Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Because in the answer to the preceding doubt it was said to be in the power of free choice to offer an impediment to grace or not to offer it, St. Thomas wishes to explain this proposition ¹.

Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he explains the proposed point; second, he shows that, notwithstanding the impediment of sin to the reception of grace, God nevertheless frees some from sin, while others are left in sin, in the following chapter.

I. As to the first, he says that, when it was said to be in the freedom of choice not to offer an impediment to grace, this belongs to those in whom the natural potency was integral; but not to him who, through a preceding inordinateness, has declined to evil. Because even if, for some moment, he can abstain from some particular act of sin by his own power; nevertheless, if he is left to himself for a long time, he will fall into sin, whereby an impediment to grace is offered.

2. For the clarity of the first part of this statement, it must be considered that by the natural potency St. Thomas understands the potency of free choice, which is also called the will, vitiated by no sin and no inordinateness, as it was in the first parent before he sinned. — This interpretation is clear, because he shares this integrity in division against the inordinateness of sin.

Concerning this integrity, however, it must be considered first that we can consider it in free choice in two ways: in one way, according as free choice is a power of the human soul absolutely, such that its integrity is considered which belongs to it from human nature considered precisely and purely; in another way, according as it was perfected through original justice, as it was in the first parent. For although there has never been any state of man in which man was not either under original justice or under sin, because the first man was created with original justice, and after his sin both he and all others were under sin; nevertheless nothing prevents nature from being able to be considered, since such original justice was something superadded to human nature, both without such a gift and without sin, and with respect to those things which belong to it according to itself as it abstracts both from such a gift and from sin.

It must be considered secondly that man can be considered in two ways: in one way, inasmuch as he is an animal; in another way, inasmuch as he is man, that is, as having reason. The natural integrity of man inasmuch as he is man requires that the sensitive appetite be regulated by reason and subjected to it: on account of which the Philosopher says, in III De Anima ², that the sensitive appetite follows the rational just as a sphere is moved by a sphere. And because original justice in man maintained this natural order of the powers of the soul, therefore it is the same thing to speak of the integrity of free choice which belongs to it from the condition of man’s nature inasmuch as it is such, and of the integrity which belongs to it with nature existing under original justice. On account of this, St. Thomas calls the state of integral nature the state of nature existing under original justice, in which state the first parents were, whether they were created in grace or not; but the state of corrupt nature he calls the state of sin ³.

He means, therefore, that in the state of integral nature, or in the state in which man was under original justice, it was in the faculty of free choice to offer an impediment to grace, and not to offer it.

3. For the clarity of the second part, it must be considered first that St. Thomas is not speaking of the remote potency of free choice, by which man is said to be able not to offer an impediment to grace, inasmuch as, with divine help presupposed, he can prepare himself for grace, and thus, having it, he can not sin. Rather, he is speaking of the proximate potency, by which free choice is said to be able to do something immediately, whether from itself alone or also from conditions superadded to it: just as we say that a man can act justly from the habit of justice, by which the will has an inclination toward acts of justice. For thus is St. Thomas’s statement understood: namely, that free choice, presupposing the inordinateness of past sin and the things that follow upon it, does not have it in its power to avoid sin, by proximate potency, that is; and thus it is not in its faculty not to offer an impediment to grace.

It must be considered secondly that we can understand someone to be able to avoid all sin, or not to be able, in two ways: in one way dividedly, by considering, namely, each single sin according to itself; in another way conjunctly, by considering, namely, all at the same time. The sense, therefore, of St. Thomas’s proposition, as is also explained in Iª IIae, q. 109, a. 8, is that a man existing in sin and lacking grace can indeed avoid all sins dividedly: — because, with any sin whatever pointed out in particular according to itself, it is true to say, "He can avoid this sin"; and this he signified when he said that for some moment, that is, for a short time, he can abstain from some particular act of sin — but he cannot avoid all conjunctly, namely so that he commits neither this nor that, with each one enumerated, but it is necessary that he commit this or that; and this he signified when he said, "if he is left to himself for a long time, he will fall into sin."

4. These things having been presupposed, St. Thomas proves his statement with respect to the second part, about which he principally intends to speak. And he argues first as follows ⁴. The mind of man, by declining from the state of rectitude, departs from the order of the ultimate end. Therefore, that end is made less loved than that toward which the mind is inordinately turned as toward an ultimate end. Therefore, whenever something occurs that is suitable to the inordinate end, and repugnant to the due end, it will be chosen, unless it is reduced to the due order through grace. Therefore, after sin, man cannot abstain from all sin unless he is restored through grace. — The last consequence is proved. Because, while something is chosen that is repugnant to the ultimate end, an impediment to grace is offered, and consequently there is a sinning.

