Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Because someone might ask: If a man existing in sin cannot fail to place an obstacle to grace, and cannot have grace through himself, can a reason be assigned why God draws some back from evil and converts them to good, but leaves others in sin? — St. Thomas answers ¹. And he does three things: first, he explains what is asked; second, he removes a certain doubt, in the following chapter; third, from what has been said he infers what predestination, reprobation, and election are, in the last chapter.

I. As to the first, he says two things. The first is that, since God can operate outside the order implanted in things; although the order of things requires that he who places an obstacle to grace ought not to receive grace; nevertheless, anticipating some of this sort with His help out of the abundance of His goodness, He draws them back from evil and converts them to good, so that in them His mercy may appear, in such a way that in others the order of justice is manifested; just as He indeed enlightens some blind persons and heals some sick persons, but not all, so that both in those whom He cures the work of His power may appear, while in the others the order of nature is preserved. — This is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle, Rom. 9.

The second is that, since from among those who are held fast in the same sins He indeed converts these, anticipating them, but permits those to proceed according to the order of things, a reason is not to be sought why He converts these and not those, but this depends upon His simple will: just as also in creation certain things were made more noble than others; and just as it proceeds from the simple will of the craftsman that from the same matter he forms certain vessels for noble uses, but certain ones for ignoble uses. — This is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle, Rom. 9.

By this the error of Origen is excluded, who assigns as the cause of this the works done by souls before they were united to bodies.

It should be noted, when St. Thomas says that God anticipates some with His help and converts them to good, that he uses this mode of speaking because a man would never be converted to God unless he were anticipated by divine help, as is clear from the things said above ².

II. For the evidence of these things, however, it must be considered that, when we ask whether there is any cause and reason why God frees some from sin, but not others, this can be understood in two ways: in one way, vaguely and indeterminately; in another way, singularly and determinately; just as it can be asked why a builder places some stones in the foundation, but some under the roof, not determining these or those; and it can be asked why from among these stones of equal disposition he places these determinate ones in the foundation, but those near the roof. And therefore St. Thomas, answering according to both senses, according to the first says that, with respect to those who are freed, there is assigned as cause the abundance of the divine goodness, which He wills to be represented through mercy. For just as He produced creatures into being through creation under a certain order for the manifestation and communication of His goodness, so also, to manifest and communicate His goodness more amply, He frees some from sin who according to the common order implanted in things ought not to be freed, but rather punished, since they have both departed from God by sinning and placed an obstacle to grace. — But with respect to those who are not freed, there is assigned as cause the due order of justice, namely eternally punitive justice, demanding that grace and glory not be given to him who places an obstacle to grace.

As to the second sense, however, he says that the divine will alone is the cause of this, and it is not necessary to seek another cause. Now the reason for this is that, as to the fact that unequal things are given to those who are equally disposed, where there is no debt on the part of the giver, but something is given out of sheer liberality, it is not necessary to assign any other cause than the free will of the giver: as is shown in the First Part, q. 23, art. 5, ad 3.

III. But since St. Thomas says the same thing, in the place cited before, concerning predestination and reprobation: namely, that the reason why some are predestined, but some reprobated, is the representation of the divine goodness by way of mercy, and the representation of the same by way of punitive justice; but the reason why He predestines this one in particular, cannot be assigned as other than the divine will: — on that account we must answer the objections of Aureolus, by which he strives to attack the aforesaid things ³.

2. For there are three things that he attacks. The first is, that the reason for the reprobation of some in common is the shining forth of divine punitive justice. And he argues first thus. Nothing intended per accidens has for its end something intended per se. But divine justice is intended by God per se, as are also the other divine perfections: reprobation, however, is intended per accidens, since it is a certain evil; for both fault and penalty, which pertain to reprobation, are evils. Therefore the shining forth of divine justice is not the end of the reprobation of some.

Secondly. Evils are not to be done that good things may come ⁴. But the reprobation of the evil, if it were without any cause on the part of the reprobate, would be evil. Therefore etc.

Thirdly. Either this would be inasmuch as reprobation regards malice: or inasmuch as it regards eternal penalty, malice having been presupposed. Not the first: because then God would intend sin per se. Therefore the second. But then the representation of punitive justice will presuppose sin. Therefore sin will be the principal cause of reprobation: and not the representation of justice.

3. The second thing that he attacks is that the divine will alone is the reason why He reprobates this one in particular, but predestines that one. And he argues thus. Everyone who at the pleasure of his will afflicts and punishes someone, and permits him to fall into sin for this alone, that he may punish and afflict, is cruel: for he delights in penalties. But if God at the pleasure of His will reprobated this one, He would will to afflict and punish at His pleasure. Therefore He would be cruel. But this is not to be attributed to God. Therefore etc.

