Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Because someone could take an occasion of error from the foregoing, St. Thomas wishes to remove a certain doubt ¹.

Concerning this, moreover, he does two things: first, he removes the doubt itself; second, he explains a certain premise assumed in the response, in the following chapter.

I. The doubt is this. For it could seem to someone, since no one can be directed to the ultimate end except by the help of divine grace, as has been shown, without which also the things necessary for tending toward it cannot be had, that it is not to be imputed to man if he lacks the aforesaid things; because to no one is that imputed which depends on another, and yet man cannot merit the help of grace, nor can he even be converted to God without it. But it is clear that this is completely false. Because it will follow that one lacking faith, hope, and the like is not worthy of punishment: contrary to what is said in John 3, He who is incredulous, etc. It will also follow, since no one arrives at the end of beatitude without the aforesaid, that there are some men who neither attain beatitude nor suffer punishment from God: the contrary of which is shown in Matthew 25. Therefore, etc.

St. Thomas answers, however, that although man through the motion of free choice can neither merit grace nor be converted to God, he can nevertheless impede himself from receiving it, as is shown in Job 21 and 24. Therefore, it is not undeservedly imputed as a fault to him who presents an impediment to the reception of grace. Because God, so far as in him lies, is prepared to give grace to all, as is clear from 1 Timothy 2; but those alone are deprived of grace who present an impediment to grace in themselves. — This is illustrated by the example of one closing his eyes while the sun is illuminating the world.

From this response St. Thomas intends to hold that that proposition, To no one is that imputed which depends on another, is false when it is not on the part of him on whom that thing depends that it is not had, but on the part of the recipient placing an impediment to the voluntary reception of it. Now it happens thus when someone does not receive grace. Therefore, it is not without imputation to him.

II. For the evidence of this, it must be considered that since the help we need for the attainment of beatitude is twofold: namely, habitual grace; and the divine motion, made both intrinsically and extrinsically, by which we are directed to the good and aroused to the preparation for grace: — the first help God does not give to all, speaking absolutely, after they have sinned; but he certainly grants it to all who prepare themselves for it out of the divine motion. The second help, however, he bestows on all, and to no one, as far as this is concerned, is God absent: since there is no one who is not moved by him to the good and to the preparation for grace, according to that text of Revelation 3:20, I stand at the door and knock, etc. But because divine providence governs and moves each thing according to the condition of its nature; and man is of free choice, and can follow and not follow the divine motion: it is from this that some, following this divine motion, prepare themselves for grace; while some, not following it, do not prepare themselves for grace, but rather present an impediment to it by sinning. God is therefore said to be prepared, so far as in him lies, to give habitual grace to all: because he wills to give it to all who prepare themselves for it, and to no one is his help lacking, moving and prompting him at times to this, namely, that he prepare himself for grace. And therefore it is well said here that it is deservedly imputed to man if he does not receive grace and the virtues accompanying it: for that he does not receive something from one who is prepared to give it, and who at times prompts him to receive it, is not without imputation to him. But if that help, without which man cannot do any good, and without which one cannot prepare himself for grace, were not common to all, but were lacking to someone: perhaps it would have some appearance of plausibility if he who lacks the said help does not acquire grace; because it seems that it is to be imputed to no one if he does not have what he cannot acquire without the help of another, if that help is not present to him. But not even this possesses complete truth. Because, if someone falls by his own will into some evil from which he cannot be freed by himself, if he is not freed, it is not without imputation to him. For he ought to have taken care not to fall into that evil from which he knew he could not be freed by his own power: just as it is not without imputation that someone does not come out of a pit, from which he cannot come out unless he is helped by another, when by his own will he threw himself into it. But the man who sins falls by his own will, whereby he is deprived of grace, which he cannot acquire by himself. Therefore, it is deservedly imputed to him if he does not have grace: even if divine help, necessary for the preparation for grace, should be lacking to him.

Hence the assumed proposition possesses truth only when he who is thus deprived was not, on account of any fault of his own, the cause of such deprivation, as is clear in the following chapter. But if he himself by his own fault was the cause of this kind of lack and privation, it is false.