Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas determined concerning the effects of sanctifying grace, he further determines concerning the effects that are called gratuitously given graces, and by enumerating them, gives an account of them ¹.

Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he enumerates them and gives an account of them; second, he shows certain differences among effects of this kind, including also those enumerated above ².

I. As to the first, it must be considered, from the teaching of St. Thomas in Ia IIae, q. cxi, a. 1, and De Veritate, q. xxvii, a. 5, that grace, according as it names some gift that is granted freely to man by God above the condition of nature and above merit, is divided: for there is a certain grace through which the man having it is joined to God and is pleasing to Him, and this is called sanctifying grace; while there is another through which one man cooperates with another to the end that he may be brought back to God, but through it he is not made pleasing, namely, for attaining beatitude; and this retains for itself the common name, and is called gratuitously given grace. — The first grace is not multiplied in one person, but is only one ³. The second, however, is multiplied: and therefore many gifts of it are posited. And it is determined concerning these in the present chapter.

II. The first gratuitously given grace, therefore, is wisdom, which is the knowledge of divine things. To which St. Thomas says belongs the revelation of the invisible things of God: that is, of those things to which the human mind cannot attain through the natural light of the intellect. Mention is made of this in Wisdom 7 and Ecclesiasticus 15.

Moreover, he manifests the necessity of this grace by noting five things. The first is that those things which we hold about God through faith must come into us from God. Because those things which a man does not see through himself, of which sort are the things that we hold through faith, he cannot know unless he receives them from one who sees. But this is God, who comprehends Himself and naturally sees His own essence. — The second is that, since those things which are from God are done in a certain order, in the manifestation of those things that pertain to faith, a certain order had to be observed: namely, that certain ones should receive immediately from God, but others from them, and thus in order all the way to the last. — The third is that in whatever things there is some order, by how much anything is closer to the first principle, by so much is it found to be more powerful. For that reason, in the order of divine manifestation, the invisible things concerning which faith is are first revealed by God to the blessed angels through open vision. Then, through the intervening office of the angels, they are manifested to certain men, not through open vision, but through a certain certitude arising from divine revelation, by a certain interior and intelligible light elevating the mind: just as through the natural light of the intellect one is rendered certain concerning the things he knows by that light. — The fourth is that this certitude is necessary in order that those things which are perceived by divine revelation may be proposed to others. Otherwise, they would not be proposed with security. — The fifth is that, along with the aforesaid light, there are sometimes present in divine revelation certain exterior or interior aids of cognition, that is, things either heard or seen, formed by divine power, which are perceived by exterior sense or imagination. These aids indeed do not suffice without the interior light for the knowledge of divine things; but the interior light suffices without them.

2. Concerning this fifth statement it must be noted, as is clear from what was said above ⁴, that since two things concur for human cognition, namely, the representation of things and the judgment concerning the things represented, the representation comes about through the reception of species, but the judgment through the intelligible light. And because judgment is the completive element of cognition, therefore the principal thing in cognition is the intellectual light, without which judgment cannot be made. For this reason it is well said that the aforesaid aids do not suffice without the interior light for the knowledge of divine things, but the interior light well suffices without them. For Pharaoh, through the things seen in dreams, did not understand what was represented, because he lacked the supernatural light; but Joseph, illuminated by the supernatural light, knew what such dreams presignified, to whom nevertheless such dreams had not been sent ⁵.

3. It must be noted further that from this discourse St. Thomas wishes to have both the necessity of this gift and its mode. The necessity indeed: because, since gratuitously given grace is ordered to this, that a man cooperate with another toward salvation by teaching or persuading exteriorly, the man must have certitude through divine revelation concerning the divine things that he wishes to hand on to another; which belongs to him through the gift of wisdom. The mode, however: because it descends in an orderly way from God into men through revelation.

III. The second is knowledge, to which seems to belong the divine revelation concerning created things: of which mention is made in Wisdom 7 and 2 Paralipomenon 1. St. Thomas shows the necessity of this, because the invisible things of God are clearly seen through the things that have been made.

