition there corresponds theological assent. For the assent of faith certainly does not exclude knowledge and a secondary assent on another motive of a lower order. Thus, for example, we believe the immortality of the soul and many other truths, God revealing them, and at the same time we understand them from rational demonstration; in the same way we believe by faith, as revealed in itself, for example, the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, and we understand it theologically from the twofold truth believed: that the Father communicates to the Son whatever is not the formal reason of paternity, and that the spiration of the third person is not formally the reason of paternity. Now this theological assent is not purely rational, because it does not rest on principles understood by reason but on principles believed by faith; nor is it, however, the assent of faith, because we do not assent simply on account of the authority of God revealing such a truth; but besides the authority of God, which is the motive of assent to the premises, there intervenes, as the formal reason of knowledge and as the motive of assent to the conclusion, the understanding of the connection and of legitimate consequence, by which the conclusion is understood as true from the premises. See Card. de Lugo De Fide Disp. I. sect. 13. n. 282. 335. sqq.

b) Further, if one of the premises is revealed while the other is certain only by the light of reason, and if what is stated in the conclusion is contained only in both taken together, then what is stated in the conclusion is indeed certain, but not simply contained in revelation; and therefore it is not an object of divine faith, but only theological assent, which rests partly on the revealed truth of the premises and partly on the naturally certain one. It is revealed that the sacrament of baptism confers grace on those who put no obstacle in the way; but if I see an infant baptized by that minister, and in such a way that no suspicion can arise against the validity of the sacrament, it is certain, though not revealed, that this infant has been validly baptized; hence the conclusion that this infant is justified is theologically certain, but it is not of faith. So Suarez, de Lugo and many others teach. But what Cano (de Locis l. VI. c. 8. ad 10.) and Vega (de Iustificatione l. IX. c. 39.) say, that a proposition deduced from one of faith and another naturally evident is itself also an object of faith, is in truth not contrary to this; for they speak of a conclusion which is wholly contained in the revealed premise, so that the naturally evident proposition only manifests this comprehension of the conclusion in the other, revealed one; and their meaning can easily be seen from the examples they use to declare their opinion. In fact, in these theological syllogisms, for the most part the naturally certain proposition, especially where the certitude is metaphysical, only manifests the comprehension of the consequent in the revealed premise; and therefore conclusions of this kind are contained implicitly in objective revelation, and consequently can be explicitly proposed by the Church and defined as to be believed by faith.

c) Finally, it must be noted that the assent of divine faith can be only most certain and firm, above all things (see the Appendix to the Tract. on Tradition and Scripture); but theological assent is not only of a lower order, it can also be accompanied by fear of the opposite, and so be a theological opinion. This can happen in three ways: either because it is not certainly established that a proposition, assumed in the premises as a principle from the sources of revelation, in the sense in which it is assumed, is contained in revelation; or because the assumed rational proposition is not certain but only probable; or because the legitimate consequence and deduction are not certain. « Theology, says Molina l. c., with respect to proper theological discourses, such as those which conclude something from one or several revealed propositions, comprises many opinions, as almost all the natural sciences are wont to have. The reason is that sometimes it proceeds indeed from revealed propositions, but not in a sense which is known to be literal and intended by the Holy Spirit; and such propositions are probable principles, which can only generate an opinion. Sometimes, however, although it proceeds from some proposition in a sense which is known to be of faith, it assumes another that is not at all revealed and not evident (not certain), or it deduces a conclusion by an inevident consequence. Discourses of this kind can only generate an opinion. »

Moreover, propositions of this kind, which depend also on unrevealed truths, and much more opinions deduced from merely probable premises, belong to theology only in the second place and as it were by accident, and not by necessity or from the essential reason of this sacred discipline itself. This must indeed be noted against certain more recent learned men, who, on account of this assumption of rational truths, have asserted that theology depends no less on philosophy than philosophy on theology.

