Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Thirdly, St. Thomas shows what is required on man's part, besides grace, for complete liberation from sin¹.

I. And he lays down two conclusions². The first of these is: It is fitting that a man departing from sin be afflicted with some punishments on account of the sin committed.

But before he proves this conclusion, he premises that a man rising from sin must repent of his past sin and resolve to avoid future sins. For he must withdraw from sin by the will, since through the will man is turned away from and directed to the ultimate end. Now man withdraws from sin by the will while he both repents of the past and resolves to avoid the future: otherwise the past sin, and even sin simply, would not be contrary to the will.

This being supposed, he argues first in this way. It is necessary that a man withdraw from sin through things contrary to those by which the will was inclined into sin. Therefore he must withdraw from sin through some penal things, by which he is afflicted on account of the fact that he sinned, so that through the punishments he may be confirmed in abhorrence of sin. — The antecedent is proved. For the movement by which one withdraws from something is contrary to the movement by which one arrives at it, just as whitening is to blackening. — The consequence, however, is proved: because the will was inclined into sin through appetite and delight concerning inferior things.

Secondly. He who rises from sin must not only detest the past sin, but also avoid the future one. Therefore it is fitting that, in order that he may be more confirmed in his resolve to avoid sins, he be afflicted for sin. — The consequence is proved. Because we see that even brute animals are drawn back from the greatest pleasures by the pains of blows.

Note that, since two things are required for a man to withdraw from sin, namely detestation of the past sin and the resolve to avoid future ones; from the first proceeds the first argument, to show that it is fitting that a man be afflicted with some punishment for sin; from the second, however, proceeds the second.

Thirdly. This is most necessary for a man rising from sin: that he diligently preserve the state of grace and the love of God, which he negligently lost through sin. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because the things we acquire with labor and pain we love more, and preserve with diligence, as is evident in money acquired by one's own labor.

Fourthly. The sinner, by sinning, acts against the order divinely instituted. Therefore it is fitting that he compensate for this by punishing in himself what he previously sinned.

The consequence is proved. Both because thus he is entirely placed outside inordination; and because it pertains to the manifestation of divine goodness and to the glory of God that punishment be rendered for sin. Both of which, namely, are decent and fitting.