The third is the gift of tongues, of which mention is made in Isaiah 50 and Luke 21. The necessity of this is shown, because the things that a man knows he cannot suitably bring forth into the notice of another except through speech. Hence, when it was necessary that the truth of faith be preached among diverse nations by a few, some were divinely instructed so as to speak in various tongues: as is clear in Acts 2.

The fourth is the grace of miracles, of which mention is made in Matthew 10 and the end of Mark. The necessity of this is shown, because proposed speech, unless it is manifest per se, needs confirmation. But the things that pertain to faith are unmanifest to human reason. Hence, since they could not be manifested through the principles of demonstration, it was necessary that the aforesaid speech be confirmed by certain indications, namely by working those things which no one else could do except God, and that it be shown that it proceeded from God.

IV. The fifth ⁶ is the grace of prophecy ⁷. The twofold necessity of which he posits ⁸.

As to the first necessity, he says first that in order that preachers speaking true things concerning the things of faith might be believed, the gift of prophecy was necessary, through which, by God revealing, they could know future things and things that are commonly hidden from men, and indicate them to others: because, while they were found to speak true things concerning hidden things that can afterwards be manifested, they would be believed when speaking true things concerning things that men cannot experience. To which pertains what is said in 1 Cor. 14: If all prophesy, etc.

Secondly, he says that through the gift of prophecy a sufficient testimony of faith is not provided unless it were concerning those things which can be known by God alone: which are the secrets of hearts ⁹, among inferior things, and future contingents.

2. But because someone could say that prophetic denunciation concerning future things is not a sufficient argument of faith, because men also naturally foreknow some things concerning the future: — St. Thomas adds that there is a difference between the foreknowledge of future things had naturally by men, and that which is according to prophetic grace. For some future things indeed can be known by men, even contingent ones, insofar as they pre-exist in their causes; and when these are known either according to themselves or through manifest effects, which are called signs, a foreknowledge can be had by man concerning some future effects, just as a physician foreknows future death or health; but nonetheless a foreknowledge of such future things is had infallibly certain only concerning effects that follow of necessity from pre-existing causes, but not concerning effects that happen from their causes not of necessity, but for the most part.

Every knowledge, however, concerning future things that is had from divine revelation according to prophetic grace is entirely certain: just as is also the divine foreknowledge, by which God infallibly knows future things according as they are in themselves. — Nor is that certitude repugnant to the contingency of future things: just as neither is the certitude of divine science. — Nor does it also take it away that prophets sometimes foretell things that do not happen: just as Isaiah prophesied concerning the death of Hezekiah, and Jonah concerning the overthrow of Nineveh, which nevertheless did not happen. Because sometimes some future effects are revealed to the prophets not according as they are in themselves, but according as they are in their causes. And then nothing prevents, if the causes are impeded from reaching their effects, the prophetic foretelling also from being changed. And so it was in the foretelling of the death of Hezekiah and the overthrow of Nineveh: one of which was according to the disposition of inferior causes; the other, however, according to the requirement of merits. — Moreover, St. Thomas adds that, although it sometimes so happens, nevertheless at the same time or afterwards a revelation is made to the prophet concerning the outcome of the future effect as to how it is to be changed: just as was done to Isaiah and Jonah.

3. Someone could also argue that prophetic denunciation is not a sufficient argument of faith, because demons foretell some true things. — But St. Thomas answers, and says first, that evil spirits, just as they abuse the working of miracles to weaken the arguments of faith, not by truly working miracles, but the things that appear miraculous to men; so also they abuse prophetic foretelling, not indeed by truly prophesying, but by foretelling some things according to the order of causes hidden from man, insofar as by the subtlety of their intellect they can know these more than men, because they know when and how the effects of natural causes can be impeded; and insofar as they know the powers of celestial bodies, which are more remote from our knowledge among natural causes, according to which inferior bodies are disposed. On account of which they can, more than any astrologer, foretell winds and other things of this sort, which occur around the mutations of inferior bodies from the motion of superior bodies. And they can also predict many true things concerning the acts of men, insofar as very many follow the impulses of passions and bodily inclinations, upon which it is manifest that celestial bodies have efficacy: although sometimes they fail in foretelling, on account of the freedom of human choice.