III. In the last part of the thesis we indicate the controversy which at one time existed, whether theology is, in the proper sense, and ought to be called, science. If by the name science is understood certain and distinct knowledge of the reasons and foundations of truth, and of the mutual connection of truths among themselves, suited to the knowability of the truths themselves for the human mind, no one will deny that theology, according to its threefold part described above (n. I.), is science in the truest sense.

The older schools of theologians, however, differed not a little among themselves about this name rather than about the thing. They considered theology under that aspect in which it draws truths from revealed principles and from faith believed. Therefore those who required of the notion of science not only certitude but also evidence of its principles, that they be known through themselves, consequently denied that theology can be called science in the proper sense (Durandus, Gregory of Rimini, Vasquez etc.). But without doubt the stronger cause is that of those who, according to the common manner of speaking and judging, teach that theology is simply science, although it differs in many respects from that notion of science which Aristotle alone was able to know and define¹⁵. The first endowment of science is certitude, which, if it is lacking, will be not science but opinion and hypothesis. Moreover, not every knowledge of truth, however certain, suffices for the notion of science; for the object of science is truths not divided from one another but known in that mutual connection which they present of themselves. For there is among the truths a certain hierarchy, according to which one depends on another and one proceeds from another. Truths on which others depend are called principles, and they are so much the higher and more universal as more truths are governed by them. Since, therefore, the whole system of truths is governed by principles, these must indeed be certain, lest the constituted whole seem not a science but a system of opinions and hypotheses; yet it is not required that the certitude be from intrinsic evidence, provided that the principles are certain from elsewhere, as much objectively¹⁶ as subjectively certain; since evidence is required only insofar as it is necessary to beget certitude. Now theology is governed by most certain principles, not indeed from their own evidence but from supernatural faith, and it deduces the truths depending on them and understands the mutual connection of the truths. It is therefore science in the truest sense. Just as those which are called subalternate sciences do not cease to be sciences because they proceed from principles taken from a higher science, so theology does not fall from this dignity because the principles from which it proceeds are evident and perceived only in a higher science, namely the science of God and of the blessed¹⁷. See Petavium Prolog. c. 8; Aguirre disp. III. sect. 2.

On the distinction of the doctrine of the one God and of the triune God.

« Theology taken more strictly, or the revealed doctrine concerning God, comprises a twofold treatment; in the first of these is considered what is absolute and one in God, and in the other the relative things are regarded, which, according to the formal reason of the origin of one from another, and therefore according to the relation of one to another, are really distinguished among themselves. Whence the doctrine of God according to the absolute things is called by the Fathers theology united, and the doctrine of God according to the relative things is called theology distinct. »

I. The Catholic profession concerning God is recalled to faith in one God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. That we may understand that one must believe in the unity according to the absolute essence by which God is, and in the real distinction of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, not according to the absolute essence but solely according to the relations of origin of one from another; and therefore that the persons are not distinguished from one essence common to three, but only from one another, insofar as they are formally relative. This profession is declared more distinctly in the theology of the Church, that is, in definitions and more explicit creeds, thus. « We believe and confess that one supreme thing is incomprehensible and ineffable, which truly is Father and Son and Holy Spirit, three persons together and each of them singly. And therefore in God there is only Trinity, not quaternity (not three distinct persons, and as it were a fourth thing, a nature distinct from them, as Abbot Joachim objected would follow from the doctrine of Peter Lombard), because each of the three persons is that thing, namely the substance, essence or divine nature, which alone is the principle of all things, without which nothing else can be found (for the operations ad extra are of God as one, not as the persons are distinct from one another). And that thing (the absolute nature and common to the three) is neither begetting nor begotten nor proceeding, but is (not under the formal aspect of absolute but under the formal aspect of relative) the Father who begets, the Son who is begotten, and the Holy Spirit who proceeds, so that there are distinctions in the persons and unity in the nature. Although, therefore, the Father is other than the Son, and the Son other than the Holy Spirit, nevertheless they are not another thing; but that which is the Father is the Son and the Holy Spirit, altogether the same, so that, according to the orthodox and Catholic faith, they are believed to be consubstantial. » Concil. Lateran. IV. cap. Damnamus.

