Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas showed that man needs divine help to attain his ultimate end, he shows that he also needs it to persevere in good¹. Concerning this, moreover, he does two things: first, he shows the proposition; second, he removes a certain doubt².

1. As to the first, he argues first thus. Man is changeable from good to evil, and vice versa. Therefore, in order that he may immovably persevere in good, he needs the help of an unmoved mover.

Secondly. The power of free choice does not extend to perseverance of this kind. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is clear. Because for that which exceeds the powers of free choice, man needs the help of divine grace. — But the antecedent is proved. The power of free choice is with respect to those things that fall under choice. What is chosen is some particular operable thing. This, however, is what is here and now. Therefore, what falls under the power of free choice is something to be done as of now. Perseverance, however, does not signify this, but signifies the continuation of operation through all time. Therefore, etc.

II. Concerning this argument there is a doubt: because St. Thomas seems to mean that perseverance cannot fall under choice, since it is not a particular thing to be done as of now. But he holds the opposite of this in Iª IIªᵉ, q. cix³; and IIª IIªᵉ, q. cxxxvii⁴.

He answers that perseverance, according as it holds itself on the part of the effect, can be taken in two ways: in one way, as it is considered after the manner of a certain one thing, inasmuch as it signifies a certain continuation; in another way, after the manner of many things, inasmuch as it includes many continued goods. In the first way, it can have the character of something eligible: because it is considered as a certain particular operable thing to be done as of now in some way, namely, as to its beginning. And thus it can fall under the faculty of free choice, and under the purpose of the will. — In the second way, it cannot fall under one purpose. Because the continued works themselves, as they are many, cannot be simultaneously presented to the will, nor do they have the character of one eligible thing and one particular operable thing. And it is according to this sense that this argument proceeds.

Secondly, it can be said that the faculty of free choice is twofold: one for choosing; the other for executing; the first of which is sometimes found without the second, because, as is said in IIª IIªᵉ, in the place cited above, choice is often in our power, but not execution. Since, therefore, the discussion here is about the first faculty, it is necessary to refer the assumed propositions to this sense. Hence that proposition, What is chosen is some particular operable thing as of now, is understood of that which is chosen as possible to be put into execution through free choice. And according to this sense, it is true that persevering does not fall under choice. — With this, nevertheless, it stands that it can fall under choice simpliciter, namely as workable by divine help. For sometimes we choose what we cannot execute from ourselves alone, but with the help of friends⁵.

III. Thirdly. Man by willing cannot cause the will to relate immovably to that which it wills. Therefore perseverance is not in the faculty of free choice. Therefore, etc. — The antecedent is proved. Because man through free choice, although he is master of his act, is nevertheless not master of his natural potencies. — But the first consequence is proved. Because for perseverance it is required that man remain immovably in the good.

Fourthly. In one who perseveres in good there are many movements of free choice into the good succeeding one another up to the end of the continuation. Of these, none of them can be the cause: because none of them lasts always. Nor all of them together: because they are not together. Therefore that continuation is caused by something higher. Therefore, etc. This reason is clear from Aristotle's procedure in Physics VIII, by which he proves that the continuation of generation in animals is caused by something higher.

Fifthly. In him who perseveres in good, there are many movements and many actions reaching to one end. Therefore it is necessary that their whole order be caused by the first directing to the end. Therefore through the help of divine grace there is perseverance in good. — The first consequence is proved. Because if there are many things ordered to one end, their whole order, until they reach the end, is from the first directing to the end. — But the second is shown: because through the help of divine grace good works are directed to the ultimate end.

It is confirmed first, by the authority of the Apostle in Philippians 1; and 1 Peter the last chapter.

It is confirmed secondly, because also in Sacred Scripture many prayers of those asking for perseverance are found, as in the Psalm, Perfect my steps, etc.; and 2 Thessalonians 2. And in the Lord's Prayer it is asked, when it is said, Thy kingdom come, which will not come unless we have been persevering.

By this is excluded the error of the Pelagians, who say that for persevering in good, free choice is sufficient for man.

IV. As to the second⁶, because someone could say that, although free choice is not sufficient per se for persevering in good, nevertheless habitual grace is sufficient: — St. Thomas excludes this by two arguments. The first is, because even he who has grace asks from God that he may persevere in good. The second is, because infused habits, according to the state of the present life, do not take away from free choice mobility to evil entirely: although through them it is in some way established in good. From which St. Thomas infers that the aforesaid help of grace for persevering is not habitual grace superadded to habitual grace previously infused for working well: but is the help of divine providence operating from without, even when all the gratuitous habits are possessed by man.

V. For the evidence of those things that are said in this chapter, it should be noted, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in Iª IIªᵉ, q. cix, a. 10; and IIª IIªᵉ, q. cxxxvii⁷, that perseverance can be taken in three ways: namely, for a habit of the mind by which a man stands firmly lest he be removed from that which is according to virtue on account of incoming sorrows; for a habit according to which a man has the purpose of persevering in good up to the end; and for a certain continuation of good up to the end of life, which namely consists in the actual execution of good works without interruption. In this third way, therefore, perseverance is taken in this place: but not in the first two ways. Because perseverance taken in those ways is infused together with grace, just as the other virtues also are: but not in this third way, because grace is given to many to whom the continuation of good works up to the end of life is not given. And therefore for this a man needs, not indeed an habitual grace other than the first, but divine help, or divine motion, directing him and protecting him against the incursions of temptations.

VI. But a doubt occurs. Because St. Thomas, in the place cited above⁸, at 3, says that now through the grace of Christ many receive both the gift of grace, by which they are able to persevere, and further it is given to them that they do persevere. For from this it is argued thus. Through the gift of habitual grace man is able to persevere. Therefore for persevering he does not need another help besides habitual grace. — The consequence is clear. Because from the opposite of the consequent the opposite of the antecedent is inferred. For it follows: Man needs another help besides grace for persevering. Therefore he cannot persevere through grace.

He answers that it is one thing to have the potency to persevere, another to have the act of persevering, which is the continuation of good works: just as it is one thing to have the potency of understanding, and another to understand in actu. Because sometimes someone has the potency for something, and nevertheless cannot go forth into act unless another moves him to operation. For no matter how much someone has the intellective potency perfected by a habit, in which way he is said to be able to understand, he nevertheless cannot go forth to the act of consideration unless the intention of the will is present. When therefore it is said that man through habitual grace is able to persevere in good, it is understood that through it he has the potency of persevering in good just as it is the principle of every good work: but not that through it, without other help, man can go forth into the act of continuation of good works.

It is clear that this is the mind of St. Thomas from his manner of speaking, in which he says that many receive the gift of grace by which they are able to persevere; and further that it is given to them that they persevere. For the first statement shows that the potency of persevering belongs to man from grace: but the second shows that the execution of the operation belongs to man not only from grace, but also with a certain other help concurring.

From which it is clear that the consequence adduced is false. For the proof of which, the assumption is denied. For it does not follow: Man needs another help besides grace for persevering as to the execution of the work. Therefore he cannot persevere through grace: — that is, through grace he does not have the potency of persevering. On the contrary, these stand together: that man needs extrinsic divine help for the execution of perseverance, or the continuation of good works; and that through grace he has the potency of persevering.