He says secondly that the things which they foreknow, they foretell, not by illuminating the mind, as in divine revelation: but sometimes according to an immutation of the imagination, as in sleeping persons, in possessed persons, and in frenetics; sometimes, however, through some exterior indications, as through the motions and chatterings of birds, and through the things that appear in the entrails of animals, and in the drawing of certain points; sometimes, however, by appearing visibly, and by sensible speech foretelling future things.

He says thirdly that, although this last visibly happens through evil spirits, namely when they arrive having been invoked, nevertheless some try to reduce the other things to celestial bodies, saying that motions which are outside of deliberation, like those mentioned before, follow the impression of a celestial body, and therefore can be signs of future effects that are caused by celestial motion: because from the impression of the same body certain signs of the future effect appear in some things. But St. Thomas says that, because this has little reason, it is rather to be thought that these have their origin from some intellectual substance, by whose power non-deliberate motions are disposed according as is suitable for the observation of future things. And although sometimes these are disposed, by divine will, through the ministry of good spirits, nevertheless they mostly happen from the operation of evil spirits: as both the holy Doctors say; and the pagans, as Valerius Maximus reports, judged. And therefore all these things were prohibited together with idolatry in Deut. 18.

4. The second necessity of prophecy ¹⁰ is because, since some things to be held by faith are preached that are done in time, such as the Nativity of Christ, and things of this kind; lest they be believed to have been fabricated by the preachers, or to have happened by chance, they are shown to have been foretold long before through the prophets; as the Apostle does, in Rom. 1.

V. Concerning that which St. Thomas says regarding the secrets of hearts, or concerning thoughts, that God alone can know them ¹¹, it must be noted, as is said in the Prima Pars, q. lvii, a. 4; De Veritate, q. viii, a. 13; and De Malo, q. xvi ¹², that this is to be understood of the knowledge of the thoughts of the intellect and the affections of the will in themselves, so that, namely, the thought is in the intellect, and the affection in the will, for God alone sees the actual being of such things which they have in the powers themselves: but not of the knowledge of them in their effect. For St. Thomas admits that through some bodily transmutation arising from thought, the thought can be known, not only by angels, but also by men: just as when, from the fact that someone thinks of dangers threatening him, the passion of fear is aroused, and from that a sudden pallor appears in the face, and from this sudden pallor of the face it can be known that he is thinking fearful things. Moreover, St. Thomas assigns the reason why they are known in themselves by God alone, among knowers extrinsic to the thinker: because, namely, that someone actually thinks depends on the will alone, for each one uses the habits and species existing in himself according to his own choice; but those things which depend on the will alone, or are in the will alone, are known to God alone, since the will is subject to God alone, and He alone can work in it, by the fact that He is its principal object as ultimate end.

VI. But concerning this reason, in order that it may be well understood, — for by Durandus, who attacks it in Book II of the Sentences ¹³, it is poorly understood — it must be noted that its foundation is this, as St. Thomas explains in De Veritate, in the cited place. For the species of the angelic intellect, and much more of the human intellect, have, speaking of those things that pertain to an angel, to represent only things existing in nature, that is, created natures, and those things that have dependence on or connection with them. But those things are said to have dependence and connection with a created nature to which some created nature has a determination. Therefore, those things which are outside this order, because namely they are numbered neither among created natures nor among those things to which a created nature has a determination, do not have to be represented through angelic species, and consequently cannot naturally be known by an angel: since the natural cognition of an angel does not extend beyond the representation of its species. Whence also in II Sent., d. iii, q. iii, a. 3, ad 4, St. Thomas says that angels, through species indwelt in them from creation, know causes having an order in nature, and everything that is determined in those causes, either simply or for the most part. Since therefore those things which proceed from the will alone, of which sort are thoughts, are neither in themselves subsisting natures and quiddities; nor have a dependence on any nature as on a cause determined to them, otherwise they would not depend on the will alone, which is a free cause related to opposites: it follows that things of this kind do not fall under the natural cognition of an angel.