From this very profession of the Catholic faith, even if glanced at in passing (for we treat of it distinctly in the Tract. on the Trinity), it is manifestly clear that God, most simple in himself, presents himself to our knowledge of faith, so long as « we know in part and prophesy in part » (1. Cor. XIII. 9.), under a twofold aspect, of the absolute and of the relatives; so that, for the explanation of the one and the other aspect, on account of the very eminence of the divine perfection and on account of the imperfection of our mode of knowing, a twofold treatment is necessary: concerning God as one according to essence and absolute attributes, and then concerning God as triune in persons relative to one another and really distinct from one another.

If we were to see God as he is in himself, then by the very vision of the absolute essence we would at the same time see that same essence as it is Father and Son and Holy Spirit; and by a like reason, on account of the intrinsic and necessary relation of the persons to one another and their identity with the essence, by the very vision of each single person we would in turn see both the divine essence and all three persons, identified with the essence and distinct from one another. But now, since we do not understand God through proper ideas, as he is in himself, but either conclude by reason as far as he is made manifest from creatures, or believe his word, which, so that it can be understood by us, descends to our mode of knowing and accommodates itself to it, as Dionysius speaks (de divin. nomin. c. 1. §. 4.): in this condition of ours, I say, we cannot conceive God except by a plainly distinct series of ideas: first as one most simple, absolute and infinite Esse, which we explain more distinctly under the various notions of attributes and absolute perfections; and then as three persons constituted and distinct from one another by relations of origin, who, both singly and all together, are that same infinite Esse, and therefore are one in essence.

Nor does the distinction between these two considerations lie simply in this, that the notion of the absolute is one insofar as God is one, and the notion of the relative is another insofar as the divine persons are three; a diversity of notions of this kind also supplies a manifold subdivision of the treatment, both of the one God and of the other treatise on the triune God. But the difference between this notion of the absolute and that of the relatives in God arises far more from the difference in the mode by which human reason, even when illumined by faith, can be occupied with the one and with the other. For although in the theology of faith all things are considered under the formal reason of revealed truth, most of the things considered on the one God are not only to be believed by faith, but can also, where it is asked whether they are, be understood and demonstrated by the light of reason; for according to these God manifests himself not only by his immediate revelation to faith, but also to the light of reason through the things that have been made. Or certainly those things which are known to us about the absolute perfections of God by revelation alone are joined with rational notions in such a way that, once they have been revealed, they are understood through knowledge sufficiently clear and distinct and wholly congruent with reason; of which kind there are several chapters, for example on the divine will. But those things which concern the intrinsic processions and the distinct divine persons are simply above reason; and therefore in these there can be no objective principle of knowing other than revelation, to which faith corresponds subjectively, while understanding corresponds only through certain analogical shadowings, a matter treated at length in the treatise on the Trinity itself.

II. As is clear from what has been said, this first treatise on the one God has as its object indeed the divine nature and what is absolute, without explicit consideration of the three persons, who, distinct from one another through their relations, are both singly and all together really identified with the one absolute nature. But on account of this very identification and, as is commonly said, on account of this communion of the one nature in three, whatever is taught about the essence and about the absolute things holds without distinction both of each person singly and of all together. Hence, from this communion of the nature in three distinct persons, and from the unity of the persons as regards the absolute, the doctrine of the essence and of the absolute attributes is called by the Fathers united theology, theology of union. For if only the singleness of the nature were known, and not the distinction of the persons, one could indeed speak of a theology of unity, but not of a united theology and theology of union. But the relations by which the single persons are constituted and distinguished are by that very fact proper to each, and not common to the three. Hence the doctrine about these has been called by the Fathers distinct theology; and because the persons include the common nature, therefore distinct theology presupposes and includes united theology.