II. Against this reason one can urge an objection in two ways. First, because it seems to proceed from a false foundation: namely, that he who sins mortally is affected toward that good toward which he was turned in sinning, as toward an ultimate end, even when the sin has ceased, until his affect is ordered through grace. For this seems to be false. Because it can be that someone having the acquired habit of temperance sins once against the inclination of the habit, and then deliberates not to commit such a sin any further. For it is evident that this man, after the sin, will not have as an ultimate end something contrary to temperance. Rather, he will more have for an end that toward which temperance inclines, which remained even while he was sinning: since a habit is not corrupted by a single contrary act.

Secondly ⁵, because that proposition does not seem true: Whenever something occurs that is suitable to the inordinate end, and repugnant to the due end, it will be chosen. For if this is true, it follows that one existing in sin cannot avoid individual sins: because, namely, what is suitable to the inordinate end will necessarily always be chosen when it occurs. This, however, is repugnant to the things said above and to be said. Therefore etc.

III. For the clarity of the first doubt, it must be considered that, since we are speaking here of the proximate potency of free choice to avoid sin or to commit it absolutely, this first reason for the impossibility of avoiding all sins is assigned from the removal of that disposition by which free choice itself was inclined by proximate disposition to avoid sin, inasmuch as it is sin; and from the positing of the contrary disposition, by which it is inclined to sinning. Because, namely, through sin there is removed the adherence of the will to God as to the ultimate end, through which the will was inclined to those things that are suitable to that end, since all works are regulated by the end, and consequently to avoiding sin, through which one is turned away from that ultimate end; while its adherence to a mutable good as to the ultimate end is posited, which is loved more than God, through which adherence it is inclined to that which is suitable to that end, which is mortal sin. For if the will, or free choice, through sin lacks the disposition by which it was able absolutely to avoid sin, and has a disposition inclining toward sin, it is a consequence that it sometimes sins; just as also one who has a habit cannot long remain without acting according to that habit. And thus he who has sinned, while that privation and that disposition remain, cannot avoid all sin, although he can avoid some particular sin.

It must be considered secondly, from the teaching of St. Thomas in De Veritate, q. 24, a. 12, that this disposition which is left in one sinning mortally is not always the habit of the vice in which he sins, because a habit is not generated from a single act; but it is a certain habitual adherence of the will to the inordinate end, that is, to a mutable good; the force and inclination of which adherence remains in it until it adheres to the immutable good as to an ultimate end, which indeed does not occur except through grace. From which it is held that, although someone may cease from sin, and may resolve not to commit that sin any further, from some deliberation; nevertheless on this account that habitual inclination of the will toward the undue end, namely toward the mutable good, or toward a good pleasurable according to sense, is not removed; because it is not removed unless the will, which through sin departed from the immutable good, is again established in the due order and in adherence to the due end. This, however, does not occur through the mere act of free choice resolving not to sin any further by that sin, but divine grace is required, whose role is to establish man in the state of due rectitude.

2. To the objection, therefore, against the reason of St. Thomas, it is said that what is false is not presupposed. For it is not presupposed that one sinning mortally, after the sin, is continually affected toward that particular good toward which he was turned in sinning; but that an inclination toward the mutable good in general remains, and an aversion from the immutable good, which is manifest to be included in every mortal sin. For he who fornicates is not necessarily affected in act or in habit after the sin toward venereal pleasure, because, as was argued, if such a one has the habit of temperance, he is easily brought back to abstinence from this kind of pleasure; nevertheless it is necessary that there remain an aversion from God, and an inclination toward the created good suitable to the one desiring it, unless a restoration of the due order is made through grace. For from the fact that someone has rejected the immutable good for a created and mutable one, and cannot by his own power adhere again to that immutable good as to the ultimate end of his operations, it remains that he habitually has the mutable and created good suitable to him as his ultimate end; for there must be one ultimate end of each man, to which he directs all his things, since all things are regulated by the end. Hence, however much he who committed fornication may return through the habit of temperance to the proper end of temperance, nevertheless through this it is not removed that the mind remains deprived of order to the due end, and is inclined toward the created good as toward the ultimate end.

It can also be said that, although through the habit of temperance he who has fornicated may return to the proper end of temperance as to a proximate end, inasmuch as he resolves to abstain henceforth from undue venery; nevertheless along with this there remains in the will an inclination left behind toward venereal pleasure as toward the ultimate end, from the fact that in venereal pleasure he established his ultimate end by sinning; for that inclination remains until it is removed through the choice of another ultimate end, whether due or undue. Moreover, this inclination is more efficacious in inducing to sin than the habit of temperance is in impeding it, on account of the corruption of nature and on account of the inordinateness of the will: because, since the ultimate end is loved supremely and necessarily, whenever something suitable to the undue end occurs, the will is borne toward it, unless it is drawn back by great deliberation.