4. The third thing that he attacks is the example adduced here concerning the craftsman who at his pleasure makes from the same matter certain vessels for noble uses, but certain ones for ignoble uses. This example, he says, is not to the purpose. For although in things lacking sense and the experience of evil the craftsman can dispose at his pleasure without the mark of cruelty and injustice; nevertheless in things having the experience of good and evil, of honor and disgrace, this cannot be done without injury. Therefore this example is not to the purpose.

IV. For the solution of these arguments, and for a clear knowledge of this matter, it must be considered first that, since four things are found in the reprobate: namely, the permission of the fall into sin; the sin itself; the dereliction by God who does not raise him up from sin, and does not infuse grace; and the penalty, or damnation, — reprobation is not related in the same way to all these, but diversely. For with respect to sin in itself, reprobation implies no causality, but only foreknowledge: for God foreknows that he who has been reprobated will sin, but He is not the productive cause of his sin. But with respect to permission, dereliction by God in sin, and damnation or penalty, it implies not only foreknowledge, but also causality: for reprobation is the cause of all these. — But predestination is related in the same way to all the things that are in the predestined. For God has foreknowledge of all these, and is the cause of all. For He causes not only glory and beatitude in the predestined, but also the meritorious work, grace, and the preparation for grace.

2. It must be considered secondly, that the things found in the predestined are ordered among themselves otherwise than the things that are in the reprobate. For the things that are in the predestined have such an order among themselves that the first is the cause of the second, the second is the cause of the third, the third is the cause of the fourth. Similarly, the fourth is the end of the third, the third of the second, and the second of the first. For it is manifest that the preparation for grace, which takes place in the predestined by divine help, is the meritorious cause of grace, at least de congruo, as was shown above ⁵; grace is the formal cause of merit; merit is the meritorious cause of glory. Similarly, glory is the end of merit; merit of grace; and grace of the preparation for it. From which it follows that the first thing that is in the predestined, namely the preparation for grace, is in its own order and genus the cause of all posterior things: since that which is the cause of the cause is also the cause of the effect. Similarly, the last, namely glory, is the end of all the preceding things: for among ordered ends the ultimate end is the end of all the preceding ones, just as among ordered acting causes the first moves all the following ones.

But the things that are in the reprobate do not preserve this order. For although sin is the demeritorious cause of dereliction by God; and dereliction by God is the disposition toward eternal penalty; nevertheless permission, which is the first thing in the reprobate, is not the cause of sin: for it places nothing in the reprobate through which he falls into sin, since he sins from his own freedom; nor does it remove anything that would prohibit him from sin. Similarly, although dereliction by God can be called in some way the end of sin, and penalty the end of dereliction, just as form or privation can be called the end of the disposition toward it: nevertheless sin is in no way the end of permission, but its particular end is that the order of nature be observed in the governance of the reprobate. For since man is of free choice, he can from his own nature fail from rectitude of operation. Now the order of nature has it that things which can fail, sometimes fail: as is clear in naturally acting causes. Therefore the sweet disposition of things has it that man is permitted sometimes to fall into sin: and therefore, if God completely preserves someone from sin, this is outside the order of nature. It remains, therefore, that it is not necessary that the first thing that is in the reprobate be the cause of all posterior things, nor that the last be the end of all the preceding things individually, as they are regarded by divine reprobation: but rather of all these things together, namely of permission, dereliction, and penalty, the end intended through divine reprobation is the shining forth of divine justice.

3. It must be considered thirdly, that the shining forth of divine mercy is the reason for predestination in one way: and the shining forth of justice is the reason for reprobation in another way. For the shining forth of mercy is so the reason for the effect of predestination that nothing else on our part is the reason for its total effect. Nor is anything on our part of which predestination is not the cause, the reason for any particular effect: since whatever is in the predestined by which he is ordered to glory, is an effect of predestination.