2. St. Thomas's reason, therefore, is to be explained thus. Those things which proceed from the will alone — that is, those things which come from a freely operating will, and have dependence on no other cause that is determined to them — are known to God alone: that is, are known by no other distinct from the one willing, except by God. But actual thought depends on the will alone: because, although thought comes from the intellect, the intellect is nevertheless not determined of itself to the thought itself, but is determined to it from the command of the will alone. Therefore also the thought of the intellect is known to God alone.

The consequence, along with the minor, is evident: from the fact that it is clear to each one that he uses the species and habits existing in himself when he wills.

The major indeed, which has two exponents: — namely this one, Those things which depend on the will of the operator alone, are known to God; and this one, Such things are known to no other — is proved through another exclusive proposition.

As to the affirmative of that exclusive proposition indeed, it is proved thus. Whatever things are caused by Him are known to God. But the movement of the will is caused by God both effectively and finally. Effectively indeed, because the will is subject to God as to causality; but that which is the effective cause of the will is also the cause of its operation; just as that which is the cause of nature is also the cause of its natural operation. Finally indeed, because God is the principal object of the will, as being the ultimate end; but the will is to be moved by the object after the manner of an end. Therefore, etc.

As to the negative indeed, it is proved through the negative of that exclusive proposition thus. An angel naturally knows only those effects of created causes that have a connection and dependence with some natural cause, that is, a cause determined to them. But the movement of the will has a connection to no natural cause: neither, I say, as to an efficient cause; nor as to a final cause. Therefore, etc. — The minor is proved. As to the efficient cause indeed, because the will is produced by no natural cause: indeed by no created cause. But by whatever extrinsic agent the movement of the will is produced, by the same is the will also produced: since the movement which is from an intrinsic principle, and the intrinsic principle itself, are referred to the same cause, according to those things which are said in Ia IIae, q. ix, a. 6. — As to the final cause indeed, it is proved because that moves the will naturally after the manner of an end, to which the will is determined. But to no created good is the will determined, but only to the good in common: and consequently to that in which the universal notion of good is found, such as is God, if it is known that the notion of beatitude is found in Him. Because the good in common alone is the first and per se object of the will. But a power has determination and inclination to the first and per se object alone. Therefore, etc.

VII. According to this interpretation of this reason, therefore, it is clear that the objections of Durandus ¹⁴ are empty. For when he says that it would follow that all things immediately created by God are known by God alone, if the act of the will is known by God alone because the will is subject to God alone as to causality: — it is clear that he does not argue to the intent of the reason. For St. Thomas does not wish to assume this universal proposition, Everything that is produced by God alone, is known to God alone: but this one, Every operation, and every effect of a creature, that proceeds from no naturally acting cause, but only from a free will and from God, is known to God alone (supply: and to the one willing, and to him to whom the one willing wishes to manifest it).

When he also says that then the motion of the heaven, because it proceeds from the will of an angel alone, would be known to God alone, if those things which depend on the will alone are known to God alone: it is clear that he assumes what is false. For the motion of the heaven does not depend on the will of an angel alone, but also on the nature of the heaven, which is naturally inclined to receiving this motion.

If however it be urged that at least it will follow that the upward motion of a stone, caused by an angel alone, will be known to God alone: for that is produced from the will of an angel alone, since the stone does not have an inclination to it, but is rather inclined to the opposite motion: — it is answered that, although the violent motion of a stone is not according to the stone's nature, nevertheless upward motion, which is violent to a stone, is natural to another body, namely fire. But in order that something not pertaining to an angel be naturally known by an angel, it is not necessary that that thing be natural to that in which it is known to exist, otherwise the angel would know no accidental predicate concerning a thing: but it suffices that it have a connection to some nature that is determined to it. For through the species of that nature it is first known by the angel as such a nature is determined to it; but through the species of that to which it belongs per accidens, it is known as inhering in it per accidens. For the angelic species represents the singular with all conditions existing in it: provided that they are of those things that have an order to some natural cause.

