Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

I. From the foregoing, St. Thomas infers what predestination, reprobation, and divine election are ¹. And he says two things ². For he says, first, that since all things that are done by God were foreseen and ordered from eternity by His wisdom, it is necessary that the aforesaid distinction among men—namely, according as by divine operation some are directed to the ultimate end helped by grace, while some, deserted by the help of grace, fall away from the end—was ordered by God from eternity. Whence, according as He preordained some from eternity as to be directed to the ultimate end, He is said to have predestined them: according to that of Ephesians 1: Who predestined us unto the adoption of sons, according to the purpose of His will.—Those, however, to whom He disposed from eternity that He would not give grace, namely final grace, He is said to have reprobated, or hated: according to that which is said in Malachi 1: Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated.—By reason of this very distinction, however, according as He reprobated some and predestined some, divine election is regarded: concerning which it is said in Ephesians 1: He chose us in Him, etc.—From which it is clear that these things are a part of divine providence, according as men are ordered to the ultimate end from divine providence. 2. Note, first, that predestination names the plan of the order of some unto eternal life, pre-existing from eternity in the divine mind, with foreknowledge of the outcome. On account of this it is said here that according as God preordained some from eternity as to be directed to the ultimate end, He is said to have predestined them. Note, second, that the divine election of some with respect to the ultimate end is regarded according as God wills to them the good of eternal life in preference to others, by not willing this good to some (namely, to the reprobate). Therefore it is said here that by reason of this distinction, according as He reprobated some, but predestined others, divine election is regarded. Note, third, that it belongs to divine providence to order all things unto their ends, and consequently to order man unto eternal life. And because it belongs to the same one to order some things to a certain end, and to exclude others from that end, therefore it belongs to divine providence to order some to the ultimate end, but to exclude others from it by permitting their fall. On account of this it is said here that predestination, reprobation, and election are a certain part of divine providence, according as men are ordered to the ultimate end from divine providence: because, namely, these pertain solely to the ordering of man to the ultimate end, whereas to divine providence belongs the order of every single thing unto any end whatsoever.

II. He says, second, that from the fact that it was said that the aforesaid are a part of providence, two things follow. The first is that from the same reasons it can be manifest that the aforesaid do not induce necessity, from which it was shown above that divine providence does not take away contingency from things. The other is that it can be manifest that predestination and election do not have a cause from any human merits, not only because grace, which is the effect of predestination, is not anticipated by merits, but precedes all human merits; but also from the fact that of the divine will and providence, which is the first cause of the things that are done, nothing can be the cause; although of the effects of providence and predestination one can be the cause of another. Which is also confirmed by the authority of the Apostle, who says: Who hath first given to Him, etc. 2. For the evidence of this matter, it must be considered that we can consider two things in predestination: namely, the effect caused in the one predestined; and the very immanent operation of God predestining. Such an effect can also be considered in two ways: namely, totally, and partially.

The first reason touched upon here proceeds concerning the total effect of predestination. For under the total effect itself is comprehended whatever is in man ordering him to salvation. Whence, since grace effects this, it is evident that it is an effect of predestination. And therefore, since it precedes all merit, it follows that merits cannot be its cause. And consequently, merits cannot be the cause of the total effect of predestination.

The second reason can indeed be understood in two ways. In one way, so that it proceeds concerning the very act of God predestining: namely, that just as nothing is the cause of the divine willing and the act of providing, so too there is no cause of predestination; since predestination is a part of providence.—In another way, so that it is understood also concerning the total effect of predestination: namely, that just as the first effects in things have as their cause only the divine will and divine providence, from which it follows that in created things nothing is the cause of all the things willed and provided by God, but only the divine goodness; so too of the whole effect of predestination nothing is the cause except the divine goodness.—Now these things are not opposed by the fact that one partial effect of predestination is the cause of another effect: just as glory is the final cause of grace; and grace is the meritorious cause of glory; and in a certain way a material disposition, just as everything that disposes a subject for the reception of some perfection is reduced to the character of matter.

St. Thomas treats of these matters in the First Part, q. XXIII; and in De Veritate, q. VI; and in I Sent., d. XLI.

It should be noted, however, that although St. Thomas has named three things, namely predestination, reprobation, and election, he says of two only, namely of predestination and election, that they do not have a cause. Because, namely, there is not the same rationale concerning all three: for of reprobation, as to its total effect, something is the cause, namely guilt; which, as has been said and explained in chapter CLXI ³, is not found in predestination.

III. If, however, it should be urged against the aforesaid, as Henry urges in Quodlibet IV and V ⁴:—both because election presupposes a disparity between the one to be chosen and the one to be reprobated; and because justice is always the companion of mercy, and thus it seems that all divine effects proceed from justice, and consequently that there is some cause on the part of the creature for all divine effects—it is said to the first that what was assumed is false. For the divine will can, from those things that are understood to be equal as far as is in them, choose one by the sole choice of the will for something for which it does not choose the other: although perhaps in human election an inequality is presupposed between the one to be chosen and the one to be reprobated, inasmuch as it is necessary for the will to be moved more by one than by another.

To the second it is said that in the first divine effects justice is not the companion of mercy, as though, namely, in them something were produced that is due to any creature; but justice can be in this way, inasmuch as God does that which is due to His wisdom and preordination ⁵. This, however, does not argue that there is something on the part of the creature that is the cause of the total effect of predestination: on account of which, namely, God might effect such an effect in the predestined.

The remaining things that pertain to this matter have been treated above, where providence was dealt with ⁶.

Praise be to God. Here ends the third book.