IV. To the second doubt ⁶ the answer is that that proposition is to be understood with this condition, unless man restrains himself by much deliberation, as is clear in De Veritate, in the question cited above ⁷. St. Thomas, however, posited it here absolutely, because there is considered what belongs per se to one existing in sin according to that inclination to the undue end. For it belongs to him per se that, whenever something presents itself that is suitable to the inordinate end, he chooses it; but if it happens that he does not choose it, this is from something else drawing him back. Where it must be noticed that, although he who sins from that habitual inclination to the undue end sins with some kind of deliberation, inasmuch as the end is already determined in his choice, and he realizes that that which is chosen is a mortal sin; nevertheless this deliberation does not suffice to draw man back from sin, because he who, having rejected the immutable good, has adhered to a mutable good, no longer judges it an evil to be turned away from the immutable good; rather, so much deliberation is required that he arrives by considering at something which he cannot fail to judge an evil; and if this is not present, man is borne into sin according to that inclination. Therefore it is very well said that, whenever something suitable to the inordinate end and repugnant to the due end occurs, it is chosen: namely, when the condition of the one having the habitual inclination to the undue end is considered per se. It does not follow from this, however, that he cannot avoid individual sins: because, this notwithstanding, he can strive against each single sin, applying as much deliberation as is required.

V. Secondly ⁸. When the mind has been inclined toward something, it is more disposed toward that toward which it is inclined. Therefore it sometimes chooses that toward which it is inclined, while the inclination remains. Therefore, if it has been inclined toward sin, it will not long remain without sinning.

The first consequence is proved. Because that toward which the mind is more inclined, it chooses, unless through a certain discussion of reason it is led away from it with a certain care: as is shown from sudden occurrences. But it is not possible for the mind of man to be continually in that vigilance so as to discuss through reason whatever it ought to will or do. Therefore etc.

For the clarity of this reason, it must be considered that, just as the habit of virtue does not impose a necessity of acting absolutely, with this or that particular considered, but only causes an inclination toward the act conformable to the habit; so also the habitual adherence to an undue end does not impose a necessity absolutely to this or that particular sin, but only causes an inclination toward sinning. Therefore just as, notwithstanding the inclination of a natural cause acting for the most part toward some effect, it can sometimes fail in its action from some impeding factor; so, while that habitual inclination of the mind toward sinning stands, this particular sin and that one can be avoided by man’s vigilance; on account of which it is said that one existing in mortal sin can avoid individual sins. But nevertheless, because the human mind is occupied in many things, it can neither continually nor for a long time be in such vigilance as is required for sin to be avoided; therefore it is necessary that one so disposed sometimes sins, and does not remain for long without sin. From which it follows that one existing in mortal sin cannot avoid all sins collectively. And from this that reason proceeds.

Thirdly. Many are the impulses of bodily passions, and many are the things desirable according to sense; very many also are the passions and occasions ⁹ of acting badly, by which man (namely in corrupt nature) is easily provoked to sinning. Therefore etc.

From these things it is inferred that the opinion of the Pelagians is foolish, who say that a man existing in sin can avoid sins without grace. The contrary of which is shown in the Psalm, when it is said, When it shall fail, etc.; and when the Lord teaches us to pray, And lead us not, etc.

VI. But because someone could infer from the aforesaid that it is not imputed to a man as a fault if he offers an impediment to grace, St. Thomas, excluding this, denies that that follows. Rather, he says that such a following sin is imputed to him as a fault on account of two things. First, because this defect is left in him from a preceding fault. Hence also a drunkard is not excused from homicide committed through drunkenness on account of his own fault. — Secondly because, since it is in his power now to avoid this or that sin, if he sins, he sins voluntarily.

From this response of St. Thomas the response to the objection of Scotus is clear, when he argues, in II Sent., d. 28 ¹⁰, that if one existing in sin could not avoid all sins, man would be obligated by God to the impossible. For it is clear first that it is not unfitting for a man to be obligated to something that has been made impossible for him from his own fault, as happens in the proposed case; but it would indeed be unfitting for him to be obligated to that which is absolutely impossible. — It is clear secondly that man is not on this account obligated to the impossible. Because he can avoid each single sin, taken according to itself. And therefore, if he commits it, he sins voluntarily.

VII. Because three things are said in this chapter: namely, that in integral nature man can not offer an impediment to grace by sinning; — that in corrupt nature and that deordered through sin, man cannot not offer an impediment to grace by sinning; — and that one existing in sin can avoid individual mortal sins, against each one of these an objection can be urged.

Against the first indeed thus. Man from the faculty of his own nature cannot fulfill the precept of charity. Therefore he cannot avoid the omission of such a precept. Therefore he cannot not sin. Therefore he cannot not offer an impediment to grace.