Similarly, when Durandus infers that then extrinsic works produced through the command of our will would be known by God alone: — it is answered in the same way. For it is said that those do not proceed from the will alone: but come from the will by means of some natural and determined cause.

VIII. Concerning the conclusion itself, however, it must be noted that the thoughts of the heart can be understood in two ways to be unknown to an angel and hidden in themselves¹⁵. First, that they are in no way known to him as to whether they are, or as to their actual being. For example, if I think about a stone, that he does not know that I am thinking about a stone. — Second, that although he knows what I am thinking as to that which is primarily represented through the species, he nevertheless does not know determinately and in particular which condition of it I am considering. For example, that he indeed knows that I am considering a stone, but he does not know whether I am considering its form, or its hardness, and so on concerning other conditions of the stone.

Some Thomists understand the conclusion in the first sense. Both because in De Veritate, in the place previously cited¹⁶, it is said absolutely that the movement of another's will cannot be known to an angel. — And because in De Malo it is said, in the place cited above¹⁷, that although one angel knows the intelligible species that are in the intellect of another angel, he cannot nevertheless know the use of the species. — And because in the First Part, in the cited place¹⁸, it is said that angels do not know thoughts, because it depends on the will alone that someone actually considers something.

Others, however, like Hervaeus in II Sent., interpret the conclusion in the second sense. And this position can have a foundation in the words of St. Thomas in De Veritate. For there, in the replies to the arguments¹⁹, he seems to mean, not that the thoughts of the heart are in no way known by an angel, but that they are not known determinately. And he assigns the reason: because from one species the intellect issues into diverse thoughts; and from one habitual knowledge many actual considerations proceed. For from these things he seems to mean that, although an angel can see that I am using this intellectual species, for example the species of a lion, he cannot nevertheless determinately know what I am thinking about the lion: since through the species of a lion I can have many thoughts about it.

2. But, although the conclusion can in some way be defended according to this second sense; and I, on account of the words of St. Thomas cited in De Veritate, once held it: nevertheless, considering more diligently the words and mind of St. Thomas, it seems to me that the first sense is to be followed in his doctrine. For it is manifest that it depends just as much on the will alone that I think about a man, as that I consider this in particular about him. And therefore, if my thought is hidden because of the fact that I think this in particular about a man from the will alone; by the same reason, the thought also by which I think about a man absolutely will be hidden.

Nor is it an obstacle that the intellect, informed by the intelligible species of man, seems to be determined to knowing the nature of man. — For it is said that, although through such a species the intellect is determined to habitual knowledge of man, it is not nevertheless determined to actual knowledge: but it is completely indifferent to it, and it depends on the will alone that it goes out into actual consideration through such a species.

3. On account of the words brought forward from De Veritate, however, it must be considered what is meant by this qualification, in themselves, and, as thoughts are in the intellect and affections in the will: when St. Thomas says that they are not known in themselves, or as thoughts are in the intellect, and affections in the will²⁰. For to know a certain consideration in itself and as it is in the intellect is to see the being that it has in the intellect. But to see the being that a certain particular consideration has in the intellect is not to see only its relation to its principal object represented through the species; rather, it is to see its relation to all the things that the intellect actually considers through it; otherwise it would not be seen in itself according as it is. Therefore it is repugnant that I consider a man as to his image and figure, and that an angel sees that consideration in itself and according as it is in the intellect, and yet knows only that I am considering a man, but not the figure of the man. For the particular being that it has in the intellect is not determined only by man, but also by the figure of the man: and through this it is distinguished from every other consideration. Likewise, if I consider the quiddity of a man through abstraction from all individuating conditions, such a thought is not seen in itself and according as it is in the intellect, unless it is seen that I am thinking about the quiddity of a man and with such abstraction. St. Thomas therefore means that, because one intellectual species can be elicitive of several thoughts concerning the principal represented object, from the fact that an angel sees a species in the intellect of another, it does not follow that he sees a certain thought actually existing in the intellect according as it is in the intellect: because, as such, every thought is determinate; but through that which according to itself is indeterminate to many things, one of them cannot be known in itself. An angel can indeed know in general what a thought about a man is; and likewise in general he can know certain extrinsic signs that a man is considering such a thing: but an actual consideration, according as it is in the intellect, or in itself, he cannot see, as we have explained, because it is entirely voluntary.