Dionysius, in chapter 2ᵃᵐ de div. nomin., entitles it « on united and distinct theology » (περὶ ἑνωμένης καὶ διακεκριμένης θεολογίας); and following Dionysius, John Damascene has in de Fide orthod. book I, chapter 10ᵃᵐ, « on divine union and distinction » (περὶ θείας ἑνώσεως καὶ διακρίσεως); and likewise Anticchus¹⁸ the monk (de fide hom. I, Bibl. Graec. Lat. Paris. 1624, T. I, p. 1029): « all theology, he says, is united and distinct ». Dionysius explains the object of each thus, l. c. nn. 1, 5, 6: « Whatever absolute name is to be thought to pertain to the whole Godhead (i.e. to the three persons in common)… But there is also in the superessential theologies a distinction, by which, in that very union, each person subsists unmixed and unconfused, and those things which belong to the superessential procession are by no means interchanged with one another. Thus we too strive to join and to distinguish the divine things in speech, as they themselves are in themselves united and distinct. » The other Fathers likewise join and distinguish this double object of united and distinct theology in many ways, for example Basilius ep. 43; Nazianzenus or. 40, n. 41; Nyssenus cont. Eunom. l. I, p. 78, etc. « Ineffable and incomprehensible, says Basil, is the communion and distinction found in these things, since neither the difference of the hypostases dissolves the continuity of the nature (τὸ συνεχὲς τῆς φύσεως), nor the communion confounds the peculiarity of the personal notions (τὸ ἰδιάζον τῶν χωρισμάτων). » Most admirably, l. c., Gregory Nazianzen: « I give you this companion and patron of your whole life, one Godhead and power, which is found singularly in the three and comprehends the three distinctly (ἐν τοῖς τρισὶν ὑπερκειμένην ἑνικῶς, καὶ τὰ τρία συλλαμβάνουσαν μεριστῶς)… the infinite union of three infinites, God each one, if he is considered in himself, as Father so Son, as Son so Holy Spirit, each keeping his own property; God again these three, if they are thought together: the one on account of consubstantiality, the other on account of the unity of principle. Scarcely have I conceived that which is one in mind, when at once I am surrounded by three; scarcely do I begin to distinguish the three, when I am led back to that which is one » etc.

What Dionysius calls the united (τὸ ἡνωμένον), Basil calls the continuity of the nature in the three (τὸ συνεχὲς τῆς φύσεως), Nyssen with the others the communion (κοινωνίαν), and Nazianzen one Godhead singularly in the three (ἐν τοῖς τρισὶν ὑπερκειμένην ἑνικῶς). Conversely, what for Dionysius is the distinct (τὸ διακεκριμένον), with Basil is the proper (τὸ ἰδιάζον), with Nyssen the incommunicable (τὸ ἀκοινώνητον), and with Nazianzen are the three, which the one Godhead distinctly embraces (τὰ τρία ἡ Θεότης συλλαμβάνουσα μεριστῶς).

It is therefore one thing to consider those things which pertain to united theology without explicitly considering the distinct persons at the same time; another thing to look only at those things which pertain to the one absolute nature, and, for lack of a sufficient proposition, to ignore those which pertain to the relatives and to the distinction of the persons; and yet another thing to wish to hold only those things which are understood of one absolute nature, and to deny those things which are sufficiently proposed in revelation about the plurality and distinction of persons in the one nature. The first is without error and is undertaken for an easier and more distinct understanding, and the necessity of this partition, or rather of formal abstraction, follows from the natural imperfection of our mode of understanding. The second is without error but joined with ignorance; and, as regards the Old Testament, in accordance with the present economy of divine providence, it presupposed a further explanation of theology to come through new revelations. The third is a heretical error, by which not only the revealed distinct theology is denied, but also united theology, considered in the mode in which it has been revealed, is subverted. Therefore the monarchy of revealed and catholic theology concerning the one God is far different from that of the heretics who were called Monarchians by the ancients and more recently Unitarians, because by denying the distinction of the divine persons they entirely removed distinct theology from the midst. Likewise, conversely, the distinct theology of the Catholics is far different from that of the Tritheists, who subverted the fundamental doctrine of divine unity. But Catholic doctrine, « and it does not obstruct the monarchy and protects the state of the economy », Tertull. contr. Prax. c. 8.

TREATISE

ON THE ONE GOD ACCORDING TO NATURE.