From this St. Thomas infers that, after a man has obtained the remission of sin and has been restored to the state of grace, he remains obliged by divine justice to some punishment. If he exacts it from himself by his own will, he is said thereby to satisfy God: inasmuch as with labor and punishment he carries out the divinely instituted order³, punishing himself for sin. — But if he does not exact this punishment from himself, it will be inflicted on him by God. Nor will it be called satisfactory, since it is not from the choice of the one undergoing it, but it will be called purgative: because, with another punishing, he is as it were purged through the reduction of the inordination to due order. It is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle, I Cor. xi. II. But concerning the aforesaid a doubt occurs. For, as St. Thomas lays down, especially in Iª IIᵃᵉ, q. lxxxvii⁴, it belongs to the notion of punishment that it be against the will. It does not, therefore, seem true that a man satisfies God from the fact that he voluntarily exacts punishment from himself. It is answered, from his doctrine in the above-cited question, and q. vi⁵, and IV Sent., d. xxi, q. 1, a. 1⁶, that something is said to be against the will in two ways: in one way, because it is against the will absolutely considered; in another way, because it is against the conditional will. For it happens that something is contrary to the will absolutely, and yet, as it is now and in the case, or from some added condition, is voluntary: just as the throwing of goods into the sea is contrary to the will absolutely, yet, with the danger considered, is voluntary. And because each thing is said to be simpliciter according to that which it is in act, but secundum quid according to that which it is in consideration only: therefore what is voluntary as it is now, and according to the occurring circumstances, is said to be simpliciter voluntary; although, as it is considered in the consideration by which it is considered per se, apart from the case and the other occurring circumstances, it is involuntary. Punishment, therefore, considered in itself, is against the absolute will; it can, however, be voluntary ex suppositione, inasmuch as a man who offends God by sinning wills to recompense this offense through some punishment. For in such a case the punishment is simpliciter voluntary, but secundum quid against the will. Hence, when it is said that it belongs to the notion of punishment that it be against the will, this is understood of the absolute will, not of the conditional will. In this way, however, it is not excluded that through voluntarily assumed punishment a man satisfies God. 2. Note, however, from the above-cited place⁷, that not only the punishment which one spontaneously exacts from oneself is satisfactory, but also the punishment inflicted by God which one patiently bears. Hence what is said here, that the punishment which is inflicted on a sinner by God is not satisfactory, is to be understood of that which one does not patiently bear: because that is in no way from the choice of the one undergoing it; but that which is patiently borne is satisfactory, inasmuch as one chooses to bear it patiently for the purgation of sins. Note also that satisfactory punishment diminishes something of the notion of punishment. For it belongs to the notion of punishment, insofar as it is punishment, that it be contrary to the will; but it belongs to the notion of satisfactory punishment that it be voluntarily assumed, not indeed absolutely and in itself, but with the offense of God considered, which must be compensated through punishment. Hence such punishment, insofar as it is in some way involuntary, has something of the notion of punishment; insofar, however, as it is voluntary, it has the notion of satisfactory punishment. For this reason, embracing both — that, I say, the satisfactory punishment is voluntary, and is in some way a punishment — St. Thomas says that a man, by voluntarily exacting punishment from himself, satisfies God, inasmuch as with labor and punishment he carries out the divinely instituted order⁸, punishing himself for sin, namely voluntarily. 3. But because someone could suppose from the aforesaid that a man, after the remission of sin, would be so obliged to satisfactory or purgative punishment that in no way could both guilt and punishment be removed together; St. Thomas, wishing to exclude this, says that in the aversion of the mind from sin the displeasure at sin and the adhesion of the mind to God can be so vehement that no obligation to punishment remains. For love of God suffices to fix man's mind in good, especially if it has been vehement; but displeasure at past guilt, when it has been intense, brings great sorrow; on account of which two things punishment was held to be necessary. And therefore through the vehemence of the love of God and of the hatred of past sin, the necessity of satisfactory and purgative punishment is excluded. But if the vehemence is not so great that it wholly excludes punishment, still, the more vehement it has been, the less punishment will suffice. III. For the evidence of what is here said about the obligation to punishment after the remission of sin, it must be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in IV Sent., d. xiv, q. II, a. 1⁹, that he who offends someone by taking away his thing acts both against the equality of friendship and against the equality of justice. And therefore in reconciliation a recompense of both must be made. But just as sometimes these two are divided in the offense, as when someone violates friendship but not justice, because he takes away from his friend nothing beyond the due affection; while sometimes they are joined, as when, violating friendship, he also takes away something from his friend: so in the recompense these are sometimes divided, as when someone placates the offended one with words, the taken thing not yet being restored — for in this the equality of friendship is restored, but not the equality of justice; while sometimes they are joined, as when someone both reconciles the friend and at the same time restores the taken thing. Since, therefore, the sinner through the affection of sin violated the friendship of God, on account of which he loses grace and incurs the offense of God; and through disobedience to the divine law took away from God the honor due to him, from which he merits punishment, which merit of punishment is called the reatus: therefore, in the aversion of a man from sin, sometimes a recompense of the equality of friendship alone is made, inasmuch as the offense is forgiven him by God and grace is restored, but the reatus is not remitted, because the punishment is not yet paid; while sometimes a recompense of the equality of both justice and friendship is made at the same time, inasmuch as grace is restored and the offense is forgiven, and the punishment is paid through the vehemence of contrition. Wishing, therefore, to show both of these, St. Thomas said first that after the remission of sin and the attainment of grace, man remains obliged to punishment by divine justice. And the meaning is that from the remission of sin alone as to the offense, and from the restoration of grace, the obligation to pay the punishment is not understood to be removed, but sometimes one is without the other. — He said, however, secondly, that sometimes no obligation to any punishment remains: because, namely, with the reception of grace, through the vehemence of contrition the payment of the whole debt of punishment is made at the same time. 2. Note, secondly, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the Fourth, d. xvii, q. ii, a. 5¹⁰, that the intensity of contrition can be considered both on the part of charity, which causes the displeasure at sin, and on the part of sensible sorrow, which the will stirs up in contrition. As to the first, charity in act can be intensified to such a degree that the contrition following from it merits the removal of guilt and absolution from all punishment. As to the second also, that sorrow can be intensified to such a degree that, since it is a certain punishment, it suffices for the deletion of guilt and punishment. Both of these ways St. Thomas gives to be understood when he says that through the vehemence of the love of God and of the hatred of sin the necessity of satisfactory or purgative punishment is excluded. IV. The second conclusion is¹¹: One man can satisfy for another, provided both are in charity. It is proved. What we do through friends we seem to do through ourselves: since friendship makes one out of two through affection, especially the love of charity. Therefore, just as through himself, so also through another can someone satisfy God, especially when there is need. It is confirmed, first. Because punishment is not lacking to the sinner even thus: since he suffers together with the friend suffering on his account. It is confirmed, secondly. Because such satisfaction for another is more acceptable to God than if one suffered for oneself: for the latter is of ready charity, the former of necessity. It is confirmed, thirdly, by the authority of the Apostle, ad Galat. vi. Note that, when St. Thomas says that one man can satisfy for another, adding, especially if there is need, he does not say this as if satisfaction were of no avail unless the one for whom satisfaction is made is incapable of satisfying, and so there is need — because, as is said in IV Sent., d. xx¹², even if someone were capable, he himself would be immune from the debt, another satisfying for him — but because satisfaction is more satisfactory when need exists. And also because, since satisfactory punishment is also for the remedy of future sin, and as to this the satisfaction of one does not profit another: it is not to be permitted, as is said in the above-cited place, that someone do penance for another, unless a corporal or spiritual defect appears in the penitent, on account of which he is incompetent to bear it.

Note also that it belongs to the notion of satisfaction properly so called that it be a meritorious work, as is said in the Fourth, d. xvii, q. ii, a. 4¹³. But merit is not without charity, since charity is the principle of meriting. Therefore it was well said that one man can satisfy for another, provided both are in charity.