IX. Concerning prophecy²¹, it must be considered first, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in IIª IIae, q. 171, a. 6, that, since the knowledge of a learner is a likeness of the knowledge of a teacher, the truth of knowledge is the same in the disciple and in the teacher. Whence, since prophecy is a kind of knowledge coming from divine revelation into the intellect of the prophet after the manner of teaching, it is necessary that the truth of divine knowledge and of prophetic knowledge be the same. On account of this it was well said above²² that prophetic knowledge of future things is entirely certain, just as divine foreknowledge is.

It must be considered secondly that, although divine knowledge regards future things both according as they are in themselves, by intuiting them presently; and according as they are in their causes, by knowing the order of the causes to the effects; and this twofold knowledge is always conjoined to the divine intellect: it is nevertheless not always conjoined in divine revelation, but sometimes prophetic revelation is an impressed likeness of divine foreknowledge as it regards future things in themselves, and then things turn out just as they are prophesied; but sometimes it is a likeness of divine foreknowledge according as it knows the order of causes to effects, and then it sometimes turns out otherwise than is prophesied, because a contingent cause is sometimes impeded from producing the effect to the production of which it was disposed. And then the sense of the prophecy is not that it will entirely turn out so: but that the disposition of lower causes is toward its turning out so. Which since it is true, nothing of the certainty of the prophecy is lost, even if the effect does not follow. For this reason it was well said that, when future effects are sometimes revealed to the prophets according as they are in their causes, nothing prevents the foretelling of the prophecy from being changed.

It must be considered thirdly, that St. Thomas says that evil spirits do not truly prophesy the prediction of future things²³ for this reason, because, as is said in IIª IIae, q. 174²⁴; and De Veritate, q. 12²⁵, to prophecy properly belongs certain foretelling concerning those things that can be known by God alone, as was said above²⁶, of which kind are the secrets of hearts and future contingents, which according to themselves are far from human knowledge, since they do not have determinate truth. For they do not foretell concerning these things according as they are in themselves, as if presently known by them: but only according to the order of causes to effects, in which way, as was shown above²⁷, future contingents do not have certainty. And therefore, although in the foretelling of these things they appear more wonderful and more truthful than men however knowledgeable, as is said here, because by subtlety of intellect they know both causes and the things that can impede them more perspicaciously: nevertheless neither their knowledge, nor their foretelling contains infallible truth.

2. Concerning that which is said, that evil spirits, in foretelling what they know, do not illuminate the human mind²⁸: it must be noted that this is not said as though by their natural power they cannot illuminate the mind: — for, as is said in De Malo, q. 16, a. 12, since the natural light of the human intellect is naturally below the angelic light, the light of the human intellect can be strengthened by the angelic light itself to judge more perfectly, just as in corporeal things a superior power assists and strengthens an inferior one — but because, since demons abuse their natural power on account of the malice of their will, they do not intend, as is also said here, to help man to the knowledge of the truth, but rather to lead him away from it. And therefore they do not foretell by illuminating: because then, the mind having been strengthened by such illumination, would be more perspicacious in knowing the truth.