2. Against the second it is argued first, from the foundation of Durandus, in Capreolus, on II Sent., d. 28 ¹¹: because man without grace is capable of every good work with moral goodness, which is from the object and circumstances. — And also because the privation of grace does not take away more than grace would posit. But it posited only the efficacy of meriting. Therefore the privation of grace takes away only this: and not the potency of avoiding all sins.

Secondly, from the foundation of Scotus ¹²: because the sinner can beware of this mortal sin. And while he bewares of this one, he bewares of all. For there cannot be at the same time in the will several consents: one, namely, by which he wills to avoid one sin, and another by which he wills to commit another. Therefore etc.

3. Against the third it is argued first. It was said above ¹³ that man without grace cannot avoid all mortal sins, from the fact that he does not have the proximate potency for this, although he has the remote potency, namely freedom of choice. But just as he does not have the proximate potency to avoid all, so neither to avoid individual ones: since above freedom of choice there is nothing in him through which he is inclined to avoid this sin. Therefore etc.

Secondly. One existing in sin is obligated to those things that are of supernatural law. And he cannot fulfill those without grace. Therefore etc.

VIII. To the first of these it is said that in the state of integral nature, presupposing that there is no grace in man, just as man cannot love God with the love of charity, which is a supernatural love, so the precept of charity is not given to him, namely that he actually love God for that time out of charity. And therefore, by not loving God out of charity, he does not sin. For if such a precept had been given to a man not having grace, having nevertheless integral nature and an ordered mind, he would have been obligated to the simply impossible: which is unfitting. But to nature so considered there are given only precepts of natural law, and not of supernatural law. But if the precept of loving God above all things with the love of charity were given to him, charity would at the same time also be infused, by which he could issue into act.

2. To Durandus, against the second statement, the answer is made: and it is said first that, although man existing in sin is capable in some way of every morally good work dividedly, he is nevertheless not capable of all conjunctly.

It is said secondly that grace, in a deordered and corrupt nature, not only posited the efficacy of meriting, but also healed nature, and effected adherence to God as to the ultimate end, such that for no good to be obtained or evil to be avoided did one existing in grace will to depart from God. And therefore, with grace removed, there remains the deordering of nature and the aversion from the ultimate end, which, together with adherence to the undue end, takes away the proximate potency to avoid all sins conjunctly.

3. To Scotus, the assumption is denied as to the second part. For someone can, while bewaring of one sin, commit another: just as someone, in committing adultery, wills not to commit incest.

It is said secondly that, although he is able to avoid this sin right now individually, and for that time avoid all other sins, he cannot, however, do this always or for a long time. And thus he cannot avoid every sin collectively.

When, however, the assumption is proved because the will cannot have two consents at the same time: — it is said first, that by a single consent the will can reject one thing and accept another when two things are proposed to it at the same time: just as when a twofold remedy for health is offered to someone, for example, a bitter potion and the amputation of some limb, and he wills to take the bitter potion, but not the amputation of the limb; for then in the acceptance of the one is understood the rejection of the opposite of the other.

It is said thirdly, that even without a consent that is borne toward two things, one can fulfill one precept and omit another.

4. To the first against the third statement, it is answered that a man existing in sin has a remote potency by which he can avoid each sin divisively, namely, the freedom of the will, by which he can strive against each sin. For although the freedom of choice alone does not suffice for avoiding all sins, because by it a man cannot be in continuous or even long-lasting vigilance to resist every sin and occasion of sin collectively; it nevertheless suffices, with the common divine help always understood, for avoiding individual sins: because, given any particular time, it is true to say that at that time he can use sufficient vigilance to avoid this particular sin.

If it be asked why, just as by common divine help a sinner can avoid individual sins, he cannot likewise avoid all sins? — it is answered that the reason for this can be that divine help moves man according to his condition. But the condition of man entails that at some particular time indeed he can be in sufficient vigilance to do or avoid something; but not throughout all time or for a long time, on account of the many things in which the human mind is entangled.

To the second, it is said that St. Thomas understands this concerning sins that are against the precepts of natural law and against the precepts of the Decalogue, but not concerning precepts that belong to supernatural law. For in these it is not true that one existing in sin can avoid individual sins, since they can in no way be avoided without grace, inasmuch as such precepts cannot be observed without grace. This does not apply to the precepts of the Decalogue.

It should be noted, however, that St. Thomas, in II Sent., d. XXVIII ¹⁴, attacks the opinion of those who say that one existing in mortal sin cannot avoid all sins, although he can avoid individual sins. But, as is evident, he retracted that opinion of his: not only in this place, but also in Iª IIae, q. CIX ¹⁵; and De Veritate, q. XXIV ¹⁶. Therefore, in his doctrine, what is said here must be held.