The shining forth of justice, however, is so the reason for reprobation that it does not exclude every other cause on our part. For although nothing on our part, namely no work of ours, is the reason for the total effect of reprobation, for the representation of divine justice alone is the reason for all these things together, namely of permission, dereliction, and penalty, since no work of ours is the reason for permission: nevertheless our evil operation, or sin, of which God is not the cause, is the reason for damnation and penalty; for God does not punish anyone, nor propose to punish, except with fault presupposed. Therefore, although it is not conceded that the foreknowledge of merits is the reason for predestination even as to the collation of glory, because we understand that God determined to give glory to someone prior to determining to give grace, and thus the foreknown merits themselves are not the reason from which the collation of glory has that it is willed by God, but rather conversely: nevertheless the foreknowledge of fault is the reason for damnation and penalty. For we do not understand that God first determined to damn this one, and afterwards foreknows his crime, on account of which he will be damned: but we understand priorly, according to reason, that He foreknows the fault of someone, then determines to desert and damn him, in such a way that the foreknown fault is the reason why his damnation falls under the act of the divine will. And thus with this reason for reprobation which is the shining forth of divine justice, fault also concurs as the reason for damnation, which is the ultimate effect of reprobation: although fault is not the reason for the first effect of reprobation, namely for the permission of the fall into fault.

V. These things having been presupposed, the objections ⁶ are easily answered. For to the first against the first statement, the answer is made by denying the minor premise. For reprobation is intended not per accidens, but per se: since from eternity God disposed to permit some to fall into fault, and to punish them on account of the fault foreknown by Him. — When, however, it is proved because reprobation is a certain evil: this is denied. For permission is not an evil, but a good: since it is fitting to human nature, which can fail from rectitude in its works. Similarly, punishment, with fault presupposed, is good: inasmuch as in it the order of justice is saved.

To the second it is said that it presupposes a falsehood: namely, that we say that the shining forth of justice is so the reason for reprobation that we exclude every other cause of damnation. But this we do not say, as was clear: but we say that the reason for the ultimate effect of reprobation is not only the shining forth of justice, but also foreknown fault. And therefore God does not reprobate, as to the ultimate effect of reprobation, without demerit, but with demerit presupposed, foreknown from eternity.

To the third it is said first, that the shining forth of punitive justice is not the reason for reprobation as reprobation regards fault in itself: since it is not willed by God, as such, nor caused, but only foreknown.

It is said secondly, that it is the reason as reprobation regards penalty with fault presupposed. — When, however, it is inferred that fault will then be the principal cause, and not the shining forth of justice: this is indeed conceded. For of this particular effect which is penalty, the principal reason for willing is the foreknown fault. For unless God foresaw that this one would sin, He would not propose to manifest His punitive justice through the punishment of this one. Hence, as St. Thomas says in the First Book, d. 40, q. 4, a. 2, that the defect of grace in someone has its first cause on the part of him who lacks grace, but God is not the cause of this defect except on the supposition of that which is on the part of this person, because namely he does not will to have it, or negligently prepares himself for it; so it must be said concerning penalty, which is a certain evil of the rational creature, that God is not the cause of this except on the supposition of the fault of him who is reprobated. And thus the first reason why the penalty of this one is eternally willed by God, is his foreknown fault: although the reason for the whole effect of divine reprobation in common, is the shining forth of eternally punitive justice.

2. To that which is objected against the second statement, the response is clear from what has been said. For it is denied that God would be cruel. — To the proof, however, it is said that it presupposes a falsehood: namely, that we say that God at the pleasure of His will reprobates someone as to the ultimate effect of reprobation, namely as to punishment. For it is evident from what has been said that this is not the mind of St. Thomas. For we say that He does not punish and afflict the reprobate at the pleasure of His will, but on account of his eternally foreknown fault, which He has decreed to order through penalty, so that His justice may be manifested.

Now, as to what St. Thomas says, that the divine will alone is the reason why He reprobates this one in particular, it being presupposed that He wills to predestine some and reprobate some, this is understood as to the first effect of reprobation, which is the permission of the fall into sin; and also as to dereliction by God in preference to others who fall into sin. For the fact that, when two are existing in sin, He raises up one and leads him to glory, but does not raise up the other, but allows him to die in sin, depends upon His will alone: and without prejudice to justice. Just as, if two have offended me equally, and I forgive the offense to one, but do not forgive the other, it can depend upon my judgment alone: and I am not unjust if I mercifully forgive the injury to one, and in the other will the order of justice to be preserved.

3. To that which is adduced in the third place against the example, it is said first, that it presupposes a falsehood: namely, that we say that God from the choice of His freedom alone, with no fault presupposed, determined to punish this one, for instance Judas, and to place him in extreme misery. For it is evident from what has often been said that this is false.

It is said secondly, that even in things that have the experience of evil, there is no injustice if, from among those who by their evil works deserve eternal penalty, He remits the eternal penalty to this one, but places that one in eternal misery. For to the former He bestows His mercy outside the order of justice: but to the latter He renders what is due to him from justice.