3. It must be noted lastly, that St. Thomas does not bring forward an argument against the opinion of those who say that movements that occur outside of deliberation are signs of future events on this account²⁹, that they follow the motion of celestial bodies and their impression, because this was disproved in the preceding parts³⁰, where it was shown to what things the power of a celestial body can extend: but he says only that this has a slight, that is, weak and worthless reason³¹; and he shows that it is false by the authority of the Saints and of the gentiles; and from the fact that in Sacred Scripture all these things are reproved together with idolatry; which would not be the case if they could be signs of future events from the impression of celestial bodies.

X. The sixth³² is the interpretation of speeches: of which mention is made in Gen. 40. Now the necessity of this is shown because, since men receive revelation from God not only for the present time, but also for the instruction of future men, it was necessary that the things revealed be not only narrated in speech to those present, but also written for the instruction of future men. And therefore, just as the revelation itself was made through the grace of God, so also it was fitting that through divine grace it be given to some to interpret writings of this kind.

2. But a doubt arises: when St. Thomas says, after the degree of those who receive revelation immediately from God, there must be another degree of grace. For he seems to mean that the revelation of prophecy, of which he made mention immediately above, is received immediately from God. The opposite of this, however, seems to have been said in the beginning of this chapter, where it was shown that divine revelation reaches men through the intervening ministry of angels.

It is answered that St. Thomas does not intend in this place that divine revelation is not made to men through the ministry of angels: but that some men receive revelation of this kind from God not through the mediation of other men. In addition to which degree there must be others, who do not receive illumination of this kind immediately from God or from angels, but through the mediation of other men, whose revelations, committed to writing, they can interpret through divine grace.

XI. The seventh is the grace of faith. The necessity of which in the manifestation of divine things is shown, because there must be some who faithfully believe the things that are revealed to others, and interpreted through others. Which indeed was shown above³³ to be a gift of God.

2. But concerning this gift a twofold doubt arises. The first is, because here only the gifts of grace freely given are enumerated: above, however³⁴, it was shown that faith is an effect of sanctifying grace.

The second is, because the gift of wisdom is also concerning those things that belong to faith: since it is concerning divine things that transcend human reason, and consequently are held by faith alone.

3. To the first of these it is said, according to the mind of St. Thomas in the place cited before in Iª IIae³⁵, that faith is taken in two ways. In one way, according as it is a virtue justifying man in himself. And thus it belongs to sanctifying grace. — In another way, as it implies a certain supereminent certainty of faith, from which a man becomes suited to instruct others concerning the things that belong to faith. And thus it is counted among the gifts of grace freely given, which are ordered to the utility of others.

It can also be said, as is said in IIª IIae, q. 4, a. 5, ad 4, that faith which is a grace freely given implies a certain excellence of faith, like constancy of faith, etc.

4. To the second it is said that we can speak in two ways of the things belonging to faith. In one way, such that all things that exceed human knowledge are said to belong to faith. And thus there is no difference between the gift of wisdom and faith, except perhaps as an inferior differs from its superior: since both kinds of knowledge are concerning divine things that exceed human reason. Whence St. Thomas, in the beginning of the chapter, wishing to determine concerning the gifts by which divine things are known through revelation, calls the knowledge of divine things the knowledge of faith. — In another way, such that those things are said to belong to faith that are only believed, and are as principles in Catholic doctrine. And thus faith is posited as a gift distinct from the gift of wisdom: because wisdom is concerned not with the principles themselves (in a scientific manner, namely), but with the conclusions that are deduced from those principles.

It can also be said that to the gift of wisdom belongs the knowledge of divine things that occurs through divine revelation by the ministry of angels only: which can also be called the knowledge of faith, insofar as it is above the capacity of our intellect. But to the gift of faith belongs also the knowledge of divine things by which we faithfully believe the things revealed to other men, and interpreted through others.

It must be noted, however, that St. Thomas says that the gift of faith holds the last degree, not because it is the last simply among gifts of this kind: but because it is the last among the gifts belonging to the knowledge of divine things had by prophetic revelation.

XII. The eighth is the discerning of spirits. The necessity of this is shown because, since through evil spirits certain things are done similar to those by which the faith is confirmed; lest men, deceived through things of this kind, believe a lie, it is necessary that they be instructed through divine grace concerning the discerning of spirits of this kind, according to the admonition of 1 John 4.

The number of these gifts is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 12.

It must be noted that the Apostle distinguishes the grace of healings from the working of miracles, — of which the one belongs to the health of bodies; the other, however, to the manifestation of divine power alone, such as that the sun stands still or becomes dark — because it has a special reason for inducing to faith. For to this one is rendered more prompt while he sees that he obtains the benefit of health from faith. — St. Thomas, however, posited both graces together above ³⁶, when he said that it was necessary to confirm the preaching of the preachers by healing the sick and working other miracles: because both belong to the grace of miracles, by which one works by divine power things that God alone can do. Therefore here only eight graces freely given are posited: in the Prima Secundae, however, ³⁷ nine are posited, because there the grace of miracles is distinguished from the grace of healings.

It must be noted also that wisdom and knowledge are enumerated among the graces freely given according as they imply a certain abundance of knowledge and wisdom, by which a man can not only in himself be wise concerning divine things, but also instruct others, and refute opponents: but not according as through them the mind is well movable by the Holy Spirit to the things that are of wisdom and knowledge ³⁸, because thus they are gifts of the Holy Spirit.

Excluded, moreover, through this is the error of certain Manichaeans who say that miracles were not worked by God; and that the prophets did not speak by the Spirit of God.

Excluded also is the error of Priscilla and Montanus, who say that the prophets, as if possessed, did not understand the things they spoke. Which is repugnant to divine illumination.

XIII. As to the second ³⁹, St. Thomas, embracing all the effects of grace enumerated above ⁴⁰, posits a twofold difference among them. The first is that, although the name of grace is fitting to all, because they are conferred freely without preceding merit; yet the effect of love alone also on this account deserves the name of grace, that it makes pleasing to God, according to that which is said in Proverbs 8. Whence faith and hope can be even in sinners: love, however, in the just alone, as is had in 1 John 4.

For the evidence of this difference, two things must be considered. One is, that faith and hope, although they accompany sanctifying grace in him who has grace, because they are infused together with grace itself; can nevertheless be found in someone without grace, and then they are called unformed. Charity, however, accompanies grace in such a way that it is not only infused together when grace is infused in someone, but also cannot be without grace. Grace, moreover, makes a man formally pleasing to God, as was shown above ⁴¹. Therefore it is well said that love alone among gratuitous gifts deserves the name of grace also on account of this, that it makes pleasing to God.

The other is, that this is not said of love and charity on this account, as if it were the first thing through which a man is rendered pleasing to God, for it was shown that this belongs to grace, which is in some way the cause of charity ⁴²: but because it secondarily renders a man pleasing and beloved to God, as that which cannot be in the soul without sanctifying grace.

2. The second difference is that, because certain of the said effects are necessary for the whole life of man, as those without which there cannot be salvation, such as to believe, to hope, to love, and to obey the commandments of God; for these it is necessary that certain habitual perfections be in men, according to which they can act when it is time. — For others, however, because they are not necessary throughout the whole life, habitual perfections are not given, but certain impressions from God, which cease when the act ceases, and are repeated when the act is opportune.

How, in truth, the prophetic light is not present to man after the manner of a permanent habit, St. Thomas shows in IIa IIae, q. 171 ⁴³; and De Veritate, q. 12 ⁴⁴. Likewise, how the power of performing miracles is not a permanent form in man, was shown in the preceding parts ⁴⁵; and is shown in IIa IIae, q. 178 ⁴⁶; and De Potentia, q. 6 ⁴⁷. For the power to perform miracles, and the prophetic light, are not present to man except at the presence of God acting, just as light is not in the air except at the presence of the sun: and they are not rooted in man, but are present to him only then when there is need. Whence the prophets do not at will foretell future things by prophetic foretelling; nor do holy men work miracles whenever they want; but only then when it has pleased God to reveal future things through man, and to perform divine works or miracles.